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PREFACE
T h e  id ea  fo r  w rit in g  th is  P hD  w a s fo rm e d  d u rin g  a v is it  to  M a n c h e ste r fo r a stu d y 
a b o u t re g io n a l sh rin k a g e  and  h o u sin g . In th e  b a r o f o u r h o te l Ed w in B u ite la ar, w h ich  
la te r b e c a m e  m y co -su p e rv iso r, c o n v in ce d  m e  to w rite  a PhD  th e s is . He h e lp e d  m e 
w ith  m y  p ro je ct p ro p o sa l and in tro d u ce d  m e to  B arrie  N e e d h a m , w h o  b e c a m e  m y 
p ro m o to r.
I am  v e ry  g ra te fu l fo r  th e ir  su p e rv is io n  o f th is  PhD . Both Ed w in  and B arrie  h a v e  been 
v e ry  critica l in th e ir  o w n g e n tle  and c o n stru c t iv e  w a y. T h e  d isc u ss io n s  h a v e  a lw ays 
b e e n  in te re st in g  and  in sp ir in g  and  to o k  p la ce  in a p le a sa n t and  o p e n  a tm o sp h e re . 
T h e y  a lw a y s  read  m y co n c e p ts  c o n sc ie n tio u s ly  and  g a v e  v e ry  c le a r  and  useful co m ­
m e n ts. N ot o n ly  do I w a n t to  th a n k  th e m  fo r  th e ir  p ro fe ss io n a l s u b sta n tiv e  su p p o rt, 
b u t a lso  fo r  th e ir  m o ral su p p o rt. T h e y  g a v e  m e  th e  r ig h t m o tiv a tio n  and  th e y  slo w ed  
m e  d o w n  w h e n  n e e d e d . T h e  lu n ch e s and  d in n e rs  at b o th  th e ir  h o m e s w e re  d e lic io u s  
and  g re a t fu n . T h a n k s  a lso  to  B a rrie ’s w ife  K iki fo r  h e r kind  h o sp ita lity  and  th e  nice 
c o n v e rsa tio n s.
M y th a n k s  go  to th e  m a n a g e m e n t o f th e  fo rm e r N e th e rla n d s In stitu te  fo r Sp atia l 
R e se a rch  (W im  D e rkse n , D o rien  M a n tin g , R ies van d e r W o u d e n , Ja n  S ch u u r, Han 
L o rz in g ) fo r le tt in g  m e sta rt th is  PhD. T h a n k s  a lso  go  to th e  m a n a g e m e n t o f the 
P B L N e th e rla n d s E n v iro n m e n ta l A s s e s s m e n t A g e n c y  (M a a rte n  H aje r and  R ein ier 
va n  d en B erg ) fo r  g iv in g  m e  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  c o n tin u e  and  fin ish  m y PhD . T h a n k  
yo u , c o lle a g u e s at th e  P B L N e th e rla n d s E n v iro n m e n ta l A s s e s s m e n t A g e n cy , fo r  yo u r 
su p p o rt. F ra n k  va n  Dam , C a ro la  d e G ro o t, N ie ls S ore l and  A n d rie s  d e Jo n g , fo r  yo u r 
c o o p e ra tio n  on re se a rch  p ro je cts  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. Y ou in sp ire d  m e  to 
in v e st ig a te  th e  su b je ct fu rth e r and  h e lp e d  m e to g a in  in s ig h t into  y o u r d isc ip lin e s  
(g e o g ra p h y , e co n o m y , p la n n in g  and  d e m o g ra p h y ). M a rk  te r  V eer, M a rn ix  B reed ijk,
Lia va n  d en B roek, H an s va n  A m ste rd a m , P a u tie  P e e te rs and  A n e t W e te rin g s  fo r yo u r 
a d v ice  a b o u t th e  d ata  to  use and  y o u r help  w ith  f in d in g  and  p re se n tin g  th a t data.
G ijs  B eets (N ID I) fo r  p ro v id in g  th e  in te rn a tio n a l d a ta  th a t w e re  used  in A p p e n d ix  3. 
S jo e rd  van  d e r Leij fo r h e lp in g  m e in th e  n e v e r-e n d in g  se arch  fo r  p la n n in g  d o cu m e n ts  
and  lite ra tu re . A n n e m ie k e  R ig h art, H elen  W e st and  B arrie  N e e d h am  fo r e d it in g  the 
m a n u sc rip t, so m e tim e s  even in y o u r p riv a te  tim e . H eleen  R o n d en  fo r  e d it in g  the 
D u tch su m m a ry. A rn o  S e g e re n , F e m k e  D a a lh u ize n , M a aike  G a lle  and  A n n e m ie k e  de 
W a a rt  th a n k  you fo r  y o u r m o ral su p p o rt and  lis te n in g  e a r d u rin g  th e  g o o d  and the 
bad  m o m e n ts  o f th e  la st years.
1
M a n y  th a n k s  to  all th e  In te rv ie w e e s. I am  v e ry  g ra te fu l fo r th e ir  c o n trib u tio n  to  th is 
re se a rch . S p e cia l th a n k s  to  W im  D erks fo r  all th e  d o c u m e n ts  and  a rtic le s  h e  p ro v id e d  
m e  w ith .
I w o u ld  h a v e  n e v e r b e e n  a b le  to  do th is  re se a rch  w ith o u t th e  su p p o rt o f m y  d ear 
fa m ily  and  frie n d s. M a n y  th a n k s  to  all m y  fr ie n d s fo r  th e  m o ral su p p o rt. W e n d y, Tan ja  
and  S h irin , a sp ecia l th a n k  you fo r y o u r s u p p o rt iv e  p h o n e  ca lls  and  lo v e ly  d in e rs. I 
c o n s id e r m y se lf  lu ck y  w ith  fr ie n d s  like  you.
M y p a re n ts  H ans and H ilda, th a n k  you fo r st im u la t in g  m e to b e th e  b e st I can . Dad fo r 
s t im u la t in g  m y  c u rio s ity  b y  su rro u n d in g  m e  w ith  th e  m o st b e a u tifu l and  in te re stin g  
b o o k s o f all k in d s  o f p h ilo so p h e rs, and  fo r  th e  fre q u e n t w e e k e n d  v is its  th a t ob liged  
m e  to h a ve  th e  n e c e ssa ry  co ffe e  b re a k s. M a m  fo r h e lp in g  m e to b e lie v e  in m y se lf  and 
fo r  th e  w e e k ly  v is its  to  th e  fitn e ss  ce n tre  th a t h e lp e d  m e  to re lax. T je b b e  and  R o sa ­
lie, th a n k  yo u  fo r y o u r m o ral su p p o rt. I co u ld  n o t h a v e  a b e tte r b ro th e r and  friend .
Last b u t n o t lea st, th a n k s  to  m y  d e a r h u sb a n d  A n to n , fo r  y o u r su p p o rt and u n d e r­
s ta n d in g  w h e n  I had  to w o rk  d u rin g  th e  e v e n in g s and  w e e k e n d s. Y ou se e m e d  to 
h a v e  a d ist in ct fe e lin g  fo r  w h e n  it w a s b e tte r to  re la x  in ste ad  o f w o rk . T a k in g  m e 
to  th e  b ea ch  fo r a w a lk , ta k in g  m e  o u t fo r  a n ice  d in n e r o r to  th e  m o v ie s  o r v is it in g  
fr ie n d s  g a v e  m e th e  e n e rg y  to  w rite  th is  b o o k. T h a n k s  fo r a lw a y s  b e in g  p o sitive  
and  m a k in g  m e la u g h . A n d , o f  co u rse , th a n k s  fo r  th e  g ra p h ic  d e sig n  th a t m a k e s this 
th e s is  lo o k  fa b u lo u s.
2
1 DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND SPATIAL 
PLANNING
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Fo r a lo n g  p e rio d , th e  N e th e rla n d s h a s e x p e rie n ce d  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th , a g ro w th  
m o re o v e r w h ich  w a s la rg e r th a n  in m o st o th e r co u n trie s  o f Europ e. In th e  p ast 
ce n tu ry , th e  p o p u la tio n  o f th e  N e th e rla n d s h a s tr ip le d 1, w h ile  fo r  o th e r E u ro p ean  
c o u n trie s  th e  a n n u a l p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  h a s b e e n  a ro u n d  1.5% . B etw e e n  19 0 0  and 
20 0 0 , o n ly  th re e  E u ro p e a n  c o u n trie s  h a ve  had  a h ig h e r p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  th a n  the 
N e th e rla n d s (P rin s  and  V e rh o e f 20 0 0 , E sv e ld t et al., 20 0 1)2. In th e  p e rio d  a fte r  the 
S e co n d  W o rld  W a r, th e  D u tch p o p u la tio n  co n tin u e d  to  g ro w  (‘b a b y  b o o m ’) a lb e it 
le ss ra p id ly . B e tw e e n  19 50  and  20 0 0 , th e  p o p u la tio n  g re w  fro m  10 .0  to  15 .8  m illio n, 
an a n n u a l g ro w th  o f  1.6 %  (C B S , 20 0 9 c).
G ive n  th is  d e m o g ra p h ic  co n te x t, th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t, fo r  th e  m o st p art, has 
fo cu se d  on c o p in g  w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th . In th e  e a rly  p o st-w a r p e rio d , th e  then 
M in istry  o f H o u sin g  and  S p a tia l P la n n in g  (M in iste r ie  v a n  V o lk s h u is v e s t in g  en 
R u im te lijk e  O rd e n in g  (VR O )) fo cu se d  on re n o v a tin g  d a m a g e d  h o u s in g  and  on e x ­
p a n d in g  th e  h o u s in g  sto ck. In a d d it io n , th e  g o v e rn m e n t a lso  p aid  a tte n tio n  to the 
n e g a tiv e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f th is  p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  (to p u b lic  h e a lth  care, e n v iro n ­
m e n t and  s p a c e )3 and  tried  to  lim it th e se  e ffects b y  im p le m e n tin g  p o lic ie s  on p u b lic  
h e a lth , sp a tia l p la n n in g , th e  e n v iro n m e n t, and h o u sin g . T h e  sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o licy
1 FROM 5.1 MILLION PEOPLE IN 1900 TO 15.9 MILLION IN 2000 (ESVELDT ET AL., 2001).
2 THE ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH IN GREECE WAS 4 .4% , IN ROMANIA 3 .8% , AND IN SWITZER­
LAND 3 .2%  , WHILE IN THE NETHERLANDS IT WAS 3 .1%  (ESVELDT ET AL., 2001).
3 IN 1972, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SET UP A SPECIAL COMMISSION (STAATSCOMMISSIE
BEVOLKINGSVRAAGSTUK  WHICH IS ALSO CALLED COMM ISSIE MUNTENDAM) TO INVESTIGATE 
POPULATION DEVELOPMENTS, BOTH IN NUMBER AND COMPOSITION, AND THE LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STATE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (STAATSCOM­
MISSIE BEVOLKINGSVRAAGSTUK, 1977). THE THEN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STRIVED FOR
A WELL-BALANCED AND STABLE POPULATION (ZERO POPULATION GROWTH) OF 14 MILLION 
PEOPLE BY 2000 (ESVELDT ET AL. 2001). THE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT THIS WAS 
DESIRABLE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONAL WELL-BEING (HEALTH). IN ITS OPINION,
THE EXISTING PRESSURE ON THE ENVIRONMENT WAS TOO LARGE AND CONTINUED
3
fo cu se d  on a c c o m m o d a tin g  th is  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th , and  v a rio u s  sp a tia l p la n n in g  
co n c e p ts  w e re  d e v e lo p e d  to do so. E x a m p le s  are  sm all to w n s w h ich  w e re  to  be 
g re a t ly  e x p a n d e d  to  re ce iv e  o v e rsp ill fro m  th e  n e a rb y  c it ie s4 (g ro e ik e rn e n ), g ro w th  
co n to u rs, c o m p a ct c ity, and  u rb an  n e tw o rk  (Z o n n e v e ld  and  V e rw e st, 20 0 5 ). Th e  
Fifth N a tio n a l P o licy  D o cu m e n t on S p a tia l P la n n in g 5 (M in iste rie  van  V R O M , 20 01), 
in p a rticu la r, co n ta in e d  m a n y  o f th e se  sp a tia l p la n n in g  co n c e p ts  w h ich  fo cu se d  on 
a c c o m m o d a tin g  g ro w th . T h e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t d id  n o t fo rm u la te  a sp e c ific  p o licy  
on p o p u la tio n .
C u rre n tly , th is  p e rio d  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  is e x p e cte d  to end. S in ce  20 0 6 , at­
te n tio n  fo r  th is  e x p e cte d  c h a n g e  h a s b een  in c re a s in g  s lo w ly 6. T h e  a tte n tio n  fo r 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s tr ig g e re d  b y  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  and  th e  
n a tio n a l and  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  o f  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (CBS) and  the  
th e n  N e th e rla n d s In stitu te  fo r S p a tia l R e se a rch  (R P B , c u rre n tly  P B L )7. A fte r  20 0 0 , the  
an n u a l n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  sta rte d  to  d e c lin e  and , in 20 0 3, w ith  0 .4 %  it had 
re a ch e d  its lo w e st leve l s in ce  19 20  (0 .5 % ). In fo llo w in g  ye a rs, th e  a n n u a l p o p u la tio n  
g ro w th  co n tin u e d  to d e cre a se  and, in 20 0 6 , re a ch e d  th e  lo w e st p o in t in re co rd e d  h is ­
to ry  (0 .1%). In 20 0 4 , S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s p ro je cte d  th e  D u tch p o p u la tio n  to reach 
its p e a k  in 20 3 5 8 and th e re a fte r  to  sta rt to  d e clin e  (C B S , 2 0 0 4 ) 9. T h e  re g io n al
POPULATION GROWTH WOULD ADD TO THIS PRESSURE (INTERDEPARTEMENTALE COMMISSIE 
BEVOLKINGSBELEID, 1982, P.108).
4 THIS CONCEPT WAS INTRODUCED IN THE THIRD NATIONAL SPATIAL POLICY (MINISTERIE VRO, 
1973). EXAMPLES ARE ALMERE, ZOETERMEER, NIEUWEGEIN, SPIJKERNISSE.
5 BECAUSE THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT FELL, THIS POLICY DOCUMENT WAS NOT APPROVED 
BY THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT.
6 THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS ADDRESSED. IN 1996, AT THE ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE NETHERLANDS DEMOGRAPHIC SOCIETY (NEDERLANDSE VERENI­
GIN G VOOR D EM OGRA FIE  (NVD)), WITH THE TITLE ‘A DECREASING POPULATION: DISASTER 
OR REMEDY?' THE EXPECTED DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES 
WERE DISCUSSED (DYKSTRA AND WISSEN, 1996). IN ADDITION, DERKS HAD PUBLISHED 
VARIOUS ARTICLES ON THIS SUBJECT (DERKS, 1996C; KLINKERS AND DERKS, 2005).
HOWEVER, THE DEBATE HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN UP AGAIN, UNTIL RECENTLY
7 IN 2008, THE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR SPATIAL RESEARCH (RUIMTELIJK PLANBUREAU  
(RPB)) WAS MERGED WITH THE NETHERLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY 
(MILIEU- E N  NATUURPLANBUREAU (MNP)) INTO THE PBL NETHERLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSM ENTAGENCY
8 TWO YEAR LATER, STATISTICS NETHERLANDS PROJECTED THAT THE DUTCH POPULATION 
WOULD REACH ITS PEAK IN 2034 (CBS, 2006).
9 IN RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS BY STATISTICS NETHERLANDS
4
p o p u la tio n  p ro je ctio n s, b a sed  on th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c t io n s  o f 2004, 
p re d icte d  in 20 0 6  th a t, b y  20 25 , 5 5%  (2 5 9 ) o f e x ist in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w o u ld  fa c e  a 
p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  and  20 %  (9 2) a h o u se h o ld  d e clin e . In so m e  D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s , 
th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  w a s e x p e cte d  to  d e cre a se  b y  10 %  (R P B  and  C B S, 20 06).
T h e  a tte n tio n  fo r  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s a lso  trig g e re d  b y  th e  a d v ice  o f Derks 
et al. (2 0 0 6 a )10 w h ich  re ce ive d  m u ch  p u b lic  a tte n tio n . T h e  a u th o rs  a rg u e d  th a t this 
d e clin e  w o u ld  b e stru ctu ra l and  w o u ld  h a v e  a m a jo r im p a ct on v a rio u s  p o lic y  fie lds, 
su ch  as h o u sin g , e co n o m y , and  tra n sp o rt. T h e y  critic ise d  th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t 
fo r  n o t a n tic ip a tin g  th is  d o w n w a rd  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n t, and a rg u e d  th a t, in 
lig h t o f im m in e n t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, cu rre n t p o lic ie s  w o u ld  n eed  re v ie w in g .
In th e  sa m e  ye ar, th e  th e n  N e th e rla n d s In stitu te  fo r S p a tia l R e se a rch  p u b lish e d  a 
stu d y  on th is  su b je ct (V an D am  et al., 2 0 0 6 ) and , in 20 07, o rg a n ise d  a c o n fe re n c e  to ­
g e th e r w ith  th e  M in istry  o f H o u sin g , S p a tia l P la n n in g  and  th e  E n v iro n m e n t (R P B  and 
M in iste rie  va n  V R O M , 2 0 0 7 )11 12. T h e  stu d y  w a rn e d  th a t, in th e  n e a r fu tu re , an in c re a s ­
in g  n u m b e r o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w o u ld  fa c e  a d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  
n u m b e rs. S im ila r to  D erks et al. (20 0 6 a ), th e  stu d y  c o n c lu d e d  th a t th is  m ig h t affect 
v a r io u s  p o lic y  fie ld s (m o st n o ta b ly  h o u s in g  and  e co n o m y ), a d d in g  th a t  n o t all p o licy  
fie ld s  w o u ld  b e affected  to th e  sa m e  d egree.
F in ally, th e  a tte n tio n  fo r  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s tr ig g e re d  b y  th e  fa ct th a t so m e 
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and  re g io n s a lre a d y  w e re  fa c in g  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e . E x a m p le s  are 
S o u th  L im b u rg , Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n , e a ste rn  G ro n in g e n , ’t G o o i, and th e  a re a  aro und  
th e  c ity  o f H aa rlem . From  20 0 6 , th e  p ro v in c e  o f L im b u rg  and  a c o lla b o ra tio n  of
(CBS, 2004) AND THE LOW ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH (IN 2003), THE MINISTRY OF 
HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT INVESTIGATED THIS DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND PUBLISHED A REPORT (MINISTERIE VAN VROM, 2005).
10 THE COUNCIL FOR HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT (VROM-RAAD)
AND THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR TRANSPORT, PUBLIC WORKS AND WATER MANAGEMENT 
(RAAD VOOR V ERKEER EN  VERVOER) COMMISSIONED DERKS ET AL. (2006A) TO INVESTIGATE 
DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES. THE COUNCIL ALSO ORGAN­
ISED TWO MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT (VROMRAAD, 2006A).
11 IN 2007, THE THEN NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR SPATIAL RESEARCH ALSO PAID ATTENTION 
TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN ITS MAGAZINE ON SPATIAL PLANNING (RUIMTE IN DEBAT, RPB,
2007).
12 IN THE SAME YEAR, THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF DUTCH ARCHITECTS (BOND VOOR N ED ER ­
LAN DSE A R CH ITECTEN  (BNA)) ALSO ORGANISED A CONFERENCE ON THIS SUBJECT (BNA,
2007).
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se v e n  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  k n o w n  as th e  re g io n a l o rg a n isa tio n  P a rkstad  L im b u rg  p re se n te d  
th e m se lv e s  as p io n e e rs  in th is  d e v e lo p m e n t. P o p u la tio n  h a s b e e n  d e c lin in g  in so m e 
in d iv id u a l m u n ic ip a lit ie s  o f P a rkstad  L im b u rg  and  in th e  re g io n  P a rkstad  L im b u rg  
s in ce  19 9 7, and  in th e  p ro v in c e  o f L im b u rg  s in ce  20 0 2. T h e  re g io n a l o rg a n isa tio n  
P a rkstad  L im b u rg  and  th e  p ro v in c e  w e re  th e  f irst to  a ctiv e ly  lo b b y  fo r m o re  a tte n ­
tio n  at n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t leve l fo r d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. Later, th e ir  e fforts w e re  
s u p p o rte d  b y  th e  p ro v in c e s  o f G ro n in g e n  and  Ze e la n d .
T h is  tra n s it io n  fro m  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a ra th e r new  
p h e n o m e n o n . A fte r  all, in th e  tw e n tie th  ce n tu ry , th e  N e th e rla n d s e x p e rie n ce d  
stro n g  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th , as d id  m o st D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s . V ie w e d  fro m  th is  p e r­
sp e ctive , it is b o th  p ra c t ic a lly  im p o rta n t and  a c a d e m ic a lly  in te re st in g  to a n a ly se  h o w  
lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  re a ct to  th is  n e w  d e m o g ra p h ic  s itu a tio n , and  w h e th e r and  h o w  
th e y  c h a n g e  th e ir  sp a tia l p o lic ie s  in o rd e r to  d eal w ith  th e se  c ircu m sta n ce s.
N e v e rth e le ss, d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is n o t a co m p le te ly  n e w  p h e n o m e n o n  in the 
N e th e rla n d s. In th e  past, th e re  h a v e  b e e n  s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and  re g io n s: w e ll- 
k n o w n  e x a m p le s  o f sh rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  are  K e rkra d e , T h e  H agu e, H aarlem , 
A m ste rd a m , H ilve rsu m , B u ssu m , Le lysta d , R o tte rd a m  and D elfzijl. D u rin g  th e  19 50 s 
and  19 6 0 s, s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w e re  p r im a rily  lo ca te d  in th e  p e rip h e ra l a re a s of 
th e  co u n try , such as in S o u th  L im b u rg , th e  n o rth e rn  p ro v in c e s  (G ro n in g e n , Friesland  
and  D re n th e ), and  in Z e e la n d 13. T h is  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s m a in ly  cau se d  by 
p e o p le  le a v in g  th e ir  d istrict to  m o v e  to th e  R a n d s ta d  re g io n 14. T h e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn ­
m e n t p e rce iv e d  th is n e g a tiv e  n e t m ig ra tio n  b a la n c e  in th e  p e rip h e ra l are as as a 
p ro b le m  b e ca u se  it w a s in c o n flict  w ith  th e  p rin c ip le  o f  sp a tia l ju st ic e  (fa ir  d istrib u ­
tio n  o f o p p o rtu n it ie s)  w h ich  w a s an o b je c tiv e  o f th e  n a tio n a l sp a tia l p o lic y  (Van Dam  
e t al., 20 0 6 , p .128 ). In re sp o n se  to th is  d e clin e , th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t, in its s ixth  
in d u str ia lisa t io n  n o te  (D e  z e sd e  n o ta  in za k e  d e in d u str ia lisa tie  van  N e d e rlan d , 
M in iste rie  va n  EZ, 19 5 8 ) d e cid e d  to st im u la te  th e  d isp e rsio n  o f in d u str ie s  and 
b u s in e sse s  (e m p lo y m e n t)  fro m  th e  R a n d s ta d  re g io n  to o th e r p a rts  o f th e  co u n try. 
T h e  g o v e rn m e n t itse lf  tried  to  set an e x a m p le  b y  re lo c a tin g  so m e  o f its o w n se rv ice s
13 THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DESIGNATED THESE AREAS AS ‘PROBLEM AREAS'. LATER, 
THESE AREAS WERE NAMED ‘STIMULATION AREAS'.
14 THE RANDSTAD REGION IS AN URBAN CONURBATION CONSISTING OF THE FOUR LARGEST 
CITIES OF AMSTERDAM, ROTTERDAM, THE HAGUE AND UTRECHT, AND SURROUNDING AREAS. 
IN THE NATIONAL SPATIAL STRATEGY THE RANDSTAD  IS DESCRIBED AS THE POLITICAL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HEART AND THE MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC 
MOTOR OF THE NETHERLANDS (MINISTERIE VAN VROM, LNV, VENW AND EZ, 2004, P.21) .
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and  a g e n c ie s  to  th e se  a re as. T h e  a ssu m p tio n  b e h in d  th is  p o lic y  w a s th a t re lo ca tin g  
e m p lo y m e n t w o u ld  lead to th e  p o p u la tio n  a lso  re lo ca tin g .
In th e  m id -19 6 0 s, b e ca u se  th e  re su lts  fro m  th is  in d u str ia lisa t io n  n o te  w e re  d isa p ­
p o in t in g  and  th e  p o p u la tio n  w a s still u n e q u a lly  d isp e rse d  o v e r th e  co u n try , the 
n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t ch a n g e d  its p o lic y  fro m  d isp e rsio n  o f in d u str ie s  to  d isp e rsio n  
o f p e o p le  (Z o n n e v e ld  and  V e rw e st, 20 0 5; V a n  D am  et al., 20 0 6 ). T h e  o b je c tiv e  w a s to 
p re v e n t la rg e  d iffe re n ce s in p o p u la tio n  d e n s ity  th ro u g h o u t th e  co u n try . It re m a in e d  
u n c le a r h o w  th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t w a n te d  to a ch ie v e  th is  o b je c tiv e  (Van D am  et 
al., 20 0 6 , p .129 ).
In th e  19 70 s, th e  v ie w p o in t  o f th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t ch a n g e d  ra d ica lly . T h e  d iffe r­
e n ce s  in p o p u la tio n  size s and  d e n sit ie s  b e tw e e n  th e  d iffe re n t D u tch re g io n s w e re  no 
lo n g e r p e rce iv e d  as a p ro b le m  b u t as an o p p o rtu n ity . Both th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t 
and lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  in th e  p e rip h e ra l are as b e g a n  to e m p h a s ise  th e  a d v a n ta g e s 
o f a sm a lle r  p o p u la tio n  size  (e .g . q u a lit ie s  o f la n d sca p e ) and  th e  d isa d v a n ta g e s  co n ­
n e cte d  to th e  cro w d e d  R a n d s ta d  re g io n  (e .g . tra ffic  ja m s). A s  a re su lt, th e  d e sire  fo r 
p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  in th e  le ss p o p u la te d  p e rip h e ra l a re a s d isa p p e a re d  (Z o n n e v e ld  
and  V e rw e st, 20 0 5; V a n  D am  et al., 20 06).
A lso , in th e  19 7 0 s, n o t o n ly  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in th e  p e rip h e ra l a re a s b u t a lso  in th e  m o st 
u rb a n ise d  p a rt o f  th e  c o u n try  (th e  R a n d s ta d  re g io n ) sta rte d  to lo se  in h a b ita n ts  (e.g. 
in T h e  H ag u e, A m ste rd a m  and  R o tte rd a m ). T h e  m ain  c a u se  w a s th e  o u tw a rd  m ig ra ­
tio n  o f p e o p le  fro m  c it ie s  to  su b u rb a n  a re a s (su b u rb a n isa t io n ) and to  ru ral areas 
(c o u n te r u rb a n isa tio n ) c lo se  to  th e  R a n d sta d '5. H o w e v e r, th e  h igh u n e m p lo y m e n t 
ra te  a lso  p laye d  a ro le . In re sp o n se  to th is , th e  m u n ic ip a lity  o f T h e  H ag u e  p u b lish e d  a 
re p o rt on th e  lo n g -te rm  d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e  e c o n o m y  o f T h e  H ag u e  (D e o n tw ik k e lin g  
v a n  d e H a a g se  e c o n o m ie  op la n g e  te rm ijn : P la n n in g  fo r  D e clin e ),  in w h ich  it u rged  the 
n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t to  a b a n d o n  its d isp e rsa l p o lic y  o u t o f fe a r fo r d e clin e  (H e n d rik s  
and  P a elin ck , 19 73).
In 19 76 , th e  D u tch G o v e rn m e n t a d a p te d  its p o lic y  on sp re a d in g  in d u str ie s , p o p u la ­
tio n  and  w e lfa re  e q u a lly  a ro u n d  th e  co u n try . T h e  g o v e rn m e n t d e cid e d , fo r e x am p le, 
to  lim it re g u la t io n s  th a t w o u ld  d isc o u ra g e  in d u str ie s  fro m  se ttlin g  in th e  R a n d sta d  
re g io n . T h e  re a so n s fo r  th is  c h a n g e  in p o lic y  w e re  its d isa p p o in tin g  re su lts  and  th e  
critic ism  fro m  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and p ro v in c e s  in th e  R a n d s ta d  re g io n . M o reo ver, 
th e  d isp e rsio n  p o lic y  w a s a lso  th o u g h t to  h in d e r c o m p e tit io n  w ith  o th e r E u ro p ean
15 SIMILAR TRENDS COULD BE OBSERVED IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (VAN DAM ET AL.,
2006, P.128)
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a g g lo m e ra tio n s . In a d d itio n , its p o lic y  o b je c tiv e  (to  sp re a d  th e  p o p u la tio n  and 
e c o n o m ic  a ct iv ity  e q u a lly  o v e r th e  co u n try )  w a s c o n sid e re d  in fe a s ib le . S in ce  19 76, 
th e  d isp e rsio n  p o licy  h a s b e e n  p h a se d  out. H o w e v e r, th is  d id  n o t m e a n  th e  end  of 
th e  stim u la tio n  p o lic y  (st im u le r in g sb e le id ). S p e c if ic  su b sid ie s  to  st im u la te  e co n o m ic  
d e v e lo p m e n t in p e rip h e ra l a re a s  still c o n tin u e  to d a y . A n  e x a m p le  is th e  so -ca lle d  
L a n g m a n  su b s id y 16 fo r th e  n o rth e rn  p ro v in c e s17 (V an  D am  et al., 20 06 ).
In th e  19 8 0 s and  19 9 0 s, th e  n a tio n a l p o lic y  fo cu se d  on st im u la t in g  re g io n s th a t w e re  
stro n g , ra th e r th a n  s u p p o rt in g  th o se  (o fte n  p e rip h e ra l re g io n s) th a t w e re  th e  w e a k ­
est. T h e  o b je c tiv e  to  d istrib u te  g ro w th  fa ir ly  (sp a tia l ju st ic e )  w a s re p la ce d  b y  one 
th a t st im u la te d  g ro w th  (e ffic ie n cy). T h is  p h ilo so p h y  called  re g io n s o p e ra tin g  u n d e r 
th e ir  o w n p o w e r (R e g io 's  op e ig e n  k ra c h t)  w a s  e n te re d  into  th e  n a tio n a l stru ctu re  
p lan  fo r u rb an  a re a s (S tru c tu u rsc h e ts  S te d e lijk e  G e b ie d e n ,  M in iste rie  van V R O M , 
19 8 3 ), w h ic h  is still in fo rce , to d a y. From  th is  p e rsp e ctiv e  and  b e c a u se  th e y  had larg e  
e c o n o m ic  and  so cia l p ro b le m s, m u ch  a tte n tio n  w a s p aid  to  s u p p o rt in g  th e  m ain 
c it ie s  o f th e  R a n d s ta d  re g io n . T h is  p o licy  o f s u p p o rt in g  th e  stro n g e st  re g io n s w as 
in c o rp o ra te d  in th e  N a tio n a l S p a tia l S tra te g y  (M in iste rie  va n  V R O M  et al., 2 0 0 6 ) and 
th e  N a tio n a l E co n o m ic  P o licy  (M in iste rie  van EZ, 2 0 0 4 ) (Van D am  et al. 20 0 6 , 130 ).
D e sp ite  th e  e x p e rie n c e s  w ith  s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and  d e p riv e d  re g io n s, d e a lin g  
w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  can b e c o n sid e re d  to  b e a n e w  c h a lle n g e  to th e  N e th e r­
la n d s. First, b e ca u se , cu rre n t and fu tu re  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is b e in g  cau se d  by 
b o th  n a tu ra l ch a n g e s (fe w e r b irth s and  m o re  d e a th s) and  a n e g a tiv e  n e t m ig ra tio n  
b a la n ce , w h ile , in th e  past, d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s m a in ly  cau se d  b y  a n e g a tive  
n e t m ig ra tio n  b a la n ce . S e co n d , b e ca u se , in th e  fu tu re , s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  are 
e x p e cte d  to b e su rro u n d e d  b y  a c o n te x t o f (p ro v in c ia l and  n a tio n a l)  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e , w h ile , in th e  past, s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w e re  e m b e d d e d  in a c o n te x t of 
n a tio n a l d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th .
16 IN 1997, A COMMISSION (LANGMAN) INVESTIGATED THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE 
NORTHERN PROVINCES AND CONCLUDED THAT THIS PART OF THE COUNTRY HAD A LAGGING 
ECONOMY AND NEEDED TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT (ZONNEVELD AND VERWEST, 2005).
17 IN 2004, THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT DECIDED TO EXTEND THE SUPPORT FOR THE NORTHERN 
PROVINCES TO 2010 (30 MILLION EUROS PER YEAR), USING RESOURCES FROM THE LANGMAN
SUBSIDY (ZONNEVELD AND VERWEST, 2005).
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1.2 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
T h is  stu d y  fo cu se s  on lo cal g o v e rn m e n t re a c tio n s  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, and 
in c lu d e s  th e  p o lic ie s  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s , re g io n s18 and  p ro v in ce s. T h e  re a so n  fo r  th is 
fo cu s  is th a t p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  is a lre a d y  e x p e rie n c e d  b y  so m e  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts, 
w h ile  th e  c o u n try  as a w h o le  is n o t e x p e rie n c in g  th is, as yet. M o re o v e r, d e m o g ra p h ic  
p ro je c t io n s  p re d ict th a t, in th e  fu tu re , d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w ill b e  e x p e rie n ce d  
p a rt icu la r ly  at lo cal g o v e rn m e n t le v e l19. T h e  re se a rch  h a s fo cu se d  on th e  re sp o n se  o f 
lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  and  o n ly  in d ire c tly  on th a t o f p r iv a te  p a rtie s  (su ch  as real estate  
o r p ro p e rty  d e v e lo p e rs  and  h o u s in g  a sso c ia tio n s).
T h e  stu d y  se e k s  to  p ro v id e  an a n sw e r to  th e  fo llo w in g  q u e stio n s: h o w  do lo ca l g o v ­
e rn m e n ts  re a ct to d e m o g ra p h ic  declin e, a n d  u n d e r  w h ich  c irc u m sta n c e s  do th e y  a d a p t  
th e ir  p o lic ie s  to it?  D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le  and  lo cal sp atia l 
p o lic y  is th e  d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  o f th is  re se a rch . It is im p o rta n t to  re a lise  th a t this 
re la tio n sh ip  can w o rk  in th e  o p p o site  d ire ctio n , to o: local sp a tia l p o lic y  can in flu e n ce  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . Fo r e x a m p le , sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o lic y  can in flu e n ce  m ig ra tio n  
f lo w s and  th e re fo re  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e 20. T h is  m e a n s th a t th e re  m a y  b e a fe e d b a c k  
b e tw e e n  th e  in d e p e n d e n t and d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le . H o w e v e r, th is  re se a rch  fo cu se s 
p r im a rily  on o n e d ire ctio n : on h o w  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  a ffe cts local sp a tia l p o licy.
D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m e a n s a d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n , in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs, or 
in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  (se e  C h a p te r 2)21. Local sp a tia l p o licy  is a set o f p o lic ies 
a n d /o r a ctio n s, fo rm u la te d  b y  local g o v e rn m e n ts  to  in flu e n ce  th e  sp a tia l s tru ctu re  
o f an a re a  (th e  d istrib u tio n  o f p e o p le  and  a ctiv itie s  o v e r sp a ce , at v a rio u s  scales).
T h is  stu d y  fo cu se s  on tw o  a sp e cts  o f th e  sp a tia l s tru ctu re , n a m e ly  h o u s in g  and  the
18 IN THE EXISTING DUTCH ADMINISTRATION, REGIONS DO NOT HAVE A FORMAL ROLE. NEVER­
THELESS, THERE ARE EIGHT URBAN REGIONS (W GR-PLUS REGIONS) WHERE MUNICIPALITIES 
ARE OBLIGED TO WORK TOGETHER UNDER THE JOINT REGULATIONS ACT (SEE CHAPTER 4).
19 AS MENTIONED BEFORE, ACCORDING TO THE REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
PROJECTIONS (RPB AND CBS, 2006), BY 2025, 55%  OF MUNICIPALITIES WILL BE CONFRONTED 
WITH POPULATION DECLINE AND 20%  OF MUNICIPALITIES WILL EXPERIENCE A DECLINE IN 
HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS. DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS STUDY, THESE PROJECTIONS WERE 
REVISED TWICE. THE MOST RECENT REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS 
(PBL AND CBS, 2009) PROJECT THAT, BY 2025, THIS WILL BE 40%  AND 3% , RESPECTIVELY. THE 
MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR THIS DIFFERENCE IS A CHANGE IN ASSUMPTIONS ON LIFE 
EXPECTANCY AND INWARD AND OUTWARD MIGRATION. SEE ALSO APPENDIX 4 .
20 THIS WILL BE EXPLAINED IN MORE DETAIL IN CHAPTER 2 .
21 IN THIS STUDY, DECLINE AND SHRINKAGE ARE USED INTERCHANGEABLY.
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re s id e n tia l e n v iro n m e n t, and  e c o n o m y  (m o re  sp e c ific a lly  fa c ilit ie s  fo r  co m m e rc ia l 
s e rv ice s  and  fo r  e m p lo y m e n t), b e ca u se  th e se  a sp e cts  w o u ld  b e im p a cte d  m o st by 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , a c c o rd in g  to V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ).
T h is  stu d y  p a ys m o re  a tte n tio n  to ch a n g e s in p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  sizes, ra th e r 
th a n  in c o m p o sit io n . N e v e rth e le ss, it is im p o rta n t to  n o te  th a t sh rin k in g  m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  and  re g io n s o fte n  a re  c o n fro n te d , n o t o n ly  w ith  a d e clin e  in s ize  o f th e ir  p o p u la ­
tio n , h o u se h o ld s, and w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n , b u t a lso  w ith  a c h a n g in g  c o m p o sitio n . 
E x a m p le s  o f su ch  ch a n g e s a re  a d e cre a se  in th e  sh a re  o f  y o u n g  p e o p le  up to  19 ye ars 
o f age, an in c re a se  in th e  sh a re  o f  p e o p le  o v e r th e  age  o f 65, a d e cre a se  in th e  sh a re  
o f h ig h ly  e d u ca te d  p e o p le , an in c re a se  in th e  sh a re  o f p o o rly  e d u ca te d  p e o p le , a 
d e cre a se  in th e  sh a re  o f h ig h -in co m e  g ro u p s, and  an in c re a se  in th e  sh a re  o f lo w - 
in c o m e  g ro u p s.
T h is  stu d y  in v e stig a te s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in lo cal (sp a tia l)  p o lic ie s  in sh rin k in g  
re g io n s (e ve n  th o u g h  th e re  a re  so m e  s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in g ro w in g  re g io n s), as 
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in s h rin k in g  re g io n s a re  e x p e cte d  to a d a p t th e ir  p o lic ie s  to 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m o re  q u ick ly , th a n  w o u ld  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in g ro w in g  re g io n s. 
A n o th e r  re a so n  fo r  th is  fo cu s  is th a t it d ist in g u ish e s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  cau sed  
b y  s u b u rb a n isa t io n  ( in tra re g io n a l m ig ra t io n ) fro m  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  ca u se d  by 
in te rre g io n a l m ig ra tio n  o r n a tu ra l ch a n g e s. In th e  case  o f s u b u rb a n isa tio n , p e o p le  
w h o  h a v e  m o ved  to su rro u n d in g  v illa g e s  w o u ld  still use lo cal se rv ice s  o f th e  c lo se st 
city. In co n tra st, w h e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is ca u se d  b y  in te rre g io n a l m ig ra tio n , the 
p e o p le  th a t le a ve  th e  re g io n , no  lo n g e r use lo cal se rv ice s  o f th a t re g io n ’s ce n tra l city. 
T h e  sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  cau se d  b y  in te rre g io n a l m ig ra ­
tio n  and  n e g a tiv e  n a tu ra l b a la n c e  are g re a te r fo r  th e  re g io n , th a n  th o se  cau se d  by 
in tra re g io n a l m ig ra tio n , and  lo cal p o lic y  re sp o n se s are  e x p e cte d  to  d iffer. Th e re fo re , 
p o lic ie s  o f sh rin k in g  c itie s  th a t are  e m b e d d e d  in g ro w in g  re g io n s (e.g. R o tterd a m  
d u rin g  th e  19 9 0 ’s22) a re  n o t in c lu d e d  in th is  stud y.
T h e  stu d y  p a rt icu la rly  a n a ly se s  th e  p o lic ie s  o f th e  la rg e st m u n ic ip a lit ie s  lo ca te d  in 
sh rin k in g  re g io n s. W h e re  th e  in d iv id u a l m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c o o p e ra te  re g io n a lly , th e  re ­
g io n a l (sp a tia l)  p o lic ie s  are  in v e stig a te d , as w e ll. It is im p o rta n t to  a n a ly se  the 
re g io n a l p o lic ie s  b e c a u se  th e  h o u s in g  and  e c o n o m ic  m a rk e ts, w h ich  a re  ce n tra l in 
th is  stu d y, are  re g io n a l on es. A lth o u g h  th e  p ro v in c e s  h a v e  n o t y e t e x p e rie n ce d  a 
d e clin e  in p o p u la tio n  (e x ce p t fo r  L im b u rg ) n o r in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs
22 BETWEEN 1994 AND 1997 (CBS, 2010A).
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(se e  C h a p te r 2)23, p ro v in c ia l p o lic ie s  a re  a lso  stu d ie d  in th is  re se a rch . T h e  re a so n  is 
th a t th e re  are  sh rin k in g  re g io n s in d iffe re n t p ro v in ce s. In a d d itio n , th e  stu d y  of 
re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s  (P B L  and  C B S, 2 0 0 9 ) p re d ict th at 
so m e  p ro v in c e s  a lso  w ill e x p e rie n c e  a fu tu re  d e clin e  in p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m ­
b e rs  o r w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n .
1.3 POLICY DYNAMICS
T h e  a ca d e m ic  d e b a te  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal sp a tia l p o licy  is n o t w ell 
d e v e lo p e d  in th e  N e th e rla n d s, n o r in o th e r co u n trie s  (se e  S e ctio n s  1.4  and  1.5). W h a t 
re se a rch  th e re  is a lm o st a lw a y s  su p p o se s  th a t it is a n e w  p o licy  c h a lle n g e  w h ich  
re q u ire s  a d a p ta tio n  o f th e  lo cal p o lic ie s. T h e  ce n tra l q u e stio n s  o f th is  re se a rch  are 
b a se d  on th is  a ssu m p tio n . B e cau se  th e re  is so little  re se a rch  a b o u t th e  re la tio n  
b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal sp a tia l p la n n in g  (th e  w o rk  b y  G lo ck  (20 0 6 ) 
is an e x ce p tio n ), th e re  is no in te g ral co n ce p tu a l m o d e l a v a ila b le . T h e re fo re , fo r this 
re se a rch , o n e had  to b e d e v e lo p e d  (see  C h a p te r 3).
From  th e  lite ra tu re  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  and  (lo ca l) p o licy , se ve ra l re q u ire m e n ts  
h a v e  b e e n  d e rive d , w h ich  th e  th e o re tic a l f ra m e w o rk  sh o u ld  m eet. First, th is  fra m e ­
w o rk  w o u ld  n eed  to b e a b le  to  e x p la in  p o licy  sta b ility  as w ell as p o licy  ch a n g e . Th e  
lite ra tu re  on o th e r co u n trie s  sh o w s th a t th is is im p o rta n t b e ca u se  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  
th a t fa c e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  do n o t a lw a y s  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  (p o lic y  stab ility). 
G lo c k  (20 0 6 ), fo r e x a m p le , sh o w e d  th a t th e  s h rin k in g  c ity  o f L e ip z ig  did ch a n g e, 
w h ile  th e  sh rin k in g  c ity  o f  D u isb u rg  did not. Sh e  c o n c lu d e d  th a t it is o n ly  u n d e r ce r­
ta in  c ircu m sta n c e s  th a t s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s.
S e co n d , th e  fra m e w o rk  w o u ld  n eed  to p a y  a tte n tio n  to b o th  a g e n cie s  and  stru ctu re s  
and  to  th e ir  re c ip ro c ity . G lo c k  (20 0 6 ), w h o  stu d ie d  th e  lo cal p o lic y  re a ctio n  o f s h rin k ­
in g  G e rm a n  c ities, c o n c lu d e d  th a t th is  is im p o rta n t. S h e  a rg u e d  th a t b o th  a cto rs and 
stru c tu re s  m a y  in flu e n ce  w h e th e r d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  le a d s to  lo cal p o lic y  sta b ility  
o r p o lic y  ch a n g e . T h is  is su b sc rib e d  b y  o th e rs  (e .g . D erks et al., 20 0 6 a; V a n  D am  et al., 
20 0 6 ; G o e d v o lk  and  K o rsten , 20 0 8 ; U b in k, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 a; H in ssen  and 
D erks, 20 0 8 ; M u ld e r, 20 0 6 ; M u ld e r, 2 0 0 8 ) w h o  h a v e  in v e stig a te d  lo cal p o lic y  re a c ­
t io n s  in s itu a t io n s  o f sh rin k a g e .
In o rd e r to  d e v e lo p  th is  in te g ra l co n ce p tu a l m o d e l, th is  stu d y  h a s used  stu d ie s  a b o u t 
p o lic y  sta b ility  and  p o lic y  ch a n g e . T h e  co n ce p tu a l m o d el is b a sed  on th e  P o licy
23 SOME PROVINCES HAVE ALREADY EXPERIENCED A DECLINE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION 
(SEE CHAPTER 2).
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A rra n g e m e n t A p p ro a ch  (P A A ) b y  A rts , V a n  T a te n h o v e  and  Le ro y  (Van T a te n h o v e  et 
al., 20 0 0 ; A rts  and  Leroy, 20 0 3; A rts  and Leroy, 20 0 6 a ), b e c a u se  th is  a p p ro a ch  best 
m e e ts  th e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  re q u ire m e n ts. T h e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, w h ic h  is the 
ce n tra l c o n c e p t o f th is  a p p ro a ch , re fe rs  to  th e  te m p o ra ry  sta b ilisa tio n  o f th e  co n te n t 
and  o rg a n isa tio n  o f a p a rt icu la r  p o lic y  d o m a in  at a sp e c ific  leve l o f  p o licy -m a k in g , in 
te rm s o f  a cto rs, re so u rce s, ru le s  and  d isc o u rse s  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .54 ). In o rd e r to 
o v e rc o m e  so m e  o f th e  d ra w b a c k s  o f th e  PAA, th is  stu d y  a lso  uses th e  w o rk  o f  Lief- 
fe r in k  (20 0 6 ), B o o n stra  (20 0 4 , 20 0 6 ), and  W ie rin g  and  C ra b b e  (20 0 6 ), w h o  ap p lied  
th e  P A A  to  e x p la in  p o licy  d yn a m ics. F inally, th e se  stu d ie s  are  co m b in e d  w ith  th e  fe w  
stu d ie s  th a t a re  a v a ila b le  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal (sp a tia l)  p o lic y  and 
a b o u t u rb an  d e clin e  in o rd e r to  b e a b le  to  a p p ly  it to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and its 
in flu e n ce  on th e  fie ld  o f lo cal sp a tia l p o licy . C h a p te r 3 e x p la in s  th e  c o n stru c t io n  of 
th e  co n ce p tu a l m o d e l in m o re  d e ta il . It a lso  e x p la in s  w h y, in th is  stu d y, o n ly  th e  co n ­
c e p t o f p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t w a s u sed , and n o t a lso  th a t o f p o litica l m o d e rn isa tio n , 
w h ic h  is a lso  a k e y  c o n c e p t o f  th e  PAA.
1.4 DUTCH DEBATE ON DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND PLANNING
A s  m e n tio n e d  in th e  in tro d u ctio n  to th is  ch a p te r, in th e  N e th e rla n d s, th e  d eb ate  
a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  sta rte d  in 20 0 6 . T h is  d e b a te  w a s trig g e re d  b y  d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts, p ro je c tio n s  and  th e  p u b lica tio n  o f  D erks et al. (20 0 6 a ), and 
fo cu se d  p r im a rily  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  and  p o ss ib le  sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s 
(se e  a lso  S e ctio n  1.1). W h e n  th is  s tu d y  w a s starte d  (20 0 8 ), n o t m u ch  w a s kn o w n  
a b o u t th e  su b je ct, w ith  e x ce p tio n  o f D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a ) and  V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ). 
T h e  a ca d e m ic  d e b a te  on sp a tia l p la n n in g , as w e ll as th e  p la n n in g  p ra ctice , fo cu sed  
m a in ly  on d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th . D u rin g  th is  s tu d y  (2 0 0 8 -2 0 10 ) th is  s itu a tio n  ch a n g e d  
ra p id ly . In 20 0 8 , th e  to p ic  w a s p u t on th e  n a tio n a l p o litica l a g e n d a 24, fo llo w e d  b y  a 
ra p id ly  d e v e lo p in g  p u b lic, p o litica l and  a ca d e m ic  d e b ate .
T h e  to p ic  w a s p u t on th e  n a tio n a l p o litica l a g e n d a  p a rt ly  as th e  re su lt  o f v a rio u s  
p a rlia m e n ta ry  m o tio n s fo rm u la te d  b y  th e  D u tch P a rlia m e n t. T h e  f irst m o tio n  w as 
fo rm u la te d  in 20 07, b y  V a n  H e u g te n  et al. (T w e e d e  K am er, 20 0 7). T h e y  asked  
V o g e la a r, th e  th e n  M in iste r o f H o u sin g , to  in itia te  a stu d y  into  th e  e ffects that 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m ig h t h a v e  on th e  h o u s in g  m a rk e ts  o f S o u th  L im b u rg , e a stern  
G ro n in g e n  and  Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n . A  stu d y  b y  th e  C o u n cil fo r P u b lic  A d m in istra t io n  
and  th e  F in a n cia l R e la tio n s C o u n cil (R o b /R fv )  a lso  p laye d  an im p o rta n t ro le  (R o b /R fv ,
24 PREVIOUSLY, THIS WAS PRIMARILY A TOPIC ONLY ON THE RESEARCH AGENDA (DE VRIES ET 
AL., 2008).
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20 0 8 ). It s tu d ie d  th e  fin a n cia l c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r m u n ic i­
p a lit ie s, and  w h e th e r th is  w o u ld  re q u ire  a re fo rm  o f th e  cu rre n t sy ste m  o f stru ctu ra l 
g o v e rn m e n t g ra n ts. T h e  stu d y  c o n c lu d e d  th a t a lth o u g h  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m ig h t 
re su lt  in a d e cre a se  in in co m e  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s , a re fo rm  o f th e  cu rre n t g ra n t system  
w o u ld  n o t b e n e e d e d . T h is  stu d y  g e n e ra te d  a g re a t d eal o f m e d ia  a tte n tio n . In the 
sa m e  ye ar, th e  th e n  N e th e rla n d s In stitu te  fo r  S p a tia l R e se arch  (RPB, c u rre n tly  PBL)  
p u b lish e d  a stu d y  a b o u t th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r th e  h o u sin g  
m a rk e t (V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ). T h is  c o n c lu d e d  th a t a d e clin e  in th e  n u m b e r o f  h o u se ­
h o ld s  co u ld  n e g a tiv e ly  affect th e  h o u s in g  m a rk e t and  w o u ld  re q u ire  an a d a p ta tio n  of 
h o u s in g  m a rk e t p o lic ie s  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and re g io n s. F ina lly, th e  c h a n g e  o f m in iste r 
(in  2 0 0 8 )25, to g e th e r w ith  so m e  lo b b y in g  on b e h a lf  o f th e  p ro v in c e  o f L im b u rg  and 
th e  c o lla b o ra tin g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  o f P a rkstad  L im b u rg  (ca lle d  re g io n a l o rg a n isa tio n  
P a rkstad  L im b u rg ) stim u la te d  a tte n tio n  fo r  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . T h e se  m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  in v ite d  th e  th e n  n e w  m in is te r  (V an d e r Laan) to  v is it  th e  c ity  o f H e e rle n  and 
sh o w e d  h im  th e  sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. In F e b ru a ry  20 0 9 , the 
re g io n a l o rg a n isa tio n  P a rkstad  L im b u rg  p u b lish e d  a stu d y, to g e th e r w ith  th e  N ICIS  
In stitu te  (La tte n  and  M u ste rd , 20 0 9 ), and  o rg a n ise d  a c o n fe re n c e  on sh rin k a g e  (D e  
n ie u w e g r o e i h e e t k rim p )  (N IC IS  and  P a rkstad  L im b u rg , 20 09).
A fte r  th e  su b je ct had  b e e n  p u t on th e  n a tio n a l p o litica l a g e n d a , m a n y  in itia tiv e s 
fo llo w e d . In 20 0 9 , in re sp o n se  to  th e  stu d y  b y  R o b /R fv  (20 0 8 ), th e  D u tch C a b in e t 
d e cla re d  th a t it su b scrib e d  to  th e  m ain  c o n c lu s io n s. It a lso  state d  th a t m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  fa c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  sh o u ld  d e v e lo p  sp e c ific  p o lic ie s. It a rg u e d  th a t the  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  th e m se lv e s  sh o u ld  h a ve  th e  m ain  re s p o n s ib ility  fo r d e a lin g  w ith  d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e. In sp ite  o f th is , th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t a n n o u n ce d  th a t it w o uld  
fo rm u la te  an a ctio n  p lan  a b o u t p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  to  su p p o rt m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in th e ir  
p o lic y  c h a lle n g e  (T w e e d e  K am er, 20 0 9 a).
In 20 0 9 , in p re p a ra tio n  fo r  th e  a ctio n  p lan , d iffe re n t in itia tiv e s  w e re  set up b y  the 
M in istry  o f H o u sin g , S p a tia l P la n n in g  and  th e  E n v iro n m e n t (VRO M ), th e  M in istry  of 
th e  In te rio r and  K in g d o m  R e la tio n s (BZK), th e  A s so c ia t io n  o f N e th e rla n d s 
M u n ic ip a lit ie s  (V N C ), and th e  A s so c ia t io n  o f th e  p ro v in c e s  o f th e  N e th e rla n d s (IPO).
A  to p  te a m  on sh rin k a g e  (led  b y  D ijkstal and  M a n s) w a s in sta lle d  to  stu d y  th e  s h rin k ­
in g  re g io n s o f P a rkstad  L im b u rg , Z e e la n d  and  G ro n in g e n . T h is  to p  te a m  co n clu d e d  
th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s a stru ctu ra l p h e n o m e n o n  th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  should  
a n tic ip a te  (D ijk sta l and  M ans, 20 0 9 a , b, c; D ijksta l, 20 0 9 ). T h e  M in istry  o f H o usin g, 
S p a tia l P la n n in g  and  th e  E n v iro n m e n t, to g e th e r w ith  th e  M in istry  o f th e  In te rio r and
25 THE THEN MINISTER OF HOUSING, VOGELAAR, RESIGNED AND HER SUCCESSOR WAS MINIS­
TER VAN DER LAAN.
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K in g d o m  R e la tio n s, o rg a n ise d  a co n g re ss  on th e  o p p o rtu n itie s  o f d e clin e, to  inform  
lo cal a d m in istra to rs  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  its ch a lle n g e s  (M in iste rie  van 
V R O M  and  M in iste rie  va n  BZK, 20 0 9 a ). A  n a tio n a l n e tw o rk  on p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  
(N a tio n a a l N e tw e rk  B e v o lk in g s d a lin g  (N N B ))  (M in iste rie  van BZK, 2 0 0 9 ) w a s set u p 26 
and  a w e b s ite  (w w w .v a n m e e rn a a rb e te r.n l) w a s la u n ch ed  to stim u la te  re se a rc h e rs  
and  g o v e rn m e n ts  to  e x ch a n g e  th e ir  k n o w le d g e  and  e x p e rie n c e  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e . In a d d it io n , th e  m in istrie s  c o m m iss io n e d  se ve ra l c o n su lta n c ie s  to  in v e stig a te  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  its c o n se q u e n ce s  (L o u te r et al., 20 0 9 ; G ro e n  et al., 20 0 9 ).
T h e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  in itia tiv e s  w e re  used  as in p u t fo r th e  a ctio n  p lan  a b o u t p o p u la ­
tio n  d e clin e  w h ic h  w a s la u n ch ed  b y  th e  M in istry  o f H o u sin g , S p a tia l P la n n in g  and the 
E n v iro n m e n t (VRO M ), th e  M in istry  o f  th e  In te rio r and  K in g d o m  R e la tio n s  (BZK), the 
A s so c ia t io n  o f N e th e rla n d s M u n ic ip a lit ie s  (V N C ), and  th e  A s so c ia t io n  o f th e  p ro v in c ­
es o f th e  N e th e rla n d s (IPO ), in th e  a u tu m n  o f 20 0 9  (M in iste rie  van  B Z K  et al., 2 0 0 9 )27. 
T h e  a ctio n  p lan  fo cu se d  m a in ly  on m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and  re g io n s th a t w e re  a lre a d y  
fa c in g , o r in th e  n e a r fu tu re  w e re  e x p e cte d  to face , c o n s id e ra b le  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e, 
and  w h e re  p ro b le m s w o u ld  e m e rg e  if  p o licy  w o u ld  re m a in  u n ch a n g e d . In th is  plan, 
a ctio n s  w e re  fo rm u la te d  fo r  s h rin k in g  re g io n s to  im p le m e n t, b o th  in th e  sh o rt and 
th e  lo n g  term , in th e  fie ld s  o f h o u sin g , e d u ca tio n , e m p lo y m e n t, and  sp a tia l p lan n in g . 
In F e b ru a ry  20 10 , th e  p lan  w a s d iscu sse d  in p a rlia m e n t (T w e e d e  K am er, 2 0 10 )28.
A fte r  th e  a ctio n  p lan , d iffe re n t in itia tiv e s  w e re  in tro d u ce d . In o rd e r to  in fo rm  m u ­
n ic ip a lit ie s , so c ie ta l g ro u p s, b u s in e sse s  and  c it ize n s  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , the 
A s so c ia t io n  o f N e th e rla n d s M u n ic ip a lit ie s  (V N C ) o rg a n ise d  a b u s to u r to  sh rin k in g  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and  th e  M in istry  o f th e  In te rio r and  K in g d o m  R e la tio n s (B Z K )  o rg a n ­
ised  a ch a t se ss io n  on th e  in te rn e t. In a d d it io n , w ith  th e  fin a n cia l su p p o rt o f the  
M in istry  o f th e  In te rio r and  K in g d o m  R e la tio n s (B Z K )  and  th e  M in istry  o f H ousin g,
26 THIS NETWORK WAS SET UP IN FEBRUARY 2009 BY THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL 
PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM 
RELATIONS, THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG, THE ASSOCIATION OF NETHERLANDS 
MUNICIPALITIES (VNG), ASSOCIATION OF DUTCH HOUSING CORPORATIONS (AEDES), AND THE 
FOUNDATION FOR SECONDARY EDUCATION IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG (STICHTING VOO RTGEZET  
ONDERW IJS PARKSTAD LIMBURG).
27 ALSO SEVERAL STUDIES WERE USED AS INPUT (E.G. DERKS ET AL., 2006A; VAN DAM ET AL., 
2006; ROB/RFV, 2008; VERW EST ET AL., 2008B; BNA, 2009B; LATTEN AND MUSTERD, 2009; MINIS­
TERIE VROM ET AL., 2009; VNG, 2009B; VAN NIMWEGEN AND HEERING, 2009A; KLINKERS ET AL., 
2009; VAN EIKEREN AND SENG., 2009).
28 PRECEDING THE DISCUSSION IN PARLIAMENT ABOUT THE ACTION PLAN TO TACKLE POPULA­
TION DECLINE, THE DUTCH POLITICAL PARTY OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPEAL (CDA)
LAUNCHED A TEN-POINT PLAN TO DEAL WITH POPULATION DECLINE (DIJK ET AL., 2010).
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S p a tia l P la n n in g  and  th e  E n v iro n m e n t (VRO M ), se ve ra l p ilo t p ro je cts  w e re  im p le ­
m e n te d  b y  d iffe re n t p a rtie s  a m o n g  w h ic h  th e  h o u s in g  e x p e rim e n ts  ste e rin g  g ro u p  
(SEV).
From  20 08 , p u b lic  d iscu ss io n  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  a lso  a cce le ra te d . T h e  m e d ia  (in 
d a ily  n e w sp a p e rs29 as w ell as n e w s b ro a d c a sts  on te le v is io n 30) pa id  a lo t o f atte n tio n  
to th e  su b je ct. V a rio u s  in te re st g ro u p s, e sp e c ia lly  th o se  a ctiv e  in th e  fie ld  o f h o u s ­
in g 31, a ct iv e ly  p a rtic ip a te d  in th e  d isc u ss io n s  (C o m p a n e n , 2 0 0 8 32; BN A, 20 0 9 b ; NVM , 
20 10 ; V N G , 20 0 9 c). T h e se  g ro u p s  a lso  o rg a n ise d  co n fe re n c e s  on th e  su b je c t (e.g. 
BN A, 20 0 9 a ; V N G , 20 0 9 b ).
S in ce  20 0 8 , a ca d e m ic  d isc u ss io n  in th e  N e th e rla n d s h a s b e e n  g ro w in g . S e ve ral D utch 
jo u rn a ls  h a v e  p u b lish e d  sp e cia l e d itio n s  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e 33, and  m a n y  
a rtic le s  h a v e  b een  w ritte n  on th is  su b je ct in th e  D u tch m a g a z in e s34. D utch 
k n o w le d g e  in st itu te s35 a lso  h a v e  a ctiv e ly  p a rtic ip a te d  in th e  d iscu ss io n s, and  have 
p u b lish e d  se ve ra l stu d ie s  on th e  effect o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r d iffe re n t p o licy  
fie ld s  (V an D am  et al., 20 0 6 ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ; V a n  N im w e g e n  
and  H eering,
29 NEWSPAPERS, SUCH AS TROUW, A LG EM EEN  DAGBLAD, H E T  FIN A N CIEELE DAGBLAD  AND DE  
VOLKSKRANT.
30 ZEMBLA, E E N  VANDAAG AND BUITENHOF.
31 E.G. ASSOCIATION OF DUTCH HOUSING CORPORATIONS (AEDES), ROYAL INSTITUTE OF 
DUTCH ARCHITECTS (BNA), DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND REAL 
ESTATE EXPERTS (NVM), DUTCH EXPERT CENTRE FOR URBAN RENEWAL (KEI), ASSOCIATION 
OF NETHERLANDS MUNICIPALITIES (VNG) AND ASSOCIATION OF THE PROVINCES OF THE 
NETHERLANDS (IPO).
32 THIS STUDY WAS COMMISSIONED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF DUTCH HOUSING CORPORATIONS 
(AEDES).
33 FOR EXAMPLE, CH R ISTELIJKE D EM OCRATISCHE VERKEN NINGEN  (KLINKERS ET AL, 2008), 
PROPERTY RESEARCH QUARTERLY (CHRISTIAANSE ET AL., 2007), BENM  (ENGELEN ET AL., 
2008), DEM OS  (BRONSEMA ET AL., 2009; VAN NIMWEGEN AND HEERING, 2009B), NOORDE- 
B R E E D T E  (LEENES, 2009) AND ROOILIJN  (MAARSE ET AL., 2010).
34 FOR EXAMPLE, ROOILIJN, GEO GRAFIE, ESB, DEMOS, ROM, B&G AND VITALE STAD.
35 FOR EXAMPLE, THE PBL NETHERLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY, THE
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE FINANCIAL RELATIONS COUNCIL (ROB/RFV), 
NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR TRANSPORT POLICY ANALYSIS (KIM), N ICIS  (KNOWLEDGE 
INSTITUTE FOR URBAN ISSUES), NETHERLANDS INTERDISCIPLINARY DEMOGRAPHIC INSTI­
TUTE (NIDI) AND THE COUNCIL FOR RURAL AREA (RLG).
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2 0 0 9 a ; RLG, 20 0 9 ; H arm s et al., 20 10 ), and  a n u m b e r o f c o n g re sse s  a lso  h a v e  been 
o rg a n ise d  on th e  su b je c t36.
1.5 INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND PLANNING
A t th e  tim e  th is  stu d y  w a s sta rte d  (20 0 8 ), little  a tte n tio n  w a s p aid  to  p la n n in g  fo r  d e ­
m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , e ith e r in a ca d e m ic  d iscu ss io n  o r in actu al p ra ctice , n e ith e r in the 
N e th e rla n d s n o r in o th e r co u n trie s . A tte n tio n  w a s still fo cu se d  on m a n a g in g  urban 
g ro w th  ra th e r th a n  urb an d e clin e . A n  e x ce p tio n  w a s th e  a ca d e m ic  d iscu ss io n  th at 
to o k  p la ce  p r im a rily  in th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  and  th e  U n ited  K in g d o m  on urb an d e c lin e 37 
(B e a u re g a rd , 19 9 3; B e a u re g a rd , 20 01; B e a u re g a rd , 20 0 8 ; M u m fo rd  and  P o w er, 2002; 
G la e s e r and  G y o u rk o  20 0 5; G la e se r et al. 20 0 6 ; B erg  et al., 19 8 2 ; C o u ch  et al. 2005; 
T u ro k  &  M y k h n e n k o , 20 0 6 ; N uissl et al., 20 07; H aa se  et al., 20 0 8 ; D ow n, 19 9 7; Dow n,
1 9 9 9 ). H o w e v e r, th o se  stu d ie s fo cu se d  on p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  ca u se d  b y  m ig ra tio n  
fro m  c ity  c e n tre s  to  su b u rb a n  a re a s  (su b u rb a n isa t io n  and  urb an sp ra w l), in co n tra st 
to  th is  p re se n t stu d y  (d e c lin e  cau se d  n o t o n ly  b y  a n e g a tiv e  m ig ra tio n  b a la n ce  but 
a lso  b y  a n e g a tiv e  n a tu ra l b a la n ce ). M o re o v e r, th e  e x ist in g  lite ra tu re  on urb an  d e ­
clin e  ra re ly  ta k e s  re g io n a l sh rin k a g e  (sh rin k in g  re g io n s) in to  c o n s id e ra tio n . P la n n ers 
w h o  did try  to  fin d  p o lic y  re sp o n se s to  th is  urb an  d e c lin e  fo cu se d  on re g e n e ra tin g  
th e  d e p riv e d  in n e r c ities.
G e rm a n y  w a s o n e  o f th e  f irst co u n trie s  w ith  an a ca d e m ic  and p la n n in g  d e b a te  a b o u t 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . It sta rte d  a ro u n d  th e  y e a r 20 0 0  and  w a s tr ig g e re d  b y  th e  d e­
m o g ra p h ic  s itu a tio n  and  d e m o g ra p h ic  fo re c a sts38. A t  th a t tim e , m a n y  c itie s  and
36 FOR EXAMPLE, IN 2009, THE NETHERLANDS DEMOGRAPHIC SOCIETY (NVD) ORGANISED A 
NATIONAL CONGRESS ABOUT GROWTH AND DECLINE IN THE NETHERLANDS (NVD, 2009).
IN THAT YEAR, THE DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHERS ORGANISED A 
CONGRESS ABOUT THE TURBULENT TIMES IN THE HOUSING MARKET, WHICH ALSO PAID 
ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (VOGON, 2009), AND THE UNIVERSITY OF AMSTER­
DAM ORGANISED AN INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ENTITLED ‘SHRINKING CITIES IN EUROPE: A 
RESEARCH AND POLICY CHALLENGE' (UVA, 2009).
37 THE LITERATURE ON URBAN DECLINE PRIMARILY FOCUSES ON CHANGES IN URBANISATION 
PATTERNS OF CITIES THAT HAVE LOST PART OF THEIR POPULATION TO SUBURBAN AREAS. 
ALSO, IT OFTEN DISCUSSES THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION FROM INDUSTRIAL TOWARDS 
POST-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES AND THE WAY THIS INFLUENCES CITIES. FINALLY, THE 
LITERATURE ON URBAN DECLINE ALSO PAYS ATTENTION TO THE PLANNING RESPONSES TO 
RECOVER DISTRESSED CITY CENTRES (PALLAGST, 2008).
38 FOR MORE INFORMATION ON CURRENT FORECASTS, SEE BUNDESINSTITUT FÜR BAU-, STADT
UND RAUMFIRSCHUNG (BBSR) (2009).
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re g io n s -  e sp e c ia lly  in fo rm e r East G e rm a n y  - fa ce d  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , and  the 
p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  e x p e cte d  th a t, in th e  n e a r fu tu re , so m e  o f th e  c itie s  and 
d istricts  in w e ste rn  G e rm a n y 39 a lso  w o u ld  b e c o n fro n te d  w ith  th is  s itu a tio n . In 
re sp o n se , v a r io u s  fe d e ra l state s in e a ste rn  G e rm a n y  fo rm u la te d  u rb an  re stru c tu r­
in g  p o lic ie s  (W ie ch m a n n , 20 0 8 , p .20 ). Fo r all o f G e rm a n y, p ro je c tio n s  a lso  p re d icte d  
a p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  in th e  n e a r fu tu re . A  re p o rt on h o u s in g  v a ca n c ie s  (W o h n u n g ­
s w irts c h a ft lic h e r  S tru k tu rw a n d e l in d en  n e u e n  B u n d e slä n d e rn )  th a t w a s co m m iss io n e d  
b y  th e  G e rm a n  Fed eral G o v e rn m e n t, re ce ive d  m u ch  p u b lic  a tte n tio n  and  p layed  
a p iv o ta l ro le . T h e  re p o rt a n a ly se d  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e  h o u s in g  m arke t 
p ro b le m  and  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (G lo c k  and H ä u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 ; P a lla g st, 20 08 ; 
W ie ch m a n n , 20 08 ).
T h is  w a s n o t th e  f irst t im e  th a t th is  su b je c t had  b een  a d d re sse d  in G e rm a n y . In 
19 8 7, fo r e x a m p le , H ä u sse rm a n n  and  S ieb el a lre a d y  a rg u e d  th a t  sh rin k in g  cities 
w e re  a n e w  ty p e  o f u rb an  c h a lle n g e  w ith  a d iffe re n t p ro file  th a n  th a t o f  g ro w in g  
c ities. T h e y  a rg u e d  th a t it w a s n o t p o ss ib le  to  re v e rse  th is  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  into 
d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  and , th e re fo re , th e  g o v e rn m e n ts  sh o u ld  a d a p t th e ir  p o lic ie s 
(H ä u sse rm a n n  and  S ie b e l, 19 8 7; G lo ck, 20 0 6 ; P a lla g st, 20 0 8 ). H o w e v e r, th is  t im e  (in
2 0 0 0 ) th e  d e b a te  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w a s fu rth e r e la b o ra te d . It w a s su p p o rte d  
b y  th e  fa c t th a t m o re  and  m o re  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (a lso  in w e ste rn  G e rm a n y ) w e re  
fa c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e 40, and, in 20 0 3, th e  p o p u la tio n  d e clin ed  in th e  w h o le  
o f G e rm a n y  (S ta tist isc h e s  B u n d e sa m t D e u tsch la n d , 20 0 6 , p .14 ). V a rio u s  in itia tiv e s 
w e re  d e v e lo p e d 41 and  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  b e c a m e  a to p ic  in th e  m e d ia . In 2002, 
th e  G e rm a n  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t, to g e th e r w ith  six  fe d e ra l sta te s, la u n ch e d  a se ve n - 
y e a r p ro g ra m m e  called  S ta d tu m b a u  O st  on urb an re n e w a l in th e  e a ste rn  p a rt o f  the
39 GERMANY HAS FOUR GOVERNMENT LEVELS: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE GERMAN 
STATES (LÄNDER), THE DISTRICTS AND THE MUNICIPALITIES. THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF 
DISTRICTS, RURAL DISTRICTS (LANDKREIS) AND URBAN DISTRICTS (KR EISFREIE  
STADT/STADTKREIS). CITIES WHICH HAVE MORE THAN 100,000 INHABITANTS OFTEN ARE 
URBAN DISTRICTS. THERE ARE 313 RURAL DISTRICTS AND 17 URBAN DISTRICTS IN GERMANY.
40 THIS CAN BE ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT BETWEEN 1995 AND 2006, 191 (43% ) OF 
GERMAN DISTRICTS (439) WERE FACING A POPULATION DECLINE (STATISTISCHES BUNDE­
SAMT DEUTSCHLAND, 2008). BETWEEN 2003 AND 2020, 60%  OF GERMAN DISTRICTS ARE 
EXPECTED TO FACE A POPULATION DECLINE. FOR THE SAME PERIOD, ONE THIRD OF GERMAN 
MUNICIPALITIES IS PROJECTED TO SHRINK, ONE THIRD IS EXPECTED TO GROW, AND ONE 
THIRD IS EXPECTED TO HAVE ZERO POPULATION GROWTH (BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, 2006, 
P.16). ONLY MUNICIPALITIES WITH MORE THAN 5,000 INHABITANTS ARE INCLUDED IN THIS 
INVENTORY.
41 THE CITY OF LEIPZIG IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THE PIONEER IN THIS DEVELOPMENT 
(PALLAGST, 2008).
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co u n try , w ith  a b u d g e t o f 2.5 b illio n  e u ro s  to  im p le m e n t it (W ie ch m a n n , 20 0 8 ). Th is 
p ro g ra m m e  is a im e d  at st im u la t in g  G e rm a n  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and sta te s  (L ä n d e r)  to 
d e v e lo p  p o lic ie s  ( in c lu d in g  on sp a tia l p la n n in g ) fo r d e a lin g  w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e c lin e 42. Later, a s im ila r  p ro g ra m m e  on th e  u rb an  re n e w a l o f th e  w e ste rn  p a rt of 
th e  c o u n try  (S ta d tu m b a u  W e st)  a lso  w a s la u n ch e d . G e rm a n y ’s Fed eral C u ltu ra l 
F o u n d a tio n  set up a p ro je ct e n title d  ‘S h rin k in g  C it ie s ’, led  b y  P h ilip p  O sw alt, to g e th e r 
w ith  th e  L e ip z ig  G a lle ry  o f C o n te m p o ra ry  A rt, th e  B au h a u s D essa u  Fo u n d a tio n  and 
m a g a z in e  A rch p lu s, w h ic h  re su lte d  in se ve ra l b o o k s and  an in te rn a tio n a l e x h ib itio n  
th a t h a s to u re d  E u ro p e  and  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  (O sw a lt, 20 0 4 ; O sw a lt et al., 2005; 
O sw a lt and  R ien iets, 20 06).
A lth o u g h  se ve ra l stu d ie s  (e .g . H u tte r et al., 20 0 3; M u ller, 20 0 4 ; G lo ck, 20 0 6 ; W ie c h ­
m an n , 20 0 3, 20 0 8 ; S ie d e n to p  and  W ie ch m a n n , 2 0 0 7 ) h a v e  in v e stig a te d  th e  su b je ct 
p ro fo u n d ly , m o st a p p ro a c h e s  w e re  m o re  p ra ctica l (e .g . W ie ch m a n n  and  S ie d e n to p , 
20 0 6 ; Kil 20 0 4; Kil 20 0 8 ; K o ck s and  G a tzw e ile r, 2 0 0 6 ) ra th e r th an  a ca d e m ic , in th e  
se n se  th a t th e y  su g g e ste d  h a n d s-o n  p o lic y  a ctio n s. T h e  w o rk  b y  G lo c k  (2 0 0 6 ) is the 
m o st re le v a n t to  th is  stu d y. Sh e  c o m p a re d  local p o lic ie s  o f tw o  sh rin k in g  G e rm a n  
c it ie s  (D u isb u rg  and  L e ip z ig ) and  co n c lu d e d  th a t L e ip z ig  had  ch a n g e d  its p o lic ie s  
w h e re a s  D u isb u rg  had  not. S h e  e x p la in e d  th is  b y  re fe rrin g  to d iffe re n t a sp e cts , such 
as p o litica l ch a n g e s and  d iffe re n ce s in p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n . S h e  a rg u e d  th a t d iffe r­
e n ce s  in p o lic y  re a c tio n s  co u ld  p a rtly  b e e x p la in e d  b y  th e  fa c t th a t L e ip z ig  p erce ive d  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  as a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m , w h e re a s  in D u isb u rg  it w a s v ie w e d  as a 
te m p o ra ry  s itu atio n .
In th e  U n ited  S tate s, th e  te rm  s h r in k in g  c it ie s  re c e n tly  e m e rg e d  as a n e w  te rm  in 
u rb an  p la n n in g  and d e v e lo p m e n t (P a lla g st, 20 0 8 ). A t tw o  d iffe re n t US u n ive rsitie s, 
re se a rch  in itia tiv e s  w e re  set up a ro u n d  th is  su b je ct. In 20 0 4 , th e  B e rk e le y  In stitu te  
o f U rb a n  and  R e g io n a l D e v e lo p m e n t ( IU R D ) o f th e  U n iv e rsity  o f C a lifo rn ia , set up 
th e  S h rin k in g  C it ie s  In tern a tio n a l S ch o o l G ro u p  and  e sta b lish e d  th e  S h rin k in g  C ities 
In te rn a tio n a l R e se arch  N e tw o rk  (S C iR N ). In 20 0 6 , th e  S C iR N  o rg a n ise d  a c o n fe re n ce  
in D re sd e n , e n tit le d  ‘C o p in g  w ith  C ity  S h rin k a g e  and  D e m o g ra p h ic  C h a n g e  - Lesso n s 
fro m  a ro u n d  th e  G lo b e ’, and, in 20 07, it o rg a n ise d  a c o n fe re n c e  e n title d  ‘T h e  Fu ture 
o f S h rin k in g  C it ie s ’ at th e  B e rk e le y  IU R D . T h e  K ent S ta te  U n iv e rs ity ’s C le ve la n d  
U rb a n  D esign C o lla b o ra tiv e  (C U D C ), to g e th e r w ith  C le v e la n d  S ta te  U n iv e rs ity ’s Levin 
C o lle g e  o f U rb a n  A ffa irs, set up th e  S h rin k in g  C itie s  In stitu te , in 20 0 5, to  a d d re ss  the  
issu e  o f u rb an  sh rin k a g e . In 20 0 8 , th e y  p u b lish e d  th e  stu d y  ‘C it ie s  G ro w in g  S m a lle r’ 
(R u g a re  and  S ch w a rz , 20 0 8 ; B e a u re g a rd , 20 08 ).
42 A RESULT FROM THIS PROGRAMME WAS THE INTERNAL BUILDING EXHIBITION, ORGANISED IN 
SAXONY-ANHALT, IN 2010 (IBA-BÜRO GBR, 2007, 2009, 2010).
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In th e  U n ited  S tate s, th e  d e b a te  on s h rin k in g  c it ie s  is d iffe re n t fro m  th a t in Europ e 
(m o re  sp e c ific a lly  in G e rm a n y). T h e  US d e b a te  d o e s n o t use th e  te rm  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e ; it re fe rs  o n ly  to  sh rin k in g  c ities. T h e  S C iR N  d e fin e s  a s h rin k in g  c ity  as a 
d e n se ly  p o p u la te d  u rb an  a re a  w ith  a m in im u m  p o p u la tio n  o f 10 ,0 0 0 , w h ic h  has faced  
p o p u la tio n  lo sse s  in la rg e  p a rts  o f th e  area, fo r a p e rio d  o f m o re  th a n  tw o  ye a rs , and 
is u n d e rg o in g  e c o n o m ic  tra n sfo rm a tio n s  th a t sh o w  sy m p to m s o f a stru ctu ra l crisis  
(P a lla g st, 20 0 8 , p .7). T h e  w a y  in w h ich  S C iR N  d e fin e s  s h rin k in g  c it ie s  sh o w s th a t the 
d e b a te  is s im ila r to  th a t on u rb an  d e clin e, w h ich  m e a n s th a t it fo cu se s  on p o p u la tio n  
d e clin e  ca u se d  b y  a n e g a tiv e  lo cal m ig ra tio n  b a la n c e  (ra th e r th a n  a n e g a tiv e  n atura l 
b a la n ce ), th e  n e g a tiv e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f th is  o u tw a rd  m o v e m e n t fo r  th e  in n e r cities, 
and  th e  u rb an  p o licy  n e e d e d  to so lv e  th e se  p ro b le m s (P a lla g st, 20 08 ).
In o th e r co u n trie s , to o, th e re  is re se a rch  into  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  th a t h a s been 
p re se n te d  and  d iscu sse d  at se ve ra l in te rn a tio n a l c o n g re sse s, fo r  e x a m p le , at the 
E u ro p e a n  N e tw o rk  fo r  H o u sin g  R e se a rch  (E N H R ) and  th e  W o rld  P la n n in g  S ch o o ls  
C o n g re ss  (W P SC ).
1.6 RELEVANCE FOR THEORY AND PLANNING
T h is  stu d y  is re le v a n t to  b o th  a ca d e m ic  d e b a te  and  p la n n in g  p ra ctice . First, it a im s 
to d e e p e n  in te rn a tio n a l and  n a tio n a l a ca d e m ic  d e b a te  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and 
sp a tia l p la n n in g , w h ich , until n o w , has b een  lim ite d  (se e  S e ctio n s  1.4  and  1.5 ); the 
fo cu s  h a s b e e n  m o re  on a c c o m m o d a tin g  (d e m o g ra p h ic )  g ro w th , th a n  on sh rin k in g  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and  re g io n s. T h e  w o rk  th a t h a s b e e n  d o n e  m a in ly  fo cu se s  on in n e r 
c it ie s  sh rin k in g  (u rb an  d e c lin e ) as a re su lt  o f s u b u rb a n isa tio n . T h is  stu d y, h o w ever, 
fo cu se s  on sh rin k in g  re g io n s and  sh rin k a g e  th a t is cau se d , n o t o n ly  b y  a n e g a tive  
m ig ra tio n  b a la n ce , b u t a lso  b y  a n e g a tiv e  n a tu ra l b a la n ce . A s  o n e q u a rte r o f the  
E u ro p e a n  re g io n s c u rre n tly  fa c e s  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  and , a cc o rd in g  to th e  p ro je c ­
tio n s, th is  n u m b e r is e x p e cte d  to  g ro w  to o n e th ird , th is  is c le a rly  an im p o rta n t 
su b je c t fo r re se a rch  (E u ro sta t, 2 0 0 9 a ) (se e  A p p e n d ix  3). T h e  co n ce p tu a l fra m e w o rk  
th a t w a s d e v e lo p e d  fo r  th is  s tu d y  a lso  co u ld  b e u sefu l fo r  a n a ly s in g  lo cal g o v e rn ­
m e n t p o lic y  re a c tio n s  in o th e r co u n trie s.
S e co n d , th is  stu d y  is re le v a n t to  th e  a ca d e m ic  d e b a te  on p o licy  c h a n g e s, in g e n e ra l. 
T h e  stu d y  u se s th e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t A p p ro a ch  in o rd e r to  u n d e rsta n d  p o licy  
d yn a m ics. T h is  a p p ro a ch  is o fte n  critic ise d  fo r b e in g  to o  static , b u t th e  w a y  it is used 
h e re  -  to  in v e st ig a te  p o lic y  d y n a m ics  -  m ig h t b e re le v a n t to  o th e r in v e st ig a t io n s  of 
p o lic y  ch a n g e .
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Fin ally, th is  stu d y  a lso  co u ld  b e n e fit  p la n n in g  p ra ctice . It g iv e s  an o v e rv ie w  o f ho w  
lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  in sh rin k in g  re g io n s are  d e a lin g  w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. As 
th is  is a n e w  ch a lle n g e , th is  in fo rm a tio n  co u ld  b e usefu l fo r  lo cal p la n n e rs  w h o  are 
a ctiv e  in o th e r re g io n s th a t are  sh rin k in g  o r a re  e x p e cte d  to sh rin k. T h is  stu d y  su p ­
p o rts  th e  e x ch a n g e  o f k n o w le d g e  and  e x p e rie n c e  b e tw e e n  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  fa c in g  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . It co u ld  a lso  b e re le v a n t to  n a tio n a l p la n n e rs, b e ca u se  it offers 
in s ig h t in to  c o n d it io n s  th a t in flu e n ce  th e  w a y  in w h ich  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  d eal w ith  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . T h is  in s ig h t co u ld  b e h e lp fu l to  th e  D u tch G o v e rn m e n t, as it 
h a s re c e n tly  starte d  to e n c o u ra g e  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  to  a n tic ip a te  th is  d eclin e.
1.7 RESEARCH METHOD
In o rd e r to  a n sw e r th e  ce n tra l q u e stio n s, th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  w a s u sed . In total, 
th re e  sh rin k in g  re g io n s w e re  a n a ly se d : P a rkstad  L im b u rg , th e  E e m sd e lta , and 
Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n . A ll ca se s a re  lo ca te d  w ith in  th e  N e th e rla n d s. S h rin k a g e  m ay 
o c cu r a cc o rd in g  to th re e  d im e n sio n s: p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld s  and  w o rk in g  age 
p o p u la tio n  (p e o p le  in th e  a g e  g ro u p  o f 20 to  65). S h rin k in g  re g io n s in th is  stu d y  h ave 
b e e n  d e fin e d  as re g io n s in w h ich  th e  m a jo rity  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h a v e  fa ce d  a d e clin e  
in at le a st o n e  o f th e  th re e  d im e n s io n s  (b e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 ), and  th o se  th a t are 
e x p e cte d  to do so in th e  fu tu re  (up  to  20 25).
P a rkstad  L im b u rg  is lo ca te d  in th e  so u th  o f th e  N e th e rla n d s and  co n sists  o f seven  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s : H eerlen , K e rkra d e , B ru n ssu m , La n d g ra a f, V o e re n d a a l, O n d e rb a n k e n  
and  S im p e lv e ld 43. T h e  E e m sd e lta  is lo ca te d  in th e  n o rth  o f th e  N e th e rla n d s and 
c o n s ists  o f fo u r m u n ic ip a lit ie s : D elfzijl, A p p in g e d a m , E e m sm o n d  and  Lo p p e rsu m . 
Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n  is lo ca te d  in th e  so u th -w e st o f th e  N e th e rla n d s and  co n sists  of 
th re e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s : Te rn e u ze n , S lu is  and H ulst. O f th e  th re e  re g io n s, it is o n ly  in 
P a rkstad  L im b u rg  th a t th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  fo rm  o n e  sta tu to ry  b o d y  (W g r-p lu s  
re g io n 44), w h ic h  h a s so m e  fo rm a l ta sk s  in c lu d in g  th e  fo rm u la t io n  o f a reg io n al
43 DURING THIS STUDY, THE NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES CONNECTED TO PARKSTAD LIMBURG 
WAS EXTENDED. SINCE NOVEMBER 2009, IT INCLUDES EIGHT MUNICIPALITIES, AFTER THE 
PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN (2003) MUNICIPALITY OF NUTH DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE AGAIN.
44 NEXT TO THE THREE FORMAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS (NATIONAL, 
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL) A FOURTH LEVEL CAN BE DISTINGUISHED: THE W GR-PLUS REGION. 
W GR-PLUS REGION IS A REGION THAT FALLS UNDER THE JOINT REGULATIONS ACT (WET 
G EM EEN SCH A PP ELIJK E R E G E LIN G E N  - WGR). THIS ACT ENABLES LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO 
COOPERATE. IN THE W GR-PLUS  REGION, A NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCES (E.G.
IN THE FIELD OF SPATIAL PLANNING) HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED, FROM LOCAL TO REGIONAL 
LEVELS. IN THE NETHERLANDS CONTAINS EIGHT W GR-PLUS  REGIONS. THE COUNCILS OF THE 
W GR-PLUS REGIONS ARE NOT DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED (SPAANS AND DE WOLFF, 2005).
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h o u s in g  and  e c o n o m ic  p lan . In th e  o th e r tw o  re g io n s, th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c o o p e ra te  in 
so m e  o f th e  p o lic y  fie ld s, b u t th e y  do n o t fo rm  a sta tu to ry  body.
In all case s, b o th  c o n te n t a n a ly s is  and in te rv ie w s h a v e  b een  used  to tra ce  p o licy  
re sp o n se s  b y  local g o v e rn m e n ts  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, th e  su b se q u e n t p o licy  
c h a n g e s, and  th e  co n d itio n s  th a t in flu e n ce  th e se  p o lic y  re a ctio n s. M o st in te rv ie w s 
w e re  held  w ith  g o v e rn m e n t o ffic ia ls  fro m  local, re g io n a l, p ro v in c ia l and  n a tio n a l 
a u th o ritie s . To o b ta in  a c o m p re h e n s iv e  v ie w , re sp o n s ib le  re p re se n ta tiv e s  w e re  
in te rv ie w e d  fro m , fo r  in stan ce , p ro p e rty  d e v e lo p m e n t co m p a n ie s, h o u s in g  a sso c ia ­
tio n s, b u s in e sse s, ch a m b e rs  o f co m m e rc e , c o n fe d e ra tio n  o f sm all and  m e d iu m -s iz e d  
e n te rp rise s  (S M E ). T h e  n u m b e r o f p e o p le  in te rv ie w e d  va ried  p e r case: in Parkstad  
L im b u rg , 27 p e o p le  a ctiv e  in th e  fie ld s  o f sp a tia l p la n n in g , h o u s in g  and  e co n o m y  
w e re  in te rv ie w e d , 18  p e o p le  in th e  E e m sd e lta , and  16 in Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n  (see 
A p p e n d ix  2 fo r  an o v e rv ie w  o f re sp o n d e n ts). M o re  in fo rm a tio n  on th e  re se a rch  
m e th o d  can b e fo u n d  in C h a p te r 4.
1.8 THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK
T h is  b o o k  is stru ctu re d  as fo llo w s. C h a p te rs  2, 3 and 4 p re se n t th e  g e n e ra l fra m e ­
w o rk . C h a p te r 2 d isc u sse s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  its sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s. It 
in tro d u ce s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  m a k e s a d istin ctio n  b e tw e e n  th e  d e clin e  in 
p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs, and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n . It p re se n ts  th e  d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  o f th e  p a st, p re se n t, and  fu tu re , at n a tio n a l, p ro v in c ia l, and 
lo cal g o v e rn m e n t le ve ls. T h e  in fo rm a tio n  on p a st and p re se n t d e v e lo p m e n ts  is b a sed  
on d a ta  fro m  S ta tistic s  N e th e rla n d s. T h e  in fo rm a tio n  on fu tu re  d e v e lo p m e n ts  is 
b a se d  on th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  o f  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (C B S , 20 0 8 b ; 
C B S, 20 0 9 b ) and  th e  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s  b y  th e  PBL 
N e th e rla n d s E n v iro n m e n ta l A s s e s s m e n t A g e n c y  and  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (P B L  and 
C B S, 20 0 9 ). Based  on th e  lite ra tu re , th is  ch a p te r a lso  g iv e s  an o v e rv ie w  o f p o ssib le  
c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r  h o u s in g  and  th e  e co n o m y.
C h a p te r 3 e x p lo re s  th e  lite ra tu re  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  and local (sp a tia l)  p olicy, 
and  on p o licy  d yn a m ics. It m a k e s a d ist in ctio n  b e tw e e n  p o licy  sta b ility , co n se rv a tiv e , 
and  ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e , and  d e scrib e s  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f a co n ce p tu a l m o d el.
T h e  ch a p te r e x p la in s  in m o re  d eta il w h y  th e  PA A  w a s used  as p o in t o f d e p a rtu re  
in th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f th is  th e o re tica l fra m e w o rk . It a lso  d e sc rib e s  th e  a d d itio n s 
th a t w e re  m a d e  in o rd e r to  o v e rc o m e  th e  s h o rtc o m in g s  o f  th is  PA A  a p p ro a ch . Th e  
c o n c e p t’s c o n g ru e n c e  and  lo cal sp a tia l co n d it io n s, fo r e x a m p le , w e re  a d d e d  to 
th e  a p p ro a ch . Finally, it g iv e s  th e  h y p o th e se s  w h ich  w e re  fo rm u la te d  b a sed  on the 
lite ra tu re .
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C h a p te r 4 d e scrib e s  th e  re se a rch  stra te g y  fo r  th e  e m p irica l p art, in m o re  d eta il. It 
p re se n ts  ju st if ic a t io n  fo r  th e  se le ctio n  o f th e  th re e  c a se -stu d y  a re as, and  d e scrib e s  
th o se  in m o re  d eta il. T h o se  ca se  d e sc rip tio n s  p ro v id e  in fo rm a tio n , p a rticu la rly , a b o u t 
th e  past, p re se n t and  e x p e cte d  (p ro je c te d ) fu tu re  d e m o g ra p h ic  s itu atio n .
C h a p te rs  5 and  6 p re se n t th e  f in d in g s  o f th e  e m p irica l re se a rch . C h a p te r 5 co n ta in s 
th e  d e scrip tio n  and  e x p la n a tio n  o f lo cal p o lic y  re a c tio n s  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  in 
th e  fie ld  o f h o u sin g ; C h a p te r 6 d o e s so fo r  th e  fie ld  o f  e co n o m y . Each c h a p te r starts 
b y  d e sc rib in g  th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r  th e  re le v a n t p o lic y  field. 
Q u a n tita t iv e  d a ta  fro m  d iffe re n t d ata  so u rce s  w e re  used  fo r th is. T h e re a fte r, both  
c h a p te rs  d e sc rib e  and  e x p la in  th e  lo cal p o lic ie s  in re la tio n  to th e  c a se -stu d y  areas. 
Each c a se -stu d y  a re a  is d iscu sse d  se p a ra te ly . In a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  co n cep tu a l 
m o d e l, a d ist in ctio n  is m ad e  b e tw e e n  ch a n g e s in d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e ­
m e n t, co n g ru e n c e , local sp a tia l c o n d it io n s  and  a sp e cts  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d eclin e.
F in ally, C h a p te r 7 p re se n ts  th e  co n c lu s io n s  o f th e  re se a rch . It co m b in e s re su lts  fro m  
C h a p te rs  5 and  6, and  d iscu sse s  th e m  in re la tio n  to  th e  h y p o th e se s  fo rm u la te d  in 
C h a p te r 3. C o n c lu s io n s  a re  p re se n te d  and  th e  p ra ctica l and  th e o re tic a l im p lica tio n s  
o f th e  stu d y  are e va lu a te d .
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2 DEMOGRAPIC 
DECLINE AND SPATIAL 
CONSEQUENCES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  ch a p te r d e scrib e s  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in th e  past, p re se n t and 
fu tu re , and  it co n s id e rs  th e  p o ss ib le  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r 
h o u s in g  and  fo r th e  re g io n a l e c o n o m y 1.
2.2 DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN GENERAL
2.2.1 DEFINITION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m e a n s th e  re d u ctio n  in p o p u la tio n  (n u m b e r o f p e o p le ), in 
n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s, o r in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  (th e  m e m b e rs  o f a p o p u la tio n  
b e tw e e n  th e  a g e s o f 20 and  65). It is im p o rta n t to  d istin g u ish  b e tw e e n  th o se  th re e  
ty p e s o f sh rin k a g e , b e ca u se  th e ir  sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s  m a y  b e d iffe re n t (se e  S e ctio n  
2 .4 ).
POPULATION DECLINE
By a p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  is m e a n t th e  d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n  in a p a rt icu la r a re a  (e.g. 
co u n try , p ro v in ce , re g io n  o r m u n ic ip a lity )  o v e r a ce rta in  n u m b e r o f  ye ars. D e m o ­
g ra p h ic  ch a n g e s are  th e  re su lt  o f ch a n g e s in th e  fo llo w in g  co m p o n e n ts : b irth  ra te 2, 
m o rta lity  ra te 3 and  m ig ra tio n  ra te 4. T h e  p o p u la tio n  d e c lin e s  w h e n  th e  n atural
1 THIS CHAPTER IS STRONGLY BASED ON THE RESEARCH ON DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND 
SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT THAT FOCUSED ON PLANNING FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF POPULA­
TION CHANGE (KRIMP EN  RUIMTE. BEVOLKINGSAFNAME, RUIM TELIJKE G EV O LG EN  EN  BELEID) 
(VAN DAM ET AL., 2006).
2 BIRTH RATE IS THE ANNUAL NUMBER OF BIRTHS PER 1,000 PEOPLE.
3 MORTALITY RATE IS THE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DEATHS PER 1,000 PEOPLE.
4 NET MIGRATION RATE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS INTO AND
EMIGRANTS OUT OF AN AREA, OVER A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, USUALLY PER 1,000 INHABIT­
ANTS. WHEN THIS RATE IS POSITIVE, IT MEANS THAT MORE PEOPLE HAVE ENTERED THE AREA
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b a la n c e  (n u m b e r o f  b irth s  m in u s n u m b e r o f d e a th s) and  th e  m ig ra tio n  b a la n ce  (n u m ­
b e r o f im m ig ra n ts  m in u s n u m b e r o f e m ig ra n ts)  b o th  are n e g a tiv e , w h e n  th e  n e g a tive  
n a tu ra l b a la n ce  is la rg e r th a n  th e  p o sitiv e  m ig ra tio n  b a la n ce , o r w h e n  th e  n e g a tive  
m ig ra tio n  b a la n c e  is la rg e r th a n  th e  p o sitiv e  n a tu ra l b a la n ce .
In o rd e r to  re p la c e  th e  p o p u la tio n  e x a c tly  (in  a s itu a tio n  o f zero  n e t m ig ra t io n ) a 
fe rt ility  ra te 5 o f a ro u n d  2.1 is n e e d e d . In th e  N e th e rla n d s, th e  fe rt ility  rate  is aro und  
1.7 , th u s  b e lo w  th e  ra te  n e e d e d  to re p la c e  th e  p o p u la t io n 6.
P o p u la tio n  d e clin e  and  a g e in g  are c lo se ly  re la te d . A n  a g e in g  p o p u la tio n  can c a u se  a 
d e c lin in g  p o p u la tio n , b e c a u se  a g e in g  cau se s  lo w e r b irth  ra te s and  m a y  ca u se  h ig h e r 
m o rta lity  ra te s. T h e  a g e -se x  p y ra m id s7 in S e ctio n  2.3 sh o w  th at, in 20 0 9 , th e  n u m b e r 
o f p e o p le  o v e r th e  a g e  o f 65 is h ig h e r and  th e  n u m b e r o f p e o p le  u n d e r th e  a g e  o f 5 is 
lo w e r th a n  in 19 9 5  (se e  F ig u res 2.3 and  2.4). T h is  h a s to  do w ith  th e  a g in g  b a b y -b o o m  
g e n e ra tio n , and  a lo w  fe rt ility  rate.
HOUSEHOLD DECLINE
W e  sp e a k  o f  a h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  w h e n  th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  in a p a rt icu la r  area 
(e .g . co u n try , p ro v in ce , re g io n  o r m u n ic ip a lity )  d e cre a se s  o v e r a ce rta in  n u m b e r of
THAN HAVE LEFT. WHEN THE MIGRATION RATE IS NEGATIVE, THIS MEANS THAT MORE PEOPLE 
HAVE LEFT THAN HAVE ENTERED.
5 FERTILITY RATE IS THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN. THE FERTILITY 
RATE THAT IS NEEDED IN ORDER TO REPRODUCE THE POPULATION IS DEPENDENT ON THE 
MORTALITY RATE. THEREFORE, THE REPLACEMENT RATE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS 
HIGHER THAN FOR INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES.
6 COMPARED TO OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THIS FERTILITY RATE OF 1.7 IS RELATIVELY 
HIGH. IN MOST EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE FERTILITY RATE IS MUCH LOWER, FOR 
EXAMPLE, 1.24 IN SLOVAKIA AND 1.27 IN POLAND. IN NORWAY, FRANCE AND IRELAND, FERTIL­
ITY RATES ARE THE HIGHEST IN EUROPE, WITH 1.90 IN NORWAY AND IRELAND AND 1.98 IN 
FRANCE (EUROSTAT, 2009B) (SEE ALSO APPENDIX 3).
7 AN A G E -S E X  PYRAMID IS A GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION THAT SHOWS THE POPULATION 
DISTRIBUTION OVER VARIOUS AGE GROUPS. IT CONSISTS OF TWO BAR GRAPHS, SHOWING 
THE NUMBER OF MALES IN A POPULATION (LEFT GRAPH) AND THE NUMBER OF FEMALES 
(RIGHT GRAPH) PER FIVE-YEAR AGE GROUPS (COHORTS). THIS A G E -S E X  DIAGRAM USUALLY
IS PYRAMID-SHAPED. HOWEVER, IN MOST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THE SHAPE IS DIFFER­
ENT. THIS IS DUE TO THE LOW BIRTH RATE, LOW INFANT MORTALITY RATE AND HIGHER
LIFE EXPECTANCY COMPARED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE SHAPE OF THE AGE-SEX 
DIAGRAM FOR THE NETHERLANDS (MUSHROOM) CAN BE EXPLAINED BY THE STABLE BIRTH 
RATE AND THE DECREASING MORTALITY RATE, CAUSING A BROAD TOP OF THE DIAGRAM.
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ye a rs. T h e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  fa lls  w h e n  fe w e r n e w  h o u se h o ld s  are  fo rm e d  than 
th e re  a re  h o u se h o ld s  d isso lve d .
In g e n e ra l, in a g iv e n  a re a  and p e rio d , th e  size  o f th e  p o p u la tio n  d e c lin e  is h ig h e r 
th a n  o f th e  h o u se h o ld  d e c lin e 8. T h is  is ca u se d  b y  th e  d e cre a se  in th e  a v e ra g e  h o u se ­
h o ld  size  (e .g . cau se d  b y  m o re  o n e and  tw o  p e rso n  h o u se h o ld s). T h is  d e cre a se  w e 
se e  in m o st w e ste rn  co u n trie s.
N ot o n ly  ch a n g e s in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s, b u t a lso  in h o u se h o ld  c o m p o sit io n 9 
m a y  affect p o lic y  fie ld s, su ch  as th a t o f h o u sin g . H o w e v e r, th e  fo cu s  o f th is  stu d y  is 
th e  lo cal g o v e rn m e n t re a ctio n  to ch a n g e s in p o p u la tio n  size, h o u se h o ld  s ize s  and 
w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n .
DECLINE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION
T h e  w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n  (p o te n tië le  b e ro e p sb e v o lk in g )  co n ta in s  all p e o p le  
b e tw e e n  th e  a g e s o f 20 and  65: th e se  p e o p le , b e c a u se  o f th e ir  age, are  c o n sid e re d  to 
b e a b le  to  p a rt ic ip a te  in th e  p ro d u c tio n  p ro ce ss  (C B S , 20 0 9 a).
It is im p o rta n t to  n o te  th a t  th e re  is a d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la ­
tio n , th e  la b o u r fo rc e  (a lso  ca lle d  w o rk in g  p o p u la tio n  o r la b o u r su p p ly )  (b e ro e p sb e v ­
o lk in g )  and  th e  e c o n o m ic a lly  a ctiv e  p o p u la tio n  (w e rk z a m e  b e ro e p sb e v o lk in g ).  Th e  
la b o u r fo rce  co n s ists  o f all p e o p le  b e tw e e n  th e  a g e s o f 20 and  65 w h o  a re  p ro fe s ­
s io n a lly  e m p lo ye d  (fo r at le a st 12 h o u rs  a w e e k ), w h o  h a v e  a cce p te d  e m p lo y m e n t 
(fo r  at le a st 12 h o u rs  a w e e k ) o r a re  w illin g  to  w o rk , th o se  w h o  are a v a ila b le  to  w o rk  
(fo r  at le a st 12 h o u rs  a w e e k ) and  are a ctiv e ly  s e a rch in g  fo r  w o rk  (C B S , 20 0 9 a ). The 
e c o n o m ic a lly  a ctiv e  p o p u la tio n , co n sists  o f p e o p le  b e tw e e n  th e  a g e s o f 20 and  65 
w h o  are p ro fe ss io n a lly  e m p lo y e d  (fo r at le a st 12 h o u rs  a w e e k ), p e o p le  w h o  h ave 
a cce p te d  e m p lo y m e n t (fo r at le a st 12 h o u rs  a w eek).
8 SEE FIGURES 2.8 AND 2.9 (SECTION 2 .3 .3).
9 WE CAN DISTINGUISH DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS. THESE TYPES MAY BE BASED ON 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, FOR EXAMPLE, SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS, COUPLES, ONE-PARENT 
HOUSEHOLDS, AND OTHER (REMAINING) HOUSEHOLD TYPES. THE TYPES MAY ALSO BE 
BASED ON THE AGE OF THE REFERENCE PERSON OF THE HOUSEHOLD - IN CASE OF A 
ONE-PARENT HOUSEHOLD THIS IS THE AGE OF THE PARENT, IN CASE OF A COUPLE OF THE 
SAME SEX THIS IS THE AGE OF THE OLDEST PERSON, IN CASE OF A COUPLE OF OPPOSITE 
SEX THIS IS THE AGE OF THE FEMALE (DE JONG, 2007, P. 10-11). EXAMPLES OF THIS LAST 
TYPE ARE YOUNG HOUSEHOLDS (15-39 YEARS), MIDDLE-AGED HOUSEHOLDS (40-64 YEARS), 
AND ELDERLY HOUSEHOLDS (65 YEARS AND OLDER).
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T h e  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  and la b o u r fo rc e  is, th u s, th a t the 
w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  in c lu d e s a lso  th e  p e o p le  b e tw e e n  th e  a g e s o f 20 and  65 w ho  
are  n o t w illin g  o r n o t a b le  to  w o rk, w h ile  th e  la b o u r fo rc e  o n ly  in c lu d e s  th e  p e o p le  
w h o  w o rk , a re  w illin g  o r a re  a b le  to  w o rk.
2.2.2 CAUSES OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m a y  h a v e  a v a r ie ty  o f ca u se s  -  so c io c u ltu ra l d e v e lo p m e n ts, 
e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts, and  sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o licy  -  each  o f w h ic h  m ig h t in flu e n ce  
th e  v a rio u s  ty p e s o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (p o p u la tio n  d e clin e, h o u se h o ld  d e clin e, 
d e clin e  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la t io n ) d iffe re n tly , and  a lso  in flu e n ce  th e  c o m p o n e n ts  of 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (n a tu ra l b a la n ce  and  m ig ra tio n  b a la n c e 10) d ifferen tly.
SOCIOCULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS
S o c io cu ltu ra l d e v e lo p m e n ts , su ch  as in d iv id u a lisa tio n  o r e m a n cip a tio n , m a y  cau se  
fa llin g  fe rt ility  rates. W h e n  th o se  fe rt ility  ra te s d ro p  b e lo w  th e  re p la c e m e n t rates, 
th e  p o p u la tio n  m ig h t d e clin e . W e  se e  a m o v e m e n t in w h ic h  p e o p le  a re  o ld e r w h en  
th e y  d e c id e  to  live  to g e th e r o r m a rry , in w h ich  w o m e n  p o stp o n e  th e ir  d e cis io n  to 
h a v e  th e ir  f irst ch ild , and in w h ic h  m o re  co u p le s  d e cid e  to  sta y  c h ild le ss . T h e se  so cio ­
cu ltu ra l d e v e lo p m e n ts  ca u se  a g e in g  and  a d e clin e  in th e  n u m b e r o f y o u n g  p eo p le .
In th e  lo n g  ru n, th is  can  ca u se  p o p u la tio n  d e c lin e  and  a d e clin e  in w o rk in g  age 
p o p u la tio n  (V an D am  et al., 20 0 6 ). H o w e v e r, th e  sa m e  so c io c u ltu ra l d e v e lo p m e n ts  
m a y  te m p e r th e  d e clin e  in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s. Fo r e x a m p le , in d iv id u a lisa tio n  
m a y  in c re a se  th e  n u m b e r o f s in g le  h o u se h o ld s, th u s  in c re a s in g  th e  to ta l n u m b e r of 
h o u se h o ld s  fo r a g iv e n  p o p u la tio n  (Van Dam  et al., 20 06).
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
S e co n d ly , e c o n o m ic  fa c to rs  m a y  ca u se  all ty p e s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . Th e  
e c o n o m ic  s itu a tio n  in flu e n ce s in w ard  and o u t-m ig ra tio n  (in  a c o u n try  o r re g io n ) of 
p e o p le , h o u se h o ld s, and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n . W h e n  th e  e c o n o m ic  s itu a tio n  is 
p ro sp e ro u s, in w ard  m ig ra tio n  w ill in cre a se  (Van d e r G a a g  et al., 19 9 9 ), and  w h e n  it 
is n e g a tiv e  o u t-m ig ra t io n  w ill in c re a se  (D e Beer, 20 0 4 ). A  n e g a tiv e  e c o n o m ic  s itu a ­
tio n  m a y  ca u se  p la n t c lo su re s  and  a d e cre a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f jo b s. T h is  m ay  in itia te
10 SOCIOCULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY MAY AFFECT 
FERTILITY RATES, BIRTH RATES, LIFE EXPECTANCY, MORTALITY RATES, AND MIGRATION 
RATES, WHICH TOGETHER DETERMINE THE NATURAL BALANCE AND THE MIGRATION 
BALANCE.
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a p ro ce ss  o f (se le c t iv e )  m ig ra tio n  to o th e r a re a s o r co u n trie s . H ence, a n e g a tiv e  
e c o n o m ic  s itu a tio n  m a y  ca u se  m ig ra tio n  th a t le a d s to  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  (F rie d rich s, 
1 9 9 3 , p .9 0 8 ). B e ca u se  it is y o u n g  p e o p le  in p a rt icu la r  w h o  m o v e  in se a rch  o f  w o rk  
(ca lle d  s e le c tiv e  o u t-m ig ra tio n ), th e  sh a re  o f e ld e rly  in th e  e c o n o m ic a lly  le ss p ro sp e r­
o u s re g io n s in cre a se s. T h is  m a y  h a v e  a n e g a tiv e  a ffect on th e  b irth  rate  and  th u s 
cre a te  a n e g a tiv e  n a tu ra l b a la n ce . It m a y  a lso  re su lt  in a fall in p o p u la tio n  and 
w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  (Van D am  et al., 20 06 ).
W e ll-k n o w n  e x a m p le s, in w h ich  th e  a b o v e -m e n tio n e d  d e v e lo p m e n ts  h a v e  taken 
p lace , a re  old in d u str ia lise d  re g io n s, su ch  as L ive rp o o l, M a n ch e ste r, D o rtm u n d , 
Le ip z ig , H alle  and  C h e m n itz . In th o se  a re as, th e  d e clin e  and  c lo su re  o f old in d u str ie s  
(e .g . m in in g  o r te x tile  in d u stry) cau se d  g re a t u n e m p lo y m e n t and s e le c tiv e  o u t­
m ig ra tio n . In th e  N e th e rla n d s, d u rin g  th e  19 6 0 s, s im ila r  d e v e lo p m e n ts  to o k  p lace  
(e .g . c lo su re  o f th e  te x tile  in d u stry  in T w e n te  and  th e  m in in g  in d u stry  in S o u th  L im ­
b u rg ). T h is , h o w e v e r, d id n o t re su lt  in m a jo r d o w n w a rd  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  
(V an  D am  et al., 20 0 6 ), b e c a u se  th e  N e th e rla n d s n e v e r had  su ch  g re a t in d u stria l 
c o n c e n tra t io n s  as d id, fo r  e x a m p le , G e rm a n y  and  England .
B ro e rsm a  and  V a n  D ijk  (20 0 2), w h o  in v e stig a te d  th e  D utch e m p lo y m e n t m arket, 
c o n c lu d e d  th a t, w ith in  th e  N e th e rla n d s, lo ss o f e m p lo y m e n t d o e s n o t im m e d ia te ly  
re su lt  in p o p u la tio n  d e clin e. A  re a so n  fo r  th is  m ig h t b e th a t jo b  lo sse s th a t w e re  
ca u se d  b y  th e  c lo su re  o f  in d u str ie s  re su lte d  in a d e cre a se  in la b o u r p a rtic ip a tio n  rate 
and  an in c re a se  in re g io n a l u n e m p lo y m e n t, b u t did n o t re su lt  in sp a tia l m o b ility  such 
as m ig ra tio n  and  co m m u tin g  (V an Dijk, 20 0 1; B ro e rsm a  and  V a n  Dijk, 2 0 0 2 )11. T h is  is 
p ro b a b ly  c o n n e cte d  w ith  th e  D utch so cia l s e c u rity  sy ste m , w h ich  g u a ra n te e s  e v e ry ­
b o d y  a ce rta in  level o f in co m e . In a d d it io n , n e w  jo b s  w e re  cre a te d  b y  th e  n a tio n a l 
p o lic y  to  d e ce n tra lise  p u b lic  se rv ice s  and  to st im u la te  co m p a n ie s  (b y  m e a n s o f fiscal 
m e a su re s) to  e sta b lish  th e m se lv e s  in th o se  re g io n s (V an d e r K w ast, 20 0 5; V e rslu is , 
20 0 6 ). F in a lly, th e  re la t iv e ly  sh o rt c o m m u te r d ista n ce s  w ith in  th e  N e th e rla n d s could  
a lso  h a v e  an effect: p e o p le  b e c o m in g  u n e m p lo y e d  in o n e re g io n  co u ld  fin d  w o rk  in 
o th e r re g io n s w ith o u t h a v in g  to m o ve  h o u se . T h e  d iscu ss io n  a b o v e  sh o w s that
11 BROERSMA AND VAN DIJK (2002) CONCLUDED THAT, IN THE 1990S, THE RESPONSE OF 
REGIONAL LABOUR MARKETS TO LABOUR DEMAND SHOCKS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT IN THE 
NETHERLANDS THAN IN THE UNITED STATES. IN THE NETHERLANDS, CHANGES IN LABOUR 
DEMAND WERE COMPENSATED BY CHANGES IN LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES AND IN 
REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, WHILE, IN THE UNITED STATES, SUCH CHANGES ARE 
COMPENSATED BY CHANGES IN SPATIAL MOBILITY.
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e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  n eed  n o t a lw a ys  h a ve  c o n se q u e n ce s  fo r  th e  d e m o g ra p h y 12 
(V an D am  et al., 20 0 6 ).
E c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  m a y  in flu e n ce  n o t o n ly  m ig ra tio n  rates, b u t a lso  fe rtility  
ra te s, m o rta lity  ra te s and  eve n  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f h o u se h o ld s. B irth ra te s w ill in cre ase  
w h e n  c o n fid e n c e  in th e  e c o n o m y  g ro w s, and  w h e n  in co m e s rise. In co n tra st, w h en  
c o n fid e n c e  in th e  e c o n o m y  d e cre a se s, b irth  ra te s m a y  a lso  d e cre a se  and  p o p u la tio n  
n u m b e rs  m a y  fall. D u rin g  th e  b o o m in g  e c o n o m y  o f 20 0 0 , th e  b irth  ra te  in th e  N e th e r­
la n d s w a s re la t iv e ly  h ig h , and  d u rin g  th e  e co n o m ic  re ce ss io n  o f  20 0 4  it w a s re la tiv e ly  
lo w  (L a tte n  and  De Jo n g , 20 0 5; V a n  D am  et al., 20 06 ).
E c o n o m ic  p ro sp e r ity  h a s in cre a se d  life  e x p e c ta n c y  b e c a u se  o f in n o v a tio n s  in m e d i­
cal tre a tm e n ts  and  in v e n tio n s  o f n e w  and b e tte r m e d ic in e s; th e se  h a v e  d e cre a se d  
m o rta lity  ra te s. P o p u latio n  d e clin e  h a s s lo w e d  d o w n  and  th e  sh a re  o f e ld e rly  has 
in cre a se d  (V an D am  et al., 20 0 6 ).
F in ally, th e  e c o n o m ic  s itu a tio n  m a y  in flu e n ce  th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  th a t are 
fo rm e d . For e x a m p le , w h e n  th e  level o f w e lfa re  is h igh, and  it is re la t iv e ly  e a sy  to 
fin d  a job , y o u n g  p e o p le  can afford  th e ir  o w n h o u se s  and  a re  a b le  to  live  on th e ir 
o w n . H o w e v e r, w h e n  e m p lo y m e n t is lo w  and u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te s are  h ig h , it w ill 
b e  d ifficu lt (e sp e c ia lly  fo r  y o u n g  p e o p le ) to  fin d  a jo b . In th is  s itu a tio n , y o u n g  p e o p le  
a re  m o re  lik e ly  to  re m a in  liv in g  w ith  th e ir  p a re n ts. T h is  in c re a se s  h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  
(La tte n , 20 0 8 ; V a n  D am  et al., 20 06).
T h e  a b o v e -m e n tio n e d  e x a m p le s  sh o w  th a t it is d ifficu lt to  m a k e  a sh a rp  d ist in ctio n  
b e tw e e n  so cio cu ltu ra l cau se s  and e c o n o m ic  ca u se s. S o c io cu ltu ra l, e c o n o m ic  and  d e ­
m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  a re  in te rre la te d  and , th e re fo re , th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  
th o se  d e v e lo p m e n ts  is c o m p le x  (Van Dam  et al., 20 0 6 , p .25 ) (se e  F ig ure  2.1). S ectio n
2.4  p a y s m o re  a tte n tio n  to  th e  c o m p le x  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  e c o n o m y  and d e m o ­
g ra p h y.
12 IN ORDER TO FIND OUT WHETHER DOWNWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS MAY INFLU­
ENCE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS (AND TO UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHY) IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW WHETHER PEOPLE FOLLOW 
EMPLOYMENT (WHICH MEANS THAT CLOSURES OF INDUSTRIES RESULT IN INCREASED 
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE TO REGIONS WITH AVAILABLE EMPLOYMENT), OR IF EMPLOYMENT 
FOLLOWS PEOPLE (WHICH MEANS THAT COMPANIES MOVE AWAY FROM REGIONS THAT 
EXPERIENCE DOWNWARD DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS, AND GO TO THOSE REGIONS
WHERE POPULATION IS GROWING). REGIONAL ECONOMISTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER 
PEOPLE FOLLOW JOBS OR JOBS FOLLOW PEOPLE. SECTION 2 .4.2 DISCUSSES THE ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, INCLUDING THE ABOVE QUESTION, IN MORE DETAIL.
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FIGURE 2.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHY, ECONOMY AND SOCIOCULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENTS. S O U R C E : VAN DAM ET AL. (2006)
SPATIAL PLANNING POLICY
S p a tia l p la n n in g  p o lic y  m a y  ca u se  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e, h o u se h o ld  d e c lin e  and  d e clin e  
in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , b e c a u se  it in flu e n ce s th e  lo ca tio n  o f p e o p le  and  a ctiv itie s.
T h e  n a tio n a l sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o licy  (M in iste rie  va n  V R O M  et al., 20 0 4 ), fo r  e x am p le , 
p ro h ib its  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  th a t a re  lo ca te d  in o r  at th e  b o rd e r o f th e  n a tio n a l la n d ­
sca p e s (n a tio n a a l la n d sc h a p '3) fro m  e x p a n d in g  th e ir  h o u s in g  sto ck. E x a m p le s  fro m  
o u r ca se  stu d ie s  are  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  o f  S lu is  (Z e e la n d ) and  B ru n ssu m  (S ou th  
L im b u rg )14. T h o se  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h a v e  to a d o p t a re strictiv e  sp a tia l p la n n in g  p olicy; 
th e y  a re  a llo w e d  to  d e v e lo p  n e w  h o u s in g  o n ly  fo r  th e ir  o w n  n a tu ra l p o p u la tio n  
g ro w th  ( ‘n e u tra l m ig ra tio n  b a la n c e ’). T h e  o b je c tiv e  o f th is  n a tio n a l sp a tia l p o licy  is to 
p re se rv e  th e  n a tio n a l la n d sca p e : b u t it m a y  a lso  ca u se  local p o p u la tio n s  to  d e clin e. 
T h is  is lik e ly  to  h a p p e n  w h e n  h o u se h o ld  size s b e co m e  sm a lle r  o r w h e n  th e  y o u n g  
p o p u la tio n  w h o  g re w  up w ith in  th e  m u n ic ip a lity  (o w n  n a tu ra l p o p u la tio n ), d e c id e  to 
le a v e  th e  a re a  and  se ttle  e lse w h e re .
S p a tia l p la n n in g  p o lic ie s  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  a lso  m a y  in flu e n ce  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  s itu ­
a tio n : fo r e x a m p le , th e y  m a y  c h a n g e  th e  v o lu m e  and  ty p e  o f th e  h o u s in g  su p p ly  in 
su ch  w a y  th a t it d a m a g e s  th e  a ttra c tiv e n e ss  o f  a m u n ic ip a lity . T h is  co u ld  h a p p en  
w h e n  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  fo cu s  on ty p e s o f h o u se s  and  ta rg e t g ro u p s (a g e  and  in co m e  
g ro u p s) th a t do n o t m a tch  th e  h o u s in g  d e m a n d . In such a s itu a tio n , a q u a lita t iv e  and
13 A NATIONAL LANDSCAPE IS AN AREA THAT HAS INTERNATIONALLY EXCEPTIONAL AND NATION­
ALLY CHARACTERISTIC QUALITIES OF LANDSCAPE, CULTURAL HISTORY AND NATURE (MINIS­
TERIE VAN VROM, LNV, VENW AND EZ, 2004, P.19).
14 SLUIS IS LOCATED IN THE NATIONAL LANDSCAPE AND BRUNSSUM IS LOCATED AT THE
BORDER OF THE NATIONAL LANDSCAPE (SEE WWW.RUIMTELIJKEPLANNEN.NL). THE NORTH­
ERN PART OF BRUNSSUM IS ALSO LOCATED AT THE BORDER OF THE NATIONAL BUFFER
ZONES (RIJKSBUFFERZONES). THE BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR THOSE AREAS IS THAT NO SPATIAL
DEVELOPMENTS ARE ALLOWED.
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q u a n tita tiv e  m ism a tch  b e tw e e n  h o u s in g  su p p ly  and  h o u s in g  d e m a n d  m ig h t occur, 
c a u s in g  a d e clin e  in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s. T h is, fo r e x a m p le , h a p p e n e d  in Lely­
stad  (V an C a ste re n , 20 0 8 ), w h e re  th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  th a t w e re  b u ilt in th e  19 8 0 s 
to  a ttra ct p e o p le  fro m  A m ste rd a m , w e re  so m o n o to n o u s  th a t th e y  d id  n o t m atch 
th e  h o u s in g  d e m a n d . A s  a re su lt, Le lystad  w a s c o n fro n te d  w ith  p o p u la tio n  d eclin e, 
v a ca n c ie s  and d e te rio ra tio n  (Van D am  et al. 20 06).
2.3 DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN THE 
NETHERLANDS
To d e sc rib e  th e  p a st and  p re se n t d e m o g ra p h ic  tre n d s  in th e  N e th e rla n d s, d a ta  w ere  
used  fro m  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (C e n tra a l B u re a u  v o o r  d e S ta tis t ie k  (CBS)). In this 
se ctio n  as w ell as in th e  next, th e  19 9 5 -2 0 0 8  p e rio d  is a n a lyse d . T h is  p a rt icu la r  p erio d  
w a s ch o se n , b e ca u se  re lia b le  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t h o u se h o ld s  is a v a ila b le  o n ly  s in ce  
1 9 9 5 , a fte r th e  in tro d u ctio n  o f  th e  m u n ic ip a l a d m in istra t io n  syste m  (G e m e e n te lijk e  
B a sisa d m in istra tie  (G BA )). To m a k e  th e  p re se n te d  in fo rm a tio n  c o m p a ra b le , th e  d e ­
v e lo p m e n t o f th e  p o p u la tio n  and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  w a s a n a ly se d  fo r  th e  sam e 
p e rio d . T h e  e x p e cte d  fu tu re  d e m o g ra p h ic  ch a n g e s are  b a sed  on tw o  p u b lic a t io n s  by 
S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s: th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c t io n s  (N a tio n a le  b e v o lk in g s- 
s p ro g n o s e  2 0 0 8 -2 0 5 0 )  (C B S , 2 0 0 8 b ), and  th e  n a tio n a l h o u se h o ld  p ro je c t io n s  (N a tio ­
n a le  h u ish o u d e n sp ro g n o se  2 0 0 9 -2 0 5 0 )  (C B S , 2 0 0 9 b )15. For re g io n a l p ro je ctio n s, the 
PEARL p ro je c t io n s16 (R e g io n a le  b e v o lk in g s- en h u is h o u d e n s p ro g n o se s  2 0 0 9 -2 0 4 0 17) 
w e re  used  b y  th e  N e th e rla n d s E n v iro n m e n ta l A s s e s s m e n t A g e n c y  (P B L )  and S ta tis ­
t ics  N e th e rla n d s (C B S )  (P B L  and  C B S, 2 0 0 9 )18 19.
15 WHEN THIS STUDY WAS STARTED, THE NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS (CBS, 2006) AND 
THE NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS (CBS, 2007) WERE AVAILABLE. DURING THE STUDY, 
BOTH PROJECTIONS WERE UPDATED (CBS, 2008B; CBS, 2009B). THERE ARE A NUMBER OF 
MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EARLIER AND THE LATER PROJECTIONS. MORE INFORMA­
TION ABOUT THESE DIFFERENCES CAN BE FOUND IN APPENDIX 4 .
16 ABBREVIATION FOR PROJECTING POPULATION EVENTS AT REGIONAL LEVEL.
17 THE REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS (PBL AND CBS, 2009) ARE BASED 
ON THE NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS PUBLISHED IN 2008 (CBS, 2008B) AND THE 
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS PUBLISHED IN 2009 (CBS, 2009B).
18 WHEN THIS STUDY STARTED, THE REGIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF 2006 (VAN DUIN 
ET AL., 2006) AND THE REGIONAL HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS OF 2007 (DE JONG, 2007) WERE 
AVAILABLE. DURING THE TIME OF THIS STUDY, THESE PROJECTIONS WERE UPDATED TWICE 
(IN 2008 AND 2009). APPENDIX 4 EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OUTCOMES OF 
THESE PROJECTIONS.
19 IN ADDITION TO PROJECTIONS, WE CAN USE SCENARIOS TO EXPLORE FUTURE
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T h e  p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  n eed  to  b e re g a rd e d  w ith  ca u tio n , b e ca u se  th e y  are 
b a se d  on e x p e c ta t io n s  o f fu tu re  b irth  rates, m o rta lity  ra te s and  m ig ra tio n  ra te s. A s 
th e se  ra te s are  in flu e n ce d  b y  so cia l, cu ltu ra l and  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts, th e y  are 
d ifficu lt to  p re d ict. M o re o v e r, th e  p ro je c t io n s  are  fo r  a p e rio d  fa r  in th e  fu tu re . Th e  
tim e  h o rizo n  o f th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s  is 2 0 5 0 20, and  fo r 
th e  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s  th is  is 2 0 4 0 21. F in ally, th e  d eta iled  
g e o g ra p h ica l leve l o f th e  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  m a k e s p re d ictio n  m o re  d if­
ficu lt. M o re  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  p ro je c t io n s  and  th e ir  u n ce rta in tie s  can b e fo u n d  
in C h a p te r 4 (B o x  4 .1). M o re  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  tre n d s in o th e r Euro ­
p e a n  co u n trie s  is p re se n te d  in A p p e n d ix  3.
DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS. IN 2006, THREE DUTCH INSTITUTES (CPB, MNP AND RPB) 
JOINTLY DEVELOPED FOUR SCENARIOS (‘GLOBAL ECONOMY', ‘STRONG EUROPE', ‘TRANSAT­
LANTIC MARKET' AND ‘REGIONAL COMMUNITIES') (CPB ET AL., 2006). THE DIFFERENT SCENAR­
IOS IMPLY DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURES. THE SCENARIOS DIFFER IN THE ASSUMP­
TIONS ON FERTILITY RATE, LIFE EXPECTANCY (MALES AND FEMALES) AND MIGRATION RATE. 
THREE OF THE FOUR SCENARIOS ASSUME THAT THE DUTCH POPULATION WILL GROW. ONLY 
THE REGIONAL COMMUNITIES SCENARIO ASSUMES A POPULATION DECREASE (STARTING IN 
2015) TO 15.1 MILLION INHABITANTS BY 2050. IN THE HIGHEST GROWTH SCENARIO (‘GLOBAL 
ECONOMY') THE DUTCH POPULATION WILL GROW TO 20.3 MILLION BY 2050. IN THE OTHER 
TWO SCENARIOS, THE POPULATION GROWS TO 16.8 MILLION (‘TRANSATLANTIC MARKET'), AND 
19.2 MILLION (‘STRONG EUROPE').
20 THE TIME HORIZON OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTION SIS 42 YEARS (2008-2050), 
FOR THE NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS THIS IS 41 YEARS (2009-2050), FOR THE 
REGIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS IT IS 32 YEARS (2008-2040), AND FOR THE REGIONAL 
HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS IT IS 31 YEARS (2009-2040).
21 RECENTLY THIS HAS BEEN CHANGED. IN THE PREVIOUS REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSE­
HOLD PROJECTIONS (RPB AND CBS, 2006; PBL AND CBS, 2008) THE TIME HORIZON WAS 2025.
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NATIONAL POPULATION: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , th e  p o p u la tio n  o f th e  N e th e rla n d s in cre a se d  fro m  15 .4  to
16 .4  m illio n  (b y  6 .4 % )(se e  F ig u re  2.2). A c c o rd in g  to th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c ­
t io n s  20 0 8 -2 0 5 0  o f S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (C B S , 2 0 0 8 b ), th e  p o p u la tio n  w ill co n tin u e  
to  g ro w  in th e  n e a r fu tu re , b u t m u ch  m o re  s lo w ly: in th e  17  y e a rs  b e tw e e n  19 91 and 
20 0 8  th is  g ro w th  w a s 9 .3%, fo r  th e  17  ye a rs  b e tw e e n  20 0 8  and  20 25  th e  e x p e cte d  
g ro w th  is 5 .0 %  (se e  F ig ure  2.2). T h e  p o p u la tio n  is e x p e cte d  to rea ch  its p e a k  in 
20 38 . T h e re a fte r, it is e x p e cte d  to d e cre a se  s lo w ly  fro m  17.4  to  17.3  m illio n , b y  2050 
(-0 .8 % )22. T h e  m o st im p o rta n t fa c to rs  c o n tr ib u tin g  to th is  d e clin e  are  th e  c o n tin u ­
in g  lo w  fe rt ility  ra te  (fa r b e lo w  th e  re p la c e m e n t leve l), th e  in c re a s in g  m o rta lity  rate  
(th e  b a b y -b o o m  g e n e ra tio n ) and  an (a n tic ip a te d ) m o d e st p o sitiv e  n e t in te rn a tio n a l 
m ig ra tio n .
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLDS: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  in cre a se d  fro m  6.5 to  7 .2  m illion  
(12 .0 % ) (se e  F ig u re  2.2). T h e  re a so n  fo r  th is  s iz e a b le  g ro w th  is a d e cre a se  in a v e r­
a g e  h o u se h o ld  size: in re ce n t d e ca d e s  th is  h a s d e cre a se d  fro m  2.35  in 19 9 5  to 2.24 
in 20 0 8  (C B S , 20 0 9 a ). H o u se h o ld s  are  b e c o m in g  sm a lle r  b e c a u se  o f fa llin g  fe rtility  
ra te s, h ig h e r life  e x p e c ta n c y  and  c h a n g in g  tre n d s in th e  fo rm a tio n  and  b re a k -u p  
o f h o u se h o ld s. T h e  n u m b e r o f o n e - and  tw o -p e rso n  h o u se h o ld s, in p a rticu la r, has 
g ro w n  ra p id ly  o v e r th e  la st fe w  d e ca d e s.
A c c o rd in g  to  th e  n a tio n a l h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s  2 0 0 9 -20 5 0  o f S ta tist ic s  N e th e r­
la n d s (C B S , 20 0 9 b ), in th e  c o m in g  ye ars, th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  w ill co n tin u e  
to  g ro w , b u t m u ch  m o re  s lo w ly  th a n  in th e  p a st d e ce n n ia . In th e  17  ye a rs  b etw e e n  
19 9 1 and  20 0 8 , th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  g re w  b y  17 .5 % , and  in th e  su b se q u e n t 17 
ye ars, b e tw e e n  20 0 8  and  2025, th e  e x p e cte d  g ro w th  is 11 .2 %  (se e  F ig ure  2.2). T h e  
m o st im p o rta n t fa c to r in th e  in c re a se  in h o u se h o ld s  is th e  c o n tin u in g  in c re a se  in the  
n u m b e r o f o n e - and  tw o -p e rso n  h o u se h o ld s  (d u e  to in d iv id u a lisa t io n  and  a g e in g  of
22 LOOKED AT FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, THE CURRENT AND FORTHCOMING
POPULATION DECLINE IN THE NETHERLANDS IS QUITE MODEST (SEE APPENDIX 3).
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th e  p o p u la t io n )23. T h e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  is e x p e cte d  to  re a ch  its p e a k  in 2039. 
T h e re a fte r (u p  to 20 50 ), th is  is e x p e cte d  to  d e cre a se  s lo w ly  (-0 .5 % ) and  sta b ilise  
a ro u n d  8 .2 m illio n  (C B S , 20 0 9 b ). T h is  d e clin e  is m a in ly  d u e  to th e  m o rta lity  rates 
w h ic h  are  e x p e cte d  to  rise  as a re su lt  o f a g e in g .
NATIONAL WORKING AGE POPULATION: DEVELOPMENTS 
AND PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  in cre a se d  fro m  9.6 to  10 .0  m il­
lio n  (4 .4 % ) (se e  F ig ure  2.2). A c c o rd in g  to th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  2 0 0 8 ­
20 50  o f S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s, in 20 11, th e  w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n  w ill rea ch  its p e a k  
o f 10 .1 m illio n  p e o p le  (C B S , 20 0 8 b ). A fte r  20 11, th is  n u m b e r is e x p e cte d  to  d e cre a se  
to 9 .2 m illio n , b y  20 40. T h e  m o st im p o rta n t c o n trib u tin g  fa c to r is th e  re t ire m e n t of 
th e  b a b y -b o o m  g e n e ra tio n .
T h e  e x p e cte d  d e clin e  in w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n  w ill n o t a u to m a tica lly  m e an  a 
d e clin e  in la b o u r fo rce . O n th e  co n tra ry, th e  la b o u r fo rce  is e x p e cte d  to  g ro w  until 
20 20 , as a re su lt  o f  an in c re a s in g  leve l o f p a rt ic ip a tio n 24. In th e  la st d e ca d e s, th e  p a r­
t ic ip a t io n  leve l o f w o m e n  h a s g ro w n  stro n g ly . It is e x p e cte d  th a t th is  w ill co n tin u e  
in th e  c o m in g  ye a rs . H o w e v e r, b e tw e e n  20 15  to  20 20 , w o m e n ’s leve l o f p a rtic ip a tio n  
is e x p e cte d  to  b a re ly  in cre a se . T h is  h a s to  do w ith  th e  fa c t th a t, a fte r  20 15 , w o m e n  
b o rn  in th e  e a rly  19 5 0 s  -  w h o  ca u se d  th e  h igh in c re a se  in p a rtic ip a tio n  - w ill re tire  
and  le a v e  th e  p ro d u c tio n  p ro ce ss. From  20 20  o n w a rd s, th e  la b o u r fo rc e  is e x p e cte d  
to d e clin e  (E u w a ls  et al., 20 0 9 , p .147).
T h e  a b so lu te  d e cre a se  in la b o u r fo rce  and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  is e x p e cte d  to 
b e m a rg in a l. H o w ever, b e ca u se  th e  to ta l p o p u la tio n  (u n til 20 3 8 ) is e x p e cte d  to 
g ro w , th e  d e cre a se  in th e  sh a re  o f w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  in th e  to ta l p o p u la tio n  
is e x p e cte d  to  b e la rg e  (E u w a ls  et al., 20 0 9 , p .150 ). B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , this 
sh a re  d e cre a se d  fro m  6 2.4 %  to  6 1.3 % 25. In th e  su b se q u e n t p e rio d , it is e x p e cte d  to
23 THE AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE IS EXPECTED TO DECREASE TO 2.1 BY 2040 (CBS, 2009B).
24 PARTICIPATION LEVEL IS THE RATIO OF THE LABOUR FORCE TO THE WORKING AGE POPULA­
TION, EXPRESSED IN PERCENTAGES.
25 IN 1995, THE WORKING AGE POPULATION WAS 9.6 MILLION ON A TOTAL POPULATION OF 15.4
MILLION (CBS, 2008A). IN 2008, THE WORKING AGE POPULATION WAS 10.0 MILLION ON A TOTAL 
POPULATION OF 16.4 MILLION (CBS, 2008A). THESE NUMBERS HAVE BEEN ROUNDED OFF. THE 
PERCENTAGES WERE CALCULATED WITH THE EXACT NUMBERS AND THEREAFTER ROUNDED
OFF.
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d e cre a se  even fu rth e r: in 20 25 , to  5 6 .9 %  and  in 20 4 0  to 5 2 .6 %  (C B S , 2 0 0 8 b )26. Th e  
ra tio  o f p e o p le  o f 65 y e a rs  and  o v e r to  th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  (g rijze  d ru k )  is 
a lso  e x p e cte d  to  in cre a se . A fte r  all, th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  d e cre a se s  w h ile  the 
n u m b e r o f p e o p le  o ld e r th a n  65 is e x p e cte d  to in cre a se , d u e  to  th e  a g e in g  o f the 
p o p u la tio n  and  in c re a se  in life  e x p e c ta n c y  (E u w a ls  et al., 2 0 0 9 )27. In 19 9 5 , th is  ratio  
w a s 4 .7  p e rso n s b e tw e e n  th e  a g e s o f 20 and  65 to  o n e  p e rso n  o f 65 y e a rs  o r  o ver. In 
20 0 8 , th is  ra tio  d e cre a se d  to 4 .2. For 20 10 , it w a s e x p e cte d  to  d e cre a se  even  fu rth e r 
to  3 .9 7 , and  fo r 20 20  th e  ra tio  is e x p e cte d  to b e 2.9 5 (P B L  and  C B S, 20 0 9  - a d a p ted  
b y  th e  PBL). T h e  d e c lin e  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  in c o m b in a tio n  w ith  a g e in g  has 
ra ise d  th e  q u e stio n  o f h o w  to k e e p  th e  so cia l s e c u rity  syste m  (m o re  sp e c ific a lly  the 
p e n sio n s) affo rd ab le .
In c o n c lu s io n , th e  N e th e rla n d s is e x p e cte d  to f irst e x p e rie n c e  a d e c lin e  in w o rk in g  
a g e  p o p u la tio n  (in 20 11), fo llo w e d  b y  a d e clin e  in p o p u la tio n  (b y  20 3 8 ) and  a d e clin e  
in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  (b y  20 39 ).
FIGURE 2.2 CHANGES IN POPULATION, IN NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND IN WORKING AGE 
POPULATION, IN THE PAST (1995-2008) AND FOR THE FUTURE (2008-2050) (X MILLION)28. S O U R C E : 
CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040 2050
% 1995-
2008
% 2008-
2025
% 2008-
2040
% 2008-
2050
POPULATION 15.4 16.4 17.2 17.5 17.3 +6.4 +5.0 +6.5 +5.7
HOUSEHOLDS 6.5 7.2 8.0 8.3 8.2 + 12.0 +11.2 +14.1 +13.6
WORKING AGE 9.6 10.0 9.8 9.2 9.3 +4.4 -2.5 -8.5 -7.0
POPULATION
26 BY 2025, THE WORKING AGE POPULATION IS EXPECTED TO BE 9.8 MILLION ON A TOTAL 
POPULATION OF 17.2 , AND, BY 2040, THE WORKING AGE POPULATION IS EXPECTED TO BE 9.1 
MILLION ON A TOTAL POPULATION OF 17.4 MILLION (PBL AND CBS, 2009). THESE NUMBERS 
HAVE BEEN ROUNDED OFF. THE PERCENTAGES WERE CALCULATED WITH THE EXACT 
NUMBERS AND THEREAFTER ROUNDED OFF.
27 THE AGE-SEX PYRAMIDS (FIGURES 2.3 AND 2 .4) ILLUSTRATE THAT, BETWEEN 1995 AND 2008, 
THE SHARE AND NUMBER OF PEOPLE OF 65 YEARS AND OVER INCREASED. THIS IS SHOWN 
BY THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE A G E -S E X  PYRAMID. THE PYRAMID'S CENTRE OF GRAVITY 
HAS MOVED UPWARDS.
28 THE NUMBERS HAVE BEEN ROUNDED OFF. THE PERCENTAGES WERE CALCULATED WITH THE 
EXACT NUMBERS.
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FIGURE 2.3 A G E-S EX  PYRAMID FOR THE NETHERLANDS, 199529. 
S O U R C E : STATISTICS NETHERLANDS.
FIGURE 2.4 A G E-S EX  PYRAMID FOR THE NETHERLANDS, 2009. 
SO U RCE: STATISTICS NETHERLANDS.
29 SEE FOOTNOTE 7 FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE A G E -S E X  PYRAMID.
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2.3.2 PROVINCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
PROVINCIAL POPULATION: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 08  in all D u tch p ro v in c e s  (e x ce p t fo r  L im b u rg ), th e  p o p u la tio n  
g re w  (se e  F ig ure  2.5). In th e  p ro v in c e s  o f U tre ch t and  F le vo la n d , p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  
w a s la rg e st. A c c o rd in g  to th e  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s, b e tw e e n  20 0 8  and 
20 4 0 , th e  p o p u la tio n  in all D u tch p ro v in c e s  w ill c o n tin u e  to  g ro w , e x ce p t fo r  L im b u rg  
and  Z e e la n d , w h e re  it is e x p e cte d  to d e cre a se  b y  7 .8 %  and  2.9 % , re sp e c tiv e ly . For 
so m e  o f th o se  p ro v in c e s  (D re n th e , F rie sla n d , G e ld e rla n d , G ro n in g e n , N orth  B rabant, 
and  O v e rijsse l), th is  g ro w th  is e x p e cte d  to  b e le ss th a n  th e  D u tch a v e ra g e  o f 6.5%.
FIGURE 2.5 CHANGE IN POPULATION IN DUTCH PROVINCES IN THE PAST (1995-2008) AND THE 
FUTURE (2008-2040). S O U R C E : CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
POPULATION30 POPULATION CHANGE
PROVINCES (X 1,000) (IN PERCENTAGES)
1995 2008 2025 2040
% 1995-
2008
% 2008-
2025
% 2008-
2040
DRENTHE 455 488 500 502 7.3 2.5 2.7
FLEVOLAND 262 379 466 479 44.4 23.0 26.4
FRIESLAND 610 643 660 658 5.5 2.6 2.4
GELDERLAND 1,864 1,984 2,036 2,047 6.4 2.6 3.2
GRONINGEN 558 573 592 596 2.8 3.2 3.9
LIMBURG 1,130 1,124 1,084 1,036 -0.6 -3.6 -7.8
NORTH BRABANT 2,276 2,425 2,531 2,565 6.5 4.4 5.8
NORTH HOLLAND 2,473 2,626 2,804 2,868 6.2 6.8 9.2
OVERIJSSEL 1,050 1,120 1,161 1,165 6.6 3.7 4.1
SOUTH HOLLAND 3,306 3,461 3,686 3,775 4.7 6.5 9.0
UTRECHT 1,074 1,201 1,323 1,413 11.8 10.1 17.6
ZEELAND 366 381 379 370 4.0 -0.4 -2.9
THE NETHERLANDS 15,424 16,405 17,221 17,474 6.4 5.0 6.5
30 THE NUMBERS HAVE BEEN ROUNDED OFF. THE PERCENTAGES WERE CALCULATED WITH THE 
EXACT NUMBERS.
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PROVINCIAL HOUSEHOLDS: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROJECTIONS
B etw e e n  19 9 5  and 20 0 8 , all Dutch p ro v in c e s  e x p e rie n ce d  a g ro w th  in h o u se h o ld  
n u m b e rs  (se e  F ig ure  2.6). T h e  la rg e st g ro w th  to o k  p la c e  in F le vo la n d , th e  sm a lle st in 
L im b u rg  and  Z e e la n d . B etw e e n  20 0 8  and  20 25, th e  n u m b e r o f  h o u se h o ld s  is e x p e c t­
ed to  c o n tin u e  to g ro w  in all p ro v in ce s, a lth o u g h  in D ren th e, Friesla n d , G ro n in g e n , 
L im b u rg , N o rth  H o llan d  O v e rijsse l, and  Z e e la n d , th is  g ro w th  w ill re m a in  b e lo w  the 
D u tch a v e ra g e  (11.2% ). In th e  lo n g e r ru n  (20 0 8  and  20 4 0 ), th e  o n ly  p ro v in c e  th a t is 
e x p e cte d  to  e x p e rie n c e  h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  is L im b u rg  (-0 .8 % ).
FIGURE 2.6 CHANGE IN NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN DUTCH PROVINCES IN THE PAST (1995­
2008) AND FOR THE FUTURE (2008-2040). SO U RCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD 
HOUSEHOLDS NUMBERS
PROVINCES (X 1,000) (IN PERCENTAGES)
1995 2008 2025 2040
% 1995-
2008
% 2008-
2025
% 2008-
2040
DRENTHE 180 206 229 232 14.5 11.1 12.3
FLEVOLAND 99 152 203 215 52.7 33.7 41.8
FRIESLAND 249 277 300 301 11.4 8.2 8.6
GELDERLAND 743 840 937 948 13.1 11.6 12.9
GRONINGEN 251 272 295 297 8.4 8.2 9.0
LIMBURG 459 498 517 494 8.4 3.9 -0.8
NORTH BRABANT 903 1,037 1,162 1,186 14.8 12.1 14.4
NORTH HOLLAND 1,129 1,232 1,361 1,414 9.2 10.4 14.8
OVERIJSSEL 414 468 518 527 13.2 10.6 12.6
SOUTH HOLLAND 1,440 1,563 1,739 1,806 8.5 11.3 15.6
UTRECHT 456 532 620 676 17.3 16.5 27.0
ZEELAND 148 166 173 169 11.6 4.7 2.1
THE NETHERLANDS 6,469 7,242 8,053 8,265 12.0 11.2 14.1
PROVINCIAL WORKING AGE POPULATION: 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  in all D u tch p ro v in c e s  (e x ce p t 
fo r  L im b u rg ) g re w  (see  F ig u re  2.7). T h is  g ro w th  w a s la rg e st in th e  p ro v in c e  o f F levo ­
la n d . T h is  s itu a tio n  is e x p e cte d  to c h a n g e  d ra m a tica lly , in th e  n e a r fu tu re . For the  
p e rio d  b e tw e e n  20 0 8  and  20 40, in all p ro v in c e s  (e x ce p t fo r F le vo la n d  and  U tre ch t) a
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d e clin e  in th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  is e x p e cte d . T h is  d e clin e  is e x p e cte d  to b e the 
la rg e st in Lim bu rg.
FIGURE 2.7 CHANGE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION IN DUTCH PROVINCES, IN THE PAST (1995­
2008) AND FOR THE FUTURE (2008-2040). S O U R C E : CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
WORKING AGE
WORKING AGE POPULATION POPULATION CHANGE
PROVINCES (X 1,000) (IN PERCENTAGES)
1995 2008 2025 2040
% 1995-
2008
%  2008­
2025
% 2008-
2040
DRENTHE 277 288 271 249 4.2 -6.1 - 13.6
FLEVOLAND 157 234 263 245 49.3 12.7 4.6
FRIESLAND 366 383 366 335 4.8 -4.5 - 12.7
GELDERLAND 1,154 1,198 1,147 1,055 3.8 -4.2 - 11.9
GRONINGEN 351 358 345 320 1.9 -3.5 - 10.5
LIMBURG 721 687 596 529 -4.7 - 13.2 -23.0
NORTH BRABANT 1,448 1,486 1,420 1,327 2.6 -4.5 - 10.7
NORTH HOLLAND 1,575 1,645 1,637 1,550 4.5 -0.5 -5.8
OVERIJSSEL 640 670 647 597 4.7 -3.4 -11.0
SOUTH HOLLAND 2,049 2,131 2,128 2,041 4.0 -0.1 -4.2
UTRECHT 676 745 776 764 10.2 4.2 2.6
ZEELAND 217 224 203 184 3.2 -9.5 - 18.1
THE NETHERLANDS 9,630 10,050 9,801 9,194 4.4 -2.5 -8.5
In c o n c lu s io n , th e  p ro v in c e  o f L im b u rg  is th e  o n ly  D utch p ro v in ce , to  d ate, th a t has 
e x p e rie n c e d  a p o p u la tio n  d e clin e. For th e  p e rio d  b e tw e e n  20 0 8  and  20 4 0 , o n ly  a fe w  
D u tch p ro v in c e s  are  e x p e cte d  to  e x p e rie n c e  a p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  (L im b u rg  and  Z e e ­
la n d ) o r a d e clin e  in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  (L im b u rg ). In a d d it io n , d u rin g  th a t p erio d , all 
p ro v in c e s  (e x ce p t fo r  F le vo la n d  and  U tre ch t) a re  e x p e cte d  to e x p e rie n c e  a d e clin e  in 
w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n .
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LOCAL POPULATION: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROJECTIONS
A lth o u g h , o v e r th e  p a st d e ca d e s, th e  p o p u la tio n  in th e  N e th e rla n d s, as a w h o le , has 
g ro w n , so m e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  e x p e rie n ce d  a d e clin e . B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , 18 .8 %  
(8 3 ) o f all D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (4 4 1) lo st p a rt o f th e ir  p o p u la tio n  (se e  F ig u re  2.8). 
A c c o rd in g  to  th e  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je ctio n s, th is  n u m b e r w ill g ro w . B etw een 
20 0 8  and  20 25, 3 9 .7 %  (17 5 ) o f all m u n ic ip a lit ie s  is e x p e cte d  to lo se  p o p u la tio n , and 
b e tw e e n  20 08  and  20 4 0 , th is  is e x p e cte d  to  b e 3 6 .7 %  (16 2) (se e  F ig ure  2.8 ). In the 
la tte r p e rio d , fo r  25%  o f th e se  m u n ic ip a lit ie s , th is  d e clin e  is e x p e cte d  to b e m o re  than 
2 .5 %.
F ig u re  2.8 sh o w s th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ith  an e x p e cte d  p o p u la tio n  d e c lin e  a re  lo cated  
all o v e r th e  co u n try ; th e  d e c lin e  w ill n o t b e lim ite d  to th e  m o re  p e rip h e ra l reg io n s. 
T h e  m ap  sh o w s th a t g ro w in g  and  s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  a re  e x p e cte d  to b e fo und  
n e x t to  each  o th e r. N e v e rth e le ss, th e  la rg e st d e clin e  is e x p e cte d  in p e rip h e ra l areas 
(e .g . n o rth e rn  and  e a ste rn  G ro n in g e n , L im b u rg , Z e e la n d , A c h te rh o e k ).
LOCAL HOUSEHOLDS: DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , o n ly  2 .3 %  (10 ) o f all m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w a s c o n fro n te d  w ith  fa ll­
in g  h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  (e.g. R o tte rd a m  and  D e lfz ijl)  (se e  F ig u re  2.9). A c c o rd in g  to 
th e  re g io n a l h o u se h o ld  p ro je ctio n s, b e tw e e n  20 08  and  20 25 , 3 .2 %  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  
(14 ) w ill e x p e rie n c e  a d e clin e  in th e  n u m b e r o f  h o u se h o ld s  (se e  F ig ure  2.9). D u ring  
th is  p e rio d , m o re  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ill lo se  so m e  o f th e ir  p o p u la tio n  (3 9 .7 %  o f all Dutch 
m u n ic ip a lit ie s)  th a n  h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  (3 .2 %  o f all D utch m u n ic ip a lit ie s). T h is  d if­
fe re n c e  is d u e  to th e  e x p e cte d  c o n tin u in g  tre n d  in sh rin k in g  h o u se h o ld  s iz e s31. In the 
lo n g  run (2 0 0 8 -2 0 4 0 ), th e  n u m b e r o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ith  h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  is e x p e c t­
ed to  g ro w : 8 .8 %  o f all m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (3 9 ) (se e  F ig u re  2.9). Fo r 7%  o f th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  
w ith  an e x p e cte d  h o u se h o ld  d e clin e, th is d e c lin e  w ill b e m o re  th a n  2.5%.
2.3.3 LOCAL DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
31 THE AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE DECREASED FROM 2.35 PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD IN 
1995, TO 2.24 PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD IN 2008. THE NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD PROJEC­
TIONS 2009-2050 EXPECT THIS DECREASE IN HOUSEHOLD SIZE TO CONTINUE DOWN TO 2.06 
PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD BY 2050 (CBS, 2009B).
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Fig u re  2.9 sh o w s th a t th e  h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  is e x p e cte d  to  o c cu r p r im a rily  in the  
m o re  p e rip h e ra l re g io n s, such as in S o u th  L im b u rg , n o rth e rn  and  e a ste rn  G ro n in g e n  
and  Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n .
LOCAL WORKING AGE POPULATION: DEVELOPMENTS 
AND PROJECTIONS
B e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  20 0 8 , 4 4 .4 %  (19 6 ) o f all m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w a s c o n fro n te d  w ith  
a d e clin e  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  (se e  F ig u re  2.10 ). A c c o rd in g  to th e  re g io n al 
p o p u la tio n  p ro je ctio n s, b e tw e e n  20 0 8  and  20 25, 7 9 .8 %  (3 5 2) o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ill 
e x p e rie n c e  su ch  a d e clin e  (se e  F ig ure  2.10 ). A fte r  20 25 , th e  n u m b e r o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s  
w ith  a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  is e x p e cte d  to rise: th e  re g io n a l p o p u la ­
tio n  p ro je c t io n s  e x p e ct th a t, b y  20 4 0 , 9 0 .0 %  o f all m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (3 9 7 ) w ill fa c e  such a 
d e clin e  (se e  F ig u re  2 .10 32).
2.4 SPATIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
T h e  p re v io u s se ctio n  has sh o w n  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is e x p e rie n ce d  lo cally , 
and th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  p ro je c tio n s  e x p e c t th is  to  co n tin u e . For th is re a so n , th is stu d y  
fo cu se s  on th e  re a c tio n s  b y  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts . Fu rth e rm o re , it fo cu se s  on lo cal p o li­
c ie s  on h o u s in g  and  th e  re g io n a l e co n o m y, as V a n  D am  et al. (2 0 0 6 ) sh o w  th a t d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  a ffects th e se  p o licy  fie ld s  th e  m o st. T h is  se ctio n  g iv e s  an o v e rv ie w  of 
th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r th o se  p o lic y  f ie ld s33.
32 IN SECTION 2 .3.1 IT IS CONCLUDED THAT NOT ONLY IS THE WORKING AGE POPULATION 
EXPECTED TO DECREASE, BUT SO IS ITS SHARE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION. THIS DECREASE 
IN THE SHARE OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION IN THE TOTAL POPULATION IS CAUSED 
BY AGEING OF THE POPULATION; THUS, THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OVER THE AGE OF 65 
INCREASES, WHILE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BETWEEN THE AGES OF 20 AND 65 DECREASES 
(EUWALS ET AL., 2009, P.150). THIS STUDY AND FIGURE 2.10 FOCUSES ON CHANGES IN THE 
WORKING AGE POPULATION NOT ON THE SHARE OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION IN THE 
TOTAL POPULATION.
33 OTHER RESEARCHERS (DERKS ET AL., 2006A; VAN DAM ET AL., 2006; ROB/RFV, 2008; HARMS 
ET AL., 2010; RLG, 2009) HAVE INVESTIGATED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND OTHER POLICY FIELDS (E.G. OF TRANSPORT, ENVIRONMENT, LOCAL FINANCES 
AND RURAL AREAS).
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FIGURE 2.8 POPULATION CHANGE IN THE NETHERLANDS, PER MUNICIPALITY.
SOURCE: CBS 2009A; PBL AND CBS 2009
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FIGURE 2.9 CHANGES IN NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE NETHERLANDS, PER MUNICIPALITY.
SOURCE: CBS 2009A; PBL AND CBS 2009.
□  < - 20%
□  -20 TO - 10%  
-10 TO -5%  
-5 TO 0%
0 TO 5%
I I 5 TO 10%
10 TO 20%
> 20%
□
□
□
□
1995-2008
HOUSEHOLD GROWTH IN THE NETHERLANDS: 
12.0%
2008-2025 2008-2040
HOUSEHOLD GROWTH IN THE NETHERLANDS: HOUSEHOLD GROWTH IN THE NETHERLANDS: 
11.2%  14.1%
42
FIGURE 2.10 CHANGES IN WORKING AGE POPULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS, PER MUNICIPALITY.
SOURCE: CBS 2009A; PBL AND CBS 2009.
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2.4.1 HOUSING MARKET AND RESIDENTIAL 
QUALITY
O n ly  fe w  stu d ie s  h a v e  in v e stig a te d  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
and  th e  h o u s in g  m arke t. E x a m p le s  o f su ch  stu d ie s  in o th e r c o u n trie s  are  th o se  by 
M ü lle r and  S ie d e n to p  (20 0 4 ), G lo c k  and  H ä u sse rm a n n  (20 0 4 ), S tro m e ie r and  B ad er 
(20 0 4 ), C o u ch  et al. (20 0 5 ), G la e se r et al. (20 0 6 ), and  G lo c k  (2 0 0 6 )34. E x a m p le s  in 
th e  N e th e rla n d s are  V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ), A d ria a n s  and  H ein z (20 0 7), V e rw e st et al. 
(20 0 8 b ), R o se n b e rg  et al. (20 10 ), and  F ran cke  (2 0 10 )35 36. In a d d it io n , R o u w e n d a l and 
V e rm e u le n  (20 0 7 ) in v e stig a te d  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  an a g e in g  p o p u la tio n  and 
th e  h o u s in g  m a rk e t. T h o se  stu d ie s  co n c lu d e  th a t th e  d e c lin e  in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs 
m a y  affect th e  (re g io n a l)  h o u s in g  sto ck, b e ca u se  th is  re d u ce s th e  d e m a n d  fo r h o u s ­
ing. H o w e v e r, it is im p o rta n t to  n o te  th a t ch a n g e s in h o u s in g  d e m a n d  d e p e n d  not 
o n ly  on ch a n g e s in th e  n u m b e r o f  h o u se h o ld s, b u t a lso  on ch a n g e s in cu rre n t and 
fu tu re  in c o m e  le ve ls  and  m o rtg a g e  ru le s (Van D am  et al., 20 0 6 ; E ich h o ltz  and  L in d e n ­
th a l, 20 0 8 ).
A  d e cre a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  m a y  h a v e  v a rio u s  c o n se q u e n ce s . First, th is 
s tu d y  d isc u sse s  th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  fo r  th e  s to c k  o f re n te d  so cia l h o u sin g . A  d e cre a se  
in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  m a y  lead  to  h ig h  v a ca n c y  and  tu rn o v e r ra te s fo r  th is  sto ck 37. 
G lo c k  and  H ä u sse rm a n n  (2 0 0 4 ) p o in t o u t th a t, in e a st G e rm a n  c itie s, d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  w a s re su lt in g  in a stru ctu ra l o v e rsu p p ly  o f b u ild in g s, p lo ts o f lan d , re sid e n tia l 
u n its  and  co m m e rc ia l p ro p e rtie s , in tu rn  re su lt in g  in h ig h  v a ca n c y  rates. Franz (20 0 1) 
c a lcu la te d  th a t, in 19 9 9 , th e  v a c a n c y  ra te  fo r  h o u s in g  s to c k  o w n e d  b y  co m m u n al
34 EICHHOLTZ AND LINDENTHAL (2008) ALSO ARGUE THAT ONLY A FEW STUDIES HAVE BEEN 
DONE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES (SUCH AS 
AGEING) AND THE HOUSING MARKET. AS EXAMPLES OF THESE STUDIES, THEY NAME MANKIW 
AND WEIL (1989), ENGELHARDT AND POTERBA (1991) AND GREEN AND HENDERSHOTT (1996).
35 IN 2010, A DUTCH BANK ALSO INVESTIGATED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND THE HOUSING MARKET, LABOUR MARKET AND LOCAL SERVICES (RABOBANK 
NEDERLAND, 2010).
36 EXAMPLES OF ARTICLS ABOUT THIS SUBJECT ARE: WAGTAND BOON (2006), BOERS AND 
POULUS (2007), UBINK (2008), AND EICHHOLTZ AND LINDENTHAL (2008).
37 A DECREASE IN HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS WILL NOT AFFECT THE RENTS OF RENTED SOCIAL
HOUSING. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THE NATIONAL POLICY ON RENTS DOES NOT TAKE
REGIONAL HOUSING MARKET DIFFERENCES INTO ACCOUNT. AS A RESULT, THE REGIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN RENT PRICES OF RESIDENTIAL HOUSING ARE NOT LARGE IN THE NETHER­
LANDS (RENES AND JOKOVI, 2008).
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h o u s in g  co m p a n ie s  in e a ste rn  G e rm a n y  w a s a lm o st 13 % 38. In 20 0 0 , it w a s e stim a te d  
th a t m o re  th a n  o n e m illio n  re s id e n tia l un its, a b o u t 14 %  o f all re s id e n tia l h o u s in g 39 in 
e a ste rn  G e rm a n y , w e re  e m p ty 40. A c c o rd in g  to th a t stu d y, th e  v a ca n c y  ra te s e x ce e d ­
ed th e  n o rm a l ‘m o b ility  re se rv e ’ (i.e . b e tw e e n  3 and  5%). T h e  h ig h  v a c a n c y  ra te s w e re  
lo ca te d  m a in ly  in in n e r-c ity , re s id e n tia l m u lti-s to re y  a p a rtm e n t b lo cks, b u ilt b e fo re  
th e  S e co n d  W o rld  W a r41. A c c o rd in g  to th e  G e rm a n  Fed eral M in istry  o f Tran sp o rt, 
B u ild in g  and  U rb a n  A ffa irs, so m e  w e st G e rm a n  c it ie s  w e re  e x p e rie n c in g  co m p a ra b le  
p ro b le m s 42 (G lo c k  and  H ä u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 , p .920).
In th e  N e th e rla n d s, h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  a lso m a y  lead  to o v e rsu p p ly  and  h igh v a ca n c y  
ra te s in re n te d  so cia l h o u s in g  sto c k 43. A c c o rd in g  to V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ), e sp e c ia lly  
e a rly  p o s t-w a r h o u sin g , h o u se s  lo ca te d  in v illa g e s  su rro u n d e d  b y  le ss  a ttra c tiv e  la n d ­
sca p e s, and h o u se s  b u ilt  in th e  19 8 0 s are  su sc e p tib le  to  th is. V e rw e st et al. (20 0 8 b ) 
d e m o n stra te d , b a se d  on c a se -stu d y  re se a rch , th a t in sh rin k in g  re g io n s, v a c a n c y  and 
tu rn o v e r ra te s in re n te d  so cia l h o u s in g  s to c k  a re  re la t iv e ly  h ig h  (se e  a lso  C h a p te r 5).
Fo r th e  N e th e rla n d s, as a w h o le , th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  a d e cre a se  in th e  n u m b e r 
o f h o u se h o ld s  and  ch a n g e s in v a ca n c y  ra te s h a s n o t b e e n  in v e stig a te d . H o w ever, 
B u ite la a r et al. (2 0 0 9 ) p re se n te d  th e  v a ca n c y  ra te s fo r D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in rented  
so cia l h o u s in g  s to c k  (se e  F ig u re  2.11). F ig u re  2.11 can  b e co m p a re d  w ith  th e  F igure
2.9 a b o u t th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  b e tw e e n  19 9 5  and  2008, 
and  w ith  th e  p ro je cte d  d e v e lo p m e n t o f h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  b e tw e e n  20 08  and  2025 
(20 4 0 ). T h is  co m p a riso n  sh o w s th a t th e  h ig h e st v a c a n c y  ra te s a re  fo u n d  in th e  m u ­
n ic ip a lit ie s  th a t h a v e  e x p e rie n ce d , o r  in th e  (n e a r) fu tu re  a re  e x p e cte d  to
38 THIS PERCENTAGE RELATES TO A VACANCY OF 350,000 OF THE TOTAL 2,8 MILLION HOUSES 
OWNED BY COMMUNAL HOUSING COMPANIES IN EASTERN GERMANY (FRANZ, 2001, P. 28).
39 THIS INCLUDED SOCIAL HOUSING AS WELL AS OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING.
40 THE PRESENTED NUMBERS ARE BASED ON A REPORT BY THE COMMISSION THAT INVES­
TIGATED CHANGES IN THE HOUSING MARKET IN EASTERN GERMANY (WOHNUNGSWIRT­
SCH A FTLICH ER  STRUKTURWANDEL IN D EN  N EU EN  BUNDESLÄNDERN), PUBLISHED IN 2000.
41 IN GERMANY, NOT ONLY RENTED SOCIAL HOUSING, BUT ALSO OWNER-OCCUPIED PROPER­
TIES ARE EMPTY.
42 TO ADDRESS THIS VACANT-HOUSING PROBLEM, THE MINISTRY LAUNCHED TWO SPECIAL 
SUBSIDY PROGRAMMES: STADTUMBAU O ST  AND STADTUMBAU WEST. THESE SUBSIDY 
PROGRAMMES FINANCIALLY SUPPORT SHRINKING MUNICIPALITIES IN THE DEMOLITION AND 
RESTRUCTURING OF THEIR ABANDONED HOUSING STOCK. THE PROGRAMMES ALSO STIMU­
LATE THE EXCHANGE OF KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN SHRINKING MUNICIPALITIES.
43 IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT, IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE RENTED SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK
IS RELATIVELY LARGE, COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES. IN 2008, 32%  OF DUTCH HOUSING
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e x p e rie n c e , a d e cre a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  (e .g . H e e rle n  and  S luis).
V e rw e st et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) a rg u e  th a t th e  h ig h  v a ca n c y  ra te s in th e  re n te d  so cia l h o u s ­
in g  s to c k  m ig h t re d u ce  th e  fin a n cia l re su lts  fo r  h o u s in g  a sso c ia t io n s  and  harm  the 
in v e stm e n t c lim a te . H o u sin g  a sso c ia t io n s  in v e st in ‘sa fe ’ a re a s o nly, and  th e y  d isp o se  
p ro p e rty  in ‘u n sa fe ’ areas, w h e re  v a c a n c y  ra te s a lre a d y  a re  h igh (G lo c k  and  H au sse r- 
m an n , 20 0 4 ). B o ers and  P o u lu s (20 0 7 ) and  V e rw e st et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) n o tice d  th a t the  
D u tch h o u s in g  a sso c ia tio n s  th a t w e re  a ctiv e  in sh rin k in g  re g io n s w e re  try in g  to sell- 
off v a ca n t p ro p e rtie s.
T h is  stu d y  a lso  d isc u sse s  th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  fo r  o w n e r-o cc u p ie d  h o u sin g . A  d e cre a se  
in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  m a y  affect h o u s in g  p rice s  and  lead  to  an in c re a se  in 
th e  a m o u n t o f t im e  it ta k e s  to  sell a p ro p e rty. G la e se r and G y o u rk o  (2 0 0 5 ) a rg u e 
th a t su d d e n  d e cre a se s  in h o u s in g  d e m a n d  (ca lle d  n e g a tiv e  d e m a n d  sh o c k s) lead  to 
a la rg e  fall in h o u s in g  p rice s. T h e  e x p la n a tio n  fo r  th is  is th e  p e rm a n e n t c h a ra c te r o f 
th e  h o u s in g  s to c k  and  its re su lt in g  in e la stic ity . B e cau se  h o u s in g  d o e s n o t d isa p p e a r 
q u ick ly , a d e cre a se  in h o u s in g  d e m a n d  a ffects th e  p ric in g  ra th e r th a n  th e  q u a n tity  of 
th e  h o u s in g  stock.
M o st re se a rc h e rs  (a m o n g  th e m  R o u w e n d a l and  V e rm e u le n  (20 0 7), E ich h o ltz  and 
L in d e n th a l (20 0 8 ), V e rw e st et al. (20 0 8 b , 20 0 9 b ), and  V e rk a d e  (2 0 0 9 )) a g re e  w ith  
G la e s e r and  G y o u rk o  (20 0 5 ) th a t a d e cre a se  in h o u s in g  d e m a n d  (w h ich  can be 
ca u se d  b y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , e sp e c ia lly , a d e c lin e  in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs) m ig h t 
re su lt  in lo w e r h o u s in g  p rice s, b u t n o te  th a t th is  is n o t an a u to m a tic  c o n se q u e n ce . 
T h e  re a so n  fo r  th is  is th a t h o u s in g  p rice s  a re  in flu e n ce d  n o t o n ly  b y  h o u se h o ld  
n u m b e rs, b u t a lso  b y  in te re st ra te s, c o n su m e r tru st, h o u s in g  su p p ly  (an d  its p h ysica l 
ch a ra c te ristic s), m a rk e t tre n d s, and  in c o m e  d e v e lo p m e n ts  (R e n e s et al., 20 0 6 , p.28 ). 
N e v e rth e le ss, R o u w e n d al and  V e rm e u le n  (20 0 7 ) e x p e ct a n y  in c re a se  in h o u s in g  p ric ­
es in sh rin k in g  a re a s to  la g  b e h in d  p rice  in c re a se s  in th e  re st o f th e  co u n try . V e rw e st 
et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) sh o w  th a t a v e ra g e  h o u s in g  p rice s  in sh rin k in g  re g io n s44 are lo w e r than 
th e  n a tio n a l a v e ra g e  and  th a t p ro p e rt ie s  are  on th e  m a rk e t fo r  lo n g e r p e rio d s of 
t im e  th a n  is th e  n a tio n a l a v e ra g e . V e rk a d e  (2 0 0 9 ) d e m o n stra te s  th a t th e  W O Z  v a lu e 45 
(e stim a te d  v a lu e  o f  real e sta te ) in sh rin k in g  a re a s lies b e lo w  th e  D u tch a v e ra g e . Th e
STOCK WAS RENTED SOCIAL HOUSING (ABF RESEARCH -  SYSTEEM  WONINGVOORRAAD 
SYSWOV).
44 A SHRINKING REGION IS A REGION IN WHICH A MAJORITY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES EXPERI­
ENCE A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF POPULATION AND/OR A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS (VERWEST ET AL. 2008B).
45 WOZ VALUE IS THE ESTIMATED VALUE OF REAL ESTATE. THE TAX PROPERTY ASSESSMENT IS 
BASED ON THIS VALUE.
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FIGURE 2.11 VACANCY RATES46 IN SOCIAL RENTED HOUSING STOCK IN DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES, IN 
PERCENTAGE, IN 2007. SO U RCE: CFV -  BBSH, ADAPTED BY THE PBL (BUITELAAR ET AL. 2008)
FIGURE 2.12 WOZ-VALUE, IN EUROS, IN THE NETHERLANDS, ON 1 JANUARY 2008, PER 
MUNICIPALITY. SO U RCE: CBS (STATLINE)
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46 THESE ARE PROPERTIES OWNED BY SOCIAL HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN
VACANT FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AND HAVE NOT BEEN NOMINATED FOR DEMOLI­
TION.
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c h e a p e st h o u se s  can b e fo u n d  in th e  re g io n s o f P a rkstad  L im b u rg , E e m sd elta , 
e a ste rn  G ro n in g e n  and  Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n , a lso  k n o w n  as th e  s h rin k in g  re g io n s 
(V e rka d e , 20 0 9 , p .174 -175 ). V e rk a d e  used  th e  W O Z  v a lu e  o f 20 0 4 . In F ig ure  2.12 this 
in fo rm a tio n  is u p d a te d  to 1 J a n u a ry  20 08 .
E ich h o ltz  and  L in d e n th a l (2 0 0 8 ) g iv e  th e  fo llo w in g  e x p la n a tio n  fo r th is . T h e y  a rg u e  
th a t ‘re g io n a l h o u s in g  m a rk e ts  w ith  a bad e co n o m ic  p ro sp e c tiv e  and  d itto  re s id e n ­
tia l q u a lity  h a v e  a tw o -fo ld  p ro b le m : n o t o n ly  d o e s th e  to ta l n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  
d e cre a se , b u t a lso  do th e  h ig h ly  e d u ca te d  (rea d : h ig h -in co m e ) h o u se h o ld s  te n d  to 
m o v e  to  m o re  p ro sp e ro u s  re g io n s. If y o u n g e r g e n e ra tio n s  are  n o t b e tte r e d u cate d  
and  w e a lth ie r  th a n  th e  p re ce d in g  g e n e ra tio n s , th e  d e cre a s in g  h o u s in g  d e m a n d  
(w h ich  is th e  re su lt  o f d e cre a se  in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs) m a y  n o t b e  re v e rse d , w h ich  
m a y  ca u se  h o u s in g  p rice s to  fa ll’ (E ich h o ltz  and  L in d e n th a l, 20 0 8 , p. 3 2 0 )47. A c c o rd in g  
to  E ich h o ltz  and  L in d e n th a l, th is  s itu a tio n  is ta k in g  p la ce  in la rg e  p a rts  o f fo rm e r East 
G e rm a n y . In so m e  East G e rm a n  re g io n s, h o u s in g  p rice s  h a v e  d e ce a se d  b y  m o re  th an  
5 0%. T h e y  w a rn  th a t ce rta in  D u tch re g io n s (e .g . S o u th  L im b u rg , Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n  
and  G ro n in g e n ) co u ld  end  up in a s im ila r  s itu a tio n . In o rd e r to  p re v e n t th is, E ich h o ltz  
and  L in d e n th a l (2 0 0 8 ) re c o m m e n d  th o se  re g io n s to  re ta in  and  a ttra ct h ig h ly  e d u ­
cate d  p e o p le  (E ich h o ltz  and  L in d e n th a l, 20 0 8 , p .320 ).
V e rw e st et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) e m p h a s ise  th a t th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f a h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  
a re  d iffe re n t fo r  o w n e r-o cc u p ie d  h o u s in g  th a n  fo r re n te d  so cia l h o u sin g . In o w n e r- 
o ccu p ie d  p ro p e rtie s , th e  d e clin e  is lik e ly  to  lead  to  an in c re a se  in th e  a m o u n t o f tim e 
th a t a p ro p e rty  is on th e  m a rk e t, in m o d e st p r ice  d e v e lo p m e n ts, and  in a d e cre a se  
in th e  n u m b e r o f p e o p le  m o v in g  h o u se, as th e y  b e co m e  ‘s tu c k ’ in th e ir  h o u s in g  s itu ­
a tio n  (A d ria a n s and  H ein z, 20 0 7; B o ers and  P o ulu s, 20 0 7; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ). For 
re n te d  so cia l h o u sin g , in co n tra st, it is lik e ly  to  lead  to h igh v a ca n c y  and  tu rn o v e r 
ra te s. H o w e v e r, in o th e r co u n trie s , fo r  e x a m p le , in G e rm a n y  (G lo c k  and  H au sser- 
m an n , 20 0 4 ), d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  a lso  h a s re su lte d  in h igh v a ca n c y  ra te s in o w n e r- 
o ccu p ie d  h o u sin g . W h e th e r  th is  a lso  h a s o ccu rre d  in th e  D u tch s h rin k in g  re g io n s, is 
u n k n o w n , as d ata  on v a c a n c y  ra te s in o w n e r-o cc u p ie d  h o u s in g  a re  n o t a v a ila b le 48, 
a lth o u g h  it w o u ld  b e m o re  lik e ly  to  b e re fle cte d  in lo w  h o u s in g  p rice s. T h is, fo r 
e x a m p le , h a p p e n e d  in th e  s h rin k in g  c ity  o f M a n ch e ste r, in th e  East M a n ch e ste r
47 FRANCKE (2010, P.9) CONCLUDES THAT IN THE DUTCH REGIONS WITH THE LOWEST 
HOUSE-PRICE DEVELOPMENT, INCOME DEVELOPMENT IS LOW AND AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD 
SIZES DECREASE THE MOST. AT THE SAME TIME, THE VACANCY RATE IN THOSE REGIONS 
INCREASES MOST.
48 STATISTICS NETHERLANDS ARE WORKING ON OBTAINING MORE INSIGHT INTO VACANCY 
RATES IN OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING. CURRENTLY, THIS OVERVIEW IS NOT YET AVAILABLE.
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n e ig h b o u rh o o d , w h e re  h o u se s, u su a lly  fo rm e r co u n cil h o u se s, w e re  b e in g  so ld  fo r 
le ss th a n  10 ,0 0 0  p o u n d s sterlin g .
In a d d itio n , h o u se h o ld  d e c lin e  m a y  in c re a se  th e  c o n c e n tra t io n  o f p a rt icu la r  p o p u la ­
tio n  g ro u p s  and  re d u c e  th e  q u a lity  o f th e  sp a tia l e n v iro n m e n t. T h e  re a so n  is th a t the 
n e g a tiv e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f th is  fo rm  o f d e clin e  (e.g. h igh v a c a n c y  ra te s, h ig h  tu rn o v e r 
ra te s, h o u s in g  p rice s  th a t la g  b e h in d  th e  n a tio n a l h o u s in g  p rice  le ve l, in c re a se  in th e  
a m o u n t o f tim e  it ta k e s  b e fo re  p ro p e rtie s  a re  so ld ) te n d  to b e co n c e n tra te d  in sp e ­
c ific  d istricts  and  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s.
S tro m e ie r and  B a d e r (20 0 4 ) o b se rv e d  such a n e g a tiv e  sp ira l in th e  sh rin k in g  c it ie s  of 
N orth  R h in e -W e stp h a lia . T h e  re s id e n ts  w h o  sta y  in th o se  a re a s are  o fte n  th e  e ld e rly  
and  th e  le a st w e ll-o ff, in c lu d in g  a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  o f im m ig ra n ts. In o th e r s h rin k ­
in g  c itie s, su ch  as M a n c h e ste r and  D e tro it (O sw a lt and  R ien ie ts, 20 0 6 ), a s im ila r 
la rg e -sca le  d o w n w a rd  sp ira l co u ld  b e o b se rv e d . A s  p e o p le  (w ith  jo b s )  left, it b e ca m e  
d ifficu lt to  let a p a rtm e n ts, re n t p rice s  d ro p p e d , ‘p ro b le m  fa m ilie s ’ m o ved  in, and  the 
im a g e  o f th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  d e te rio ra te d . T h is  had  a n e g a tiv e  effect on in v e stm e n ts  
and  q u a lity  o f life  in th o se  sh rin k in g  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s.
G la e s e r and  G y o u rk o  (2 0 0 5 ) and  G la e se r et al. (20 0 6 ) in v e stig a te d  sh rin k in g  cities 
in th e  U n ite d  S ta te s49. T h e y  a rg u e d  th a t  n e g a tiv e  e c o n o m ic  sh o ck s  m a y  re su lt  in a 
d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n  and  in h o u s in g  p rice s. T h e y  a rg u e  th a t, w h e n  h o u s in g  p rices 
d ro p  b e lo w  th e  co st o f n e w  b u ild s  (c o n stru c tio n  co sts), h o u s in g  co n stru c tio n  w ill 
stop , and  a c ity  m a y  d e te r io ra te  (G la e s e r et al., 20 0 6 ). In s h rin k in g  a re as, p e o p le  w ho  
can  afford  to, w ill m o ve  out, and  p e o p le  w h o  ca n n o t, w ill sta y  b e h in d  (se le c tiv e  o u t­
m ig ra tio n ). M o re o v e r, lo w  h o u s in g  co sts  m a y  a ttra ct u n d e rp riv ile g e d  p e o p le , s ince 
ch e a p  h o u s in g  is m o re  a ttra c tiv e  to  th e  p o o r. T h is  m a y  re su lt  in a c o n c e n tra t io n  of 
p o v e rty , w h ich  co u ld  d e te r g ro w th  eve n  fu rth e r. In th is  w a y, an a rea can  end  up in a 
n e g a tiv e  d o w n w a rd  sp ira l (G la e se r and G y o u rk o , 20 05).
Fo r th e  N e th e rla n d s, s im ila r e ffects a re  e x p e cte d  (V an  D am  et al., 20 0 6 , 20 0 8 ; E ich ­
h o ltz  and  L in d e n th a l, 20 0 8 ; V e rk a d e , 20 0 9 ). H o w e v e r, V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ) and 
V e rk a d e  (2 0 0 9 ) b o th  a rg u e d  th a t th e  s itu a tio n  fo r  th e  N e th e rla n d s m a y  n o t b e as 
d ra m a tic  as in so m e  fo re ig n  s h rin k in g  c it ie s  (e .g . D e tro it and  L e ip z ig ). For th e  re la ­
t iv e  size  o f th e  d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n  and h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs, th a t are  e x p e cte d
49 GLAESER AND GYOURKO (2005) AND GLAESER ET AL. (2006) INVESTIGATED THE EFFECTS OF 
REGIONAL POPULATION DECLINE (AND CHANGES IN DEMAND) ON HOUSING STOCK. THEY
CONCLUDED THAT, BECAUSE HOUSES CAN BE BUILT QUICKLY, BUT DISAPPEAR SLOWLY, 
URBAN DECLINE IS NOT A MIRROR IMAGE OF GROWTH (GLAESER AND GYOURKO, 2005, P. 346; 
GLAESER ET AL., 2006).
49
o r a lre a d y  a re  e x p e rie n c e d  in D utch m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (se e  F ig u res 2.8 and 2.9), is m uch 
sm a lle r  th a n , fo r in sta n ce , in fo rm e r East G e rm a n  and  in US c it ie s50 51. A lso , the  
d ista n ce s  w ith in  th e  N e th e rla n d s are  m u ch  sm a lle r  th a n , fo r  e x a m p le , in th e  U n ited  
S ta te s  o r G e rm a n y, as a re su lt  o f  w h ich  re s id e n tia l m ig ra tio n  b e h a v io u r is d ifferen t. 
V a n  D am  (2 0 0 9 ) a rg u e s th a t, in n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  w h e re  th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  
d e cre a se  and v a ca n c y  ra te s in cre a se , th e  q u a lity  o f th e  sp a tia l e n v iro n m e n t m ay 
c o m e  u n d e r p re ssu re . T h is  is lik e ly  to  b e th e  ca se  in n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  w ith  th e  least 
a ttra c tiv e  h o u s in g  sto ck. T h o se  s h rin k in g  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  m a y  b e c o n fro n te d  w ith  
v a n d a lism  and  crim e . A n  e x a m p le  is ‘W o ld  A ’, w h ich  w a s o n e  o f th e  s h rin k in g  n e ig h ­
b o u rh o o d s  o f Le lysta d . In th e  late  19 8 0 s and 19 9 0 s, th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  in this 
n e ig h b o u rh o o d  d e clin e d , w h ile  th e  v a n d a lism  and  crim e  ra te s ro se. In th e  N e th e r­
la n d s, q u a n tita tiv e  stu d ie s  a b o u t th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e cre a s in g  n u m b e rs  of 
h o u se h o ld s  and  v a n d a lism  and  crim e  a re  n o t y e t a v a ila b le  (Van D am  et al., 20 06 ).
E ich h o ltz  and  L in d e n th a l (2 0 0 8 ) w a rn  th a t, in s h rin k in g  re g io n s, e sp e c ia lly  w h e n  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a cc o m p a n ie d  by e c o n o m ic  d isa d v a n ta g e , a d o w n w a rd  sp ira l 
m a y  o c cu r if  th e re  is se le c tiv e  o u t-m ig ra tio n . V e rk a d e  (2 0 0 9 ) c o n c lu d e s th a t it is 
e sp e c ia lly  in p e rip h e ra l sh r in k in g  re g io n s th a t a d o w n w a rd  sp ira l m ig h t a rise , w ith  
d e c re a s in g  p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  and  e m p lo y m e n t, to g e th e r w ith  c o n c e n ­
tra tio n s  o f p a rt icu la r  p o p u la tio n  g ro u p s  (le ss  p r iv ile g e d ) (V e rka d e , 20 0 9 , p .180 ).
T h o se  c o n se q u e n ce s  m e n tio n e d  a b o v e  w ill h a v e  d iffe re n t e ffects on th e  v a rio u s  
a cto rs  on th e  h o u s in g  m a rk e t. T h e  p ro b le m s co n n e cte d  w ith  a d e c lin e  in th e  n u m ­
b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  are  p r im a rily  fe lt  b y  h o u s in g  su p p lie rs , su ch  as h o u s in g  a sso c ia ­
tio n s, real e sta te  d e v e lo p e rs, la n d lo rd s  and  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  w ish  to  sell o r re n t th e ir 
p ro p e rtie s . In a s itu a tio n  o f d e clin e , se lle rs  w ill re c e iv e  less m o n e y  fo r  th e ir  p ro p e r­
tie s, and  sa le s w ill ta k e  m o re  tim e . B e cau se  o f th e  m a n y  v a ca n c ie s, th e  in c o m e s of 
h o u s in g  a sso c ia t io n s  and  la n d lo rd s  w ill b e  re d u ce d . H o w ever, th e re  are  o th e r a ctors, 
w h o  m ig h t b e n e fit. A  d ro p  in th e  n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  co u ld  lead to  a m o re  re lax ed  
h o u s in g  m arke t, w h ich  w ill b e n e fit  h o u s in g  co n su m e rs: it m a k e s it e a s ie r  fo r  them
50 SOME NEIGHBOURHOODS OF LEIPZIG EXPERIENCED A DECREASE IN POPULATION NUMBERS 
OF 20 TO 30% , WHICH RESULTED IN A VACANCY RATE OF 20%  OF THE HOUSING STOCK 
(BONTJE, 2004A, 2004B).
51 NOT ONLY THE RELATIVE SIZE BUT ALSO THE ABSOLUTE SIZE OF THE DECREASE IN 
POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS IN THE NETHERLANDS IS MUCH SMALLER THAN
ABROAD. MOST MUNICIPALITIES THAT EXPERIENCE POPULATION DECLINE ARE SMALL AND 
OFTEN RURAL (VAN DAM ET AL., 2006; VERW EST ET AL., 2010). THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THEIR 
DECREASE MAY SEEM HIGH, BUT AS MUNICIPALITIES ARE ONLY SMALL, THE ABSOLUTE 
DECREASE OFTEN IS LESS SPECTACULAR, COMPARED TO DECLINES FOUND IN SOME OTHER 
COUNTRIES.
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to fin d  h o u s in g  th a t m e e ts  th e ir  re q u ire m e n ts, and  at a re la tiv e ly  lo w  p rice . T h is  m ay 
lead  to  a b e tte r p r ic e -q u a lit y  ra tio  (P rie m u s, 19 9 9 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ; V a n  Dam  
and  V e rw e st, 20 10 ).
2.4.2 REGIONAL ECONOMY
T h e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  th e  e c o n o m y  is v e ry  c o m p le x  
and  le ss d ire ct th a n  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  h o u s in g 52. A s  a re su lt, th e re  
is m u ch  d isa g re e m e n t and  m u ch  is u n k n o w n  a b o u t th e  e c o n o m ic  c o n se q u e n ce s  of 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . T h is  se ctio n , n e v e rth e le ss, a tte m p ts  to  g iv e  an o v e rv ie w  of 
th o se  p o ss ib le  c o n se q u e n ce s . T h e  e ffects o f a d e clin e  in p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m ­
b ers, and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , a re  d iscu sse d  se p a ra te ly , b e ca u se  th e  d e clin e  in 
p o p u la tio n  and  in n u m b e r o f h o u se h o ld s  p r im a rily  affect th e  d e m a n d  fo r g o o d s and 
se rv ice s, w h ile  th e  d e clin e  in w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n  a ffects th e  la b o u r su p p ly.
DEMAND FOR GOODS AND SERVICES
A  d e cre a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f p e o p le  and  h o u se h o ld s  co u ld  lead  to a sm a lle r  m arke t 
and  le ss su p p o rt fo r  p r iv a te  se rv ice s. E sp e c ia lly  p o p u la t io n -re la te d  in d u str ie s  (e .g . re ­
tail and  c a te rin g , h e a lth  care, to u rism ) w o u ld  b e a ffected , b e ca u se  th o se  b u sin e sse s  
te n d  to fo llo w  p e o p le  (D e G ra aff et al., 2 0 0 8 )53. V a rio u s  a u th o rs  h a ve  a lso  m a d e  this 
p o in t (V an D am  et al., 20 0 6 ; D erks et al., 20 0 6 a, 20 0 6 b ; V e rk a d e , 20 0 9 ; H uiszo o n , 
20 0 8 ; A a rts  et al., 20 0 8 ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ). S u p p lie rs  o f su ch  se rv ice s  m ig h t d e c id e  to 
c lo se  th e ir  b u s in e sse s, re su lt in g  in an o v e rsu p p ly  o f co m m e rc ia l real e sta te  and  m an y 
v a ca n c ie s  (se e  F ig u re  2.13). D e cre a s in g  p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  m a y  lead 
to a stru ctu ra l o v e rsu p p ly  o f co m m e rc ia l real e sta te  and  (h ig h ) v a ca n c y  ra te s (w ith 
a cc o m p a n y in g  n e g a tiv e  e ffects on th e  re s id e n tia l q u ality , su ch  as im p o v e rish m e n t of 
n e ig h b o u rh o o d s). F ig u re  2.13 sh o w s th a t th e  h ig h e st v a ca n c y  ra te s o f reta il p ro p e rty  
a re  fo u n d  in th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  th a t h a v e  a lre a d y  e x p e rie n ce d  a d e cre a se  in p o p u la ­
tio n  and  h o u se h o ld s  (se e  a lso  F ig u res 2.8  and  2.9).
V a n  D am  et al. (2 0 0 6 ) q u a lify  th is  b y  e m p h a s is in g  th a t th e  d e cre a se d  d e m a n d  is 
ca u se d  n o t o n ly  b y  fe w e r c u sto m e rs  b u t a lso  b y  th e ir  c h a n g in g  b e h a v io u r (ch a n g e s 
in m o b ility  b e h a v io u r, c o n su m e r b e h a v io u r, and  in life  sty le ) and  b y  th e  ch a n g in g  
b e h a v io u r o f su p p lie rs  ( in flu e n ce d  b y  co m m e rc ia l co n s id e ra tio n s). V a n  D am  (19 9 5)
52 THIS HAS TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS MAY BE BOTH THE CAUSE 
AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
53 THIS IS NOT THE CASE FOR EXPORTING AND VALUE ADDED SECTORS, SUCH AS INDUSTRY, 
DISTRIBUTION AND TRADE, AND BUSINESS SERVICES (DE GRAAFF ET AL., 2008).
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and  V a n  D am  et al. (2 0 0 6 ) a rg u e  th a t th o se  ch a n g e s h a v e  a g re a te r in flu e n ce  on the 
d im in ish in g  su p p o rt fo r p r iv a te  se rv ice s  th a n  th e  s lo w  p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  
d e v e lo p m e n ts  w o u ld  h a v e 54. T h e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  can  o n ly  sp e e d  up th e  p ro ce ss 
w h ic h  is in itia te d  b y  b e h a v io u ra l ch a n g e s (o f co n su m e rs  and  su p p lie rs), b u t is n o t the  
m ain  ca u se  o f it.
In a d d it io n , th e  a u th o rs  a rg u e d  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is n o t th e  c a u se  o f  the 
c ru m b lin g  a w a y  o f th e  su p p o rt fo r  local se rv ice s, b u t ra th e r th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  is in d u ce d  by a d e clin e  in lo cal se rv ice s. For so m e  p e o p le , th e  d isa p p e a ra n c e  
o f c o m m e rc ia l se rv ice s  re d u c e s th e  a ttra c t iv e n e ss  o f v illa g e s  and  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  
as p la ce s  to  live. T h e  co u n cil fo r P u b lic  A d m in is tra t io n  (R o b /R fv , 2 0 0 8 ) co n clu d e d  
th a t th is  is o n ly  th e  ca se  fo r sp e c ific  p o p u la tio n  g ro u p s  (e.g. th e  le ss  m o b ile  e ld erly). 
T h e  R o b /R fv  (2 0 0 8 ) e m p h a s ise s  th a t lo cal se rv ice s  a re  le ss  im p o rta n t to  th e  v ia b ility / 
q u a lity  o f th e  sp a tia l e n v iro n m e n t th a n  is o fte n  su p p o se d . T h e y  re fe r to  th e  re se a rch  
b y  L a m m e rts  and  D o gan (20 0 4 ), w h ich  c o n c lu d e s  th a t th e  sp a tia l e n v iro n m e n t in v il­
la g e s  is p r im a rily  b a sed  on re s id e n tia l q u a lity  and  so cia l co n ta cts, and  n o t so m u ch  on 
lo cal se rv ice s  (R o b /R fv , 20 0 8 , p .8 1; L a m m e rts and D o g an , 20 0 4 , p .120 ). T h e se  c o n c lu ­
s io n s a re  a lso  su p p o rte d  b y  V is s e r  and  V a n  D am  (20 0 6 ) and  T h isse n  (20 10).
M o re o v e r, th o se  su p p lie rs  o f co m m e rc ia l se rv ice s, as a re su lt  o f a d e cre a se  in w o rk ­
in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , h a v e  d ifficu ltie s  f in d in g  a su c c e sso r to  ta k e  o v e r th e ir  b u sin e sse s. 
A g a in , th o se  e ffe cts  are  ca u se d  n o t o n ly  b y  d o w n w a rd  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts, 
b u t a lso  b y  ch a n g e s in ch o ice  o f e d u c a tio n  and p ro fe ssio n .
54 VAN DAM ET AL. (2006) ILLUSTRATE THIS BY REFERRING TO THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. WHEN 
MORE AND MORE INHABITANTS OF A VILLAGE GO TO A NEARBY CITY TO BUY THEIR GROCER­
IES IN LARGE SUPERMARKETS INSTEAD OF GOING TO THE LOCAL SUPERMARKETS, BAKERIES
AND GREENGROCERS, THIS MAY LEAD TO THE CLOSURE OF THOSE LOCAL SHOPS. WHEN 
THIS HAPPENS IN A VILLAGE WHERE THE POPULATION DECLINES, THIS DECLINE WILL SPEED 
UP THE CLOSURE OF LOCAL SHOPS. AFTER ALL, AS A RESULT OF THE DECREASE IN POPULA­
TION AND NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS, THE MARKET BECOMES SMALLER, TOO. HOWEVER, 
EVEN IN CASES OF POPULATION GROWTH, THE ABOVE DESCRIBED CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
COULD LEAD TO BANKRUPTCY OF LOCAL SHOPS. MORE AND MORE CONSUMERS BUY THEIR 
GROCERIES AT LARGE SUPERMARKETS (WHERE THEY CAN BUY EVERYTHING AT ONCE),
WHICH ARE MAINLY ACCESSIBLE BY CAR. THOSE CHANGES IN LIFESTYLES AND PREFER­
ENCES HAVE STIMULATED THE SCALING UP OF SUPERMARKETS. ALSO THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
SUPPLIERS AND THEIR CHANGED BUSINESS ECONOMICS (ECONOMICS OF SCALE AND COSTS 
OF EXPLOITATION) HAVE SUPPORTED THIS TREND (VAN DAM 1995; EVERS ET AL., 2005; VAN 
DAM ET AL., 2006).
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FIGURE 2.13 VACANCY RATES IN RETAIL PROPERTY (SHOPS)55 IN PERCENTAGE, IN 2009, PER 
MUNICIPALITY. S O U R C E : LOCATUS.
< 2 %
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LABOUR SUPPLY
S e v e ra l a u th o rs  (Van Im h off and V a n  W isse n , 20 01; D erks et al., 20 0 6 a; V a n  Dam  et 
al., 20 0 6 ; V a n  D ijk  and  P e lle n b a rg , 20 0 6 a; E u w a ls  et al., 2 0 0 9 ) h a v e  p o in te d  o u t th at 
a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  is lik e ly  to  a ffect th e  la b o u r m a rk e t b y  re d u c ­
in g  th e  la b o u r su p p ly . H o w e v e r, th is  is n o t in e v ita b le . W h e th e r  su ch  a s itu a tio n  takes 
p la c e  d e p e n d s on th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e  la b o u r p a rtic ip a tio n  leve l (V an  Im h o ff and 
V a n  W isse n , 2 0 0 1)56 57, as an in c re a s in g  la b o u r p a rtic ip a tio n  co u ld  fu lly  o r p a rtia lly  
co m p e n sa te  fo r a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n .
54 ALSO CALLED ‘POINTS OF SALE', THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AT AN UNIQUE 
ADDRESS. THIS MEANS THE POINTS OF SALE HAVE THEIR OWN EMPLOYEES, OWN CASH 
REGISTERS AND OWN SQUARE METRES. A MORE COMMON NAME FOR THIS IS SHOP (LISA).
56 VAN DIJK AND PELLENBARG (2006A) ARGUE THAT INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES, LIKE CHANGES 
IN THE DUTCH OLD AGE PENSIONS ACT, INFLUENCE THE LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND THUS 
ALSO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF THE WORKING AGE 
POPULATION AND THE SUPPLY OF LABOUR.
57 BROERSMA AND VAN DIJK (2002) AND NOBACK AND VAN DIJK (2006) STUDIED THE LABOUR 
PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS AND CONCLUDED THAT THERE ARE REGIONAL 
DIFFERENCES IN THIS.
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A s  d e scrib e d  in S e ctio n  2.3 .1, a cc o rd in g  to S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s, th e  D u tch w o rk in g  
a g e  p o p u la tio n  w ill d e cre a se  fro m  20 11, and  th e  la b o u r fo rce  w ill d e cre a se  a ro u n d  
20 20  (E u w a ls  et al., 20 0 9 ). T h e se  e x p e c ta t io n s  do n o t ta k e  a cc o u n t o f th e  e x p e cte d  
c h a n g e s in th e  D utch G e n e ra l O ld  A g e  P e n sio n s A c t  (A lg e m e n e  O u d e rd o m sw e t  
(A O W )), so it is u n ce rta in  h o w  th e  la b o u r p a rtic ip a tio n  and  th u s th e  la b o u r su p p ly  
w ill d e v e lo p . It is e x p e cte d  th a t th e  fo re se e a b le  ch a n g e s in th e  A O W  w ill in c re a se  the 
p a rt ic ip a t io n  level a m o n g  p e o p le  o f th e  a g e s o f 65, 66 and  67. H o w e v e r, w h e th e r 
th is  co u ld  co m p e n sa te  fo r th e  e x p e cte d  d e clin e  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , is u n ce r­
ta in  (E u w a ls  et al., 20 0 9 ).
A  re d u ctio n  in th e  la b o u r su p p ly  m a y  h a v e  a v a rie ty  o f c o n se q u e n ce s . T h e  fo llo w in g  
p a ra g ra p h s  p ro v id e  an o v e rv ie w  o f p o ss ib le  e c o n o m ic  c o n se q u e n ce s , as w ell as the 
d iscu ss io n  on th e se  c o n se q u e n ce s, as th e re  is s tro n g  d isa g re e m e n t on th is  su b ject.
A  d ist in ctio n  is m a d e  b e tw e e n  e ffe cts  fo r th e  la b o u r m a rk e t and  fo r  th e  reg io n al 
(sp a tia l)  e co n o m y .
EFFECTS ON THE LABOUR MARKET
First, so m e  a rg u e  th a t a d e cre a s in g  la b o u r su p p ly  w o u ld  lead  to la b o u r sh o rtag e s, 
o th e rs  d isa g re e , as an in c re a se  in la b o u r p ro d u c tiv ity  and  ch a n g e s in u n e m p lo y m e n t 
ra te  co u ld  fu lly  o r p a rt ia lly  c o m p e n sa te  fo r  a fa llin g  la b o u r su p p ly . S e ve ra l o th e r 
d e v e lo p m e n ts , su ch  as ch a n g e s in th e  A O W  (se e  a b o ve ), co u ld  a lso  affect la b o u r su p ­
p ly. M o re o v e r, w h e th e r a d e cre a s in g  la b o u r su p p ly  w o u ld  lead  to  la b o u r sh o rta g e s 
a lso  d e p e n d s on la b o u r d e m a n d . T h is  d e m a n d  is d ifficu lt to  p re d ict and  is d e te r­
m in e d , n o t o n ly  by d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts , b u t a lso  by e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts. 
M o re o v e r, th o se  tw o  a re  o fte n  re late d  (C o m m iss ie  B ak ker, 20 0 8 , p .4 )58. La b o u r 
d e m a n d  co u ld  a lso  b e affected  n e g a tiv e ly  as a re su lt  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. S o m e 
a rg u e  th a t in d u str ie s  (e sp e c ia lly  p o p u la t io n -re la te d  in d u str ie s  or la b o u r-in te n s iv e  in ­
d u str ie s)  te n d  to  le a v e  sh rin k in g  re g io n s, w h ich  w o u ld  re d u ce  la b o u r d e m a n d . In the 
n e x t se ctio n , ‘re g io n a l (sp a tia l)  e c o n o m y ’, th e  w a y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m ig h t affect 
la b o u r d e m a n d , is d iscu sse d  in m o re  d e ta il.
S e co n d , so m e  a rg u e  th a t, fo r e m p lo y e rs  w h o  are lo ca te d  in a re g io n  w h e re  the  
w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  is d e clin in g , it co u ld  b e c o m e  m o re  d ifficu lt to  fin d  en o u g h  
(w ell q u a lif ie d ) p e rso n n e l w ith in  th e  (sh rin k in g ) re g io n . T h is  co u ld  re su lt  in e m p lo y ­
e rs  c o m p e tin g  fo r e m p lo y e e s. S u ch  a s itu a tio n  w o u ld  n e g a tiv e ly  affect, e sp e cia lly ,
58 SECTION 2 .2.2 ALSO DESCRIBES HOW ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS MAY CAUSE
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. HOWEVER, DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE ALSO MAY AFFECT THE 
ECONOMY.
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th e  la b o u r-in te n s iv e  in d u str ie s  (e.g. se rv ice s  se cto rs). In th e se  se cto rs, la b o u r is an 
im p o rta n t fa cto r, and  fo r  th e m  litt le  b e n e fit  can b e e x p e cte d  fro m  g ro w th  in la b o u r 
p ro d u c tiv ity  o r p ro d u c t in n o v a tio n . H o w ever, in o th e r se cto rs , a d e cre a se  in la b o u r 
su p p ly  m ig h t b e co m p e n sa te d  b y  a u to m a tio n  p ro ce sse s  o r in n o v a tio n s  th a t re su lt  in 
an in c re a se  in p ro d u ctiv ity . W h e th e r  th is  co m p e tit io n  fo r la b o u r in d e e d  w ill em e rg e  
is a g ain  d e p e n d e n t on th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  th e  d e m a n d  fo r la b o u r, w h ic h  a lso  can be 
(a s d e scrib e d  a b o v e ) affected  b y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e.
T h ird , a cc o rd in g  to so m e  re se a rc h e rs  (D e rk s  et al., 20 0 6 a; E u w a ls  et al., 2 0 0 9 ) a 
d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  o r la b o u r su p p ly  m ay  re su lt  in g e n e ra l w a g e  
rises. V a n  D ijk  and  P e lle n b a rg  (20 0 6 a , 20 0 6 b , 2 0 0 6 c ) and  E u w a ls et al. (2 0 0 9 ) sa y  th at 
th is  is n o t in e v ita b le . A fte r  all, m o st se c to rs  fo llo w  n a tio n a l c o lle c tiv e  la b o u r a g re e ­
m e n ts  (Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomsten (CAOs)) th a t  a lso  in c lu d e  a g re e m e n ts  on 
sa la r ie s  (se e  Box 2.1). A n  e x ce p tio n  m ig h t b e th e  la b o u r-in te n s iv e  in d u str ie s , w h e re  a 
d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  o r la b o u r fo rce  m a y  in d e e d  re su lt  in w a g e  rises. 
T h e  re a so n  fo r  th is  is th a t it is d ifficu lt to  re lo c a te  so m e  la b o u r-in te n s iv e  a ctiv itie s  
(e .g . h e a lth  ca re ) to  o th e r co u n trie s . M o re o ve r, p ro je c tio n s  p re se n te d  in A p p e n d ix  3 
(F ig u re  4 ) in d ic a te  th a t o th e r E u ro p e a n  c o u n trie s  a lso  m a y  e x p e c t d e cre a se s  in w o rk ­
in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  (se e  a lso  B e e r et al, 20 10 ). From  th is  p e rsp e ctiv e , it w o u ld  a lso  be 
d ifficu lt fo r  e m p lo y e rs  to  a ttra ct n e w  e m p lo y e e s  fro m  o th e r E u ro p e a n  co u n trie s.
Fo u rth , E u w a ls  et al. (2 0 0 9 ) a rg u e  th a t, in s h rin k in g  re g io n s, fo r  co n su m e rs  so m e 
se rv ice s  (e .g . h e a lth  ca re ) m a y  b e c o m e  m o re  e x p e n siv e , b e c a u se  d e m a n d  fo r  th o se  
(la b o u r-in te n s iv e )  se rv ice s  is e x p e cte d  to  in c re a se  (d u e  to a g e in g 60) w h ile  la b o u r su p ­
p ly  is e x p e cte d  to  d e cre a se .
59 IN THE NETHERLANDS, IN COMPARABLE JOBS, OLDER PEOPLE EARN MORE MONEY THAN 
YOUNG PEOPLE. THIS IS BASED ON THE IDEA THAT OLDER PEOPLE HAVE MORE WORKING 
EXPERIENCE AND, AS A RESULT, ARE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN YOUNGER PEOPLE. 
HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT ALWAYS THE CASE. WHEN EMPLOYEES G ET OLDER AND THEIR 
PRODUCTIVITY DECREASES (INSTEAD OF INCREASES), THEY OFTEN KEEP THEIR SALARY 
LEVEL. THIS IS CONSIDERED FAIR BECAUSE IT CAN BE SEEN AS DELAYED REWARD, FOR 
EARNING LESS (THAN THEIR PRODUCTIVITY) WHEN THEY WERE YOUNGER (EUWALS ET AL., 
2009, P.156- 158).
60 THE ELDERLY USE THOSE SERVICES MORE AND TODAY'S ELDERLY HAVE MORE MONEY THAN 
THEY USED TO HAVE.
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BOX 2.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND COLLECTIVE LABOUR MARKET AGREEMENTS
EUWALS ET AL. (2009) ARGUE THAT, DUE TO A DECREASE IN THE LABOUR FORCE, THE 
BASIC PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE DUTCH WAGE STRUCTURE IS BASED COULD COME 
UNDER PRESSURE54. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE WHEN THE LABOUR FORCE NOT 
ONLY DECLINES BUT ALSO AGES (WHICH HAPPENS IN SHRINKING REGIONS). EMPLOYERS 
HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO USING CHEAP YOUNG EMPLOYEES TO BALANCE THE 
HIGHER WAGE COSTS OF OLDER EMPLOYEES. IF THE NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
WITHIN A CERTAIN AREA SHOULD DECREASE, IT WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT FOR 
EMPLOYERS TO ATTRACT THESE TYPES OF EMPLOYEES. AS A RESULT OF THIS SCARCITY 
OF YOUNG EMPLOYEES, THE WAGES OF YOUNG PEOPLE MIGHT RISE. WHEN THIS 
HAPPENS, EMPLOYERS ARE NO LONGER ABLE TO FINANCE OLDER EMPLOYEES BY ALSO 
EMPLOYING YOUNGER ONES. WHEN WAGES OF YOUNG EMPLOYEES WOULD INCREASE
SO WOULD THE PRESSURE TO ADAPT THE BASIC PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE DUTCH WAGE 
STRUCTURE IS BASED AND TO BRING THE SALARIES OF OLDER PEOPLE MORE IN LINE 
WITH THEIR PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS (I.E. TO REDUCE THEIR WAGES). AFTER ALL, THEIR 
INCOME CAN NO LONGER BE COMPENSATED BY THE (RELATIVELY CHEAP) WAGES OF 
YOUNG PEOPLE (COMPARED TO THEIR PRODUCTIVITY) (EUWALS ET AL. 2009, P.156-158).
HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE AGEING OF THE POPULATION, IT WILL BECOME DIFFICULT 
TO ALTER WAGES OF OLDER EMPLOYEES. AFTER ALL, THE SHARE OF ELDERLY 
WITHIN THE TOTAL LABOUR FORCE IS HIGH. BECAUSE OF THAT, THEY HAVE A STRONG 
BARGAINING POSITION. TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS (THE CONFEDERATION OF 
NETHERLANDS INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYERS (VNO-NCW)) CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS 
ABOUT WAGE STRUCTURES. BECAUSE MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TRADE UNIONS 
ARE OLDER, THEY HAVE A STRONG SAY IN PAY NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, BECAUSE 
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LAST-IN-FIRST-OUT, OLDER EMPLOYEES WHO ARE IN PERMANENT 
EMPLOYMENT HAVE A STRONGER NEGOTIATING POWER THAN YOUNGER PEOPLE WITH A 
SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT (EUWALS ET AL., 2009, P.156- 158).
Fifth, D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a ) a rg u e  th a t a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n  m a y  lead 
to  a d e cre a se  in u n e m p lo y m e n t and  to  an in cre a se  in un filled  v a ca n c ie s. V a n  D ijk 
and  P e lle n b a rg  (20 0 6 a ), De B e e r (20 0 8 , 2 0 0 9 ) and  Eu w a ls et al. (20 0 9 ) d isa g re e . Van 
D ijk  and  P e lle n b a rg  (2 0 0 6 a ) p o in t o u t th a t D erks et al. (20 0 6 ) u n d e re stim a te  the  
m ism a tch  th a t o fte n  o ccu rs  b e tw e e n  la b o u r su p p ly  and  d e m a n d . T h e  q u a lif ica tio n s  
o f th e  la b o u r su p p ly  do n o t a lw a y s  m a tch  w h a t is re q u ire d . T h e re fo re , a d e cre a se  in 
la b o u r su p p ly  d o e s n o t n e c e ssa rily  re su lt  in a d e cre a se  in u n e m p lo y m e n t. V a n  D ijk 
and  P e lle n b a rg  a rg u e  fu rth e r th a t D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a ) p a y  to o  little  a tte n tio n  to  the 
fa c t th a t la b o u r su p p ly  m ig h t in c re a se  as a re su lt  o f a m e n d m e n ts  to  th e  G e n e ra l Old 
A g e  P e n sio n s A ct, o r to  an in c re a se  in w o rk in g  hours.
De Beer (2 0 0 9 ) e m p h a s ise s  th a t la b o u r su p p ly  and  d e m a n d  a re  in te rd e p e n d e n t. 
A c c o rd in g  to  m o d e rn  e c o n o m ic  th e o rie s  a b o u t stru ctu ra l u n e m p lo y m e n t (e.g. 
La yard , N ickell and  Ja c k m a n , 19 9 1), u n e m p lo y m e n t le ve ls  are  n o t d ire c tly  d e te rm in e d  
b y  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in th e  la b o u r fo rce , b u t p r im a rily  b y  in stitu tio n a l fa cto rs , su ch  as 
f le x ib ility  o f w a g e s, so cia l s e c u rity  syste m  (e.g. m in im u m  w a g e  le ve ls), th e  p o w e r 
o f th e  tra d e  u n io n s, and  th e  d e g re e  o f (d e -)c e n tra lisa t io n  o f w a g e  n e g o tia t io n s  (D e
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B e e r 20 0 8 , p .28 2; E u w a ls et al., 20 0 9 ). De B e e r (2 0 0 9 ) a lso  a rg u e s th a t, n o t o n ly  in 
th e  N e th e rla n d s b u t a lso  a b ro a d , th e re  se e m s to b e no  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  ch a n g e  
in la b o u r fo rc e  and  c h a n g e  in u n e m p lo y m e n t rate. In th e  E u ro p e a n  co u n trie s  w ith  a 
stro n g  d e clin e  in la b o u r fo rce  (e .g . G e rm a n y , Esto n ia , Latvia, L ith u an ia , H u n g a ry  and 
R o m a n ia 61), u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te s h a v e  b een  re la t iv e ly  h igh. Fo r e x a m p le , b e tw e e n  
19 9 7  and  20 0 7, th e  la b o u r fo rc e  o f  G e rm a n y  d e cre a se d  b y  1.4 % , w h e re a s  th ro u g h o u t 
th is  p e rio d  th e  u n e m p lo y m e n t rate  sta b ilise d  a ro u n d  8 .0 %  (D e B e e r 20 0 8 , p .28 2).
EFFECTS ON THE REGIONAL (SPATIAL) ECONOMY
S ix th , re s e a rc h e rs  d isa g re e  a b o u t th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  a d e cre a se  in w o rk ­
in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  and  sta n d a rd  o f liv in g  (g ro ss  re g io n a l d o m e stic  p ro d u ct). S o m e 
( in c lu d in g  De B eer (2 0 0 9 ) and  D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a )) c o n c lu d e  th a t a d e cre a se  in the 
la b o u r fo rce  m a y  re su lt  in a d e cre a se  in g ro ss  re g io n a l d o m e stic  p ro d u ct. De Beer 
(2 0 0 9 ) a rg u e s th a t such a d e cre a se  m ay  re su lt  in a s lig h tly  lo w e r p e r-c a p ita  stan d a rd  
o f liv in g . D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a ) a rg u e  th a t a d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n  m ig h t re su lt  in an 
a b so lu te  d e cre a se  in g ro ss  re g io n a l d o m e stic  p ro d u ct, h o w e v e r, b e c a u se  th e  p o p u la ­
tio n  d e cre a se s, th e  g ro ss  re g io n a l d o m e stic  p ro d u c t p e r in h a b ita n t m ig h t in cre ase . 
V a n  D am  et al. (2 0 0 6 ) a lso  a rg u e  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  d o e s n o t a u to m a tica lly  
lead  to  an e c o n o m ic  d e c lin e 62. G a k o v a  and  D ijkstra  (2 0 10 ) in v e stig a te d  th e  E u ro p ean  
s itu a tio n  and  co n c lu d e d  th a t p o p u la tio n  d e c lin e  in ru ral re g io n s o f E u ro p e  ra re ly  
le a d s to  e c o n o m ic  d e c lin e 63. E co n o m ic  d e clin e  is d e fin e d  as th e  g ro w th  in g ro ss 
re g io n a l d o m e stic  p ro d u c t p e r h ea d , w h ich  is su b sta n tia lly  lo w e r th a n  th e  n a tio n a l 
ra te  o f b e tw e e n  20 0 0  and  20 06 (G a k o v a  and  D ijkstra, 20 10 , p. 1).
S e v e n th , a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  co u ld  a lso  re su lt  in an in cre ase d  
o u t-m ig ra t io n  o f b u s in e sse s  and  an in c re a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f c lo su re s  o f f irm s that 
do n o t re lo ca te . T h is  e sp e c ia lly  co u ld  b e th e  ca se  fo r la b o u r-in te n s iv e  in d u strie s. 
T h o se  in d u str ie s  m a y  c o n s id e r m o v in g  to o th e r (g ro w in g ) re g io n s, w h e re  it w o u ld  be
61 SEE APPENDIX 3 .
62 VAN DAM ET AL. (2006) ARGUE THAT ECONOMIC DECLINE CAN BE DEFINED IN TWO WAYS. A 
DECREASE IN THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) OR A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF 
JOBS (VAN DAM ET AL., 2006, P.26).
63 THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE COMBINATION OF POPULATION DECLINE AND ECONOMIC
DECLINE IN THE EU15 (AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE,
IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM) IS EXCEPTIONAL, AND MAINLY OCCURS IN RURAL REGIONS THAT HAVE THE 
LOWEST SHARE OF POPULATION (GAKOVA AND DIJKSTRA, 2001, P.3).
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e a sie r  to  fin d  e n o u g h  p e rso n n e l64. T h is  co u ld  re d u ce  th e  la b o u r d e m a n d  in a s h rin k ­
in g  re g io n . O th e r ty p e s o f in d u str ie s  w ill p ro b a b ly  n o t re lo ca te . H o w e v e r, a cco rd in g  
to  V a n  O o rt et al. (20 0 7), th e  la b o u r m a rk e t is n o t a p u sh  fa c to r fo r th e  m ig ra tio n  of 
c o m p a n ie s; p u sh  fa c to rs  are  b u s in e ss  g ro w th  and  a v a ila b ility  o f land  fo r e x p a n sio n  
(V an O o rt et al., 20 0 7). M o re o ve r, th e y  sh o w  th a t m o st b u s in e sse s  m o ve  w ith in  the 
sa m e  m u n ic ip a lity ; lo ca tio n  sh ifts  to  o th e r re g io n s are  e x ce p tio n a l.
E ig h th , a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  m ay  a lso  re su lt  in a d e cre a se  in in w ard  
m ig ra tio n  o f b u s in e sse s. Fo r m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w h e re  th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  d e ­
cre a se s, it can  b e c o m e  m o re  d ifficu lt to  a ttra ct n e w  co m p a n ie s. In th e  N e th e rla n d s, it 
is a lre a d y  d ifficu lt fo r  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to  a ttra ct n e w  co m p a n ie s, b e ca u se  m o st m ig rate  
o n ly  o v e r sh o rt d ista n ce s  (V an O o rt et al., 20 0 7). To re g io n s w h e re  th e  w o rk in g  age 
p o p u la tio n  d e cre a se s, n e w  c o m p a n ie s  w ill h e s ita te  to  m o ve , fo r fe a r o f n o t fin d in g  
e n o u g h  q u a lif ie d  p e rso n n e l65.
N inth, a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  m ig h t d e cre a se  th e  d e m a n d  fo r la b o u r 
(d e c re a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f jo b s  and  a lo ss o f e m p lo y m e n t). T h is  is re late d  to  th e  
p re v io u s  tw o  p o in ts. De B e e r (2 0 0 9 ) a rg u e s th a t a d e cre a se  in th e  la b o u r fo rce  m ay 
lead  to  a re d u c tio n  in th e  g ro w th  in jo b s. He stu d ie d  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  m u ta ­
t io n s  in th e  la b o u r fo rc e 66 (a ge d  15 to  64) and  th e  g ro w th  in jo b s, b e tw e e n  19 9 5  and
2 0 0 5 . T h e  re su lts  fro m  th is  s tu d y  sh o w e d  th a t a d e cre a se  in th e  s ize  o f th e  la b o u r 
fo rc e  re su lte d  in a sm a lle r  g ro w th  in jo b s. T h is  can b e e x p la in e d  b y  th e  fa c t th a t an 
o v e rsu p p ly  o f la b o u r a ttra c ts  n e w  c o m p a n ie s  to  a ce rta in  re g io n . In s h rin k in g  re ­
g io n s, th e  o p p o site  can  b e th e  case. A  re d u ctio n  in w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n  m a y  lead 
c o m p a n ie s  to  d e cid e  to  avo id  sh rin k in g  re g io n s and , in ste a d , to  e sta b lish  th e m se lv e s  
in g ro w in g  re g io n s, w h e re  th e y  h a v e  m o re  o p p o rtu n itie s  to  fin d  e n o u g h  and  su itab le  
e m p lo y e e s.
64 ANOTHER ADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT THERE ARE MORE CONSUMERS IN THOSE GROWING 
REGIONS.
65 IN SHRINKING REGIONS, NOT ONLY THE DECREASING WORKING AGE POPULATION IS A 
PROBLEM, BUT ALSO COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION (E.G. IN AGE AND EDUCATION). IN 
THOSE AREAS, THE SHARE OF ELDERLY AND UNEDUCATED PEOPLE IS RELATIVELY HIGH, AND 
THAT OF YOUNG AND HIGHLY EDUCATED PEOPLE IS RELATIVELY LOW. AS A RESULT, FINDING 
EMPLOYEES WITH SPECIFIC SKILLS WILL BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR EMPLOYERS.
66 DE BEER (2009) DEFINES THE LABOUR FORCE AS THE PEOPLE BETWEEN THE AGES OF 15 AND 
65 . IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION, THE LABOUR FORCE WAS DEFINED AS THE PEOPLE BETWEEN 
THE AGES OF 20 AND 65.
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Ten th , th e re  m ig h t b e a re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  
and  th e  d e m a n d  fo r b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s. D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a ) a rg u e  th a t a d e cre a se  
n e g a tiv e ly  a ffects th e  d e m a n d  fo r land  (re a d : b u s in e ss  and  office  lo ca tio n s), th u s 
cre a tin g  an o v e rsu p p ly  o f b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s, h ig h  n u m b e rs  o f u n o ccu p ie d  p ro p e rtie s  
at b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s, and e m p ty  offices, o r lo w e r p rice d  b u s in e ss  sites. If in d u str ie s  
th a t use a g re a t a m o u n t o f sp a ce  m o v e  e lse w h e re , b e ca u se  o f th e  la b o u r m arket, 
m u ch  sp a ce  w ill b e  le ft and  an o v e rsu p p ly  o f b u s in e ss  lo c a tio n s  m ig h t o ccu r. Van 
D ijk  and  P e lle n b a rg  (20 0 6 a , p.3; 20 0 6 b , p .165 ; 20 0 6 c, p .3 16 ) d isa g re e . T h e y  arg u e 
th a t a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  d o e s n o t a u to m a tica lly  lead  to  a re d u c ­
tio n  in la b o u r su p p ly  and  an in cre a se  in w a g e s. B e ca u se  o f th a t, it is n o t e v id e n t th at 
in d u str ie s  w ill m o ve  to  lo w -w a g e  co u n trie s . In a d d it io n , th e y  a rg u e  th a t, b u s in e ss  
lo c a tio n s  in sh rin k in g  re g io n s are  o ccu p ie d  e sp e c ia lly  by o ffices (p u b lic  and  co m m e r­
cial se rv ice s) and  b u s in e sse s  in th e  lo g istic s  s e c to r (w h o le sa le rs , s to ra g e  p ro v id e rs, 
tra n sp o rt  and  c o m m u n ic a t io n  co m p a n ie s). T h e se  ty p e s o f b u s in e sse s  w ill n o t e a sily  
m o v e  to lo w -w a g e  co u n trie s .
R en es et al. (20 0 9 ) a rg u e  th a t  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  in d ire c tly  in flu e n ce s  th e  d e m a n d  
fo r  b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s. T h e y  c o n c lu d e  th at, in sh rin k in g  re g io n s, th e  d e m a n d  fo r  n ew  
b u s in e ss  lo c a tio n s  is lo w  (R e n e s, 20 0 9 , p .12). D e v e lo p m e n t p la n s fo r n e w  b u sin e ss  
lo c a tio n s  sh o u ld  b e d e te rm in e d  a cc o rd in g  to sp e cific , lo cal co n d it io n s, o f w h ich  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is o n e 67. T h e y  a rg u e  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  m a y  in flu ­
e n ce  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  b u s in e ss  lo c a tio n s  in th re e  d iffe re n t w a ys. First, d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e v e lo p m e n ts  in flu e n ce  th e  d e m a n d  fo r p ro d u cts , p ro d u ce d  b y  b u s in e sse s  lo cated  
on b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s. S e co n d , d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in flu e n ce  th e  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t in th e  la b o u r fo rce  and  th u s th e  d e m a n d  fo r b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s. F inally, d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in flu e n ce  th e  p o ss ib ilit ie s  fo r  re stru c tu rin g  b u s in e ss  lo catio n s, 
and  th e re b y  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  n e w  b u s in e ss  lo ca tio n s. In s itu a tio n s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  it m a y  b e d ifficu lt to  tra n sfo rm  o ld  b u s in e ss  lo c a tio n s  into  re s id e n tia l areas 
(d u e  to  th e  lo w  d e m a n d  fo r  h o u sin g ), an d , th e re fo re , th e re  w ill b e le ss n e e d  to m o ve 
b u s in e sse s  th a t are  lo ca te d  on th e se  lo c a tio n s  to  n e w  b u s in e ss  lo c a tio n s  (R e n e s, 
20 0 9 , p .128 ).
67 OTHER SPECIFIC, LOCAL CONDITIONS ARE THE DEMAND FOR NEW BUSINESS LOCATIONS 
FROM THE LOCAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY, THE CAPACITY TO ATTRACT NEW BUSINESSES,
THE SIZE OF THE OUTDATED BUSINESS LOCATIONS, THE POSSIBILITY TO TRANSFORM 
BUSINESS LOCATIONS INTO RESIDENTIAL AREAS, THE NEED TO MOVE BUSINESSES FROM 
THE CENTRE OF A TOWN TO NEW BUSINESS LOCATIONS ON THE PERIPHERY, THE AVAILABLE 
SUPPLY FOR NEW BUSINESS LOCATIONS IN RELATION TO THE DEMAND, THE LAND AVAILABLE 
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW BUSINESS LOCATIONS, AND THE AVAILABLE SUBSIDIES TO 
REDEVELOP BUSINESS LOCATIONS (RENES, 2009, P.86).
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS
T h is  ch a p te r h a s sh o w n  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is e x p e rie n ce d  m a in ly  on a local 
leve l, and  th a t th is  s itu a tio n  is lik e ly  to  co n tin u e .
T h e  se co n d  p a rt o f th e  c h a p te r d iscu sse d  th e  e ffects th a t, a cc o rd in g  to  th e  lite ra ­
tu re , d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m a y  h a ve  on h o u s in g  (an d  re s id e n tia l q u a lity ) and  on 
th e  re g io n a l e co n o m y . It sh o w e d  th a t a d e cre a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f  h o u se h o ld s  m ay 
lead  to  an o v e rsu p p ly  in re n te d  so cia l h o u sin g , to  re la t iv e ly  h ig h  n u m b e rs  o f u n o c ­
cu p ie d  p ro p e rtie s , and to h igh tu rn o v e r ra te s; fo r  o w n e r-o cc u p ie rs  th is  m a y  lead  to 
an in c re a se  in th e  le n g th  o f tim e  re s id e n tia l p ro p e rt ie s  are  on th e  m a rk e t, to  h o u s in g  
p rice s  th a t a re  b e lo w  th e  n a tio n a l a v e ra g e , and  to a lo w e r re s id e n tia l q u a lity  d u e  to  a 
h ig h e r c o n c e n tra tio n  o f lo w -in co m e  g ro u p s.
A  d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  m ay  a lso  re d u ce  th e  d e m a n d  fo r 
so m e  p u b lic  and  p riv a te  se rv ice s. T h is  m ay, fo r  e x a m p le , re su lt  in an o v e rsu p p ly  of 
and  u n o ccu p ie d  co m m e rc ia l real e state . H o w e v e r, th e  su p p ly  o f  th e se  se rv ice s  is 
d e te rm in e d  n o t o n ly  b y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  b u t a lso  b y  th e  b e h a v io u r o f 
c o n su m e rs  and su p p lie rs.
A  d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  m a y  lead  to a re d u ctio n  in la b o u r su p p ly, but 
th is  is n o t in e v ita b le . W h e th e r th is  s itu a tio n  w ill a rise , d e p e n d s on th e  d e v e lo p m e n t 
in la b o u r p a rtic ip a tio n . T h e re  is m u ch  d isa g re e m e n t b e tw e e n  re se a rc h e rs  on the  
p o ss ib le  e c o n o m ic  e ffects o f a d e cre a se  in w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  and in th e  la b o u r 
fo rce . S o m e  e x p e c t th a t it m a y  lead  to a sh o rta g e  o f la b o u r, an in c re a se  in w a ge s, 
an in c re a se  in th e  p rice  o f so m e  se rv ice s, a d e cre a se  in u n e m p lo y m e n t, a d e cre a se  in 
w e lfa re , an in c re a se  in o u t-m ig ra tio n  o r c lo su re  of, e sp e c ia lly , la b o u r-in te n s iv e  in d u s ­
trie s, a d e cre a se  in th e  d e m a n d  fo r la b o u r (d e c re a se  in th e  n u m b e r o f jo b s  and  a loss 
o f e m p lo y m e n t), a d e cre a se  in in w ard  m ig ra tio n  o f b u s in e sse s  (d e c re a se  in e sta b ­
lish e d  firm s, d e cre a se  in n e w ly  e sta b lish e d  firm s), and  a d e cre a se  in th e  d e m a n d  fo r 
b u s in e ss  and  office  lo ca tio n s. W h e th e r  th e se  e ffects a ctu a lly  o ccu r, d e p e n d s  on the  
d e v e lo p m e n t in la b o u r p ro d u c tiv ity  and  on in stitu tio n a l facto rs.
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3 THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK
3.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  stu d y  se e k s  to  p ro v id e  an a n sw e r to  th e  fo llo w in g  q u e stio n s: how do local gov­
ernments react to demographic decline, and under which circumstances do they adapt 
their policies to it? To a n sw e r th e se  q u e stio n s, an a n a ly tica l f ra m e w o rk  is n eed ed .
T h is  fra m e w o rk  has b een  cre a te d  u s in g  id e a s fro m  th e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t A p p ro a ch  
(A rts, V a n  T a te n h o v e  and  Lero y), co m b in e d  w ith  L ie ffe rin k  (20 0 6 ), W ie rin g  and 
C ra b b e  (20 0 6 ), and  B o o n stra  (20 0 4  and  20 0 6 ), w h o  a p p lie d  th e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t 
A p p ro a ch  to e x p la in  p o lic y  d y n a m ics. S u b se q u e n tly , id e a s fro m  M ol (A rts  and  Leroy, 
2 0 0 3 1) w e re  a d d e d  to u n d e rsta n d  p o licy  d yn a m ics  in a sp e c ific  p o licy  fie ld  (sp a tia l 
p la n n in g ). F inally, th e se  stu d ie s  w e re  co m b in e d  w ith  a v a ila b le  stu d ie s  a b o u t d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (G lo c k  and  H a u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 ; G lo ck, 20 0 6 ; V a n  D am  et al., 20 06; 
G o d e rb a u e r, 20 0 7), urb an d e clin e  (e .g . B e a u re g a rd , 2 0 0 8 ) and  tra n s it io n s  (R o tm a n s 
et al., 20 0 1; R o tm a n s, 20 0 5 ), to  u n d e rsta n d  sp a tia l p o licy  d yn a m ics  cau se d  by d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e. T h is  c h a p te r p re se n ts  th e  o p e ra t io n a lisa t io n  o f th e  ce n tra l co n ce p t 
o f lo cal sp a tia l p o licy  c h a n g e  and  g iv e s  an o v e rv ie w  o f th e  c o n d it io n s  m e n tio n e d  in 
th e  lite ra tu re , w h ich  m ig h t in flu e n ce  th is  c h a n g e  in lo cal sp a tia l p o licy.
3.2 ACADEMIC ATTENTION FOR POLICY 
REACTIONS TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
M o st o f th e  lite ra tu re  a rg u e s th a t g o v e rn m e n ts  fa c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  sh o uld  
c h a n g e  th e ir  sp a tia l p o lic ie s. R e se a rch e rs  w h o  h a v e  in v e stig a te d  th e  s itu a tio n  in 
o th e r c o u n trie s2, as w e ll as th o se  w h o  in v e stig a te d  th e  D u tch s itu a tio n 3, use s im ila r
1 ARTS AND LEROY (2003) SUMMARISED THE OPINIONS BROUGHT FORWARD BY DIFFERENT 
PEOPLE DURING A DISCUSSION ABOUT PAA.
2 FOR EXAMPLE, HÄUSSERMANN AND SIEBEL (1987), WIECHMANN (2003, 2008), COUCH ET AL. 
(2005), HÄUSSERMANN AND GLOCK (2004), GLOCK (2006), BONTJE (2009), FRANZ (2001, 2004).
3 FOR EXAMPLE, VAN DER WAGT AND BOON (2006), DERKS ET AL. (2006A, 2006B), BOERS AND
POULUS (2007), UBINK (2007, 2008), DANDER (2007), VERW EST ET AL. (2008B), VERW EST ET AL. 
(2009A), HINSSEN AND DERKS (2008), GOEDVOLK AND KORSTEN (2008), BUYS AND VAN IERSEL 
(2008), VAN WISSEN (2008, 2009), DERKS (2009), KLOUWEN (2010), AND HOSPERS (2010).
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a rg u m e n ts  to  su b sc rib e  to  th is  sta te m e n t. T h e  a rg u m e n ts  th e y  use are  d e scrib e d  
b elo w .
First, th e y  a rg u e  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a n e w  s itu a tio n  th a t c a n n o t b e re ve rse d  
in to  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  an d , th e re fo re , re q u ire s  a n o th e r p o licy  co n te n t. Th ey 
re fe r to  th e  fa c t th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is o fte n  fo u n d  in c lu ste rs  o f m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  (re g io n s, p ro v in c e s  a n d /o r c o u n trie s), and  th a t in th e  fu tu re  m o re  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  
(re g io n s, p ro v in c e s  a n d /o r c o u n trie s) w ill b e c o n fro n te d  w ith  th is  s itu a tio n . H au sser- 
m a n n  and  S ieb el (19 8 7 ) a rg u e  th a t it is n o t p o ss ib le  to  tra n sfo rm  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  in to  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th 4 and th a t a s h rin k in g  c ity  is a n e w  ty p e  o f u rb an ism  
(G lo ck, 20 0 6 , p .15). C o u ch  et al. (2 0 0 5 )5 a rg u e  th a t ‘g ive n  th a t little  d e m o g ra p h ic  
g ro w th  is to  b e e x p e cte d  in E u ro p e  in th e  fo re se e a b le  fu tu re , d e c lin in g  c itie s  like 
L ive rp o o l and L e ip z ig  sh o u ld  n o t a n tic ip a te  a re tu rn  to  th e ir  fo rm e r im p o rta n c e  and 
p la ce  in th e  u rb an  h ie ra rch y. T h e  p a st h a s sh o w n  th a t e fforts to  a ttra ct (and  su b ­
s id iz e ) in d u str ia l in v e sto rs  and  to  d e v e lo p  b ig  in fra stru ctu ra l fa c ilit ie s  w ith  p u b lic  
m o n e y , w h ich  h a v e  b een  u n d e rta k e n  in b o th  c ities, co u ld  n o t sto p  -  le t a lo n e  re v e rse
-  th e  d e clin e . H ence, urb an  p o lic y  m a k in g  and  p la n n in g  w ill h a v e  to  c o n c e n tra te  on 
th e  o rg a n isa tio n  o f sh rin k in g  and re d e v e lo p m e n t, in ste ad  o f th e  o rg a n isa tio n  o f 
g ro w th ’ (C o u ch  et al., 20 0 5, p .133  and  134).
S e co n d , w h e n  local g o v e rn m e n ts  fa c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m a in ta in  th e ir  tra d i­
t io n a l p o lic y  (fo cu sed  on d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th ), th is  m a y  in c re a se  th e  p ro b le m s (e.g. 
v a c a n t b u ild in g s) and  th e  co m p e tit io n  b e tw e e n  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  fo r  th e  sa m e  in h a b ­
ita n ts. T h is  is a rg u e d  b y  H a u sse rm a n n  and  S ieb el (19 8 7), G lo c k  and  H a u sse rm a n n
4 THIS IS DEPENDENT ON THE TIME FRAME YOU USE. IN THE SHORT TERM THE REVERSION OF 
SHRINKAGE INTO GROWTH IS IMPOSSIBLE. HOWEVER, BERG ET AL. (1982) ARGUE THAT IN THE 
LONG TERM THIS REVERSAL IS POSSIBLE. THEY ANALYSED HOW URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS 
HAD DEVELOPED OVER A PERIOD OF 150 YEARS. IN DOING SO, THEY DISTINGUISHED THREE 
DIFFERENT PHASES AND SHOWED THAT THESE MAY OCCUR IN SEQUENCE. BECAUSE THIS 
RESEARCH FOCUSES ON A SHORTER TIME PERIOD (SEE CHAPTER 4), WE CAN ASSUME THAT 
WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME, REVERSING SHRINKAGE BACK TO GROWTH IS NOT POSSIBLE. NOR 
IS THIS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE DECLINE IS CAUSED BY A NEGATIVE NATURAL BALANCE AND 
A NEGATIVE MIGRATIONAL BALANCE. THE NEGATIVE NATURAL BALANCE WOULD BE DIFFICULT 
TO REVERSE IN THIS SHORT TIME FRAME BECAUSE POPULATION POLICY DOES NOT FIT THE 
DUTCH TRADITION. FOR THE NEGATIVE MIGRATIONAL BALANCE THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT 
BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT STRICT MIGRATION POLICY AND THE EXPECTED DEMOGRAPHIC 
DEVELOPMENTS. IN THE MEDIUM TERM, THE POPULATION OF THE NETHERLANDS IS 
EXPECTED TO DECREASE.
5 THEY ANALYSED SPRAWL IN SITUATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (IN LEIPZIG AND LIVER­
POOL).
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(20 0 4 ), G lo c k  (20 0 6 ), W ie ch m a n n  (20 0 8 ), and  G lo c k  (20 0 6 , p .15 )6. W ie c h m a n n  (20 08 , 
p .2 9 ) a rg u e s th a t ‘b u s in e ss  as u su a l’ (rea d : g ro w th -o r ie n te d  stra te g y ) is v e ry  like ly  
to  lead  to  c o u n te rp ro d u c tiv e  stra te g ie s  7. V a n  Dam  et al. (20 0 6 ) and  V e rw e st et al. 
(2 0 0 8 b ) w a rn  th a t w h e n  a m u n ic ip a lity  in a s itu a tio n  o f h o u se h o ld  d e clin e  co n tin u e s 
to  fo cu s  its p o lic y  on d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th , th is  m a y  stre n g th e n  th e  n e g a tiv e  co n se ­
q u e n ce s o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (e.g. an in c re a se  in v a ca n c y  ra te s in re n te d  social 
h o u s in g  sto ck, an in c re a se  in th e  le n g th  o f t im e  th a t o w n e r-o cc u p ie d  p ro p e rtie s  are 
on th e  m a rk e t, and  c o n c e n tra t io n  o f lo w  in c o m e  g ro u p s). T h e y  a rg u e  th a t th o se  
c o n se q u e n ce s  w ill b e co n c e n tra te d  in th e  le a st a ttra c tiv e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  and  w ill 
b e p r im a rily  fe lt  by th e  p a rtie s  su p p ly in g  th e  h o u s in g  (p ro p e rty  d e v e lo p e rs, h o u s ­
in g  a sso c ia tio n s, p r iv a te  ve n d o rs, la n d lo rd s, and  m u n ic ip a l a u th o ritie s): th e  in co m e  
g e n e ra te d  fro m  se llin g  and  re n tin g  h o u se s  w ill d e cre a se .
D iffe re n t re se a rc h e rs  (e .g . G lo c k  and  H ä u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 ; D erks et al., 20 0 6 ; Van 
D am  et al., 20 0 6 ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ; B uys and  V a n  le rse l, 20 0 8 ; Van 
W isse n , 2 0 0 9 ) c o n c lu d e  th a t if m u n ic ip a lit ie s  th a t are  lo ca te d  in sh rin k in g  re g io n s 
do n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic y  and c o n tin u e  to  fo cu s  on g ro w th , a c o m p e tit io n  b e tw e e n  
n e ig h b o u rin g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  o v e r th e  sa m e  in h a b ita n ts  and h o u se h o ld s  m a y  e m erg e. 
In G e rm a n y , th e y  call th is  p o lic y  Kannibalismus. G lo c k  and  H ä u sse rm a n n  (2 0 0 4 ) w arn  
th a t o n ly  th e  m o st a ttra c tiv e  lo c a tio n s  and  n e ig h b o u rh o o d s  w o u ld  h a v e  a c h a n ce  to 
su cce e d  in th is  c o m p e tit io n  (G lo c k  and  H ä u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4, p .9 23). T h e  o th e r p lace s 
w ill n o t b e a b le  to  a ttra ct n e w  in h a b ita n ts . B uys and  V a n  lerse l (20 0 8 ) and  V a n  W is ­
sen (2 0 0 9 ) illu stra te  th a t p o lic ie s  to  a ttra ct in h a b ita n ts  to  sh rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  
th a t a re  lo ca te d  in s h rin k in g  re g io n s, h a v e  n o t b e e n  effe ctive . M o re  th a n  th a t, th e y  
c o n c lu d e  th a t th o se  e fforts in cre a se d  th e  in tra re g io n a l c o m p e titio n .
T h e re  are  a lso  th o se  (D e rk se n , 20 10 ; M o d d e r, 20 0 9 ; H o o im e ije r, 2 0 0 6 ) w h o  a rg u e 
th a t, w ith in  th e  N e th e rla n d s (e sp e c ia lly  at n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t le ve l), no  p o licy  
c h a n g e  is n e ce ssa ry . T h e ir  m ain  a rg u m e n t is th a t in th e  N e th e rla n d s d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  is o n ly  a m a rg in a l p ro b le m . T h e re  a re  a lso  re se a rc h e rs  (e .g . V e rk a d e , 20 0 9 ) 
w h o  a g re e  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  can ca u se  p ro b le m s in ce rta in  p la ce s  in the
6 THEIR HYPOTHESIS IS: ‘IN DEN STÄDTEN (SCHRUMPFENDEN STADT) DOMINANTE ORIEN­
TIERUNG AM WACHSTUM DIE NEGATIVEN FOLGEN DER SCHRUMPFUNGSPROZESSE 
VERSTÄRKT UND DARÜBER HINAUS AUCH DIE MÖGLICHEN CHANCEN NEUER URBANER 
LEBENSFORMEN VERHÜLLT' (GLOCK, 2006, P.15).
7 WIECHMANN THEREFORE ARGUES THAT CITIES THAT ARE CONFRONTED WITH DYNAMIC
CHANGE IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PARAMETERS (E.G., DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE) WITHIN A 
HISTORICALLY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME SHOULD NEITHER PLAN FOR GROWTH NOR FOR 
SHRINKAGE. THEY SHOULD PLAN TO STAY FLEXIBLE AND MAKE THEIR CITIES ADAPTIVE TO 
CHANGE (WIECHMANN, 2008, P.29).
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N e th e rla n d s, b u t th a t it w o u ld  b e b e tte r to  le a v e  th is  s itu a tio n  to  m a rk e t re sp o n se s, 
ra th e r th a n  g o v e rn m e n t in te rv e n tio n .
T h is  is an a n a ly tica l ra th e r th a n  a p re sc rip tiv e  stu d y. It d o e s n o t se e k  to  co n c lu d e  
w h e th e r d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a p ro b le m  o r not. T h is  stu d y  w ill in v e st ig a te  w h e th e r 
lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  perceive d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  as a p ro b le m  and  w h e th e r th e y  
c h a n g e  th e ir  lo cal p o lic y  as a re su lt  o f th at. T h is  th e s is  a sk s  a b o u t th e  fa c to rs  that, 
in actu al p ra ctice , in flu e n ce  p o licy  c h a n g e  in th e  lig h t o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. O th e r 
stu d ie s  h a v e  b e e n  co n ce rn e d  w ith  th e  n o rm a tiv e  q u e stio n  a b o u t th e  n e c e ss ity  of 
p o lic y  c h a n g e  and g o v e rn m e n t in te rv e n tio n .
N e ith e r is th is  a p o lic y  e v a lu a tio n  stu d y. It in v e st ig a te s  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e ­
m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  p o licy . H o w e v e r, it d o e s n o t in v e st ig a te  th e  o p p o s ite  re la t io n ­
ship.
S tu d ie s  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  and  p o licy  sh o w  th a t lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  e x p e ­
r ie n c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  ra re ly  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic y 8. G lo c k  (20 0 6 ) n o tice s  th at 
it is o n ly  u n d e r ce rta in  c o n d it io n s  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  le a d s to  p o lic y  ch a n g e: 
p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n  is o n e  o f th o se  c o n d it io n s. R e se arch  into  lo cal p o lic ie s  o f D utch 
sh rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (e.g. D erks et al., 20 0 6 a, 20 0 6 b ; U b in k, 20 07, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st 
e t al., 20 0 8 b ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 9 a ; H in sse n  and  D erks, 20 0 8 ; G o e d v o lk  and  K orsten , 
2 0 0 8 ) re a c h e s a s im ila r  c o n c lu s io n : d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  d o e s n o t a u to m a tica lly  lead 
to  p o licy  ch a n g e . T h e re  a re  b a rrie rs  (e .g . fra m e s, re so u rce s, ru le s) th a t h in d e r th is 
p o lic y  c h a n g e 9.
T h e  e x ist in g  stu d ie s a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  p o lic y  a lso  sh o w  th a t it is im p o s­
s ib le  to  id e n tify  o n e s in g le  fa c to r th a t d e te rm in e s  w h e th e r d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
le a d s to  p o licy  ch a n g e . T h re e  d iffe re n t a p p ro a c h e s can b e d istin g u ish e d , a b o u t the  
fa c to rs  th a t d e te rm in e  th e  p o licy  re a ctio n .
8 BECAUSE DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IS A RELATIVELY NEW PHENOMENON, INTERNATIONALLY, 
ONLY A FEW EXAMPLES ARE KNOWN OF POLICY REACTIONS TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. 
MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TRY TO COMBAT DECLINE. EXAMPLES OF CITIES THAT HAVE 
ACCEPTED DECLINE AND ARE DEALING WITH IT, ARE LEIPZIG, DESSAU, YOUNGSTOWN, 
TOYAMA, AND DURHAM (PALLAGST, 2011; WIECHMANN, 2011).
9 DERKS (2006A) AND HINSSEN AND DERKS (2008), FOR EXAMPLE, POINT OUT THAT THE FRAME
OF LOCAL POLITICIANS AND POLICYMAKERS IS A PIVOTAL EXPLANATION. THEIR HYPO­
THESIS IS THAT THE GROWTH PARADIGM HINDERS (LOCAL) POLITICIANS AND POLICYMAK­
ERS IN CHANGING THEIR POLICIES FROM PLANNING FOR GROWTH TOWARDS PLANNING FOR 
DECLINE.
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First, a cc o rd in g  to th e  s tru c tu re  p e rsp e ctiv e , w h e th e r th e re  is local p o lic y  (ch a n g e ) 
is d e te rm in e d  b y  structures (e .g . so cia l e c o n o m ic  s itu a tio n , in stitu tio n a l and ju d i­
cial e m b e d d e d n e ss, re g io n a l su p p ly  stru ctu re , f in a n ce  syste m ). T h is  p e rsp e ctiv e  is 
o fte n  a sso c ia te d  w ith  M a rx ist th e o rie s. A c c o rd in g  to th is  p e rsp e ctiv e , th e  sp a ce  
th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h a v e  fo r a ctio n  is lim ite d  as re su lt  o f e x o g e n o u s  s tru c tu re s  th at 
p re d e te rm in e  th e ir  b e h a v io u r. In th e  ca se  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, th e ir  a ctio n  space 
is p r im a rily  d e te rm in e d  b y  th e  ru le s th a t a re  set b y  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t and  b y  the 
e c o n o m y 10. T h is  p e rsp e ctiv e  n e g le c ts  th e  fa c t th a t e m p irica l e x a m p le s  sh o w  th at 
d iffe re n t a cto rs  act d iffe re n tly  w ith in  th e  sa m e  in stitu tio n a l fra m e w o rk . For in stan ce , 
n o t e v e ry  e a ste rn  E u ro p e a n  c o u n try  re sp o n d e d  in th e  sa m e  w a y  a fte r th e  fall of 
co m m u n ism  in th e  la te  19 8 0 s and  e a rly  19 9 0 s. S o m e  ch o se  h y p e rc a p ita lism , w h ile  
o th e rs  fo llo w e d  a m o re  m o d e ra te  p ath . A lso , w ith  re g a rd  to d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, it 
h a s b e e n  a rg u e d  th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w ith in  th e  sa m e  s tru c tu re  use th e ir  a ctio n  sp a ce  
d iffe re n tly  (G lo ck, 20 0 6 , p .5 2-5 6 ).
S e co n d , a cc o rd in g  to  th e  a cto r p e rsp e ctiv e , th e  lo cal p o licy  re a ctio n  is d e te rm in e d  
by actors and their actions. T h e  a ctio n s  can b e e x p la in e d  by e ith e r th e  ra tio n a l a cto r 
m o d e l o r  th e  s o c ia l-c o n stru c tiv ist  m o d e l. T h e  ra tio n a l a cto r m o d el a rg u e s th a t the 
lo cal p o lic y  re a ctio n  is d e te rm in e d  b y  th e  a cto rs  b e h a v in g  ra t io n a lly  in th e ir  q u e st to 
m a x im ise  u tility. T h e  lo cal p o lic y  can b e e x p la in e d  b y  lo o k in g  s o le ly  at th e  p ro ce ss 
o f lo cal p o licy  d e cis io n  m a k in g  and  at th e  in v o lv e d  a cto rs , w ith o u t ta k in g  into  a c­
c o u n t th e  c o n te x t w ith in  w h ic h  th e se  p ro c e sse s  ta k e  p lace . T h e  p o litica l p ro ce ss  is 
d e te rm in e d  by in te re sts  and  p o w e rs. T h is  m o d e l trie s  to  id e n tify  th e  m o st in flu e n tia l 
a cto rs  and  th e  a cto r c o n ste lla t io n 11 (G lo ck, 20 0 6 , p .5 6 -6 5 ).
T h e  so cia l-c o n stru c tiv ist  m o d el a rg u e s th a t  th e  p ro ce ss  and  c o n te n t o f local p o licy  is 
d e te rm in e d  b y  th e  a cto rs and  th e ir  id e a s. It is b a sed  on a so cia l-c o n stru c tiv ist  
o n to lo g y, w h ich  starts  fro m  th e  v a ry in g  v a lu e  ra t io n a lit ie s  o f a cto rs, th e ir  p ro b le m  
d e fin it io n s, th e ir  ideas, th e ir  p a ra d ig m s and  th e ir  p o w e r o f p e rsu a s io n . Th e  
d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  th e  ra tio n a l a cto r m o d e l and th e  so c ia l-c o n stru c tiv ist  m o d e l is 
th a t th e  fo rm e r ta k e s  o n e  o v e ra rc h in g  b e h a v io u ra l a ssu m p tio n  -  (b o u n d e d ) ra tio ­
n a lity  -  as a g iv e n , w h ic h  m a k e s a ctio n s  e n tire ly  p re d icta b le , w h ile  th e  so c ia l-co n - 
stru c t iv ist  m o d e l se e s b e h a v io u ra l p re fe re n ce s  as a fu n c tio n  o f id e a s and  d isco u rse s,
10 ACADEMIC TRADITIONS WITH A ‘STRUCTURE PERSPECTIVE' ARE NEO-MARXISM, THE PUBLIC 
CHOICE THEORY AND THE REGULATION THEORY (GLOCK, 2006, P.52-56).
11 THERE ARE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS (MOVEMENTS) WHICH TAKE THIS PERSPECTIVE. EXAMPLES 
ARE THE ELITE THEORY (E.G. HUNTER, 1953), PLURALISTS (E.G. DAHL, 1961), URBAN 
SOCIOLOGY (LOGAN AND MOLOTCH, 1987), AND THE GAME THEORY (DOWNS, 1957) (GLOCK, 
2004, P.56-65)
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w h ic h  are c o n stru cte d  b y  a cto rs  in in te ra c tio n  w ith  ea ch  o th e r. T h e se  d isco u rse s  
c o n se q u e n tly  sh a p e  th e ir  b e h a v io u r. T h is  is w h a t H aje r ca lls  ‘d isc o u rse  s tru c tu ra t io n ’ 
(H aje r, 19 9 5).
T h ird , a cc o rd in g  to  th e  d u a lity  o f stru c tu re  p e rsp e ctiv e , lo cal p o lic y  (c h a n g e ) is 
d e te rm in e d  b y  th e  interaction between actors and structures. A c c o rd in g  to  th is  p e r­
sp e ctiv e , a cto rs  c a n n o t e x ist or b e a n a lyse d  se p a ra te ly  fro m  th e  s tru c tu re  (ru le s and 
re so u rce s), and  stru c tu re s  c a n n o t e x ist o r  b e a n a ly se d  se p a ra te ly  fro m  th e  a cto rs. In 
o th e r w o rd s, a cto rs  in flu e n ce  s tru c tu re s  and  s tru c tu re s  in flu e n ce  a cto rs. T h is  is also 
ca lle d  th e  ‘d u a lity  o f s tru c tu re ’. T h is  id e a  is b a sed  on th e  w o rk  o f  G id d e n s (19 8 4 ), 
w h o  d e v e lo p e d  th e  th e o ry  o f stru c tu ra tio n , w h ich  is an a n a ly sis  o f  a g e n cy  and  stru c ­
tu re , in w h ic h  n o n e  is g ra n te d  p rim a cy. T h is  co m b in a tio n  o f and  in te ra c tio n  b e tw e e n  
a cto rs  and  s tru c tu re s  can  affect th e  p o lic y  re a ctio n  o f lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  to w a rd s 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e.
T h e  fe w  a ca d e m ic  stu d ie s  th a t in v e stig a te  th e  re la tio n  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
and  lo cal p o licy  (c h a n g e ) c o n c lu d e  th a t b o th  a cto rs and  stru c tu re s  in flu e n ce  th at 
re la tio n sh ip . A c to r a sp e cts  (e.g. co a lit io n s, p o licy  e n tre p re n e u rs, p ro b le m  p e rce p ­
tio n , fra m e s) m ay  affect w h e th e r m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c h a n g e  th e ir  local p o licy  (G lo ck,
20 0 6 ; D e rks et al., 20 0 6 ; V a n  D am  et al., 20 0 6 ; G o e d v o lk  and  K o rsten , 20 0 8 ; U bink, 
20 0 8 ; M u ld e r, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 a; H in ssen  and  D erks, 20 0 8 ). S ta b le  co ­
a litio n s, p e rce p tio n  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  is a te m p o ra ry  p h e n o m e n o n , and 
g ro w th -o r ie n te d  fra m e s  (p a ra d ig m s) o f th e  a cto rs  in vo lve d  m ay p re v e n t a p o licy  
c h a n g e . N ew  co a lit io n s, p e rce p tio n  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a stru ctu ra l p h e n o ­
m e n o n , and  d e c lin e -o rie n te d  fra m e s (p a ra d ig m s) o f th e  a cto rs  in v o lv e d  m a y  ca u se  a 
p o lic y  c h a n g e 12.
H o w e v e r, th e se  sa m e  stu d ie s  c o n c lu d e d  th a t stru ctu ra l a sp e cts  (e .g . ru le s and 
re so u rc e s) a lso  in flu e n ce  th e  lo cal p o lic y  re a ctio n  to w a rd s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d eclin e.
T h e y  a rg u e  th a t n a tio n a l su b sid ie s  and  b u d g e ts  m a y  re stra in  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  fro m  
ch a n g in g  th e ir  p o lic ie s, b e ca u se  th o se  n a tio n a l ru le s  are  b a sed  on d e m o g ra p h ic  
g ro w th . E x a m p le s  a re  th e  IS V  (in v e stm e n t b u d g e t fo r  urb an  re n e w a l) and  BLS (b u d ­
g e ts  to  st im u la te  p ro d u c tio n  o f h o u se s). T h o se  b u d g e ts  st im u la te  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to 
in c re a se  th e ir  h o u s in g  sto ck. M u ld e r (20 0 6 ) c o n c lu d e s th a t th e  d iffe re n ce s in the 
stra te g ie s
12 THOSE ASPECTS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL IN SECTION 3 .6 .
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b e tw e e n  L e ip z ig  and  L ive rp o o l can  b e e x p la in e d  b y  th e  fa ct th a t E n g lan d  h a s a liberal 
and  G e rm a n y  a c o n se rv a tiv e  w e lfa re  sta te  re g im e 13 14.
F in ally, th e se  stu d ie s  co n c lu d e d  a lso  th a t  th e re  is a re c ip ro c ity  b e tw e e n  b o th  acto rs 
and  stru c tu re s. T h e y  e m p h a s ise  th a t a cto rs  a re  used  to g ro w th  and  as a re su lt  the  
stru c tu re s  a re  fo cu se d  on st im u la t in g  g ro w th , c a u s in g  th e  in te ra c tio n s  b e tw e e n  the 
a cto rs  in v o lv e d  to b e co n stra in e d  and  th e re  is p o licy  stab ility .
3.3 CLASSIFICATION OF LOCAL POLICY 
REACTIONS TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
First, tw o  d e g re e s  o f re a ctio n  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  are  d ist in g u ish e d :
- Do n o th in g  (p o licy  sta b ility ): w h e n  a lo cal g o v e rn m e n t d o e s n o t e x p lic itly  
a d a p t th e  c o n te n t o f its p o licy  in re a ctio n  to d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e.
- T a k e  a ctio n  (p o licy  ch a n g e ): w h e n  a lo cal g o v e rn m e n t e x p lic it ly  a d a p ts  th e  
c o n te n t o f its p o licy  in re a ctio n  to d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e.
T h is  d ist in ctio n  b e tw e e n  p o lic y  sta b ility  and  p o lic y  ch a n g e , h o w e v e r, is n o t sufficient. 
Tw o  d iffe re n t ty p e s o f local p o lic y  c h a n g e  can  b e d istin g u ish e d  (se e  F ig ure  3.1).
- C o n se rv a tiv e  local p o lic y  ch a n g e s are  m a d e  w h e n  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  
m e n tio n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and a d a p t th e  c o n te n t o f th e ir  p o lic y  a c­
co rd in g ly , in o rd e r to  in c re a se  th e  p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs, a n d /o r 
w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n . T h e  aim  is to  c o m b a t th is  d e clin e.
- R ad ica l lo cal p o lic y  ch a n g e s a re  m a d e  w h e n  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  m e n tio n  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  and  a d a p t th e  c o n te n t o f p o licy  a cco rd in g ly , a cc e p t­
in g  th e  d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs, a n d /o r w o rk in g  age 
p o p u la tio n , and  a d a p tin g  to  th a t.
13 HE TRIES TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES OF MUNICIPALITIES TOWARDS 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE BY USING THE THEORY OF ESPING-ANDERSON (THE THREE WORLDS 
OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 1990) WHICH REFERS TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF WELFARE REGIMES 
(LIBERAL, SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT AND CONSERVATIVE). IN HIS LATER WORK, MULDER (2007) ALSO 
INCORPORATED THE ACTOR PERSPECTIVE.
14 IN THE CONSERVATIVE WELFARE STATE, THE POLICIES DIRECT BOTH THE RENTED AND THE 
OWNER-OCCUPIED SECTOR, WITH BOTH LANDLORDS AND OWNER-OCCUPIERS RECEIVING 
STATE SUPPORT (MULDER, 2006). WHEREAS IN THE LIBERAL WELFARE STATE, MORE ATTEN­
TION IS PAID TO A BETTER PERFORMANCE OF THE HOUSING MARKET, FOCUSSING ON THE 
OWNER OCCUPIED SECTOR (MULDER, 2006).
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It is im p o rta n t to  n o tice  th a t th e  c o n se rv a tiv e  and  ra d ica l lo cal p o lic y  ch a n g e s both 
a re  e x tre m e s, and  th a t, in re a lity, it is a co n tin u ü m  w ith  d e g re e s  o f  change.
M u ch  re se a rch  into  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal (sp a tia l)  p o lic y  re g a rd s  p o licy  
s ta b ility  and  c o n se rv a t iv e  p o lic y  c h a n g e  as th e  sam e , and ca lls  b o th  ‘p o lic y  s ta b ility ’. 
T h is  stu d y  m a k e s th e  d istin ctio n , w h ich  le a d s to  th re e  d e g re e s  o f p o lic y  re a ctio n :
- P o licy  stab ility ,
- C o n se rv a tiv e  p o lic y  ch a n g e,
- R ad ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e.
T h is  stu d y  in v e stig a te s  h o w  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  re a ct to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  in th e ir  
sp a tia l p o licy , and  e x p la in s  th o se  p o licy  re a ctio n s. Local sp a tia l p o lic y  is a set o f p o li­
c ie s a n d /o r a ctio n s, fo rm u la te d  b y  local g o v e rn m e n t (re a d : m u n ic ip a lity , re g io n  or 
p ro v in ce ), to  in flu e n ce  th e  sp a tia l stru c tu re  o f an a rea (th e  d istrib u tio n  o f p e o p le  and 
a ctiv itie s  in sp a ce s  o f v a rio u s  scale s, fo r e x a m p le , m u n ic ip a lity , re g io n  and  p ro v ­
in ce ). T h is  stu d y  fo cu se s  on tw o  a sp e c ts  o f th e  sp a tia l stru ctu re , n a m e ly  h o u sin g  
and  e co n o m y. T h is  m e a n s th a t it in c lu d e s  p o lic ie s  and  a ctio n s  fo r  h o u s in g  lo catio n s, 
b u s in e ss, re ta il and office  lo c a tio n s  and  im a g e  (a ttra c t iv e n e ss)  o f th e  a re a  (to p e o p le  
a n d /o r b u s in e sse s  to  settle).
T h e  sp a tia l p o lic ie s  th a t local g o v e rn m e n ts  in a sh rin k in g  re g io n  fo rm u la te  can be 
c la ssifie d  in d iffe re n t w a ys. O n e  is b y  th e  policy field it in v o lv e s. M o st stu d ie s  ab o ut 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  sp a tia l p o licy  fo cu s  on u rb an  a n d /o r h o u s in g  p o lic ie s. H o w ­
e ver, o th e r p o lic y  fie ld s  can b e in vo lve d , su ch  as th e  (re g io n a l)  e co n o m y, lo cal se r­
v ice s, lo cal f in a n ce s, rural a re as, and  tra n sp o rt/in fra stru ctu re  (e .g . K ocks, 20 0 3, 2005; 
G o d e rb a u e r, 20 0 5; B e rte lsm a n  S tiftu n g , 20 0 6 ; D erks et al., 20 0 6 a, 20 0 6 b ; V a n  Dam  
e t al., 20 0 6 ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; V a n  N im w e g e n  and  H e erin g , 20 0 9 a ; RLG, 20 0 9 ; H arm s et 
al., 20 10 ). T h is  s tu d y  fo cu se s  on th e  sp a tia l s tra te g ie s  in re la tio n  to h o u s in g  and  the 
e co n o m y , as th e se  a sp e c ts  w o u ld  b e im p a cte d  m o st b y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, a cc o rd ­
in g  to  V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ).
S e co n d , lo cal sp a tia l p o lic ie s  can d iffe r in objective. W h e n  a local g o v e rn m e n t e x p e ri­
e n ce s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , it can try  to  in c re a se  th e  p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs 
and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , and  in th a t w a y  re v e rse  th e  d e clin e . A lte rn a tiv e ly , it can 
a cc e p t th e  d e clin e.
T h ird , local sp a tia l p o lic ie s  can d iffe r in levels of policy action, that is, in abstraction 
leve l, ra th e r th a n  sp a tia l le ve l. A  d istin ctio n  is c o m m o n ly  m a d e  b e tw e e n  stra te g ic  
p lan s, o p e ra tio n a l p lan s, and  a ctio n s, b e c a u se  d iffe re n t le v e ls  o f p o lic y  m a y  a sk  fo r
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d iffe re n t c o n d it io n s. S tra te g ic  p la n s a re  in d ic a tiv e  p la n s th a t a re  n o t le g a lly  b in d in g 15, 
w h ile  o p e ra tio n a l p la n s a re  le g a lly  b in d in g  (M a sto p  and  Faludi, 19 9 7, p .8 19 ).
E x a m p le s  o f s tra te g ic  p la n s are  m u n ic ip a l o r  p ro v in c ia l stru c tu re  v is io n s  (structuur- 
visie) and  th e  p ro v in c ia l s tru c tu re  p lan  (streekplan). E x a m p le s  o f o p e ra tio n a l p lan s 
a re  th e  lo cal la n d -u se  p lan  (bestemmingsplan), p ro je c t d e c is io n  (projectbesluit), the  
sp e c ific  p o licy  s ta te m e n ts  in th e  p ro v in c ia l stru c tu re  p lan  (concrete beleidsbeslis­
singen in het streekplan), and p ro v in c ia l o rd e n a n ce  (provinciale verordening). B ecau se  
p la n n in g  is n o t ju st  a b o u t m a k in g  p la n s b u t a lso  a b o u t im p le m e n tin g  th e m , a ctio n s 
a re  in c lu d e d , as w e ll (A le x a n d e r, 19 9 2). A c t io n s  re fe r to  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f the 
stra te g ie s  th a t  a re  fo rm u la te d  in th e  stra te g ic  and  o p e ra tio n a l p lan s, and to  the  
in te n tio n s  o f th e  p la n s to  affect fu tu re  d e cis io n s  and  a ctio n s  o f o th e rs  (A le x a n d e r, 
19 9 2, p .73). T h e se  a re  real in te rv e n tio n s  in th e  h o u sin g , la b o u r and  re ta il m arke ts, 
and  o ffice  and  b u sin e ss  lo catio n s.
F ig u re  3.1 g iv e s  an o v e rv ie w  o f p o lic ie s  th a t a re  m e n tio n e d  in th e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t 
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  in re la tio n  to h o u s in g  and  e co n o m y , d ist in g u ish in g  b e tw e e n  
c o n se rv a tiv e  and  ra d ica l. R ad ica l p o licy  ch a n g e s a re  rare . T h e y  can b e fo u n d  in 
L e ip z ig  (G lo ck, 2 0 0 6 ) and  D re sd e n  (W ie ch m a n n , 20 0 8 ). D u isb u rg  (G lo ck, 2 0 0 6 ) and 
N e w ca stle  (W ie ch m a n n , 20 0 3 ) are  e x a m p le s  o f s h rin k in g  c it ie s  th a t h a v e  fo rm u la te d  
a c o n se rv a tiv e  p o lic y  change.
In re a lity, th e  d ist in c tio n  b e tw e e n  lo cal p o lic ie s  th a t try  to  re v e rse  and  th o se  th at 
a cc e p t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is le ss  c le a r th a n  state d  a b o ve . R e stru c tu rin g  o f h o u se s 
m ay, fo r  e x a m p le , c o n trib u te  to  b o th  o b je ctiv e s; it can re su lt  in a re d u ctio n  in the 
su p p ly  o f h o u se s  w h e n  p a rts  o f a p a rtm e n t b u ild in g s  are  d e m o lish e d  o r w h e n  tw o 
h o u se s  a re  m e rg e d  in to  o ne, and  it can  a lso  im p ro v e  th e  q u a lity  o f th e  h o u s in g  sto ck  
w h ic h  m ay  a ttra c t  p e o p le  to  se ttle  in th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d . T h e  se t-u p  o f sp e cific  
e d u c a tio n s  m ay, fo r  e x a m p le , a lso  c o n trib u te  to  b o th  o b je ctiv e s; it can re su lt  in the 
a ttra ctio n  o f  (y o u n g ) p e o p le  and  c o m b a t d e clin e, b u t it can  a lso  im p ro v e  th e  m atch 
b e tw e e n  th e  la b o u r su p p ly  and  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  la b o u r in th e  reg io n.
It sh o u ld  b e m e n tio n e d  th a t p o lic ie s  fo rm u la te d  in o th e r p o licy  fie ld s  (e .g . in tra n s ­
p o rt, e d u ca tio n , c u ltu re ) a lso  m a y  c o n trib u te  to  th e  a b o v e -sta te d  o b je ctiv e s. Th e  
c o n stru c t io n  o f a n e w  ro a d , fo r  e x a m p le , m a y  c o n trib u te  to  th e  o b je ctiv e  o f in c re a s ­
in g  th e  p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs, and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n . It m a y  in cre ase  
th e  in w ard  m ig ra tio n  o f b u s in e sse s, w h ich  m a y  in c re a se  th e  d e m a n d  fo r lab o ur.
15 A STRATEGIC PLAN IS A (FLEETING) RECORD OF AGREEMENTS WHICH FORMS A FRAME OF 
REFERENCE FOR THE ACTORS THAT HAVE FORMULATED (AGREED ON) IT (MASTOP AND 
FALUDI, 1997, P.819).
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FIGURE 3.1 EXAMPLES OF BOTH TYPES OF POLICY CHANGE
TYPE OF POLICY 
CH A N G E/ 
POLICY FIELD
HOUSING
ECONOMY
CONSERVATIVE POLICY CHANGE
- PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTING 
NEW, AMBITIOUS AND 
ATTRACTIVE RESIDENTIAL 
AREAS;
- MARKETING;
- INVEST IN RESIDENTIAL 
QUALITY ‘CREATE PLACES FOR 
PEOPLE' (E.G. EDUCATIONAL 
AND CULTURAL FACILITIES, 
IMPROVEMENT IN PUBLIC 
SPACE, LOCAL SERVICES, 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT).
- PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTING 
OF NEW COMMERCIAL ZONES, 
OFFICE AND BUSINESS 
LOCATIONS;
- ARCHITECTURALLY AMBITIOUS 
LANDMARK PROJECTS;
- MARKETING (E.G. CREATE A 
NEW AND POSITIVE IMAGE, 
PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES, USE 
SLOGANS);
- PROMOTION OF SPECIALIST 
NICHES AND STIMULATE 
ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION
- ENCOURAGEMENT OF 
SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES;
- CREATE NEW ECONOMIC 
FUNCTIONS AND INDUSTRIES 
(E.G. INVEST IN HIGH-TECH 
INDUSTRY AND TRY TO CREATE A 
KIND OF SILICON VALLEY);
- EXTEND EDUCATIONAL 
FACILITIES (E.G. SET UP 
CAMPUSES, STIMULATE 
COOPERATION BETWEEN LOCAL 
BUSINESSES AND EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTES, DEVELOP SPECIFIC 
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES);
- EXTEND INFRASTRUCTURE.
RADICAL POLICY CHANGE
- REVITALISING EXISTING 
HOUSING STOCK;
- DEMOLITION OF EXISTING 
(ABANDONED, UNDERUSED, 
VACANT) HOUSING STOCK AND 
TRANSFORM URBAN DISTRICTS 
INTO GREEN PARKS;
- REDUCE NEW-BUILD HOUSING 
PROGRAMMES;
- STRENGTHEN INTERMUNICIPAL 
COORDINATION (E.G. CITY- 
WIDE URBAN STRATEGY) OR 
MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION;
- STIMULATE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS (E.G. URBAN 
REGENERATION COMPANIES).
- REVITALISING OF (ABANDONED, 
UNDERUSED) RETAIL, OFFICE, 
AND BUSINESS LOCATIONS;
- DEMOLITION OF EXISTING 
RETAIL, OFFICE, AND 
BUSINESS LOCATIONS AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF BROWN 
FIELDS INTO NEW GREEN 
FIELDS;
- REDUCE PROGRAMMES FOR 
NEW RETAIL, OFFICE, AND 
BUSINESS LOCATIONS;.
- STRENGTHEN INTERMUNICIPAL 
COORDINATION (E.G. CITY- 
WIDE URBAN STRATEGY) OR 
MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION.
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T h e  a v a ila b ility  o f jo b s  m ay  a ttra ct n e w  in h a b ita n ts  (n e w  e m p lo y e e s). T h e  e sta b lish  
m e n t o f a n e w  in te rn a tio n a l sch o o l, o r cu ltu ra l e ve n ts, m ig h t im p ro v e  th e  re sid e n tia l 
q u a lity  and  in c re a se  th e  n u m b e r o f in h a b ita n ts . H o w e v e r, th is  s tu d y  re stricts  itse lf 
to  p o lic ie s  a n d /a c tio n s  th a t are  p r im a rily  co n ce rn e d  w ith  h o u s in g  m a rk e t, re g io n al 
e co n o m y , la b o u r m a rk e t, re ta il, office, and  b u s in e ss  lo c a tio n s  (se e  a lso  C h a p te r 4).
U sin g  th e  d ist in c tio n  m a d e  a b o ve , th e  re se a rch  q u e stio n  can b e re p h ra se d : under 
which circumstances do local governments that experience demographic decline 
choose for policy stability, conservative policy change or radical policy change?
3.4 POLICY ARRANGEMENT APPROACH
T h is  se ctio n , as w e ll as th e  next, p re se n ts  a c o n ce p tu a l m o d e l th a t m a k e s it p o ss ib le  
to  u n d e rsta n d  w h y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w o u ld  lead  to p o lic y  sta b ility , c o n se rv a tiv e  
p o licy  ch a n g e , o r to  ra d ica l lo cal p o licy  ch a n g e . T h e  u n d e rly in g  a ssu m p tio n  is th a t 
lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  m a k e  p o licy  in a ra tio n a l w a y, th a t is ta k in g  in te n d e d  a ch ie v e ­
m e n ts  into  a cc o u n t and  lo o k in g  fo r th e  b e st w a y  o f a ch ie v in g  th e m , and  b a s in g  th e ir  
d e cis io n  m a k in g  on p ro ve n  facts.
From  th e  stu d ie s  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  (lo c a l)  p o lic y  (se e  S e ctio n  3 .2), tw o 
c o n c lu s io n s  can d ra w n  th a t are  re le v a n t to  th e  co n ce p tu a l m o d e l. First, th e se  stu d ie s 
sh o w  th a t local g o v e rn m e n ts  e x p e rie n c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  o fte n  do n o t ch a n g e  
th e ir  p o licy  in re a ctio n  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  (p o licy  sta b ility). S e co n d , th e y  sh o w  
th a t it is im p o ss ib le  to  id e n tify  o n e s in g le  fa c to r th a t d e te rm in e s  w h e th e r d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  le a d s to  p o licy  sta b ility , c o n se rv a tiv e  p o licy  c h a n g e  or ra d ica l p o licy  
ch a n g e . M o re o ve r, b o th  a cto rs  and  s tru c tu re s  m a y  a ffect th is  re a ctio n , and  th e re  
is a re c ip ro c ity  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o . W e  c o n c lu d e  th a t tw o  sp e c ific  c o n d itio n s  n eed  to 
b e in c lu d e d  in th e  c o n c e p tu a l fra m e w o rk : it sh o u ld  a d d re ss  b o th  p o lic y  sta b ility  and 
p o lic y  ch a n g e , and  it sh o u ld  in c lu d e  b o th  a cto rs  and  s tru c tu re s  and  th e  re c ip ro c ity  
b e tw e e n  bo th.
T h e  co n ce p tu a l m o d e l is b a sed  on th e  fo u r d im e n sio n s o f th e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t 
A p p ro a ch  (P A A )16, b e c a u se  th is  a p p ro a ch  m e e ts  th e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  co n d itio n s  
b e tte r th a n  a lte rn a tiv e  a p p ro a ch e s. B e fo re  d isc u ss in g  th e  a lte rn a tiv e s, first, the  
p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is d e scrib e d , w h ich  is a ce n tra l c o n ce p t o f th e  PAA. A rts  et al. 
(2 0 0 0 a ) d e fin e  th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t as ‘th e  te m p o ra ry  sta b ilisa tio n  o f th e  co n te n t 
and  o rg a n isa tio n  o f a p a rt icu la r  p o lic y  d o m a in 17 at a sp e c ific  level o f p o lic y  m a k in g
16 ARTS, VAN TATENHOVE AND LEROY ARE THE FOUNDERS OF THE PAA.
17 A POLICY DOMAIN INCLUDES ALL POLICY PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO A PARTICULAR
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in te rm s o f fo u r d im e n sio n s: a cto rs, re so u rce s, ru le s and  d isc o u rse s ’ (A rts  et al., 
2 0 0 0 a , 54). In th e  p re se n t stu d y, th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is d e fin e d  as th e  te m p o ra ry  
s ta b ilisa tio n  o f th e  c o n te n t and  o rg a n isa tio n  o f sp a tia l p o licy  at lo cal, re g io n a l and 
p ro v in c ia l le ve ls, in te rm s o f fo u r d im e n sio n s: a cto rs, re so u rce s, ru le s  and  d isco u rse s. 
It co n ta in s  p u b lic  (g o v e rn m e n t), s e m i-p u b lic  (h o u s in g  a sso c ia t io n s) a cto rs  as w ell 
as p r iv a te  a cto rs  (d e v e lo p e rs, b u s in e sse s) a ctiv e  in th e  fie ld  o f h o u s in g  and  th e  
e c o n o m y 18. T h e  im p lic a tio n  o f th is  d e fin it io n  o f p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is th a t it su g g e sts  
a w a y  to e x p la in  p o lic y  ch a n g e . W h e n  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t 
b e c o m e  c o n g ru e n t, p o licy  sta b ility  e m e rg e s. A  p o lic y  c h a n g e  is a ssu m e d  to  o ccu r 
w h e n  o n e  o f th o se  fo u r d im e n s io n s  c h a n g e s. S e ctio n  3 .5  w ill e x p la in  in m o re  d etail 
h o w  th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t can b e used  to  e x p la in  p o lic y  d yn a m ics.
T h e  d e fin itio n  o f  th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t id e n tifie s  fo u r d im e n sio n s:
- A c to rs  and  th e ir  co alitio n s
- R e so u rc e s /p o w e r
- Rules
- D isco u rse s  (se e  F ig u re  3.2).
FIGURE 3.2 POLICY ARRANGEMENT SOURCE: LIEFFERINK 2006, P.60
DOMAIN, SUCH AS CLIMATE CHANGE, NATURE CONSERVATION, ACID RAIN, AND THE LIKE. 
TWO WAYS OF DELINEATING A DOMAIN ARE (1) TO FOCUS ON THE WAY IN WHICH A SPECIFIC 
POLICY ISSUE IS FORMALLY INSTITUTIONALISED IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM (E.G. MINISTRIES, 
POLICY PLAN) AND (2) TO FOCUS ON THE WAY IN WHICH THESE FORMAL BOUNDARIES ARE 
USED AND CHALLENGED BY THE RELEVANT PLAYERS IN THE FIELD (ARTS ET AL., 2000A, P.54).
18 AS STATED EARLIER, PRIVATE PARTIES HAVE ONLY BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT INDIRECTLY.
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ACTORS AND COALITIONS
A  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t can b e ch a ra c te rise d  b y  a ( lim ite d ) n u m b e r o f c o a lit io n s. Each 
co a lit io n  co n s ists  o f a n u m b e r o f p la y e rs  w h o  sh a re  in te rp re ta t io n s  o f a p o lic y  d is­
c o u rse  o r re so u rce s, in th e  co n te x t o f th e  ru le s  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .5 7). Tw o typ e s 
o f c o a lit io n s  can b e d ist in g u ish e d : o n e th a t su p p o rts  and  o n e th a t c h a lle n g e s  the  
p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t. S u p p o rt in g  c o a lit io n s  are  c o a lit io n s  th a t su p p o rt th e  d o m in a n t 
p o lic y  d isc o u rse  o r ru le s  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .5 7). T h e y  a re  im p o rta n t fo r th e  te m ­
p o ra ry  sta b ilisa tio n  o f  th e  c o n te n t and  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f a p a rt icu la r  p o lic y  d om ain . 
C h a lle n g in g  c o a lit io n s  are  co a lit io n s  th a t c h a lle n g e  th e  d o m in a n t p o lic y  d isc o u rse  or 
ru les. T h e y  p la y  an im p o rta n t ro le  in re a c h in g  a p o lic y  ch an g e.
RESOURCES/POWER
T h re e  d iffe re n t ty p e s o f re so u rc e s  m a y  b e d istin g u ish e d , n a m e ly , m o n e y , in fo rm a tio n  
(k n o w le d g e ) o r p o litica l le g it im a c y  (L ie ffe rin k , 20 0 6 ). T h e  d iv is io n  o f th e se  re so u rce s 
b e tw e e n  th e  v a rio u s  a cto rs  le a d s to  d iffe re n ce s  in p o w e r and  in flu e n ce  (L e ro y  and 
A rts, 20 0 6 , p .13). P o w e r re fe rs  to  th e  m o b ilisa tio n  and  d e p lo y m e n t o f th e  a va ila b le  
re so u rce s, and  in flu e n ce s w h o  d e te rm in e s  p o licy  o u tc o m e s and  h o w  (Liefferin k, 
20 0 6 , p .4 7 )19.
RULES
T h e se  are th e  ru le s c u rre n tly  in o p e ra tio n  (w ith in  th e  a rra n g e m e n t), in te rm s of 
formal p ro c e d u re s  o f d e cis io n  m a k in g  and  im p le m e n ta tio n  (e .g . th e  n e w  Spatia l 
P la n n in g  A ct, th e  N a tio n a l S p a tia l S tra te g y , lo cal la n d -u se  p la n ) as w e ll as informal 
ru le s  and  ‘ro u t in e s ’ o f in te ra c tio n  (L ie ffe rin k, 20 0 6 , p .47). Fo rm al ru le s  are  fix e d  and 
a u th o rise d  th ro u g h  legal te x ts  o r d o c u m e n ts  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .6 1). In form al ru les 
a re  p a rt o f th e  p re d o m in a n t p o litica l cu ltu re  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .6 1). T h e se  ru les 
d e lin e a te  a p o lic y  d o m a in  and  p ro v id e  s tru c tu re  to  th e  p o litica l fie ld  (A rts  et al., 
20 0 0 a ). T h e y  d e te rm in e , fo r e x a m p le , th e  p o ss ib ilit ie s  and  c o n stra in ts  fo r p o licy
19 TWO TYPES OF POWER CAN BE DISTINGUISHED. FIRST, THERE IS POLITICAL POWER,
WHICH IS THE ABILITY OF ACTORS TO MOBILISE RESOURCES AND ACHIEVE CERTAIN POLICY 
OUTCOMES (CONTROL OVER IMPORTANT RESOURCES). SUCH OUTCOMES CAN BE ACHIEVED 
NOT ONLY BY DETERMINING POLITICAL DECISIONS, BUT ALSO BY DOMINATING PUBLIC 
DEBATES, DEFINING POLICY ISSUES, SETTING AGENDAS, OR EVEN CHANGING THE FORMAL 
AND INFORMAL RULES (ARTS ET AL., 2000A, P.59). IT ENCOMPASSES ALSO THE POWER OF 
ACTORS TO CONTROL THE POLICY AGENDA AND WITHHOLD SOME ISSUES FROM IT (WHICH IS 
ALSO CALLED NON-DECISION POWER) (BACHRACH AND BARATZ, 1963).
SECOND, THERE IS RELATIONAL POWER, WHICH MEANS THE ABILITY OF ACTORS TO
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a g e n ts  (p u b lic  a d m in istra to rs) to  a ct w ith in  th a t d o m a in , th e  p o litica l p la y e rs  (p o lit i­
c ia n s) w h o  a re  in vo lve d  and  th o se  w h o  are  not, th e  in te rre la t io n s  b e tw e e n  a cto rs, 
and  th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f p o lic y  co a lit io n s  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .61).
DISCOURSES
In g e n e ra l, a p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is c h a ra c te rise d  b y  o n e d o m in a n t p o lic y  d isco u rse , 
th e  c o n te n t o f w h ic h  is c o n tin u o u s ly  c h a lle n g e d  b y  (e le m e n ts  o f) c o m p e tin g  
d isc o u rse s  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 a , p .6 3). In th e  PAA, d isc o u rse s  are  d e fin e d  as: ‘e x p re ss ­
in g  th e  v ie w s and  n a rra tiv e s  o f th e  a cto rs  in vo lve d  (sta n d a rd s, va lu e s, d e fin it io n s  of 
p ro b le m s and  a p p ro a c h e s to  s o lu t io n s )’ 20(L ie ffe rin k, 20 0 6 , p .4 7). P o licy  d isco u rse s  
a re  d e fin e d  as d o m in a n t in te rp re ta t iv e  sc h e m e s, ra n g in g  fro m  fo rm a l p o lic y  co n ­
c e p ts  to  p o p u la r  sto ry  lin es, b y  w h ich  m e a n in g  is g ive n  to a p o lic y  d o m a in  (A rts  et al., 
2 0 0 0 a , p .6 3). In o th e r w o rd s, th e  p o lic y  d isc o u rse s  en ta il th e  s ta n d a rd s  and  va lu e s, 
th e  d e fin it io n s  o f p ro b le m s and  th e  a p p ro a c h e s  to  so lu tio n s  b y  th e  a cto rs  in vo lve d  
(L e ro y  and  A rts, 20 0 6 , p .14).
T h e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  are  in e x tr ic a b ly  in te rw o v e n  (L ie ffe rin k , 20 0 6 , p .4 8 ). T h is  m e an s 
th a t o n e  d im e n sio n  a ffects th e  o th e r d im e n sio n s. T h is  in te rre la t io n  is e sse n tia l fo r 
u n d e rsta n d in g  a p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t (L ie ffe rin k , 20 0 6 , p .48 ). W h e n  th e  d ifferen t 
d im e n s io n s  are  c o n g ru e n t, th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t w ill b e sta b le  and  th e  p o licy  w ill 
b e  sta b le  to o . P o licy  a rra n g e m e n ts  are  p ro d u ce d  b y  h u m a n  a g e n c ie s  in in te ractio n ,
CONTROL POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN ACTORS AND ACHIEVE POLICY OUTCOMES (ARTS ET 
AL., 2000A). ACTORS AROUND A GIVEN POLICY ISSUE, TO VARIOUS DEGREES, ARE DEPEND­
ENT ON EACH OTHER FOR RESOURCES. THESE RELATIONS OF AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCY 
BETWEEN ACTORS EXIST, BECAUSE RESOURCES ARE UNEQUALLY DIVIDED (ASYMMETRICAL 
DISTRIBUTED) BETWEEN ACTORS (LIEFFERINK, 2006, P.54). THE MORE THESE RELATIONS OF 
POWER ARE OBJECTIFIED IN INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND ROUTINES -  FIXING, SO TO 
SPEAK, THE ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCIES, QUALIFICATIONS, REVENUES AND POSITIONS -  
THE MORE NATURAL AND OBVIOUS DOMINATION SEEMS (ARTS ET AL., 2000A, P.60).
20 THIS DEFINITION IS DRAWN FROM THE WORK OF HAJER (1995) AND DRYZEK (1997), WHO 
BOTH DEFINE DISCOURSE IN A SIMILAR WAY. HAJER (1995) DEFINES DISCOURSE AS: ‘A 
SPECIFIC ENSEMBLE OF IDEAS, CONCEPTS, AND CATEGORIZATIONS THAT ARE PRODUCED, 
REPRODUCED AND TRANSFORMED IN A PARTICULAR SET OF PRACTICES AND THROUGH 
WHICH MEANING IS GIVEN TO PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL REALITIES' (HAJER, 1995, P.44). DRYZEK 
DEFINES POLICY DISCOURSE SIMILARLY AS: ‘A SHARED WAY OF APPREHENDING THE WORLD. 
EMBEDDED IN LANGUAGE, IT ENABLES THOSE WHO SUBSCRIBE TO IT TO INTERPRET BITS 
OF INFORMATION AND PUT THEM TOGETHER INTO COHERENT STORIES OF ACCOUNTS. EACH 
DISCOURSE RESTS ON ASSUMPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS AND CONTENTIONS THAT PROVIDE THE 
BASIC TERMS FOR ANALYSIS, DEBATES, AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS (...) ‘(DYRZEK,
1997, P.8) (ARTS ET AL. 2000, P.63).
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re su lt in g  in a cce p te d  ru les, co a lit io n s  and  d isco u rse s. H o w e v e r, o n ce  fo rm e d , p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n ts  and  th e  ru le s th a t  g o  a lo n g  w ith  th e m  co n stra in  in te ra c tio n s  o f the 
a g e n ts  in v o lv e d , w h ich  is an e x p la n a tio n  fo r  th e  p o lic y  sta b ility  (A rts  and  V a n  T a te n ­
h o ve , 20 0 6 , p .26).
T h e  m ain  re a so n  fo r se le c t in g  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  P A A  as a sta rt in g  p o in t w as 
th a t it m e e ts  th e  c o n d itio n s  th a t w e re  e sta b lish e d  fo r  th e  c o n ce p tu a l fra m e w o rk , 
b e tte r th a n  a lte rn a tiv e  th e o rie s  o f p o lic y  sta b ility  and ch a n g e . T h e se  a lte rn a tiv e s  
in c lu d e  th e  P u n ctu a te d  E q u ilib riu m  F ra m e w o rk  b y  B a u m g a rtn e r and Jo n e s  (P E F), the 
S tre a m  F ra m e w o rk  b y  K in g d o n  and  Z a h a ria d is  (M S F), th e  A d v o c a c y  C o a lit io n  F ram e ­
w o rk  b y  S a b a tie r and  Je n k in s -S m ith  (A C F), and  th e  d isc u rs iv e  a p p ro a ch  b y  H ajer 
(1 9 9 5 ). T h e  P A A  w a s c h o se n  b e ca u se  it p a y s a tte n tio n  to b o th  a cto rs  and  stru ctu re s, 
and  th e ir  in te ra ctio n . T h e  P A A  trie s  to  b a la n ce  th e  m e a n in g  and  im p a c t o f  the 
b e h a v io u r o f a g e n c ie s  on th e  o n e  h a n d , and stru ctu ra l fa c to rs  th a t d riv e  o r b lo ck  
p o lic y  ch a n g e s on th e  o th e r (L e ro y  and  A rts, 20 0 6 , p .5). T h e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  
d im e n sio n  ‘a cto rs  and  c o a lit io n s ’ re fe rs  to  th e  ‘a g e n c ie s ’ and  th e  o th e r th re e  d im e n ­
s io n s  ‘re s o u rc e s /p o w e r’, ‘ru le s ’ and  ‘d is c o u rs e s ’, a c c o rd in g  to  A rts  and  V a n  T a te n ­
h o ve , re fe r to  th e  ‘stru c tu ra l’ fa c to rs  (A rts  and  V a n  T a te n h o v e , 2 0 0 6 ) 21. T h e  co n ce p t 
o f p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t e n a b le s  re se a rc h e rs  to  lo o k  at p o licy  c h a n g e  fro m  a co m b in e d  
stru c tu re -a g e n c y  p e rsp e ctiv e  (A rts  et al., 20 0 0 b , p .20 3). By e n c o m p a ss in g  th o se  fo u r 
d im e n sio n s, th e  P A A  ta k e s  a sta n ce  th a t is c le a rly  d ist in g u ish a b le  fro m  th e  (p o licy  
c h a n g e ) th e o rie s  th a t p r im a rily  fo cu s  on ju st  o n e  o r tw o  d im e n sio n s (L iefferin k, 
20 0 6 ). In a d d itio n , th e  fo u r d im e n sio n s b e tte r a llo w  fo r e m p irica l o p e ra t io n a lisa ­
tio n  th a n  so m e  o f th e  co n c e p ts  fro m  a lte rn a tiv e  th e o rie s, such as S a b a tie r’s ‘b e lie f 
s y ste m s ’.
T h e  a lte rn a tiv e  th e o rie s  fo cu s  p r im a rily  on o n e end  o f th e  stru c tu re -a g e n c y  d u ality . 
A C F  and  M S F  p a y  m o st a tte n tio n  to a g e n c ie s  (a cto rs  and  c o a lit io n s) fo r in te rp re tin g  
a p o lic y  ch a n g e . S a b a tie r  (19 9 8 ), fo r e x a m p le , a rg u e s th a t p o lic ie s  w ith in  a sp ecific  
ju r isd ic tio n  w ill n o t ra d ic a lly  c h a n g e  as lo n g  as th e  s u p p o rt in g  su b sy ste m 22, th e  a d v o ­
ca cy  c o a lit io n  th a t in stitu te d  th e  p o licy , re m a in s  in p o w e r w ith in  th a t ju r is d ic tio n  -  
e x ce p t w h e n  such a c h a n g e  is im p o se d  b y  a h ie ra rc h ic a lly  su p e rio r ju risd ictio n .
21 THE WAY IN WHICH DISCOURSE IS USED IN THIS RESEARCH REFERS MORE TO ‘AGENCIES’ 
THAN TO ‘STRUCTURAL’ FACTORS. DISCOURSE IS DEFINED AS THE IDEAS ABOUT THE NATURE 
OF THE PROBLEM AND THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS (SEE SECTION 3 .5 .1).
22 THIS SUBSYSTEM CONSISTS OF ACTORS FROM A VARIETY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANI­
SATIONS WHO ARE ACTIVELY CONCERNED WITH A POLICY PROBLEM OR ISSUE, SUCH AS
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K in g d o n  (2 0 0 3 ) a rg u e s th a t c h a lle n g in g  c o a lit io n s  -  p o lic y  e n tre p re n e u rs23 -  are 
n e c e ssa ry  to  rea ch  a p o licy  c h a n g e 24. P o lic ie s w ill c h a n g e  w h e n  th e  th re e  d ifferen t 
stre a m s th a t  K in g d o n  d ist in g u ish e s  (p ro b le m s, so lu tio n s, p o lit ics) m eet, th a t is, 
w h e n  a p o lic y  w in d o w 25 o p e n s. T h is  o ccu rs  w h e n  p o lic y  e n tre p re n e u rs  are  a b le  to 
c o m b in e  th e  d iffe re n t stre a m s: a p ro b le m  is re co g n ise d , a so lu tio n  is a v a ila b le , the 
p o litica l c lim a te  is re a d y  fo r ch a n g e , and  th e  c o n stra in ts  do n o t p ro h ib it  a ctio n  (K in g - 
d on , 20 0 3, p .165).
T h e  d isc u rs iv e  a p p ro a ch , on th e  o th e r h a n d , p r im a rily  p a ys a tte n tio n  to ‘d is c o u rs e ’, 
s o m e th in g  w h ic h  A rts  and V a n  T a te n h o v e  (20 0 6 ) c o n s id e r a stru ctu ra l a sp e ct. H ajer 
(19 9 5 ) a rg u e s th a t a d isc o u rse -a n a ly t ica l a p p ro a ch  is h e lp fu l to  a n a ly se  p o lic y  d y n a m ­
ics. A  d isc o u rse  can b e u n d e rsto o d  as a sp e c ific  e n se m b le  o f id e a s, c o n ce p ts  and  ca t­
e g o risa t io n s  th a t is p ro d u ce d , re p ro d u ce d , and  tra n sfo rm e d  in to  a p a rt icu la r  set of 
p ra ctice s, and  th ro u g h  w h ich  m e a n in g  is g iv e n  to p h ysica l and  so cia l re a lit ie s  (H ajer, 
1 9 9 5 , p .4 4 ). A lth o u g h  H aje r fo cu se s  p r im a rily  on d isco u rse , he a lso  e m p h a s ise s  th at 
th e  ro le  o f a cto rs  and  co a lit io n s  is p ivo tal. He a rg u e s th a t, in o rd e r to  re a ch  a p o licy  
c h a n g e , p a rt ic ip a n ts  h a v e  to d e v e lo p  a sh a re d  u n d e rsta n d in g  o f w h a t th e  p ro b le m  
is (H aje r, 19 9 5 ). He a rg u e s th a t d isc o u rse  co a lit io n s  are  n e e d e d , w h ic h  are d e fin e d  as 
th e  e n se m b le  o f a set o f sto ry lin e s; th e  a cto rs  w h o  cre a te  th e se  sto ry lin e s  and  are 
in flu e n ce d  b y  th e m ; and  th e  p ra ctice s  on w h ich  th is  d isc u rs iv e  a ct iv ity  is b a se d  and 
re p ro d u c e d  (H a je r, 19 9 5 , p .6 5 ). S to ry lin e s  are  n a rra t iv e s  on so cia l re a lity  th ro u g h  
w h ic h  e le m e n ts  fro m  m a n y  d iffe re n t d o m a in s  are  co m b in e d  and  th a t p ro v id e  a cto rs 
w ith  a set o f sy m b o lic  re fe re n c e s  th a t su g g e st  a c o m m o n  u n d e rsta n d in g  (H ajer,
1 9 9 5 , p .6 2). S to ry lin e s  fu lfil an e sse n tia l ro le  in th e  c lu ste rin g  o f k n o w le d g e , the
AGRICULTURE, AND WHO REGULARLY SEEK TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY IN THAT DOMAIN 
(SABATIER, 1998, P.99).
23 POLICY ENTREPRENEURS ARE ADVOCATES WHO ARE WILLING TO INVEST THEIR RESOURCES
-  TIME, ENERGY, REPUTATION, MONEY -  TO PROMOTE A POSITION IN RETURN FOR ANTICI­
PATED FUTURE GAIN IN THE FORM OF MATERIAL, PURPOSIVE, OR SOLIDARY BENEFITS 
(KINGDON, 2003, P.123).
24 LIKE SABATIER, KINGDON ALSO ARGUES THAT FOCUS EVENTS (E.G. POLITICAL CHANGES) OR 
INDICATORS (E.G. NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS) ARE NECESSARY CONDITIONS, BUT NOT SUFFI­
CIENT IN THEMSELVES FOR CHANGING POLICIES.
25 POLICY WINDOWS ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR LINKING THREE STREAMS. POLICY
WINDOWS OPEN INFREQUENTLY AND STAY OPEN FOR ONLY SHORT PERIODS (KINGDON,
2003, P.167). THEY ARE OPENED BY CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL STREAM (E.G. CHANGE OF 
ADMINISTRATION, A SHIFT IN THE PARTISAN OR IDEOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN 
AMERICAN CONGRESS (LOWER HOUSE), A SHIFT IN NATIONAL MOOD) OR NEW PROBLEMS, 
WHICH CAPTURE THE ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOSE CLOSE TO THEM 
(KINGDON, 2003, P.168).
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p o s it io n in g  o f a cto rs, and , u ltim a te ly , in th e  cre a tio n  o f co a lit io n s  b e tw e e n  th e  ac­
to rs  o f a g ive n  d o m a in  (H aje r, 19 9 5 , p .6 3). T h e  sto ry lin e s  are  seen  as th e  d iscu rs iv e  
c e m e n t th a t ke e p s a d isc o u rse  co a lit io n  to g e th e r (H aje r, 19 9 5 , p .6 5 ). T h e y  stru ctu re  
th e ir  b e h a v io u r.
S im ila r  to  H ajer, S a b a tie r and  J e n k in s -S m ith  (19 9 9 ) a lso  p a y  a tte n tio n  to stru ctu ra l 
a sp e cts , h o w e v e r, th e y  use th e  c o n c e p t o f th e  b e lie f  syste m  in ste ad  o f th a t of 
d isc o u rse 26. T h e  b e lie f  sy ste m  in v o lv e s  v a lu e  p rio rit ie s , p e rce p tio n s  o f im p o rta n t 
cau sal re la tio n sh ip s , p e rce p tio n s  o f w o rld  state s, and p e rce p tio n s/a ssu m p tio n s  
c o n c e rn in g  th e  e ffica cy  o f v a r io u s  p o licy  in stru m e n ts  (S a b a tie r, 19 9 8 , p .9 9 ). T h e y  
use th e  c o n c e p t o f th e  b e lie f  syste m  and  its d iv is io n  into  th re e  d iffe re n t la y e rs  (deep  
co re , p o lic y  co re, and  se c o n d a ry  a sp e c ts27), to  e x p la in  th e  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  m ajo r 
and  m in o r c h a n g e s28. H o w e v e r, a c c o rd in g  to M in stro m  and  V e rg a ri (19 9 6 ), th e  c o n d i­
t io n s  u n d e r w h ich  m a jo r p o licy  ch a n g e s o c cu r re m a in s  u n cle a r (S a b a tie r, 19 9 8 , p.118; 
S a b a tie r  and  Je n k in s -S m ith , 19 9 9 , p .14 7). A n d  as a rg u e d  e a rlie r, ‘b e lie f s y ste m s ’ are 
d ifficu lt to  o p e ra tio n a lise .
26 THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DISCURSIVE APPROACH OF HAJER AND THE ACF OF 
SABATIER IS THAT SABATIER HOLDS AN INDIVIDUALIST ONTOLOGY AND EMPHASIZES THE 
ROLE OF BELIEFS IN ADVOCACY COALITIONS, WHEREAS HAJER HOLDS A RELATIONAL ONTOL­
OGY AND FOCUSES ON THE CONSTITUTIVE ROLE OF LANGUAGE, THE ROLE OF STORYLINES 
AND DISCURSIVE AFFINITIES IN SHAPING THE BEHAVIOUR OF ACTORS (HAJER, 1995, P.69).
27 THE DEEP CORE OF THE SHARED BELIEF SYSTEM INCLUDES BASIC ONTOLOGICAL AND 
NORMATIVE BELIEFS, SUCH AS THE RELATIVE VALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM VERSUS 
SOCIAL EQUALITY, WHICH OPERATE ACROSS VIRTUALLY ALL POLICY DOMAINS (SABATIER 
AND JENKINS-SMITH, 1999, P.121). ‘POLICY CORE BELIEFS REPRESENT A COALITION'S BASIC 
NORMATIVE COMMITMENTS AND CAUSAL PERCEPTIONS ACROSS AN ENTIRE POLICY DOMAIN 
OR SUBSYSTEM. THEY INCLUDE FUNDAMENTAL VALUE PRIORITIES, SUCH AS THE RELATIVE 
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, BASIC 
PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE GENERAL SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS PRINCI­
PAL CAUSES, AND STRATEGIES FOR REALISING CORE VALUES WITHIN THE SUBSYSTEMS' 
(SABATIER AND JENKINS-SMITH, 1999, P.122).‘SECONDARY ASPECTS OF A COALITION'S BELIEF 
SYSTEM COMPRISE A LARGE SET OF NARROWER (E.G. TYPICALLY LESS THAN SUBSYS­
TEM WIDE) BELIEFS CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM OR THE RELATIVE 
IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS CAUSAL FACTORS IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS, POLICY PREFER­
ENCES REGARDING DESIRABLE REGULATIONS OR BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS, THE DESIGN 
OF SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS, AND THE EVALUATIONS OF VARIOUS ACTORS' PERFORMANCE' 
(SABATIER AND JENKINS SMITH, 1999, P.122).
28 THE BASIS FOR MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RADICAL AND CONSERVATIVE POLICY 
CHANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT BETWEEN MAJOR AND MINOR POLICY CHANGE. MY 
DISTINCTION IS BASED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF THE POLICY AND, FOR SABATIER, IT IS BASED 
ON THE TOPIC AND SCOPE OF THE POLICY CHANGE. MAJOR CHANGE IS CHANGE IN THE
77
M o st o f th e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  a p p ro a c h e s  te n d  to e m p h a s ise  e ith e r a g e n cie s  or 
s tru c tu re s, ra th e r th a n  b o th , as w e ll as th e ir  re c ip ro c ity . F e n g e r and K lo k  (2 0 0 1) c rit i­
c ise  th e  A C F  th e o ry  fo r  u n d e re st im a tin g  th e  ro le  o f  re so u rce s. D istrib u tio n a l co n flicts  
and  th e  te m p ta tio n  to fre e  rid e  (w h ich  can p re v e n t a p o licy  c h a n g e ) a re  ig n o re d  
(S a b a tie r, 19 9 8 , p .115 -116 ). In th e  PAA, a tte n tio n  is b e in g  p a id  to  b o th . D istrib u tio n al 
co n flicts  are  in c o rp o ra te d  in th e  d im e n sio n  ‘re s o u rc e s ’, w h ic h  fo cu se s  on d iv is io n  of 
re so u rc e s  b e tw e e n  a cto rs . T h e  te m p ta tio n  to  fre e  rid e  is d iscu sse d  in th e  d im e n sio n  
‘a cto rs  and  th e ir  c o a lit io n s ’, w h ic h  d iscu sse s  p a tte rn s  o f in te ra c tio n  (se e  S e ctio n  3.5).
U n lik e  th e  PAA, th e  M S F  and  A C F  th e o rie s  p a y  le ss a tte n tio n  to th is  d u a lity  o f stru c ­
tu re  (re c ip ro c ity  b e tw e e n  a g e n cie s  and  stru ctu re s). T h e  o th e r th e o rie s  (M S F  and 
A C F )  e m p h a s ise  th a t stru c tu re s  in flu e n ce  a cto rs , h o w e v e r, th e y  (e x ce p t fo r  in the  
d isc u rs iv e  a p p ro a ch  o f H aje r) u n d e re st im a te  th e  fa c t  o f a cto rs  a lso  a ffe ctin g  stru c ­
tu re s. T h e  M S F  th e o ry , fo r e x a m p le , d ist in g u ish e s  th re e  d iffe re n t stre a m s (re c o g ­
n ised  p ro b le m s, p o licy  so lu tio n s, and  p o litica l e v e n ts) and  a rg u e  th a t th e se  stre am s 
d e v e lo p  re la t iv e ly  in d e p e n d e n tly  fro m  each  o th e r (K in g d o n , 20 0 3). T h e  A C F  th e o ry  
p a y s b r ie f a tte n tio n  to th e  fa c t th a t stru c tu re s  (p o licy  b e lie fs , re so u rce s, in stitu tio n a l 
ru le s) in flu e n ce  a cto rs, h o w e v e r it p a ys le ss  a tte n tio n  to th e  re v e rse  effect.
H a je r (19 9 5 ) d o e s p a y  a tte n tio n  to  th e  d u a lity  o f s tru ctu re , b u t o n ly  to  a lim ited  
e x te n t. A lth o u g h  h e  e m p h a sise s  th e  stru ctu ra l e ffe cts o f d isc o u rse  on th e  b e h a v io u r 
o f a cto rs  and  th e  re p e tit io n  th e re o f in in stitu tio n a lise d  p ra c t ic e s  (discourse struc­
turation and  discourse institutionalisation), re v e rse ly , little  a tte n tio n  is p a id  to  the 
stru ctu ra l effect o f in stitu tio n s  on a cto rs  and  d isco u rse s.
T h e  PEF th e o ry , in co n tra st, s im ila r to  th e  PAA, fo cu se s  on b o th  a cto rs and  stru c ­
tu re s. B a u m g a rtn e r and  Jo n e s  a rg u e  th a t p o licy  is ch a ra c te rise d  b y  lo n g  p e rio d s of 
sta b ility , and  th a t p o licy  g e n e ra lly  ch a n g e s o n ly  in c re m e n ta lly  b e ca u se  o f re stra in ts , 
su ch  as th e  ‘s t ic k in e s s ’ o f in stitu tio n a l stru ctu re s, v e ste d  in te re sts  and  b o u n d e d  
ra t io n a lity  o f in d iv id u a l d e cis io n  m a k e rs. La rg e  ch a n g e s do n o t o c cu r fre q u e n tly  and 
w ill b e  stim u la te d  b y  ch a n g e s in o n e  o f th o se  c o n d it io n s29 w h ic h  can b e cau se d  by 
la rg e  sh ifts  in so c ie ty  o r g o v e rn m e n t. R e stra in ts  and  s tim u li b o th  re fe r to  a cto rs  and 
s tru c tu re s. N e v e rth e le ss, th is  th e o ry  is n o t u sed , b e ca u se  it is m o re  su ita b le  to
POLICY CORE ASPECTS OF A GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME, WHEREAS MINOR CHANGE IS 
CHANGE IN THE SECONDARY ASPECTS (SABATIER, 1998, P.118).
29 THE FORCES THAT CREATE POLICY STABILITY DURING SOME PERIODS ARE THE SAME AS 
THOSE THAT COMBINE DURING CRITICAL PERIODS TO FORCE DRAMATIC AND LONG-LASTING 
CHANGES DURING OTHER PERIODS (BAUMGARTNER AND JONES, 1993, P.237).
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e x p la in  sta b ility  th a n  it is d yn a m ics. B esid es, th e  w a y  in w h ich  th e  re stra in ts  and 
s tim u li are  d e fin e d  are le ss c le a r th a n  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  PAA.
T h e  PA A  p a ys a tte n tio n  n o t o n ly  to  a cto rs and stru ctu re s, b u t a lso  e x p lic it ly  to  the  
re c ip ro c ity  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o . A rts  and  V a n  T a te n h o v e  (2 0 0 6 ) a ck n o w le d g e  th a t 
a g e n ts  a re  stro n g ly  in flu e n ce d  b y  s tru c tu re s  and  v ice  v e rsa . T h e y  a rg u e  th a t ’the  
stru ctu ra l p ro p e rtie s  o f  th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t (e .g . ru les, re so u rce s, d isco u rse ), 
a re  th e  c o n te x t o f c o n d it io n s  in w h ich  th e  a ctio n s  o f a g e n cie s  ta k e  p lace. T h e se  
stru ctu ra l p ro p e rtie s  co n stra in  and  e n a b le  a g e n c ie s  in th e ir  in te ra ctio n . R everse ly, 
to  a d v a n c e  th e ir  in te re sts, and  w h ile  try in g  to  affect p o lic y  o u tco m e s, a cto rs  m o b il­
ise  re so u rce s, m a k e  use o f ru les, fra m e  d isco u rse s, and  b u ild  co a lit io n s. A s  a resu lt 
o f th e se  in te ra ctio n s, th e  stru ctu ra l p ro p e rt ie s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t m ig h t be 
m o d ifie d  o r tra n sfo rm e d  (a lth o u g h  n o t n e c e ssa rily  s o ) ’ (A rts  and  V a n  T a te n h o ve , 
20 0 6 , p. 27).
T h e  a b o ve , th e re fo re , w a s an im p o rta n t re a so n  fo r c h o o sin g  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  of 
th e  P A A  as s ta rtin g  p o in t fo r  th is  co n ce p tu a l fra m e w o rk . A n  a d d itio n a l a d v a n ta g e  of 
P A A  in c o m p a riso n  to th e  o th e r a p p ro a c h e s is th a t it is useful fo r  e m p irica l re se a rch , 
b e c a u se  it e n c o m p a sse s  fo u r d im e n s io n s  th a t can a lm o st b e re g a rd e d  as in d ica to rs  
o f ch a n g e . S e ctio n  3.5  e x p la in s  th is  in m o re  d e ta il. T h e  fo u r d im e n sio n s o f th e  p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n t a p p ro a ch  a llo w , th u s, fo r o p e ra t io n a lisa t io n  o f  e m p irica l rese a rch .
T h e  PA A  a lso  h a s d ra w b a ck s. I sta rt w ith  ‘p o litica l m o d e rn is a tio n ’, a k e y  c o n c e p t of 
th e  a p p ro a ch . It re fe rs  to  p ro ce sse s  o f tra n sfo rm a tio n  w ith in  th e  p o litica l d o m a in  of 
so cie ty , e sp e c ia lly  re g a rd in g  g o v e rn m e n t, m a rk e t and  civil so c ie ty  in te rre la tio n s  (Van 
T a te n h o v e  et al., 20 0 0 , p. 3 0 -3 6 ). Fo r re la t iv e ly  sh o rt-ru n  p o lic y  ch a n g e s th e se  stru c ­
tu ra l co n te x tu a l ch a n g e s a re  le ss  re le v a n t. I a ssu m e  th e se  to b e fa ir ly  sta b le  in the 
c o n te x t o f th is  re se a rch . W h a t th e  c o n c e p t o f p o litica l m o d e rn isa tio n  does shed  lig h t 
on, h o w e v e r, is th e  fa c t th a t lo ca lise d  p o licy  p ra c t ise s  are  e m b e d d e d  in a w id e r in sti­
tu tio n a l, p o litica l, e c o n o m ic  and  d e m o g ra p h ic  c o n te x t. T h is  c o n te x t w ill b e  tack led  
d iffe re n tly  fro m  th e  PAA. It is d e a lt  w ith  w h e n  th e  d isc o u rse  d im e n sio n  is d iscu sse d . 
Local d isc o u rse s  are  affected  b y  c o n te x tu a l ch a n g e s (an d  v ice  ve rsa ). Fo r in stan ce , 
th e  g lo b a l f in a n cia l cris is  h a s had  an effect on th e  lo cal p e rce p tio n  o f  sh rin k a g e . In a d ­
d itio n , th e  w id e r in stitu tio n a l and  p o litica l c o n te x t is a lso  a condition fo r lo cal p o licy  
ch a n g e . T h is  re la tio n  is th e o rise d  and  a n a ly se d  b y  th e  c o n ce p t o f stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l 
co n g ru e n c e , as in tro d u ce d  b y  B o o n stra  (S e ctio n  3 .5.2).
S e co n d ly , th e  P A A  h a s b e e n  critic ise d  fo r n o t b e in g  d yn a m ic  e n o u g h  to  ex p la in  
( lo c a l)  p o lic y  ch a n g e s (se e  a lso  B o o n stra, 20 0 4 ; A rts  and  Leroy, 20 0 6 b ). T h e  a rg u ­
m e n ts  are  th re e fo ld . First, th e  P A A  fo cu se s  on e x p la in in g  sta b ility  and  d o e s not
79
e x p la in  w h y  p o lic ie s  ch a n g e . T h e  fo u n d e rs  o f th e  P A A  d isa g re e  w ith  th is  and , in 20 06, 
p u b lish e d  th e  b o o k  ‘ In stitu tio n a l D y n a m ics  in E n v iro n m e n ta l G o v e rn a n c e ’ to  d e m o n ­
stra te  th a t th e  P A A  a lso  co u ld  b e used  fo r  a n a ly s in g  p o lic y  ch a n g e s. L ie ffe rin k  (20 06), 
e m p h a s ise s  th a t th e  fo u r d im e n sio n s o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t are  in e x tric a b ly  
in te rw o v e n , and  th a t th e  n o tio n  o f th is  in te rre la te d n e ss  is e sse n tia l fo r u n d e rsta n d ­
in g  p o lic y  sta b ility  as w e ll as th e  d y n a m ics  o f a p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t (se e  F ig ure  3.2).
He e x p la in s  th a t th e  in te rre la te d n e ss  im p lie s  th a t a c h a n g e  in o n e  o f th e  fo u r d im e n ­
s io n s o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t m a y  in d u ce  c h a n g e  in o th e r d im e n sio n s, w h ich  could  
th e n  ca u se  a p o licy  ch a n g e .
M o re o v e r, B o o n stra  (2 0 0 4 ) and  L ie ffe rin k  (2 0 0 6 ) a rg u e  th a t th e  P A A  a p p ro a ch  
h a rd ly  ta k e s  a cc o u n t o f th e  c o n d it io n s  u n d e r w h ich  p o lic ie s  c h a n g e  (and  stab ilise ). 
T h e  P A A  a rg u e s th a t a c h a n g e  in o n e o f th e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t 
m a y  in d u ce  a c h a n g e  in its o th e r d im e n sio n s. H o w e v e r, B o o n stra  (20 0 4 ) a rg u es 
th a t th is  d o e s n o t m a k e  c le a r th e  c o n d it io n s  u n d e r w h ic h  p o licy  ch a n g e s o r re m a in s 
stab le . L ie ffe rin k  (20 0 6 ) a lso  a rg u e s th a t th e  P A A  d o e s n o t m a k e  c le a r th e  fo rce s  th a t 
can  ca u se  a c h a n g e  in o n e  o f  th e  d im e n sio n s.
In a d d it io n , th e  P A A  h a s b een  critic ise d  b y  M ol (A rts  and  Leroy, 20 0 3 ) fo r n e g le ctin g  
th e  sp e cia l fe a tu re s  o f  th e  p o lic y  o b je ct. O th e r th e o rie s  on p o lic y  d yn a m ics  a lso  h ave 
b e e n  critic ize d  on th is  po int.
Fu rth e rm o re , th e  P A A  d o e s n o t p a y  a tte n tio n  to d iffe re n t ty p e s o f ch a n g e . It is th e re ­
fo re  n o t a b le  to  e x p la in  th e  c o n d it io n s  u n d e r w h ic h  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  fo rm u la te  
e ith e r a c o n se rv a t iv e  o r  a ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e .
D e sp ite  th e se  d ra w b a ck s, v a r io u s  e m p irica l s tu d ie s  (e.g. Liefferink, 20 0 6 ; W ie rin g  and 
C ra b b é , 20 0 6 ; B o o n stra, 20 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 ) h a v e  a p p lie d  th e  P A A  to  a n a ly se  p o licy  d y n a m ­
ics. A c c o rd in g  to W ie rin g  and  C ra b b é  (20 0 6 , p .9 4 ) th e  fo u r d im e n sio n s o f  th e  p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n t a re  fu n c tio n a l in re c o n stru c t in g  w h e re  and  in w h ich  o rd e r in stitu tio n a l 
c h a n g e s ta k e  p lace . In th is  stu d y, th e  in s ig h ts  o f th o se  fo u r a u th o rs  a re  used  to 
o v e rc o m e  th e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  sh o rtc o m in g s , to  m a k e  th e  fo u r d im e n sio n s o f the  
P A A  m o re  d yn a m ic  and  e n a b le  a b e tte r e x p la n a tio n  o f th e  c o n d it io n s  u n d e r w h ich  
d iffe re n t k in d s o f  c h a n g e  (c o n se rv a t iv e  and  ra d ica l p o licy  c h a n g e ) ta k e  p lace.
S e ctio n  3 .5  d e sc rib e s  h o w  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  P A A  co u ld  b e a d a p te d  fo r 
e x p la in in g  p o lic y  d yn a m ics. In to ta l, fo u r a d a p ta tio n s  h a v e  b een  m ad e . First, several 
ty p e s  o f  c h a n g e  in th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t are  d e scrib e d , 
b a se d  on L ie ffe rin k  (2 0 0 6 ) and  W ie rin g  and  C ra b b é  (20 0 6 ). S e co n d , th e  c o n c e p t of 
stra te g ic , s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l, and s tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l ( in )c o n g ru e n c e  is a d d e d , based
80
on B o o n stra  (20 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 ) and  L ie ffe rin k  (20 0 6 ). T h e  th ird  a d a p ta tio n  co n sists  o f the 
fe a tu re s  o f th e  p o lic y  o b je ct, b a se d  on M ol (A rts  and  Leroy, 20 0 3). F in ally, ch a n g e s in 
e x te rn a l fa c to rs  are  a d d e d , d e rive d  fro m  W ie rin g  and  C ra b b é  (20 0 6 ), R o tm a n s et al. 
(20 0 1), R o tm a n s (2 0 0 5 ) and  B e au re g a rd  (20 0 8 ). In S e ctio n  3.6 , th e  th e o re tic a l fra m e ­
w o rk, a d a p te d  fo r  a n a ly s in g  p o licy  d yn a m ics, is a p p lie d  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e.
3.5 EXPLAINING POLICY DYNAMICS BY USING 
THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF THE PAA
3.5.1 CHANGE IN A DIMENSION OF THE POLICY 
ARRANGEMENT
In o rd e r to  m a k e  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f  th e  P A A  d yn a m ic, f irst p o ss ib le  ty p e s of 
c h a n g e  in th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t h a v e  to b e id en tified .
T h e se  p o ss ib le  typ e s o f ch a n g e s w e re  d e rive d  fro m  L ie ffe rin k  (2 0 0 6 ) and  W ie rin g  
and  C ra b b é  (2 0 0 6 )30. C h a n g e s in th e  d im e n sio n s o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t could  
ca u se  a p o lic y  ch a n g e . A lso , e x te rn a l fo rce s  o f  c h a n g e  n eed  to b e id e n tifie d . External 
fo rc e s  o f c h a n g e  m a y  (b u t n o t n e c e ssa rily  w ill)  ca u se  ch a n g e s in th e  d im e n s io n s  of 
th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. S e ctio n  3 .5 .4  e x p la in s  in m o re  d e ta il th e  e x te rn a l fo rc e s  of 
c h a n g e  (e.g. d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e). B elo w , th e  ch a n g e s in d im e n s io n s  a re  id en tified .
L ie ffe rin k  (20 0 6 , p .48  and  5 0 -5 9 ) in d ic a te s  th e  fo llo w in g  ty p e s o f ch a n g e:
1 N ew  ideas
- N ew , first-le v e l d isco u rse . T h e se  are g e n e ra l id e a s a b o u t th e  o rg a n isa tio n  
o f  so cie ty , p a rt icu la rly  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  state , m a rk e t and  civil 
so c ie ty . Fo r e x a m p le , a b o u t th e  p re fe rre d  m o d e  o f g o v e rn a n c e  (L iefferin k,
20 0 6 , p .58).
- N ew , se c o n d -le v e l d isco u rse . T h e se  are  id e a s a b o u t th e  co n cre te  p o licy  
p ro b le m  in q u e stio n , fo r e x a m p le , a b o u t a p ro b le m ’s n a tu re , its cau ses 
and  p o ss ib le  so lu tio n s  (L ie ffe rin k , 20 0 6 , p .58).
2 A cto rs
- A p p e a ra n c e  o f n e w  a cto rs
- C h a n g e  in c o a lit io n  co m p o sitio n
30 WIERING AND CRABBE (2006) CALL THEM INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN POLICY ARRANGE­
MENTS.
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3 Fo rm al and in fo rm a l ru les
- C h a n g e s  in m u tu a lly  ag re e d  fo rm a l p ro ce d u re s
- C h a n g e s  in in fo rm a l ro u tin e s  o f  in te ra ctio n  w ith in  in stitu tio n s
4 R e so u rce s
- In tro d u ctio n  o f e x tra  re so u rc e s  (e .g . su b sid ie s , k n o w le d g e , sk ills)
- W ith d ra w a l o f re so u rce s
W ie rin g  and  C ra b b e  (20 0 6 , p .9 5 ) n a m e  th e  fo llo w in g  ty p e s o f ch a n g e:
1 D isco u rse
- N ew  p a ra d ig m
- N ew  id e a s a b o u t d e sira b le  s itu a tio n s  th a t a cto rs  strive  fo r
- N ew  id e a s a b o u t h o w  a cto rs  e x p e c t to  re a ch  th e se  d e sira b le  s itu a tio n s
2 A cto rs
- N ew  c o n ste lla tio n  o f a cto rs
- C h a n g e s  in p a tte rn s  o f th e ir  in te ra ctio n
3 Rules
- C h a n g e s  in le g is la tio n  (fo rm a l ru le s)
- C h a n g e s  in p ro c e d u re s31
- C h a n g e s  in p o litica l cu ltu re
4 R e so u rc e s /p o w e r
- S h ifts  in re so u rc e  c o n ste lla tio n  o f a cto rs
- C h a n g e s  in p o w e r re la tio n s
T h e  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  th e  lists by L ie ffe rin k  (2 0 0 6 ) and W ie rin g  and  C ra b b e  (20 0 6 ) 
is th a t th e y  d e fin e  d isc o u rse  d iffe re n tly . L ie ffe rin k  (in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  fo u n d e rs  
o f th e  PAA, A rts , V a n  T a te n h o v e  and  Le ro y32) m a k e s a d ist in ctio n  b e tw e e n  first- and 
se c o n d -le v e l d isco u rse . W ie r in g  and C ra b b e  m a k e  a d istin ctio n  b e tw e e n  th e  p a ra ­
d ig m s b y  w h ich  th e  a cto rs live, n e w  id e a s a b o u t th e  d e sira b le  s itu a tio n s  th a t a cto rs 
striv e  for, and  n e w  id e a s a b o u t h o w  a cto rs  e x p e ct to  re a ch  th e se  d e sira b le  s itu a ­
tio n s.
31 ACCORDING TO WIERING AND CRABBE PROCEDURES ARE SIMILAR TO INFORMAL RULES.
32 SEE VAN TATENHOVE ET AL. (2000); ARTS AND LEROY (2003); ARTS AND LEROY (2006A).
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B ased  on th e ir  w o rk , th is  s tu d y  id e n tifie s  th e  fo llo w in g  ty p e s o f ch a n g e s in the 
d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t:
1 C h a n g e s  in d isco u rse s
- C h a n g e s  in id e a s a b o u t th e  n a tu re  o f th e  p ro b le m  and th e  p o ssib le  
so lu tio n s
2 C h a n g e s  in a cto rs  and  co alitio n
- N ew  a cto rs
- C h a n g e s  in c o n ste lla tio n  o f a cto rs  ( ‘c h a lle n g in g  c o a lit io n s ’)
- C h a n g e s  in p a tte rn s  o f  in te ra ctio n
3 C h a n g e s  in ru le s
- C h a n g e s  in fo rm a l ru le s  (e.g. ch a n g e s in p ro c e d u re s  and  legal te x ts  and 
d o c u m e n ts)
- C h a n g e s  in in fo rm a l ru le s  (e .g . ch a n g e s in ro u tin e s  o f in te ra c tio n )
4 C h a n g e s  in th e  re so u rc e s/p o w e r b a la n ce
- C h a n g e s  in re so u rc e  c o n ste lla tio n s, th a t is, in d iv is io n  o f re so u rc e s  (e.g. 
fin a n ce s, k n o w le d g e , p o litica l le g it im a c y) b e tw e e n  a cto rs
- C h a n g e s  in p o w e r re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  a cto rs
L ie ffe rin k  (2 0 0 6 ) a rg u e s th a t th e  in te rc o n n e c te d n e ss  o f th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  d oes 
n o t im p ly  th a t p o licy  a rra n g e m e n ts  are  a lw a y s  h a rm o n io u s, sta b le  and  in te rn a lly  
c o n siste n t. He a rg u e s th a t a c h a n g e  in o n e o f th e  d im e n s io n s  m a y  ca u se  in c o n g ru ­
e n ce  b e tw e e n  th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f an a rra n g e m e n t, w h ic h  m a y  re su lt  in sh o rte r o r 
lo n g e r p e rio d s o f in sta b ility  and  c h a n g e  (L ie ffe rin k, 20 0 6 , p .4 9 ) 33. He b a se d  th is  idea 
on H a je r (2 0 0 3 ) and  B o o n stra  (20 06).
T h u s, a c h a n g e  in th e  d im e n sio n  o f a p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t m a y  e n d a n g e r th e  co n g ru ­
e n ce  o f w h a t w a s a sta b le  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. T h is  s tu d y  in v e stig a te s  the
33 HE STATES THAT A CHANGE IN ONE OF THE DIMENSIONS MAY INDUCE CHANGES IN OTHER 
DIMENSIONS OF THE POLICY ARRANGEMENT. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE INDISSOLUBLE 
INTERRELATEDNESS OF THE FOUR DIMENSIONS, REPERCUSSIONS ACROSS DIMENSIONS 
ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR -  EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO DO SO IN EACH 
AND EVERY CASE (LIEFFERINK, 2006, P.48). THE ARGUMENT THAT THE FOUR DIMENSIONS 
ARE INTERCONNECTED, OF COURSE, DOES NOT IMPLY THAT POLICY ARRANGEMENTS ARE 
ALWAYS HARMONIOUS, STABLE AND INTERNALLY CONSISTENT. INCONGRUENCE AMONG THE 
(FOUR) DIMENSIONS OF AN ARRANGEMENT MAY IN FACT RESULT IN SHORTER OR LONGER 
PERIODS OF INSTABILITY AND SHOCK WISE CHANGE (LIEFFERINK, 2006, P.49).
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c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r  lo cal sp a tia l p o lic ie s. It p a rt icu la rly  a d ­
d re sse s  w h e th e r and  h o w  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  a ffects th e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n t. B e ca u se  th e  a n a ly s is  o f th is  s tu d y  b e g in s  at th e  d isc o u rse  d im e n sio n , it 
p a rt icu la r ly  e x p lo re s  w h e th e r d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  cau se s  ch a n g e s in th e  d isco u rse  
d im e n sio n  (se e  S e ctio n  3 .6 .1). H o w e v e r, d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  a lso  m a y  affect the 
o th e r d im e n sio n s o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. It m a y  ca u se  ch a n g e s in a cto rs  and  th e ir  
co a lit io n s, and  in p a tte rn s  o f in te ra c tio n  b e tw e e n  th o se  a cto rs. In a d d it io n , it m ay 
ca u se  ch a n g e s in fo rm a l ru les, su ch  as ch a n g e s in p ro c e d u re s  and  legal te x ts  and 
d o cu m e n ts, and  in in fo rm a l ru les, such as ch a n g e s in ro u tin e s  o f in te ra ctio n . Finally, 
it can ca u se  ch a n g e s in re so u rc e s  o r in p o w e r b a la n ce , su ch  as ch a n g e s in re so u rce  
c o n ste lla tio n s, th a t is, in d iv is io n  o f re so u rce s, and ch a n g e s in p o w e r re la tio n s  b e ­
tw e e n  a cto rs.
W h e n  o n e  d im e n sio n  ch a n g e s, c o n g ru e n c e  m ay  b e re sto re d  by ch a n g e s in th e  o th e r 
d im e n sio n s. T h is  w ill b e  su cce ssfu l o n ly  w h e n  th e  c h a n g e  in th e  d im e n sio n  is m a r­
g in al and  d o e s n o t ca u se  la rg e  (stra te g ic  a n d /o r stru c tu ra l-in te rn a l)  in co n g ru e n ce .
In su ch  a case, a n e w  ve rs io n  o f th e  e x ist in g  a rra n g e m e n t co u ld  a rise . T h is  is w h a t is 
ca lle d  a c o n se rv a t iv e  p o licy  ch a n g e .
If th e  c h a n g e  in o n e  o f  th e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is la rg e  and  cau ses 
(s tra te g ic  a n d /o r stru c tu ra l-in te rn a l)  in c o n g ru e n c e  th a t c a n n o t b e a b so rb e d  b y  the 
o th e r d im e n sio n s o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, a n e w  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t m ay  arise, 
re su lt in g  in a ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e . T h e  n e x t se ctio n  d e sc rib e s  th e  d iffe re n t ty p e s o f 
in c o n g ru e n c e , in m o re  d eta il.
W h e th e r  a c o n se rv a tiv e  o r ra d ica l p o lic y  c h a n g e  o ccu rs  d e p e n d s  on th e  d e g re e  of 
c h a n g e  in th e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. T h is  stu d y  id e n tifie s  u n d e r 
w h ic h  c ircu m sta n c e s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w o u ld  lead  to c o n se rv a tiv e  and radical 
p o licy  ch a n g e s.
3.5.2 STRATEGIC, STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL 
AND STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL (IN) 
CONGRUENCE
T h e  c o n c e p t o f c o n g ru e n c e  and  th e  d istin ctio n  b e tw e e n  stra te g ic , stru c tu ra l-in te rn a l 
and  s tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l ( in )c o n g ru e n c e  a re  b a sed  on B o o n stra  (20 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 ) w ho  
d e fin e d  th e se  ty p e s o f c o n g ru e n c e  as fo llo w s. S tra te g ic  c o n g ru e n c e  is th e  e x te n t 
to  w h ic h  p o licy  a cto rs  w ith in  a g iv e n  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t sh a re  p o lic y  d isco u rse  
and  c o m m o n  in te re sts  w h e n  d e p lo y in g  a ctio n s. S tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l co n g ru e n c e  is 
th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  (fo u r) d im e n s io n s  o f a p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t a re  co h e re n t.
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S tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l c o n g ru e n c e  is th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t as 
a w h o le  m a tc h e s  th e  w id e r (n a tio n a l)  in stitu tio n a l co n te x t, e x te rn al to  th e  p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n t34. A  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t is sta b le  w h e n  th e re  is s tra te g ic  co n g ru e n ce , 
s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l co n g ru e n c e  and  stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l co n g ru e n ce .
T h is  d ist in ctio n  b e tw e e n  th e  d iffe re n t ty p e s o f ( in )c o n g ru e n c e  is p a rt icu la rly  re le v a n t 
to  th is  stu d y, as it e n a b le s  in v e stig a tio n  o f th e  c o n d it io n s  u n d e r w h ic h  p o licy  ch a n g e  
is e ith e r c o n se rv a tiv e  o r ra d ica l. W h e n  th e  c h a n g e  in d im e n sio n  is la rg e  and  cau ses 
s tra te g ic  and  s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l in c o n g ru e n c e  th a t  c a n n o t b e a b so rb e d  by th e  o th e r 
d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, a n e w  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t m ay a rise , re su lt­
in g  in a ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e . H o w e v e r, w h e n  th e  c h a n g e  is m a rg in a l and  ca u se s  no 
o r little  s tra te g ic  a n d /o r s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l in c o n g ru e n c e  and  can  b e e a sily  a b so rb e d  
by o th e r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, a n e w  v a rie ty  o f th e  e x ist in g  p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n t m a y  a rise . In th is  ca se  w e  sp e a k  o f a c o n se rv a tiv e  p o lic y  ch a n g e.
B o o n stra  (2 0 0 4 ) a rg u e s th a t, fo r  th e  e m e rg e n c e  o f  a n e w  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t, 
s tra te g ic  and  s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l c o n g ru e n c e  is n e e d e d . T h is  m e a n s th a t a b ig  ch a n g e  
in o n e o f th e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n ts  is n o t e n o u g h  to  p ro d u c e  a 
ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e . B ig  ch a n g e s in th e  o th e r th re e  d im e n sio n s w o u ld  b e n e e d e d  
to o , in o rd e r to  re -e sta b lish  th e  s tra te g ic  and  s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l co n g ru e n ce . W ie rin g  
and  C ra b b e  (20 0 6 ) su b sc rib e  to  th is  and  a rg u e  th a t a ra d ica l p o lic y  c h a n g e  re q u ire s 
n o t o n ly  a b ig  c h a n g e  in th e  ‘d is c o u rs e ’ d im e n sio n , b u t a lso  in all o th e r d im e n sio n s 
(e .g . n e w  ru les, n e w  co a lit io n s, and  n e w  re s o u rc e s /p o w e r b a la n ce ).
H o w e v e r, B o o n stra  (2 0 0 4 ) a rg u e s th a t fo r  a p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t to  in stitu tio n a lise , 
s tra te g ic  and  s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l c o n g ru e n c e  a re  n o t e n o u g h  and stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l 
c o n g ru e n c e  is n e e d e d , as w ell. S h e  a rg u e s th a t a h ig h  d e g re e  o f h a rm o n y  w ith  the 
w id e r e x te rn a l in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t e n a b le s  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n ts  to  su rv iv e  
(B o o n stra , 20 0 6 , p .19 8 ). T h is  a d d it io n  is re le v a n t b e ca u se , in o rd e r to  un d e rsta n d  
th e  sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o licy  fie ld  (w h ich  is th e  fo ca l p o in t o f th is  stu d y), it is im p o rta n t 
to  p a y  a tte n tio n  to th e  in te rd e p e n d e n ce  b e tw e e n  th e  d iffe re n t g o v e rn m e n t leve ls 
and  sp a tia l sca le s. T h e  a ctio n  sp a ce  o f lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  is d e te rm in e d  by th e  w id e r 
n a tio n a l in stitu tio n a l co n te x t. W h e th e r  a p o lic y  c h a n g e  at lo cal g o v e rn m e n t level 
o ccu rs  is p a rt ly  d e p e n d e n t on n a tio n a l p o licy . G o v e rn m e n t le v e ls  are  stro n g ly  in te r­
re la te d  and , th e re fo re , th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t leve l sh o u ld  b e in c o rp o ra te d  in th e  
a n a lys is . A s  e x p la in e d  e a rlie r, I used  th e  id e a  o f s tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l c o n g ru e n c e  as a
34 THE PAA EMPHASISES THE IMPORTANCE OF CONGRUENCE. HOWEVER, BOONSTRA ADDS 
TO THE POLICY ARRANGEMENT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
CONGRUENCE: STRATEGIC, STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL AND STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL.
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p a rtia l s u b stitu te  fo r  ‘p o litica l m o d e rn is a tio n ’, w h ich  is used  b y  th e  fo u n d in g  fa th e rs 
o f th e  PAA.
3.5.3 FEATURES OF THE POLICY OBJECT
A  th ird  a d d it io n  to th e  PA A  is th e  fe a tu re s  o f th e  p o licy  o b je ct. T h e  PA A  h a s been 
critic ise d  fo r  ig n o rin g  th e  p o ss ib le  in flu e n ce  o f th e  p o lic y  o b je ct itse lf. A rts  and  Leroy 
(2 0 0 3 ) n o tice  th a t M ol critic ise s  th e  PA A  a p p ro a ch  fo r  n o t b e in g  e x p lic it ly  sp e cific  
e n o u g h  fo r u n d e rsta n d in g  e n v iro n m e n ta l p o licy . M ol ca lls  it an ‘e n v iro n m e n ta lly  
p o o r th e o ry ’. A c c o rd in g  to  h im , it is u n cle a r w h a t e n v iro n m e n t is, w h ic h  ro le  it p lays 
in th e  co n ce p tu a l m o d e l, and  to  w h ich  sta rt in g  p o in ts  (o r a ssu m p tio n s)  th is  w ill lead 
in th e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t A p p ro a ch . He a sk s w h e th e r th e  sp e c ific  c h a ra c te ristic s  of 
th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l issu e s  re q u ire  sp e cia l p o lic y  th e o rie s. In o th e r w o rd s, h e  q u e s ­
t io n s  w h e th e r e n v iro n m e n ta l issu e s are  s im ila r  to  o th e r p o lic y  issu e s, o r h a v e  sp ecific  
fe a tu re s  w h ic h  re q u ire  sp e c ific  p o lic y  th e o rie s  (A rts  and  Leroy, 20 0 3, p .9 2 -9 3 ). S im ila r 
q u e stio n s  co u ld  b e asked  in re la tio n  to sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o lic y  (th e  fo cu s o f this 
s tu d y ) b e c a u se  th e  o b je cts  o f th is  p o lic y  (su ch  as h o u s in g  su p p ly  and  /o r  su p p ly  of 
b u s in e ss  lo c a t io n s)  a lso  h a v e  sp e c ific  c h a ra c te ristic s . T h e  b u ilt e n v iro n m e n t h a s the  
c h a ra c te rist ic s  o f a s to c k  th a t is im m o b ile  and  c a n n o t b e ch a n g e d  re a d ily .
T h o se  sp ecia l fe a tu re s  o f th e  p o lic y  fie ld  and  p o lic y  o b je ct a re  n e g le cte d  n o t o n ly  by 
th e  PAA, b u t a lso  b y  o th e r p o lic y  (ch a n g e ) th e o rie s. T h e  A C F  th e o ry , fo r e x am p le, 
a lso  h a s b e e n  critic ize d  on th is  p o in t. H o w e v e r, S a b a tie r  and  Je n k in s -S m ith  (19 9 9 ) 
a rg u e  th a t th e  A C F  th e o ry  is u n ive rsa l and  a p p lic a b le  to  all p o licy  fie ld s. T h e y  state  
th e ir  a rg u m e n t b y  re fe rrin g  to th e  w id e  v a rie ty  o f p o licy  d o m a in s  th e ir  fra m e w o rk  
h a s b e e n  a p p lie d  to.
T h is  stu d y  fo cu se s  on sp a ce . S p a ce  as th e  o b je ct o f p o licy  and  p la n n in g , and  as one 
o f th e  c o n d it io n s  fo r  p o licy  c h a n g e  o r sta b ility . T h e  lo cal sp a tia l c o n d itio n s  h a v e  been 
a d d e d  fo r  tw o  re a so n s. First, b e ca u se  it can b e a ssu m e d  th a t th o se  fe a tu re s  are  im ­
p o rta n t fo r u n d e rsta n d in g  p o licy  d yn a m ics. S e co n d , b e ca u se  it is a ssu m e d  th a t th e y  
a re  re le v a n t fo r  e x p la in in g  th e  c o n d it io n s  re q u ire d  fo r  c o n se rv a tiv e  and  ra d ica l p o licy  
c h a n g e . T h e  fe a tu re s  o f th e  p o licy  o b je ct can in flu e n ce  th e  e x te n t o f th e  c h a n g e  in 
d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t and, th e re fo re , w h e th e r a c o n se rv a tiv e  or ra d i­
cal p o lic y  c h a n g e  is lik e ly  to  ta k e  p lace. C h a n g e s  in th e  b u ilt  e n v iro n m e n t (p h ysical 
re a lity) m ay, fo r e x a m p le , ca u se  n e w  d isc o u rse s  and  a lte r th e  p a tte rn  o f in te ra ctio n s.
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3.5.4 FEATURES OF THE EXTERNAL FORCE OF 
CHANGE
T h e  fo u rth  a d d itio n  to  th e  PA A  is th e  fe a tu re s  o f th e  e x te rn a l (e x o g e n o u s) fo rce  
o f ch a n g e . In th is  stu d y, th is  re fe rs  to  fe a tu re s  o f th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le  (d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e ) such as its s ize  and  d u ra tio n . It can b e a ssu m e d  th a t th e se  fe a tu re s  
w ill affect th e  e x te n t o f c h a n g e  in th e  d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, w h ich  
w ill affect w h e th e r it w ill lead to in c o n g ru e n c e  o r not, w h ic h  d e te rm in e s w h e th e r a 
c o n se rv a tiv e  o r ra d ica l p o lic y  c h a n g e  is lik e ly  to  ta k e  p lace.
T h o se  th a t h a v e  used  th e  P A A  to  u n d e rsta n d  p o lic y  d yn a m ics, a ck n o w le d g e  th at 
p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n ts  do n o t o p e ra te  w ith in  a v a cu u m . L ie ffe rin k  (20 0 6 , p .49 ), fo r 
e x a m p le , a rg u e s th a t ch a n g e s in th e  b ro a d e r so cia l, cu ltu ra l, p o litica l and  e co n o m ic  
co n te x t, or in fa c t th e  p h ys ica l e n v iro n m e n t, h a v e  an im p a ct on, fo r in sta n ce , p o w e r 
re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  a cto rs  in v o lv e d  in sp e c ific  p o lic y  p ro ce sse s. H o w e v e r, h e  d o e s not 
d isc u ss  th o se  e x te rn a l fo rce s  o f c h a n g e  in h is w o rk.
FIGURE 3.3 CONCEPTUAL MODEL
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W ie rin g  and  C ra b b e  (20 0 6 ), h o w e v e r, do p a y  e x p lic it  a tte n tio n  to th is. T h e y  m a k e  a 
d istin ctio n  b e tw e e n  e x o g e n o u s  fo rc e s  o f c h a n g e  and  sh o c k  e v e n ts35. E x a m p le s  o f 
e x o g e n o u s  fo rc e s  o f c h a n g e  are so cie ta l ch a n g e s (e .g . e m a n c ip a tio n  and  in d iv id u ­
a lisa t io n ) and  ch a n g e s w ith in  o th e r p o licy  d o m a in s. E x a m p le s  o f sh o c k  e v e n ts  are 
p o litica l e v e n ts  and  d isa ste rs  (e .g . flo o d in g , e a rth q u a k e s, fin a n cia l and  e co n o m ic  
crise s). T h e  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  th e m  is th a t sh o c k  e v e n ts  o c cu r su d d e n ly , w h e re a s 
so cie ta l ch a n g e s h a p p e n  m o re  g ra d u a lly . H o w e v e r, n o n e  o f th o se  re se a rc h e rs  pay 
a tte n tio n  to th e  fe a tu re s  (e.g. sp e e d , e x te n t o r d u ra t io n ) o f  th e se  fo rc e s  o f ch a n g e  
and  th e  ch a n g e s in th e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t th e y  cau se.
3.6 CONCEPTUAL MODEL APPLIED TO 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
T h e  p re v io u s se ctio n  fo rm u la te d  a co n ce p tu a l m o d e l w h ich  can b e used  to e x p la in  
p o lic y  d y n a m ics, in g e n e ra l (se e  F ig u re  3 .3 .). In o rd e r to  a p p ly  th e  m o d e l to  ex p la in  
p o lic y  ch a n g e s th a t ta k e  p la ce  as a re su lt  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, th e  a v a ila b le  lite ra ­
tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  p o lic ie s  and  a b o u t u rb an  d e clin e  and  p o lic ie s  is 
used.
3.6.1 CHANGE IN A DIMENSION OF THE POLICY 
ARRANGEMENT
T h e  a n a ly sis  o f th is  stu d y  (se e  S e ctio n s  5 .4  and  6 .4 ) b e g in s  at th e  d isc o u rse  d im e n ­
sion . T h is  is b e ca u se  th e  ce n tra l re se a rch  q u e stio n  c o n c e rn s  th e  c o n te n t o f th e  local 
p o lic y  re a ctio n s. T h is  stu d y  u se s a n a rro w  d e fin it io n  o f d isc o u rse  to  k e e p  a c lear 
d istin ctio n  b e tw e e n  th e  d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le  (c o n te n t o f th e  p o licy  re a c tio n ) and  the 
v a ria b le s  (so -ca lle d  ‘in te rv e n in g  v a ria b le s ’, w h ich  can e x p la in  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e ­
tw e e n  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le  (d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e ) and  th e  d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le ), 
o f w h ic h  th e  c h a n g e  in th e  (d isc o u rse ) d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is o n e 36. 
D isco u rse  is d e fin e d  as th e  w a y  a cto rs  p e rce iv e  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  p ro b le m  and  the
35 WIERING AND CRABBE (2006) ALSO DISTINGUISH ENDOGENOUS FORCES OF CHANGE. AN 
EXAMPLE OF AN ENDOGENOUS FORCE OF CHANGE IS THE (PERCEPTION OF THE) POOR 
FUNCTIONING OF THE POLICY DOMAIN. THIS IS THE CASE WHEN A POLICY ARRANGEMENT 
EVOLVES IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT CAN NO LONGER DEAL SUFFICIENTLY WITH THE PROBLEMS 
IT FACES, AND THUS BECOMES INEFFICIENT OR NON-TRANSPARENT (WIERING AND CRABBE,
2006, P.94).
36 OTHER INTERVENING VARIABLES OF THIS STUDY ARE: STRATEGIC, STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL 
AND STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL CONGRUENCE, LOCAL SPATIAL CONDITIONS, AND ASPECTS OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. THOSE INTERVENING VARIABLES ARE DISCUSSED IN SECTIONS 3 .6.2 
TO 3 .6 .4 .
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p o ss ib le  so lu tio n s; th e  w a y  th e  a cto rs re sp o n d  to th a t p e rce p tio n  is n o t in co rp o ra te d  
in th e  d e fin it io n  o f d isco u rse . D isco u rse , w h e n  d e fin e d  in th is  w a y, h a s a stro n g  co n ­
n e ctio n  w ith  th e  ‘a cto r and  c o a lit io n ’ d im e n sio n . A lth o u g h  in th is  c o n c e p tu a l fra m e ­
w o rk , ch a n g e s in ‘d is c o u rs e ’ and  ‘a cto rs  and  c o a lit io n s ’ are  e x p la in e d  se p a ra te ly , in 
th e  e m p irica l ch a p te rs  (5 and  6) th e y  w ill b e d iscu sse d  in co n n e c tio n  w ith  e a ch  o ther.
G lo c k  (20 0 6 ) c o n c lu d e s  th a t w h e th e r m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c h a n g e  th e  c o n te n t o f  th e ir  local 
p o lic y  is d e p e n d e n t on th e  w a y  th e y  p e rce iv e  th e  p ro b le m . If th e y  se e  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  as a sh o rt-te rm  d e v e lo p m e n t, th e y  w ill n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o licy . H o w e v e r, if 
th e y  p e rce iv e  it as a lo n g -te rm  d e v e lo p m e n t, th e re  is m o re  p re ssu re  to  c h a n g e  the 
p o lic y  co n te n t. G lo c k ’s h y p o th e s is  (20 0 6 ) is th a t stru ctu ra l d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w ill 
lead  to  a p o lic y  ch a n g e , and a te m p o ra ry  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w ill not.
T h is  d ist in ctio n  is n o t su ffic ie n t to  e x p la in  th e  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  p o licy  stab ility , 
c o n se rv a tiv e  p o licy  c h a n g e  and  ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e . T h e re fo re , in th is  stu d y, th re e  
ty p e s o f p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n s  a re  d ist in g u ish e d :
- D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is no p ro b le m ,
- D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a te m p o ra ry  p ro b le m , and
- D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m .
T h e re  is p o lic y  sta b ility  if  a m a jo rity  o f  th e  a cto rs  p e rce iv e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  to  be 
no p ro b le m . For a c o n se rv a tiv e  local p o licy  ch a n g e , a m a rg in a l c h a n g e  in p ro b lem  
p e rce p tio n  is n e e d e d . T h e  p e rce p tio n  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is no p ro b le m  is 
re p lace d  b y  th e  p e rce p tio n  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a te m p o ra ry  p ro b le m . For 
a ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e , a ra d ica l c h a n g e  in p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n  is n e e d e d . M ore 
sp e c ifica lly , a m a jo rity  o f a cto rs  n e e d s to  a cce p t th e  id e a  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
is a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m . T h is  can  b e d e scrib e d  as a sh ift in d isco u rse . T h e  la st does 
n o t o c cu r e a sily  o r ra p id ly, and  o fte n  is th e  re su lt  o f a g ra d u a l a cc u m u la tio n  o f m a n y  
in cre m e n ta l ch a n g e s.
T h e  fa ct th a t, so  far, n o t m a n y  s h rin k in g  c it ie s  h a v e  ch a n g e d  th e ir  p o lic ie s  ra d i­
ca lly  illu stra te s  th a t it is d ifficu lt to  rea ch  su ch  a sh ift in d isco u rse . T h is  is a rg u e d  by 
th o se  w h o  h a v e  a n a lyse d  p o lic y  c h a n g e  in g e n e ra l (e .g . S a b a tie r, 19 9 8 37), as w ell 
as th o se  w h o  a n a lyse d  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  (lo ca l)  p o lic y  (e.g. W ie ch m a n n ,
37 SABATIER (1998), FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUES THAT THE DEEP CORE BELIEFS AND POLICY CORE 
BELIEFS (COMPARABLE TO WHAT IN THIS STUDY IS CALLED PARADIGM) ARE VERY RESISTANT 
TO CHANGE. THEY ARE MORE RESISTANT TO CHANGE THAN SECONDARY ASPECTS (WHICH IS 
COMPARABLE TO WHAT IN THIS STUDY IS CALLED PROBLEM PERCEPTION).
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20 0 3, 20 0 8 38). T h o se  w h o  h a ve  a n a ly se d  th e  D u tch s itu a tio n  (e.g. D erks et al., 20 06; 
K o rste n  and  G o e d v o lk , 20 0 8 ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 7; V e rw e st, 20 09a; 
H in sse n  and  D erks, 2 0 0 8 ) a lso  a rg u e  th a t th e  d isco u rse  on d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  is 
d o m in a n t a m o n g  local and  n a tio n a l p o lic y m a k e rs. D e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  is p erce ive d  
as th e  d e sira b le  s itu a tio n  to  striv e  for, and  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  d o e s n o t fit th is 
d isco u rse .
D e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m a y  ca u se  a c h a n g e  in th e  d isc o u rse  d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o licy  
a rra n g e m e n t. S e ctio n  3 .6 .4  d e sc rib e s  th is  in m o re  d eta il and  a lso  d e scrib e s  w h en  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  w ill re su lt  in c o n se rv a tiv e  p o lic y  c h a n g e  and  w h e n  it w ill result 
in ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e.
3.6.2 STRATEGIC, STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL, 
AND STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL (IN) 
CONGRUENCE
T h e  m o st c o m m o n  re a ctio n  o f s h rin k in g  c it ie s  is e ith e r to  do n o th in g  (p o licy  sta b ility ) 
or to  h a v e  a c o n se rv a tiv e  c h a n g e  o f p o licy . T h e  d e g re e  o f co n g ru e n c e  or in c o n g ru ­
e n ce  can h e lp  to  e x p la in  th is. In th e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, th e  term  
in c o n g ru e n c e  is n o t u sed , h o w e v e r w h a t is m e a n t b y  th is  is o fte n  re fe rre d  to in o th e r 
te rm s.
STRATEGIC AND STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL CONGRUENCE
O n th o se  ra re  o c ca s io n s  w h e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  re su lts  in a ra d ica l c h a n g e  in 
p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n  (d isco u rse ), it m a y  n o t b e e n o u g h  fo r  ra d ica l p o lic y  ch an g e. 
C h a n g e s  in th e  o th e r th re e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t a lso  w ill b e  n e e d ­
ed, in o rd e r to  re a ch  th e  n e c e ssa ry  s tra te g ic  and  s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l co n g ru e n ce .
T h e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  p u ts fo rw a rd  d iffe re n t fa c to rs  fo r e x p la in ­
in g  w h y  (ra d ic a l)  p o lic y  c h a n g e  ra re ly  o ccu r. T h e se  fa c to rs  re fe r to  th e  fo u r d ist in ­
g u ish e d  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t (d isco u rse s, a cto rs  and  co alitio n s, 
re so u rce s, and  ru le s). T h e  p re v io u s  se ctio n  a lre a d y  sh o w e d  th a t th e  e x ist in g  (tra d i­
t io n a l)  d isc o u rse  is a re a so n  w h y  (ra d ic a l)  lo cal p o licy  c h a n g e  d o e s n o t o ccu r. Below , 
th e  la st th re e  d im e n s io n s  a re  d e scrib e d .
38 WIECHMANN (2008) ARGUED THAT IT TOOK A LONG TIME BEFORE DRESDEN CHANGED ITS 
PARADIGM AND POLICY DRAMATICALLY (RADICALLY). DESPITE THE FACT THAT DRESDEN 
LOST 60,000 INHABITANTS WITHIN A DECADE, FOR A LONG TIME THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
CONTINUED TO FOLLOW A GROWTH-ORIENTED POLICY (WIECHMANN, 2008).
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T h e  f irst fa c to r th a t e x p la in s  w h y  (ra d ic a l)  p o licy  c h a n g e  d o e s n o t o ccu r is th a t of 
a cto rs  and  co a lit io n s. For e x a m p le , th e  cu rre n t p a tte rn  o f in te ra c tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  
a cto rs  and  th e  sta b le  ( ‘su p p o rt in g ’) c o a lit io n s  m ay  re stra in  th is. T h e  sta b le  co a lit io n s  
th a t su p p o rt th e  tra d it io n a l p o lic y  d isco u rse , can  p re v e n t p o licy  ch a n g e . G lo c k  (20 0 6 ) 
c o n c lu d e d  th a t th e  sta b le  co a lit io n  w a s th e  re a so n  w h y  th e  sh rin k in g  c ity  o f D u isb u rg  
d id  n o t (ra d ic a lly ) c h a n g e  its p o licy .
V a n  D am  et al. (2 0 0 6 ) g iv e  a n o th e r re a so n  w h y  (ra d ic a l)  lo cal p o lic y  c h a n g e  d oes 
n o t o ccu r, n a m e ly  th a t lo cal p o lit ic ia n s  d e riv e  th e ir  sta tu s  fro m  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  
s itu a tio n  w ith in  th e ir  m u n ic ip a lit ie s . If th e re  is a d ro p  in p o p u la tio n  a n d /o r h o u se h o ld  
n u m b e rs, local p o lit ic ia n s  o fte n  p e rce iv e  th is  as d a m a g in g  to th e ir  statu s. D e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  h a s a n e g a tiv e  co n n o ta tio n , and  local p o lit ic ia n s  p e rce iv e  it as a 
th re a t. T h is  sta tu s issu e  e x p la in s  th e  cu rre n t p a tte rn  o f in te ra c tio n  and  e x p la in s  w h y 
it is d ifficu lt fo r  lo cal p o lit ic ia n s  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  p a tte rn  o f in te ra c tio n  fro m  p la n n in g  
fo r g ro w th  to w a rd s  p la n n in g  fo r d e clin e.
F in ally, G lo c k  (20 0 6 ) and  V e rw e st et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) c o n c lu d e  th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  do not 
c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic y  (ra d ic a lly ) b e ca u se  o f th e  co lle c tiv e  a ctio n  d ile m m a 39. T h e  m u n ic i­
p a lit ie s  m ay, fo r e x a m p le , g e t b o g g e d  d o w n  in a s itu a tio n  in w h ic h  each  m u n ic ip a lity  
c h o o se s  th e  m o st ra tio n a l p o lic y  o p tio n  (a ct io n ) fo r  m a x im is in g  its o w n n u m b e r of 
in h a b ita n ts . In a sh rin k in g  re g io n  th is  w o u ld  re su lt  in th e  le a st d e sira b le  o u tc o m e  fo r 
all m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (p riso n e rs  d ile m m a ). W h e n , in a sh rin k in g  re g io n , e a ch  m u n ic ip a lity  
trie s  to  a ttra c t  n e w  in h a b ita n ts  b y  e x te n d in g  its h o u s in g  s to c k  (b y  a p p ro v in g  p lan s 
fo r  n e w  h o u s in g  d e v e lo p m e n t)  th is  m a y  stre n g th e n  th e  in tra re g io n a l co m p e tit io n  
and  m a y w o rse n  th e  p ro b le m s th a t a cc o m p a n y  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. T h e  m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  w o u ld  b e b e tte r off if  th e y  w e re  to  c o o rd in a te  th e ir  a ctio n s. In so m e  ca se s the 
re g io n a l h o u s in g  m a rk e t is to o  sm all fo r  tw o  n e w  h o u s in g  p ro je cts, b u t la rg e  en o u g h  
fo r  o n e  n e w  h o u s in g  p ro je ct. If, in su ch  case s, m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w e re  to  c o o rd in a te  th e ir  
a ctio n s, o n e  h o u s in g  p ro je ct co u ld  b e b u ilt in th e ir  re g io n , in ste a d  o f  n o n e  b e in g  
im p le m e n te d  b e ca u se  m o re  h o u s in g  p ro je cts, se p a ra te ly , do n o t re a ch  th e  m in im al 
n u m b e r o f sa le s  to  sta rt b u ild in g . T h is  p a tte rn  o f in te ra c tio n  (w h ich  is g u id e d  by 
se lf-in te re st)  m a k e s it d ifficu lt fo r m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to  c o o p e ra te  and to c h a n g e  th e ir  
p o lic ie s  (ra d ica lly ). In a d d it io n , th e  te n d e n c y  to  ‘fre e  r id e ’ and th e  fe a r  o f fre e  rid ers
39 THE CLASSICAL COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA IS A SITUATION IN WHICH EACH PLAYER 
(RATIONAL AGENT) TRIES TO MAXIMISE HIS OR HER OWN UTILITY WITHOUT COORDINATING 
THEIR ACTIONS WITH OTHER PLAYERS. WHEN EACH PLAYER IS GUIDED BY SELF-INTEREST 
THIS DOES NOT RESULT IN THE BEST ACHIEVABLE OUTCOME FOR ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE 
PRISONERS DILEMMA IS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS. IT REPRESENTS A SITUATION IN WHICH ALL 
PLAYERS, BECAUSE OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, ARE WORSE OFF THAN 
WHEN THEY WOULD HAVE COORDINATED THEIR ACTIONS.
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a re  re a so n s w h y  ra d ica l p o lic y  c h a n g e  d o e s n o t o ccu r. M u n ic ip a lit ie s  a re  afra id  th at 
w h e n  th e y  ra d ic a lly  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  (e .g . re d u c e  th e ir  h o u s in g  p ro g ra m m e ) 
o th e r m u n ic ip a lit ie s  th a t do n o t in te n d  to ra d ic a lly  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  w ill b e n e fit 
fro m  th e ir  e fforts (e .g . a ttra ct in h a b ita n ts) (se e  a lso  S e ctio n  3.2). T h is  fe a r e x p la in s  
w h y  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  re ta in  th e  cu rre n t p a tte rn s  o f in te ra c tio n  (w h ich  is g u id e d  b y  se lf­
in te re st).
T h e  a b o v e  m e n tio n e d  lite ra tu re  c o n c lu d e s th a t th e  re a so n  w h y  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  ra re ly  
ch a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  ra d ic a lly  is th a t th e re  are  no n e w  a cto rs /c o a lit io n s  o r n e w  p a t­
te rn s  o f  in te ra ctio n . A s  m e n tio n e d  b e fo re , th e  ‘d is c o u rs e ’ d im e n sio n  and  ‘a cto r and 
c o a lit io n ’ d im e n sio n  a re  c lo se ly  re la te d . T h is  m e a n s th a t in o rd e r to  re a ch  a rad ical 
p o lic y  ch a n g e , b o th  d im e n sio n s o f  th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t n eed  to  ch a n g e . T h e  lit­
e ra tu re  sh o w s th a t it is ra re  fo r  n e w  a cto rs  to  e m e rg e , and  fo r a c h a lle n g in g  co alitio n  
a n d /o r ch a n g e s in th e  p a tte rn  o f in te ra c tio n  to  a rise . A s  a re su lt, if  th e  id e a  ta k e s  ro o t 
th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m , it d o e s n o t m atch  cu rre n t p a tte rn s  
o f in te ra c tio n  (s tra te g ic  in c o n g ru e n c e ), m a k in g  it d ifficu lt to  b e a cce p te d  b y  a m a jo r­
ity  o f a cto rs.
T h e  se co n d  fa c to r th a t e x p la in s  w h y  (ra d ic a l)  p o licy  c h a n g e  d o e s n o t o ccu r, a re  the 
e x ist in g  (fo rm al and  in fo rm a l) ru le s. T h e  m u tu a lly  a g re e d  fo rm a l p ro c e d u re s  and  the 
in fo rm a l ro u tin e s  o f in te ra c tio n  th a t are  fo cu se d  on g ro w th  m e an  th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  
w o u ld  ra th e r sta b ilise  th e ir  p o licy  th a n  (ra d ic a lly ) c h a n g e  it. V e rw e st et al. (20 0 8 b ) 
a rg u e  th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  do n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic y  (ra d ic a lly ) b e c a u se  o f a lre a d y  
issu e d  b u ild in g  p e rm its  and th e  fe a r o f f in a n cia l c la im s fro m  d e v e lo p e rs, su b m itte d  
in re a ctio n  to ch a n g e s in th e  local p lan s. A t  a re g io n a l leve l, th e  a b se n c e  o f ju rid ica l 
in stru m e n ts  th a t fo rce  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to  a ct in a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  re g io n a l a g re e m e n ts  
m a k e s it d ifficu lt to  re a ch  ra d ica l p o licy  c h a n g e s. Even th e  sta tu s  o f W g r-p lu s  reg io n  
d o e s n o t g iv e  th e  in vo lve d  a cto rs  th e  in stru m e n ts  to  ra d ic a lly  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ies.
T h e  th ird  re a so n  w h y  p o licy  c h a n g e  d o e s n o t o ccu r is th e  cu rre n t re so u rc e s  and 
p o w e r b a la n ce  (re so u rc e  co n ste lla tio n  and  p o w e r re la tio n s). R e le v a n t stu d ie s  
m a in ly  fo cu s  on th e  im p o rta n c e  o f fin a n cia l re so u rce s. T h e  m o st im p o rta n t so u rce  
o f in c o m e  fo r D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s  is th e  fin a n cia l c o n trib u tio n  th e y  re ce iv e  fro m  the 
n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t (fo r m o re  in fo rm a tio n , se e  th e  n e x t se ctio n  a b o u t stru ctu ra l- 
e x te rn a l co n g ru e n c e ). In a d d it io n , m u n ic ip a lit ie s  a lso  re ce iv e  in c o m e  th ro u g h  local 
ta x e s  (e .g . p ro p e rty  ta x )40 and  tra d in g  in land . T h o se  in c o m e s  m ig h t d e cre a se  as a
40 THE REVENUES FROM LOCAL TAXES ARE RELATIVELY LOW COMPARED TO IN OTHER
COUNTRIES. MOST OF THE INCOME OF MUNICIPALITIES COMES FROM THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
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re su lt  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; A lle rs  and 
Z e ilstra , 20 0 9 a , b, c).
R e se a rch e rs  in o th e r co u n trie s  (e .g . G lo c k  and  H a u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 ; Ju n k e rn h e in ric h  
and  M ico sa tt, 20 0 5; G lo ck, 2 0 0 6 ) a lso  p o in t o u t th a t (f in a n c ia l)  re so u rc e s  fo cu s  on 
d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  and  th a t th is  can e x p la in  w h y  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  do n o t c h a n g e  
th e ir  p o lic y  (ra d ica lly ). J u n k e rn h e in ric h  and  M ico sa tt (20 0 5 , p .13 -14 ) e m p h a s ise  th at 
in G e rm a n y , sh rin k a g e  p u ts p re ssu re  on local fin a n ce s; m u n ic ip a lit ie s ’ in co m e s 
re d u ce , w h ile  e x p e n se s  d e cre a se  o n ly  in ce rta in  p o lic y  fie ld s41. G lo c k  (20 0 6 , p .20 5 ) 
a lso  stre sse s  th a t s h rin k in g  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  are  lik e ly  to  end up in a p re ca rio u s  fin an cia l 
s itu a tio n . S h e  p o in ts  o u t th a t th e  fisca l c a p a c ity  o f e a st G e rm a n  citie s  h a s w e a k e n e d  
b y  th e  v a ca n t h o u s in g  p ro b le m  cau se d  b y  a d e clin e  in h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs. The 
re a so n  is th a t a la rg e  p a rt o f  th e  to ta l h o u s in g  s to c k  is o w n e d  b y  c o m m u n a l h o u sin g  
c o m p a n ie s  (G lo c k  and  H a u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 , p .924).
K n o w le d g e  and  p o litica l le g it im a c y  a lso  are  im p o rta n t re so u rc e s  th a t in flu e n ce  local 
p o lic y  ch a n g e . T h e  im p o rta n c e  o f k n o w le d g e  is e m p h a siz e d  in th e  lite ra tu re  on p o licy  
c h a n g e 42. H o w ever, th e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal p o lic ie s  d oes 
n o t p a y  m u ch  a tte n tio n  to  th e m . O n ly  G lo c k  (20 0 6 ) and  W ie ch m a n n  (20 0 8 ) m e n tio n  
th e m , b u t o n ly  in p a ss in g . W ie ch m a n n  (20 0 8 ), fo r e x a m p le , a rg u e d  th at, fo r a lo ng 
tim e , D re sd e n  did n o t c h a n g e  its p o licy  ra d ica lly , b e c a u se  th e  p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  
w e re  to o  o p tim istic . T h e  actu al p o p u la tio n  tre n d  w a s w o rse  th a n  th e  fo re c a sts  p re ­
d ic te d 43. T h e  d ifficu lty  in p re d ict in g  fu tu re  p o p u la tio n  d e v e lo p m e n ts  and  th e  g re a t
41 THIS ARGUMENT IS ALSO EMPHASISED BY THOSE WHO ANALYSED URBAN DECLINE AND 
URBAN POLICIES. FRIEDRICHS (1993), FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUES THAT IN THE UNITED STATES,
IN SHRINKING MUNICIPALITIES, TAX REVENUES DECREASE AND MUNICIPALITIES HAVE LESS 
CAPITAL AVAILABLE FOR INVESTMENTS.
42 SABATIER AND JENKINS-SMITH (1999, P.125) ARGUE THAT VERY SOLID EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS 
NEEDED TO REACH A CHANGE IN DEEP CORE BELIEFS AND POLICY CORE BELIEFS. SECOND­
ARY ASPECTS (PROBLEM PERCEPTION) ARE ASSUMED TO BE MORE READILY ADJUSTED IN 
LIGHT OF NEW DATA, EXPERIENCE, OR CHANGING STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS (SABATIER,
1998, P.104). THEY ARGUE THAT THIS EVIDENCE IS MOST LIKELY TO BE DEVELOPED AND 
ACCEPTED IN THOSE FIELDS WHERE ACCEPTED QUANTITATIVE DATA AND CONSENSUAL 
THEORIES ARE AVAILABLE, WHEN A PRESTIGIOUS PROFESSIONAL FORUM EXISTS THAT 
REQUIRES THE PARTICIPATION OF EXPERTS FROM VARIOUS COALITIONS, AND IN SITUA­
TIONS INVOLVING AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF CONFLICT (SABATIER AND JENKINS-SMITH,
1999, P.125). IT IS SUPPOSED TO PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN CHANGING PROBLEM PERCEPTIONS 
(DISCOURSE) AND THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS (ACTORS AND THEIR COALITIONS).
43 THE REASONS FOR THIS DISCREPANCY WERE THE TIME LAG AND THE NORMATIVE BIAS 
TOWARDS OPTIMISM AMONG THE CITY'S PLANNERS (WIECHMANN, 2008).
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u n ce rta in ty  a b o u t fu tu re  d e v e lo p m e n ts  b o th  m a y  b e an e x p la n a tio n  fo r  th e  fa c t th at 
m o st m u n ic ip a lit ie s  did n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  (ra d ic a lly )44.
N e v e rth e le ss, th e  lite ra tu re  o fte n  d o e s m e n tio n  th a t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  do n o t ch a n g e  
th e ir  p o lic ie s, b e c a u se  n e w  id e a s fo r tra n s fo rm in g  p la n n in g  fo r  g ro w th  in to  p la n n in g  
fo r d e c lin e  do n o t m atch  th e  e x ist in g  fin a n cia l re so u rc e s  (th is  can b e called  
s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l in co n g ru e n ce ).
STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL CONGRUENCE
In th e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  and  (lo ca l)  p o lic y  it is said  th a t th e  cu r­
re n t n a tio n a l in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t is an im p o rta n t re a so n  w h y  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  do 
n o t ra d ic a lly  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  (e.g. D erks et al., 20 0 6 a; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et 
al., 20 0 8 b ; G o e d v o lk  and  K o rsten , 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 20 0 9 ; Latten , 20 0 9 ).
T h e  f irst fa c to r th a t e x p la in s  w h y  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  do n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o licy  (ra d i­
ca lly )  is th e  d isc o u rse  on d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th  w ith in  th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t. The 
n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t d o e s n o t p e rce iv e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  as a stru ctu ra l 
(irre v e rs ib le )  p ro b le m  (d isc o u rse ) and  d o e s n o t p ay a tte n tio n  to it in its p o lic ie s. 
D erks et al. (2 0 0 6 a ) c o n c lu d e  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, to  m a n y  n a tio n a l p o lic y ­
m ak e rs, is a ‘b lin d  s p o t’: th e y  are  n o t a w a re  o f th e  fa c t th a t it is a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m . 
W ith  th e ir  re p o rt on stru ctu ra l p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  (Structurele bevolkingsdaling. Een 
urgente nieuwe invalshoek voor beleidsmakers) th e y  a im e d  to  in c re a se  a w a re n ess 
a m o n g  n a tio n a l p o lic y m a k e rs  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m  th at 
a sk s  fo r a n e w  p o licy  p e rsp e ctiv e . R e ce n tly , th e  a tte n tio n  fo r d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  at 
n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t h a s sta rte d  to g ro w  (see  C h a p te r 1). C h a p te rs  5 and  6 d iscu ss 
th is  in m o re  d eta il (se e  Box 5.1 and  Box 6.1).
T h is  w a s th e  s itu a tio n  in o th e r co u n trie s  a lso . W ie c h m a n n  (20 0 8 , p .20 ), w h o  in v e s ­
tig a te d  th e  lo cal p o licy  re sp o n se  o f D re sd e n  to w a rd s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, a rg u es 
th a t, fo r  y e a rs , sh rin k a g e  w a s a p o litica l ta b o o  in G e rm a n y. W ith in  th e  a d m in istra tiv e  
syste m , tra d it io n a lly  o rie n te d  to w a rd s  g ro w th  o b je ctiv e s, sh rin k a g e  w a s co n sid e re d  
to  b e in tra cta b le  (W ie ch m a n n , 20 0 8 , p.20 ).
44 WIECHMANN (2008) ARGUES THAT STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY BECOMES IMPORTANT BECAUSE
THE FUTURE REMAINS UNPREDICTABLE (WIECHMANN, 2008, P.19). HE ARGUES THAT LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PLAN TO STAY FLEXIBLE AND MAKE THEIR CITIES ADAPTIVE TO 
CHANGE (WIECHMANN, 2008, P.29).
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T h e  se co n d  fa c to r  th a t m a k e s it d ifficu lt fo r  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o li­
c ie s (ra d ic a lly ) is th e  p a tte rn  o f in te ra c tio n  b y  th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t. V e rw e st et 
al. (2 0 0 8 b ) a rg u e  th a t if  th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t o b lig e s  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  to  m eet 
th e  o b je c tiv e s  ag re e d  on (in  a p e rio d  w h e n  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  c o n te x t w a s d iffe re n t) 
it w ill b e  d ifficu lt fo r  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  (ra d ica lly).
T h e  th ird  fa c to r th a t p re v e n ts  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  fro m  c h a n g in g  th e ir  p o lic ie s  ra d i­
cally , is th a t  o f n a tio n a l re so u rc e s  (fin a n ce s, k n o w le d g e , p o litica l le g it im a c y ) (this 
is s tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l in c o n g ru e n c e ). V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ), th e  C o u n cil fo r  P ub lic 
A d m in is tra t io n  and  th e  F in a n cia l R e la tio n s C o u n cil (R o b /R fv , 20 0 8 ), V e rw e st et al. 
(20 0 8 b ), V e rw e st et al. (20 0 9 a ), H in ssen  and  D erks (20 0 8 ), and  K lin ke rs et al. (20 0 9 ) 
all n o tice  th a t th e  cu rre n t n a tio n a l a llo ca tio n  syste m  fo r  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (called  
Gemeentefonds45), and  th e  sp e c ific  fin a n cia l in stru m e n ts  (e.g. IS V  and  BLS) in th e  field 
o f h o u sin g , are  d e sig n e d  to a cc o m m o d a te  g ro w th . T h e se  e x ist in g  fin a n cia l re so u rce s 
st im u la te  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to  g ro w  (p o lic y  s ta b ility ) ra th e r th a n  to  a d a p t to  d e clin e  
(ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e ). A a rts  et al. (20 0 8 ), H u iszo o n  (2 0 0 8 ) and  K lin ke rs et al. (20 0 9 ) 
a rg u e  th a t a lso  in o th e r p o lic y  fie ld s  (e.g. e d u c a tio n ) th e re  a re  sp e c ific  (fin a n cia l) 
re so u rc e s  th a t fo cu s  on g ro w th 46.
45 THE INCOMES OF DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES ARE PRIMARILY BASED ON THE FUNDS THEY 
RECEIVE FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (CALLED GEMEENTEFONDS). THE NATIONAL 
SUBSIDY RECEIVED BY EACH DUTCH MUNICIPALITY IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE. 
WHEN THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS WITHIN A MUNICIPALITY INCREASES, SO DOES MONEY 
IT RECEIVES FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN CONTRAST, WHEN A MUNICIPALITY 
DECREASES IN POPULATION IT RECEIVES LESS MONEY. IN THIS WAY, THIS SUBSIDY STIMU­
LATES MUNICIPALITIES TO STRIVE FOR POPULATION GROWTH.
DESPITE THIS OBSERVATION, THE COUNCIL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE FINANCIAL 
RELATIONS COUNCIL ARGUE THAT THE INDICATORS FOR DISTRIBUTING THIS GEMEENTE­
FONDS DO NOT NEED TO BE ADAPTED. AFTER ALL, WHEN MUNICIPALITIES LOSE INHABITANTS, 
COSTS WILL DECREASE ACCORDINGLY
ALLERS AND ZEILSTRA (2009A,B,C) AGREE WITH THIS. THEY ARGUE THAT IN SHRINKING 
MUNICIPMALITIES THE TOTAL INCOME COULD BE DECREASED, BUT THE INCOME PER INHABIT­
ANT COULD INCREASE. THE FACT THAT THE INCOME RECEIVED BY MUNICIPALITIES FROM THE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DECREASES AS A RESULT OF DECREASING POPULATION COULD 
BE COMPENSATED BY THE FACT THAT THEY OFTEN THEN RECEIVE MONEY AS A RESULT OF 
THEIR WEAKENED SOCIAL STRUCTURE. THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS, NAMELY, 
IS BASED NOT ONLY ON POPULATION NUMBERS BUT ALSO ON OTHER INDICATORS.
SHRINKING CITIES, HOWEVER, ARGUE THAT THE FINANCIAL ALLOCATION SYSTEM NEEDS TO 
BE REVISED. THEY ARGUE THAT A TRANSFORMATION FROM GROWTH TOWARDS DECLINE IS 
EXPENSIVE, AND BECAUSE OF THAT THEY DESERVE MORE MONEY FROM THE GEMEENTE­
FONDS THAN MUNICIPALITIES WITH SIMILAR BUT STABLE POPULATION NUMBERS.
46 THEY REFER, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE FINANCIAL ALLOCATION SYSTEM FOR SCHOOLS, WHICH 
IS BASED ON A SIMILAR PRINCIPLE AS THE FINANCIAL ALLOCATION SYSTEM FOR
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T h is  a lso  a p p lie s  to  s itu a t io n s  in o th e r c o u n trie s . G lo c k  (20 0 6 , p .19 5 ) e m p h a s ise s  th a t 
m o st n a tio n a l p ro g ra m m e s in G e rm a n y  are  fo cu se d  on g ro w th . In 20 0 2, th e  Fed eral 
G e rm a n  G o v e rn m e n t, to g e th e r w ith  th e  e a ste rn  fe d e ra l state s, set up a se v e n -y e a r 
p ro g ra m m e  calle d  Stadtumbau O st47. B oth W ie ch m a n n  (2 0 0 8 ) and G lo c k  (20 0 6 ) 
e m p h a s ise  th e  im p o rta n c e  o f th is  n a tio n a l p ro g ra m m e  fo r  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in the 
tra n s it io n  fro m  p la n n in g  fo r g ro w th  to w a rd s  p la n n in g  fo r d e clin e. T h e y  n o tice d  th a t 
th e  fe d e ra l S ta d tu m b a u  p ro g ra m m e  h e lp e d  s h rin k in g  c it ie s  to  in c o rp o ra te  n e w  p o li­
c ies. G lo c k  (20 0 6 , p .2 0 4 ) e m p h a sise s  h o w  co n d itio n s  at a h ig h e r g o v e rn m e n t level, 
su ch  as n a tio n a l p ro g ra m m e s, can  in flu e n ce  (ra d ic a l)  lo cal p o licy  c h a n g e  in c it ie s  Th is 
illu stra te s  th e  im p o rta n c e  o f stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l c o n g ru e n c y  fo r re a lis in g  a radical 
p o licy  ch a n g e .
W ie c h m a n n  (2 0 0 8 ) a rg u e s th a t th e  la c k  o f k n o w le d g e  at n a tio n a l level m a y  b e a n o th ­
e r re a so n  w h y  (ra d ic a l)  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  do n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s. W ie ch m a n n  
(2 0 0 8 ) sta te s  th a t, un til th e  b e g in n in g  o f th e  n e w  m ille n n iu m , d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
w a s a p o litica l ta b o o  in G e rm a n y , b u t th a t th is  h a s s in ce  c h a n g e d . He e m p h a sise s  
th a t th e  in d e p e n d e n t e x p e rt c o m m iss io n , w h ich  w a s in sta lle d  by th e  G e rm a n  Fed eral 
G o v e rn m e n t to  a n a ly se  h o u s in g  m a rk e t p ro b le m s re late d  to c o n tra c tio n  p ro ce sse s, 
p la y e d  an im p o rta n t ro le  in th is  c h a n g e  (se e  a lso  C h a p te r 1).
F in a lly, v a r io u s  stu d ie s  ( in c lu d in g  K lin ke rs et al., 20 0 9 ; R o b /R fv, 20 0 8 ; V e rw e st et al., 
20 0 8 b ; H in sse n  and  D erks, 2 0 0 8 ) c o n c lu d e  th a t local a d m in istra to rs , g e n e ra lly , do 
n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  b e c a u se  o f e x ist in g  n a tio n a l fo rm a l and  in fo rm a l ru le s  (this 
is stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l in c o n g ru e n c e ). K lin ke rs et al. (20 0 9 ) in v e stig a te d  th e  effect of 
ru le s  in m o re  d e ta il48, and  c o n c lu d e  th a t in th e  p o lic y  d o m a in  o f h o u s in g  and  sp atia l 
p la n n in g , th e re  are  ru le s  w h ich  p re v e n t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  fro m  d e a lin g  e ffe ctiv e ly  w ith  
th e  c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. E x a m p le s  o f th o se  ru le s  are  BLS (b u d ­
g e ts  to  st im u la te  h o u s in g  p ro d u c tio n ) and  IS V  (se co n d  urb an re n e w a l in v e stm e n t 
b u d g e ts), w h ic h  are  d e sig n e d  to a cc o m m o d a te  d e m o g ra p h ic  g ro w th . T h e  d istin ctio n  
b e tw e e n  re so u rc e s  and  ru le s is d ifficu lt to  m a k e  h ere. S u b sid ie s  a re  re so u rc e s  and , at 
th e  sa m e  tim e , a re  su b je ct to  ru le s  on h o w  th e y  n e e d  to  b e spent.
MUNICIPALITIES. THE SYSTEM IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHEN A SCHOOL ATTRACTS 
MORE PUPILS, IT RECEIVES ADDITIONAL FUNDS FROM THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, 
CULTURE AND SCIENCE. IN CONTRAST, WHEN PUPIL NUMBERS GO DOWN, SO DO THE FUNDS.
47 IN 2004, A STADTUMBAU WEST PROGRAMME WAS ALSO STARTED.
48 THEY INVESTIGATED WHETHER AND HOW FORMAL RULES INFLUENCE THE POSSIBILITIES 
AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CHANGE THEIR POLICIES (RADICALLY) IN 
SITUATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
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V e rw e st et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) a rg u e  th a t th e  W g r-p lu s  sta tu s d o e s n o t p ro v id e  th e  reg io n  
w ith  su ffic ie n t fin a n cia l and  ju rid ic a l in stru m e n ts  to  e n fo rce  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to  act in 
a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  re g io n a l a g re e m e n ts  and  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  ra d ica lly . H o w ­
e ver, th e y  a rg u e  th a t th e  n e w  S p a tia l P la n n in g  A c t  o ffers p ro v in c e s  e n o u g h  p o ss ib ili­
t ie s  to  st im u la te  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  to  act in a cc o rd a n c e  w ith  re g io n a l a g re e m e n ts  and to 
c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  a cco rd in g ly . B esid e s, th e  R o b /R fv  (2 0 0 8 ) a rg u e s th a t th e  F in an ­
cial S u p e rv is io n  A c t e n a b le s  p ro v in c e s  to  m o n ito r local a n n u a l b u d g e ts  and  stim u la te  
lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  (ra d ica lly ). T h e y  can w a rn  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in 
a d v a n c e  if  th e ir  in te n d e d  e x p e n d itu re s  are  e x p e cte d  to  e x ce e d  th e ir  in co m es.
D e sp ite  re ce n t, g ro w in g  in te re st, at D u tch n a tio n a l level, fo r  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
(se e  Box 5.1 and  Box 6.1), th e  cu rre n t e x te rn a l in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t is still fo cu sed  
on g ro w th . A s  a re su lt, th e  s tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l c o n g ru e n c e  n e c e ssa ry  to  rea ch  ra d i­
cal p o lic y  ch a n g e s at lo cal leve l w ill b e d ifficu lt to  re a ch . R ad ica l p o licy  c h a n g e  w ill 
n o t ta k e  p lace , even  w h e n  it is a cce p te d  th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is a stru ctu ra l 
p ro b le m , if th is  d o e s n o t m a tch  th e  p a tte rn  o f  in te ra ctio n  w ith in  th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn ­
m e n t, th e  e x istin g  n a tio n a l re so u rc e s  and  th e  e x ist in g  n a tio n a l fo rm a l and in fo rm al 
ru le s  (th is  is stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l in co n g ru e n ce ).
3.6.3 LOCAL SPATIAL CONDITIONS
S p e c if ic  lo cal sp a tia l c o n d it io n s  m ig h t in flu e n ce  th e  c h a n g e  in o n e  o r m o re  o f the  
d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t in re a ctio n  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, and in th at 
w a y  in flu e n ce  th e  lo cal p o licy  ch a n g e.
A  fe w  re se a rc h e rs  ( in c lu d in g  G lo c k  and  H a u sse rm a n n , 20 0 4 ; G o d e rb a u e r, 20 0 7; and 
V e rw e st et al., 2 0 0 8 b ) h a ve  a d d re sse d  th e  im p o rta n c e  o f lo cal sp a tia l c o n d it io n s  in 
u n d e rsta n d in g  h o w  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  re a ct to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . E x a m p le s  of 
th e  sp a tia l co n d it io n s  th a t th e se  a u th o rs  re fe r to  in th e ir  w o rk  are  m o stly  re lated  
to h o u s in g  sto ck: its c o n d it io n , th e  d e g re e  o f  co n c e n tra tio n  o f its le a st a ttra ctiv e  
p art, its a g e, and  its o w n e rsh ip . T h e se  c o n d it io n s  re fe r m a in ly  to  th e  h o u s in g  sto ck  
b e ca u se , as m e n tio n e d  b e fo re  (se e  S e ctio n  3 .2), m o st stu d ie s  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  and  p o lic y  fo cu s  on th is  p o licy  fie ld .
T h e se  co n d it io n s  can in flu e n ce  th e  ‘d is c o u rs e ’ d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. 
T h e y  m a y  in flu e n ce  h o w  th e  p ro b le m s re late d  to d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  a p p e a r and 
w h e th e r o r n o t th is  d e c lin e  ca u se s  a ra d ica l c h a n g e  in p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n . V e rw e st 
et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) c o n c lu d e  th a t a m u n ic ip a lity  is m o re  w illin g  to  c h a n g e  its p o lic y  ra d i­
ca lly  w h e n  th e  le a st a ttra c tiv e  h o u s in g  sto ck, w h ich  is m o st v u ln e ra b le  to  d e clin e, is 
(sp a tia lly )  co n c e n tra te d . In th is  s itu a tio n , th e  p ro b le m s th a t  m a y  a rise  as a re su lt  of
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d e clin e  (e .g . v a ca n c ie s)  b e co m e  m o re  v is ib le  and  th e  (p u b lic ) p re ssu re  to  do so m e ­
th in g  a b o u t th e m  and c h a n g e  th e  p o lic y  (ra d ic a lly ) m a y  in cre a se . W ie rin g  and  C rab b e
(2 0 0 6 ) a rg u e  th a t th is  p re ssu re  g ro w s w h e n  it b e c o m e s c le a r th a t  th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e ­
m e n t can  no lo n g e r d eal a d e q u a te ly  w ith  th e  p ro b le m s it faces.
Local sp a tia l co n d itio n s  can  ca u se  a c h a n g e  n o t o n ly  in th e  ‘d is c o u rs e ’ d im e n sio n  but 
a lso  in th e  ‘re s o u rc e ’ d im e n sio n , a lth o u g h  th e  e ffects m a y  b e d iffe re n t. A  c o n c e n tra ­
tio n  o f th e  le a st a ttra c t iv e  h o u s in g  can c h a n g e  th e  p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n  ra d ica lly  (see  
a b o ve ). H o w e v e r, it can affect th e  ‘re so u rc e  c o n s te lla t io n ’ in su ch  a w a y  th a t p o licy  
s ta b ility  is th e  re su lt. Fo r th e  p ro b le m s th a t a cc o m p a n y  th is  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
a lso  w ill b e  co n c e n tra te d , m a k in g  it d ifficu lt fo r  su ch  a m u n ic ip a lity  to  fin d  en o u g h  
fin a n cia l re so u rc e s  to  c h a n g e  its p o lic y  ra d ic a lly  (V e rw e st et al., 20 0 8 b ). T h e  co sts 
re la te d  to  th o se  k in d s o f p o lic ie s  (e.g. d e m o lit io n  and  re stru c tu rin g ) can b a re ly  -  or 
n o t at all -  b e co v e re d  b y  th e  in co m e  g e n e ra te d  fro m  n e w  h o u sin g .
G e rr ic h h a u z e n  and  D o g te ro m  (20 0 7 ) a rg u e  th a t n o t o n ly  th e  co n d it io n  o f th e  h o u s­
in g  s to c k  b u t a lso  its a g e  can e x p la in  th e  p o lic y  stra te g ie s  th a t a cto rs  fo rm u la te  to 
d eal w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. T h e y  a rg u e  th a t re stru c tu rin g  o r d e m o lit io n , w h ich  
can  b e c o n sid e re d  as a ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e , is m o re  d ifficu lt to  a ch ie v e  if th e  ren ted  
so cia l h o u s in g  s to c k  is n e w  ra th e r th a n  o ld. T h is  is b e c a u se  th e  n e w  re n te d  social 
h o u s in g  s to c k  h a s n o t y e t b e e n  w ritte n  off, f in a n c ia lly 49. T h e  a g e  o f th e  so cia l rented  
h o u s in g  s to c k  d e te rm in e s  w h e th e r ra d ica l p o licy  c h a n g e  is f in a n c ia lly  fe asib le .
T h e  w a y  in w h ic h  o w n e rsh ip  is d istrib u te d  is a lso  m e n tio n e d  in th e  lite ra tu re , to 
e x p la in  th e  w a y  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  re sp o n d  to d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. G o d e rb a u e r
(20 0 7), V e rw e st et al. (2 0 0 8 b ) and  G lo c k  and  H a u sse rm a n n  (2 0 0 4 ) a rg u e  th a t the  
c h a n g e  fro m  e x p a n sio n  o f th e  h o u s in g  s to c k  to w a rd s  d e m o lit io n  and  re s tru c tu r­
ing, w h ic h  can b e c o n sid e re d  as a ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e , is d ifficu lt in a s itu a tio n  of 
sca tte re d  o w n e rsh ip . W h e n  th e  o w n e rsh ip  in a n e ig h b o u rh o o d  is fra g m e n te d , a cto rs 
(p riv a te  o w n e rs, h o u s in g  a sso c ia tio n s, p ro je c t d e v e lo p e rs)  a re  h e s ita n t to  b e th e  first 
to  in ve st, b e ca u se  all o th e r p ro p e rty  o w n e rs  in th e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  w ill b e n e fit  as 
w e ll (fre e -rid e r p ro b le m ). S ca tte re d  o w n e rsh ip  a ffects th e  p o w e r re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  
a cto rs  (re so u rc e s) in su ch  w a y  th a t ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e s a re  d ifficu lt to  re a lise . In 
19 8 5 , K lo ste rm a n  a lre a d y  a d d re sse d  th a t th e  p r is o n e rs ’ d ile m m a  m a k e s it d ifficu lt to
49 IN GENERAL, HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS CONSIDER RENTED SOCIAL HOUSING TO BE WRITTEN 
OFF, FINANCIALLY, AFTER 50 YEARS (STRIJLAND, 2006; GERRICHHAUZEN AND DOGTEROM,
2007).
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im p ro v e  a d e c lin in g  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  and  a rg u e d , th e re fo re , th a t g o v e rn m e n t action 
w o u ld  b e n e e d e d 50.
In th is  stu d y, lo cal sp a tia l c o n d it io n s  e sp e c ia lly  re fe r to  o w n e rsh ip  and  th e  d e g re e  of 
c o n c e n tra t io n  o f th e  le a st a ttra c tiv e  s to c k  (h o u sin g , re ta il, b u s in e ss  and  office).
3.6.4 ASPECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
T h e  a sp e cts  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  a lso  can  affect th e  e x te n t o f th e  c h a n g e  in th e  
d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, and  w h e th e r a c o n se rv a t iv e  or ra d ica l p o licy  
c h a n g e  m a y  o ccu r. T h e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  sh o w s th a t d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  e x p e rie n ce d  b y  lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  is n o t u n ifo rm . T h e  d e clin e  m ay 
v a ry  in size , sp e e d  and  d u ra tio n . T h is  d istin ctio n  is b a sed  on lite ra tu re  a b o u t urban 
d e c lin e 51 (B e a u re g a rd , 20 0 8 ), tra n s it io n s  (R o tm a n s  et al., 20 0 1), and  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  (G lo ck, 20 0 6 ; V a n  D am  et al., 20 06).
B e a u re g a rd  (20 0 8 , p .5 20 ) d e scrib e s  urb an p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  in th e  U n ite d  S tate s 
b e tw e e n  18 20  and  20 0 0 . He co m p a re d  th e  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  in th e  la rg e  N orth- 
A m e ric a n  c it ie s  o v e r th re e  d iffe re n t p e r io d s52, b y  lo o k in g  at p re v a le n ce , se ve rity, 
p e rsiste n c e , and  g e o g ra p h ica l in c id e n ce . P re v a le n ce  re fe rs  to  th e  n u m b e r o f t im e s 
th a t a c ity  e x p e rie n ce d  a d e ca d e  o f  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  d u rin g  th e  th re e  d ist in g u ish e d  
tim e  p e rio d s. S e v e rity  re fe rs  to  th e  a v e ra g e  sca le  o f th e  d e clin e  (a v e ra g e  a b so lu te  
and  p e rce n ta g e  c h a n g e  in p o p u la t io n ) d u rin g  th e  th re e  d ist in g u ish e d  tim e  p e rio d s. 
P e rs iste n ce  re fe rs  to  th e  te m p o ra l e n d u ra n c e  o f th is  d e clin e, in o th e r w o rd s, the 
n u m b e r o f d e ca d e s  o v e r w h ich  c it ie s  co n tin u e d  to  lo se  re s id e n ts  d u rin g  th e  th re e
50 HE ILLUSTRATES THIS BY REFERRING TO THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE: ‘IF A LANDLORD 
IMPROVES HIS PROPERTY AND THE OTHERS DO NOT, THE NEIGHBOURHOOD WILL CONTINUE 
TO DECLINE, MAKING HIS INVESTMENT FINANCIALLY INADVISABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF 
HE DOES NOT IMPROVE HIS PROPERTY AND THE OTHERS IMPROVE THEIRS, THE GENERAL 
IMPROVEMENT OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD WILL ALLOW HIM TO RAISE TENTS WITHOUT 
INVESTING ANY MONEY. AS A RESULT, IT IS IN EACH INDIVIDUAL'S SELF INTEREST TO MAKE 
NO IMPROVEMENTS; HOWEVER, IF THEY ALL REFUSE TO DO SO, THE NEIGHBOURHOOD WILL 
DECLINE FURTHER, MAKING THINGS WORSE FOR EVERYONE' (KLOSTERMAN, 1985, P. 9).
51 MORE SPECIFICALLY, URBANISATION PROCESSES IN SITUATIONS OF URBAN DECLINE.
52 THREE DIFFERENT PERIODS THAT ARE DISTINGUISHED ARE 1820- 1920, 1950-1980 AND
1980-2000.
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d istin g u ish e d  tim e  p e r io d s53. G e o g ra p h ic a l in c id e n c e  is th e  re g io n a l d istrib u tio n  o f 
th e  c it ie s  w h ich  w e re  c o n fro n te d  w ith  p o p u la tio n  d e clin e  d u rin g  th e  th re e  tim e 
p e r io d s54.
R o tm a n s et al. (20 0 1, p .16 ) a rg u e  th a t tra n s it io n s  in v o lv e  a ra n g e  o f p o ss ib le  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t p a th s, o f w h ich  th e  d ire ctio n , sca le  and  sp e e d  m a y  b e in flu e n ce d  by g o v e rn ­
m e n t p o licy , b u t n e v e r co n tro lle d  e n tire ly . T h e y  d e fin e  tra n s it io n s  as a g ra d u a l, c o n ­
t in u o u s  p ro ce ss  o f  c h a n g e  w h e re b y  th e  stru ctu ra l c h a ra c te r o f a so c ie ty  tra n sfo rm s. 
T h e y  m e n tio n  d e m o g ra p h ic  tra n s it io n  as an e x a m p le . T h e y  a rg u e  th a t tra n s it io n s  are 
n o t u n ifo rm , and n e ith e r is th e  tra n s it io n  p ro ce ss  d e te rm in istic ; th e re  a re  la rg e  d iffe r­
e n ce s  in sca le s o f c h a n g e  and  th e  p e rio d s o v e r w h ich  th e y  occu r.
G lo c k  (20 0 6 ), w h o  a n a lyse d  th e  lo cal g o v e rn m e n t re a ctio n  o f tw o  G e rm a n  s h rin k ­
in g  c itie s, a rg u e s th a t th e  d u ra tio n  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is an im p o rta n t fa c to r in 
w h e th e r m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s  o r not. V a n  D am  et al. (20 0 6 ), w h o  a n a l­
yse d  th e  D utch s itu a tio n , a rg u e  th a t th e  lo cal p o lic y  re a c tio n s  to w a rd s  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  d e p e n d  on th e  scale , d u ra tio n  and sp eed  at w h ich  th e  d e clin e  p ro ce e d s 
w ith in  a p a rt icu la r area.
A ll th e se  a u th o rs  e m p h a s ise  th e  im p o rta n c e  o f  d u ra tio n  ( ‘p e rs is te n c e ’, ‘p e rio d  o ve r 
w h ic h  tra n s it io n  o c c u rs ’). In a d d itio n , th re e  stu d ie s  (B e a u re g a rd , 20 0 8 ; V a n  D am  et 
al., 20 0 6 ; and R o tm a n s et al., 20 0 1) a lso  m e n tio n  size  ( ‘se v e rity ’, ‘sc a le ’) as an 
im p o rta n t fa cto r. F inally, R o tm a n s et al. (2 0 0 1) and  V a n  D am  et al. (2 0 0 6 ) in d icate  
th a t sp e e d  a lso  p la ys a p ivo tal ro le.
T h is  stu d y  o n ly  d isc u sse s  s ize  and  d u ra tio n . Both a re  su g g e ste d  to b e an e x p la n a tio n  
fo r  lo cal g o v e rn m e n t re a c tio n s  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e . B e ca u se  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in the 
ca se -stu d y  re g io n s h a v e  n o t ye t o r o n ly  re c e n tly  b een  c o n fro n te d  w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e , s ize  and  d u ra tio n  se e m  su ffic ie n t in d ic a to rs  to  e x p la in  lo cal g o v e rn m e n t 
re a ctio n s. Both a sp e c ts  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  are  e x p la in e d  b elo w .
T h e  s ize  (e x te n t) o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  re fe rs  to  th e  (p e rc e n ta g e  o f th e ) d e cre a se  
in p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  and  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , d u rin g  a certain  
p e rio d  o f tim e. T h e  tim e  p e rio d s used  in th is  stu d y  a re  19 9 5  to 20 0 8 , 20 08  to 2025, 
and  20 08  to 20 4 0 . T h e  e x te n t o f th e  d e clin e  d u rin g  th e se  p e rio d s h a s b e e n  p re se n te d
53 BEAUREGARD SHOWS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF CITIES THAT HAVE FACED 
DECREASES IN POPULATION ; IN A SINGLE DECADE, IN MULTIPLE DECADES, OR IN (TWO OR 
THREE) CONSECUTIVE DECADES.
54 FOUR REGIONS ARE DISTINGUISHED: NORTH-EAST, MIDWEST, SOUTH AND WEST.
100
a cc o rd in g  to  th e  fo llo w in g  p e rce n ta g e s: 0 to  2.5%, 2.5 to  5%, 5 to  10 %, 10  to  15 % , 15 
to  20 %, and  m o re  th a n  20%. T h e se  a re  th e  c a te g o rie s  th a t are  used  in th e  m a p s (see 
C h a p te r 2). C h a p te r 4 p re se n ts  th e  e x te n t o f th e  d e clin e  fo r each  c a se -stu d y  area 
in p e rce n ta g e s  and  e x a ct n u m b e rs  fo r th e  th re e  d ist in g u ish e d  p e rio d s. R e lated  to 
size , th is  stu d y  a lso  lo o k s  at h o w  th e  d e clin e  is d istrib u te d  w ith in  th e  re g io n  (the 
in c id e n ce ).
T h is  stu d y  a lso  d isc u sse s  th e  d u ra tio n  o f th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. H o w e v e r, it uses 
an o th e r in d ic a to r th a n  th a t used  b y  B e a u re g a rd  (20 0 8 ), b e c a u se  n o t all m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  and c a se -stu d y  re g io n s h a v e  b een  c o n fro n te d  w ith  e v e ry  ty p e  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  (se e  C h a p te rs  1, 2 and  4). T h is  s tu d y  d o e s n o t sh o w  th e  n u m b e r o f c o n se cu ­
t iv e  d e ca d e s d u rin g  w h ich  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  (o r re g io n ) h a v e  b e e n  c o n fro n te d  w ith  
d iffe re n t ty p e s o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , b u t o n ly  sh o w s s in ce  w h e n  th e y  h a v e  been 
c o n fro n te d  o r w h e n  th e y  a re  e x p e cte d  to b e c o n fro n te d  w ith  th e  th re e  d ifferen t 
ty p e s o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  (a lso  ca lle d  th e  tu rn in g  p o in t). For ea ch  ca se -stu d y  
re g io n , C h a p te r 4 p re se n ts  w h e n  th e  re g io n  and  in d iv id u a l m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w e re  first 
c o n fro n te d  w ith , o r a re  e x p e cte d  to b e c o n fro n te d  w ith , a d e cre a se  in p o p u la tio n , 
h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs  a n d /o r w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n . T h e  d u ra tio n  o f th e  d e m o g ra p h ­
ic d e clin e  is p re se n te d  in tw o  w a ys. First, in le n g th  o f  tim e  (in y e a rs)  b e tw e e n  th e  
tu rn in g  p o in t and  th e  p re se n t t im e ; d e scrib e d  as long, short o r not happened yet. S e c ­
o n d , in th e  n u m b e r o f  y e a rs  fo r w h ich  th e  d e clin e  is e x p e cte d  to co n tin u e . B ecau se  
th is  la st fa c to r is in c o rp o ra te d  in th e  se le ctio n  crite r ia  fo r  th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s, the  
d e clin e  is e x p e cte d  to  p e rsist  in all o f th e  se le cte d  re g io n s. T h e  p o in t in tim e  w h e n  
th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s w e re  f irst c o n fro n te d  w ith  d iffe re n t ty p e s o f d e clin e  va ries 
b e tw e e n  re g io n s.
T h is  stu d y  d o e s n o t in c lu d e  th e  p a ce  o f d e cre a se s  in p o p u la tio n , h o u se h o ld  n u m ­
b e rs  o r w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n , se p a ra te ly , b e c a u se  th is  in d ic a to r d o e s n o t se e m  
re le v a n t fo r th is  stu d y. C h a p te rs  1 and  2 sh o w  th a t th e re  are  no  m a jo r d iffe re n ce s 
in p a ce  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  b e tw e e n  D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s . T h e se  ch a p te rs  also 
sh o w  th a t th e  sp e e d  o f th e  d e clin e  w ith  in D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s  m a y  b e co n sid e re d  
slo w , co m p a re d  to  th a t in m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in o th e r co u n trie s . T h is  s tu d y  a lso  d o e s not 
in c lu d e  p re v a le n ce . A s  m o st m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h a v e  o n ly  re c e n tly  b e e n  c o n fro n te d  w ith  
d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , p re v a le n ce  is le ss re le v a n t to  th is  s tu d y  and , fo r  th a t reason , 
w a s le ft out.
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3.7 CONCLUSIONS AND HYPOTHESES
T h e  stu d y  a sk s th e  fo llo w in g  q u e stio n s: how do local governments react to demo­
graphic decline, and under which circumstances does local demographic decline lead to 
policy stability, conservative policy change or a radical policy change? To a n sw e r th ese  
q u e stio n s, th e  fo u r d im e n sio n s o f  th e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t A p p ro a ch  (P A A ) are  used 
as a b a sis, b e ca u se  it b est m e e ts  th e  c o n d it io n s  re q u ire d  fo r th e  c o n c e p tu a l f ra m e ­
w o rk , co n d it io n s  th a t can b e d e rive d  fro m  th e  lite ra tu re  on d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and 
p o licy . T h e  P o licy  A rra n g e m e n t A p p ro a ch  co v e rs  b o th  stru c tu re  and  a g e n c ie s  and 
th e  re c ip ro c ity  b e tw e e n  s tru c tu re s  and  a g e n cie s. It h a s its d ra w b a ck s, as w e ll, as the 
a p p ro a ch  is n o t d y n a m ic  e n o u g h  to  e x p la in  p o lic y  ch a n g e s, h a rd ly  ta k e s  a cc o u n t of 
th e  co n d it io n s  u n d e r w h ich  p o lic ie s  ch a n g e , and  d o e s n o t p a y  a tte n tio n  to  d ifferen t 
ty p e s o f  ch a n g e . In a d d itio n , th e  P A A  ig n o re s  sp e c ific  fe a tu re s  o f th e  p o licy  object.
To o v e rc o m e  th e se  sh o rtc o m in g s , th e  fo llo w in g  co n c e p ts  w e re  a d d e d : ch a n g e s in 
d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t; stra te g ic , s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l and  stru ctu ra l- 
e x te rn a l co n g ru e n ce ; lo cal sp a tia l co n d itio n s; and  a sp e c ts  o f th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e . T h e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e  c o n c e p tu a l m o d e l is d e scrib e d  in th is  c h a p te r, and 
s u m m a rise d  in F ig u re  3.4.
FIGURE 3.4 CONCEPTUAL MODEL APPLIED TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
From  th e  c o n ce p tu a l f ra m e w o rk  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is  can b e fo rm u la te d .
1 In order to realise a radical policy change, not only a radical change in d is­
co urse would be needed, but also radical changes in actors and coalitions,
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formal and informal rules, and resource/power balance. In o rd e r to  re a ch  a 
ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e , a ra d ica l c h a n g e  in th e  ‘d is c o u rs e ’ d im e n sio n  o f the 
p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t is n e e d e d , o n e  w h ich  ca u se s  s tra te g ic  a n d /o r s tru c tu r­
a l-in te rn a l in c o n g ru e n c e , and  d o e s n o t m atch , n o r can b e a b so rb e d  by, th e  
o th e r th re e  d im e n s io n s  o f th e  e x ist in g  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. Larg e  ch a n g e s 
in th e  o th e r (th re e ) d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t a re  n e e d e d , 
to o , in o rd e r to  re sto re  th e  stra te g ic  and  s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l co n g ru e n ce  
th a t is n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  e m e rg e n c e  o f a ra d ica l n e w  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t. 
T h u s, a p a rt fro m  a n e w  p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n  (e .g . d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
is a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m ), th e re  m a y  a lso  b e th e  n eed  fo r n e w  a cto rs  a n d / 
o r c h a lle n g in g  (n e w ) co a lit io n s, ch a n g e s in p a tte rn s  o f in te ra c tio n , n e w  
fo rm a l ru le s  (e .g . p ro c e d u re s)  and  in fo rm a l ru le s (e .g . ro u tin e s  and 
in te ra c tio n s), n e w  re so u rc e s  (m o n e y  and  in fo rm a tio n ) a n d /o r n e w  p o w e r 
b a la n c e  (re d istrib u te  re so u rce s). A s  m e n tio n e d  b e fo re , th e  a n a ly sis  of 
th is  s tu d y  b e g in s at th e  ‘d is c o u rs e ’ d im e n sio n  (se e  S e ctio n  3 .6 .1). H ow ­
e ver, th is  d o e s n o t m e an  th a t a ra d ica l p o licy  c h a n g e  a lw a y s  sta rts  w ith  
a c h a n g e  in d isco u rse . C h a n g e s  in th e  o th e r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  e x istin g  
p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t m a y  a lso  tr ig g e r a ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e .
2 In order to realise a radical policy change, a radical change in the external 
(national) institutional context would be needed. A  c h a n g e  in th e  ex tern al 
(n a t io n a l)  in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t is re q u ire d , in o rd e r to  re a ch  th e  stru ctu ra l- 
e x te rn a l c o n g ru e n c e  th a t is n e e d e d  fo r a n e w  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t to 
e m e rg e  and  b e in stitu tio n a lise d  at lo cal level.
3 A radical change in one of the dimensions of the policy arrangement will take 
place only if demographic decline has become clearly visible in the spatial 
condition. For e x a m p le , w h e n  th e  le a st a ttra c tiv e  h o u s in g  (re ta il, b u sin e ss, 
and  office) s to c k  is sp a tia lly  (g e o g ra p h ica lly )  co n c e n tra te d , th e  p ro b le m s 
re la te d  to d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  a lso  w ill b e co n c e n tra te d , and , th u s, m o re  
p h y s ic a lly  v is ib le , w h ich  m a y  ca u se  a la rg e  c h a n g e  in p ro b le m  p e rce p tio n  
(e .g . d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m ay b e p e rce iv e d  as a stru ctu ra l p ro b le m )55. 
T h is  sp a tia l c o n c e n tra t io n  m a y  a lso  affect th e  o th e r d im e n s io n s  o f the  
p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t (e .g . f in a n cia l re so u rce s). It co u ld  even h a v e  an effect 
on fin a n cia l re so u rc e s  o p p o site  to  th a t on th e  d isco u rse , w h e re b y  it co u ld  
b e c o m e  m o re  d ifficu lt to  re a ch  a ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e . Fo r e x a m p le , if 
th e re  is sp a tia l c o n c e n tra tio n  it m a y  b e c o m e  m o re  d ifficu lt fo r  a
55 NOT ONLY LOCAL SPATIAL CONDITIONS BUT ALSO NEW RESOURCES (NEW INFORMATION) MAY 
CONTRIBUTE TO THIS.
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m u n ic ip a lity  to  fin d  e n o u g h  fin a n cia l re so u rc e s  to  c h a n g e  its p o lic y  ra d ic a l­
ly. In a d d it io n , o w n e rsh ip  o f th e  h o u s in g  (reta il, b u s in e ss, and  o ffice) sto ck  
can  a lso  effect th e  d im e n sio n s o f th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t. It m a y  in flu e n ce  
th e  ‘re s o u rc e ’ d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t (e .g . m o n e y ). W h e n  
th e  o w n e rsh ip  o f th e  s to c k  is fra g m e n te d , im p le m e n tin g  a ra d ica l p o licy  
c h a n g e  w ill b e m o re  d ifficu lt.
4 A large and long-lasting demographic decline always precedes a radical 
policy change. S u ch  a d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m ay  c a u se  la rg e  ch a n g e s in 
th e  p h ysica l e n v iro n m e n t, w h ich  th e  e x ist in g  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t c a n n o t 
d eal w ith  su ffic ie n tly , and  w h ich  m a y  tr ig g e r a ra d ica l c h a n g e  in p ro b lem  
p e rce p tio n  (discourse). T h is  m a y  re su lt  in a n e w  id e a  a b o u t th e  n a tu re  
o f th e  p ro b le m . For e x a m p le , th a t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is p e rce iv e d  as a 
stru ctu ra l p ro b le m  and  th u s w o u ld  w a rra n t a ra d ica l p o lic y  ch a n g e . Th is 
la rg e  and  lo n g -la st in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  m a y  a lso  ca u se  la rg e  ch a n g e s 
in th e  o th e r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t (e .g . fin a n cia l re so u rce s  
a n d /o r p o w e r re latio n s).
FIGURE 3.5 CONDITIONS FOR DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT REACTIONS
POLICY STABILITY
CONSERVATIVE 
POLICY CHANGE
RADICAL POLICY 
CHANGE
1 ASPECTS OF SMALL AND SMALL AND LARGE AND
DEMOGRAPHIC SHORT -LASTING SHORT-LASTING LONG-LASTING
DECLINE DEMOGRAPHIC DEMOGRAPHIC DEMOGRAPHIC
DECLINE DECLINE DECLINE
2 LOCAL SPATIAL E.G SPATIAL E.G. SPATIAL E.G. SPATIAL
CONDITIONS FRAGMENTATION FRAGMENTATION CONCENTRATION OF
(DISPERSION) OF (DISPERSION) OF LEAST ATTRACTIVE
LEAST ATTRACTIVE LEAST ATTRACTIVE STOCK.
STOCK. STOCK. LARGE CHANGES
NO OR SMALL SMALL CHANGES IN PHYSICAL
CHANGES IN PHYSICAL IN PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT.
ENVIRONMENT. ENVIRONMENT. EXISTING POLICY
EXISTING POLICY EXISTING POLICY ARRANGEMENT
ARRANGEMENT CAN ARRANGEMENT CANNOT DEAL
DEAL SUFFICIENTLY CANNOT DEAL SUFFICIENTLY
WITH CHANGES SUFFICIENTLY WITH CHANGES
IN THE PHYSICAL WITH CHANGES IN THE PHYSICAL
ENVIRONMENT. IN THE PHYSICAL 
ENVIRONMENT.
ENVIRONMENT.
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POLICY STABILITY
CONSERVATIVE 
POLICY CHANGE
RADICAL POLICY 
CHANGE
3 CHANGE IN A NO CHANGE IN MARGINAL CHANGE RADICAL CHANGE
DIMENSION OF A DIMENSION IN A DIMENSION IN A DIMENSION
THE POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE POLICY OF THE POLICY
ARRANGEMENT ARRANGEMENT ARRANGEMENT ARRANGEMENT,
(E.G. CHANGE (E.G. DEMOGRAPHIC SUCH AS A CHANGE SUCH AS A CHANGE
IN DISCOURSE, DECLINE IS NO IN PROBLEM IN PROBLEM
CHANGE IN PROBLEM). PERCEPTION PERCEPTION
ACTOR AND (DEMOGRAPHIC (DEMOGRAPHIC
COALITION, DECLINE IS A DECLINE IS A
CHANGE IN TEMPORARY STRUCTURAL
RULES, CHANGE PHENOMENON). PHENOMENON).
IN RESOURCES)
4 STRUCTURAL- BECAUSE THERE A MARGINAL A RADICAL CHANGE
INTERNAL IS NO CHANGE IN A CHANGE IN ONE OF IN THE DIMENSION
CONGRUENCE DIMENSION, THERE THE DIMENSIONS ENDANGERS THE
IS STRATEGIC AND OF THE POLICY STRATEGIC AND
STRUCTURAL- ARRANGEMENT STRUCTURAL-
INTERNAL CAN BE ABSORBED INTERNAL
CONGRUENCE. BY THE OTHER CONGRUENCE OF THE
THE TRADITIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ARRANGEMENT. TO
ARRANGEMENT CAN ARRANGEMENT. NO RECOVER STRATEGIC
CONTINUE TO EXIST. RADICAL CHANGES AND STRUCTURAL-
OF THE OTHER INTERNAL
DIMENSIONS CONGRUENCE,
OF THE POLICY RADICAL CHANGES
ARRANGEMENT IN ALL THE OTHER
ARE NEEDED. DIMENSIONS
A NEW VARIETY OF THE POLICY
(RENEWAL) OF THE ARRANGEMENT
EXISTING POLICY ALSO ARE NEEDED.
ARRANGEMENT WILL A NEW POLICY
EMERGE. ARRANGEMENT WILL
EMERGE.
5 STRUCTURAL- 
EXTERNAL 
CONGRUENCE
BECAUSE THERE 
IS NO CHANGE IN A 
DIMENSION THERE 
IS STRUCTURAL- 
EXTERNAL 
CONGRUENCE.
THIS NEW VARIETY 
(RENEWAL) OF THE 
EXISTING POLICY 
ARRANGEMENT 
MATCHES THE 
NATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT. THIS 
MEANS THAT THERE
IS STRUCTURAL- 
EXTERNAL 
CONGRUENCE AND 
NO CHANGE IN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT IS 
NECESSARY.
TO INSTITUTIONALISE 
A NEW POLICY 
ARRANGEMENT,
A CHANGE IN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT IS 
NECESSARY 
TO ACHIEVE 
STRUCTURAL- 
EXTERNAL 
CONGRUENCE.
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T h e  lite ra tu re  a b o u t d e m o g ra p h ic  d e c lin e  c o n c lu d e s  th a t m o st lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  
fa c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  do n o t c h a n g e  th e ir  p o licy , o r at th e  m o st c h o o se  a 
co n se rv a t iv e  p o licy  ch a n g e . T h e y  ra re ly  c h o o se  a ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e . T h e  re a so n  
fo r  th is  co u ld  b e th a t c o n d it io n s  fo r a ra d ica l p o lic y  c h a n g e  a re  m o re  d e m a n d in g . 
E sp e c ia lly  d e m a n d in g  a re  c o n d it io n s  a cc o rd in g  to w h ich  all fo u r d im e n sio n s o f  the 
p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t to g e th e r w ith  th e  e x te rn a l in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t are  re q u ire d  to 
ch a n g e . It is m u ch  e a s ie r to  re n e w  an e x ist in g  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t (a c o n se rv a tiv e  
p o lic y  re a c tio n ) th a n  to  in st itu t io n a lise  a n e w  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t (a ra d ica l p o licy  
ch a n g e ). A  c o n se rv a tiv e  p o lic y  c h a n g e  is a re a ctio n  to a m a rg in a l c h a n g e  in one 
d im e n sio n  o f th e  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, w h ich  is a b so rb e d  by th e  o th e r d im e n s io n s  o f 
th e  e x ist in g  p o licy  a rra n g e m e n t, w h e re b y  stra te g ic  and  stru c tu ra l-in te rn a l co n g ru ­
e n ce  are re sto re d . B e ca u se  th e re  is no  q u e stio n  o f s tru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l in co n g ru e n ce , 
a c h a n g e  in in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t is n o t re q u ire d . See  F ig u re  3 .5  fo r an o v e rv ie w  o f the 
co n d it io n s  fo r th e  d iffe re n t p o lic y  re a ctio n s.
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  ch a p te r d e scrib e s  and  e x p la in s  m e th o d o lo g ica l ch o ice s  m a d e  d u rin g  the  
re se a rch , to  fa c ilita te  v a lu a tio n  o f th e  f in d in g s  and  co n c lu s io n s  in th is  re p o rt. S ectio n
4.2 d e sc rib e s  th e  re se a rch  m e th o d , S e ctio n  4.3 th e  c rite r ia  used  in th e  se le ctio n  of 
ca se  stu d ie s, S e ctio n  4 .4  th e  stra te g ie s  used  fo r  co lle c t in g  d ata. S e ctio n  4.5  d e scrib e s  
th e  past, p re se n t and  e x p e cte d  fu tu re  d e m o g ra p h ic  s itu a tio n  in th e  th re e  c a se -stu d y  
re g io n s: P a rkstad  L im b u rg , E e m sd e lta  and  Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n . Finally, S e ctio n  4.6 
co m p a re s  the d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  in th o se  th re e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s.
4.2 RESEARCH METHOD
To a n sw e r th e  ce n tra l q u e stio n s, th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  w a s u sed . Y in  d e fin e s  th is  as 
fo llo w s: ‘an e m p irica l in q u iry  th a t in v e stig a te s  a c o n te m p o ra ry  p h e n o m e n o n  w ith in  
its re a l-life  co n te x t; w h e n  th e  b o u n d a rie s  b e tw e e n  p h e n o m e n o n  and  c o n te x t are 
n o t c le a rly  e v id e n t; and  in w h ich  m u ltip le  so u rc e s  o f e v id e n c e  a re  u se d ’1 (Yin, 2003, 
p .13). T h e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  is ch a ra c te rise d  b y  a sm all n u m b e r o f re se a rch  units, 
a la b o u r-in te n s iv e  a p p ro a ch , p re fe re n ce  fo r in -d e p th  re se a rch  (in ste a d  o f broad  
re se a rch ), and  ra tio n a l and  in fo rm e d  c h o ice  o f re se a rch  un its. In a d d it io n , it uses 
m u ltip le  so u rce s  o f e v id e n c e  (m o stly  q u a lita t iv e  d ata ) and  o b se rv a tio n s  on lo catio n  
(P e stm a n , 20 0 1, p .39).
T h e  m ain  re a so n  fo r u s in g  th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  is th a t it o ffers th e  p o ss ib ility  o f 
g a in in g  in -d e p th  k n o w le d g e  a b o u t th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  
( in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le )  and  lo cal sp a tia l p o lic y  (d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le ). In th is  w a y, it 
can  g iv e  in s ig h t in to  th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  a co n te x tu a l c h a n g e  (d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e c lin e )  and  th e  lo cal sp a tia l p o lic y  p ro ce ss  and  p o lic y  co n te n t. T h e  m e th o d  en a b les 
sy ste m a tic  stu d y in g  o f p o lic y  p ra c tic e s  in a s itu a tio n  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , and 
o f th e  w a y  in w h ic h  th o se  p ra c tic e s  are  in flu e n ce d  b y  a cto rs, re so u rce s, ru le s  and 
d isc o u rse  (in  o th e r w o rd s: th e  p o lic y  a rra n g e m e n t); stra te g ic , s tru c tu ra l-in te rn a l, 
stru c tu ra l-e x te rn a l co n g ru e n ce , and  lo cal sp a tia l co n d it io n s. T h e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d ,
1 THE CASE-STUDY INQUIRY COPES WITH THE TECHNICALLY DISTINCTIVE SITUATION OF
HAVING MANY MORE VARIABLES OF INTEREST THAN DATA POINTS, RESULTING IN 1) RELYING 
ON MULTIPLE SOURCES OF EVIDENCE, WITH DATA NEEDING TO CONVERGE IN A TRIANGULAT­
ING FASHION, AND 2) BENEFITING FROM THE PRIOR DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL PROPO­
SITIONS TO GUIDE DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS (YIN, 2003, P.13- 14).
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th u s, p ro v id e s  n o t o n ly  d e ta ile d  in fo rm a tio n  on th e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal sp a tia l p o licy , b u t a lso  on th e  c o n d it io n s  th a t in flu e n ce  
w h e th e r and  h o w  local g o v e rn m e n ts  c h a n g e  th e ir  sp a tia l p la n n in g  p o lic ie s  (in the  
fie ld s  o f h o u s in g  and  th e  e co n o m y ).
A c c o rd in g  to  F lyv b je rg , th e re  are  c ritics  o f th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  w h o  a rg u e  th a t the 
s tu d y  o f a sm all n u m b e r o f  ca se s can o ffe r no g ro u n d s  fo r  e s ta b lish in g  f in d in g s  th at 
a re  re lia b le  o r th a t can b e g e n e ra lise d . A n o th e r  fre q u e n t critic ism  h e  p re se n te d  is 
th a t th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  is s u b je c t iv e  and  g iv e s  to o  m u ch  sc o p e  fo r the 
re s e a rc h e r’s o w n in te rp re ta tio n , w h ich  can  b ia s th e  f in d in g s. F lyv b je rg  in d ica te d  th at 
so m e  c ritics  sa y  th a t th e  c a se -stu d y  re se a rch  m e th o d  is m o st u sefu l as an e x p lo ra ­
to ry  to ol fo r g e n e ra tin g  h y p o th e se s. S u b se q u e n tly , th e se  critics  sa y  th a t te s tin g  of 
th e se  h y p o th e se s  and  th e o ry  b u ild in g  w o u ld  b e b e st d o n e  th ro u g h  o th e r m e th o d s o f 
re se a rch  (F lyv b je rg , 20 0 6 , 20 09).
F lyv b je rg  re fu te s  th e se  c ritic ism s  b y  e x p la in in g  and  c o rre c tin g  so m e  m isu n d e rsta n d ­
in g s and  o v e rs im p lif ic a tio n s  o f  c a se -stu d y  re se a rch . He a rg u e s th a t b o th  sta te m e n ts
-  th a t th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  is n o t su ita b le  fo r  th e  g e n e ra lisa t io n  o f f in d in g s  and 
th a t it is m o st s u ita b le  in a p re lim in a ry  sta g e  o f th e  re se a rch  fo r g e n e ra tin g  h y p o th ­
ese s  -  a re  in co rre ct. He a rg u e s th a t b o th  are  d e rive d  fro m  th e  fa c t th a t  critica ste rs  
b e lie v e  th a t o n e  c a n n o t g e n e ra lise  on th e  b a s is  o f a s in g le  case. T h is  b e lie f is in c o r­
rect, h e  says, and  co n c lu d e s  th a t th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  can o fte n  b e a p p lie d , and 
th a t it is u sefu l fo r b o th  g e n e ra t in g  and te stin g  h y p o th e se s. F ly v b je rg  (20 0 6 , p .224 - 
237; 2 0 0 9 ) sta te s  th a t th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  is ideal fo r  g e n e ra lisa t io n  b y  u s in g  the 
fa ls if ic a tio n  te st o f Karl P o p p e r -  fo r  in d e n tify in g  w h a t P o p p e r called  ‘b la c k  sw a n s ’2.
In a d d it io n , it is a lso  p o ss ib le  to  g e n e ra lise  on th e  b a sis  o f  a s in g le  case  a b o u t the 
re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  d iffe re n t fa c to rs  and  th e ir  ca u sa lity . H o w e v e r, such g e n e ra lisa tio n  
on th e  b a s is  o f o n e  o r m o re  ca se s is d iffe re n t fro m  th a t b a sed  on a la rg e  sa m p le . Th e  
tw o  re se a rch  m e th o d s d e liv e r d iffe re n t ty p e s o f k n o w le d g e , b o th  o f w h ic h  are re l­
e v a n t to  so cia l sc ie n ce . R e se a rch  b a sed  on o n e o r a fe w  ca se s  can d e liv e r k n o w le d g e  
a b o u t cau sal m e c h a n ism s w h ich  c a n n o t b e p ro v id e d  fro m  la rg e  sa m p le s, and  v ice  
v e rsa . In th is  w a y, d iffe re n t re se a rch  m e th o d s can  co m p le m e n t e a ch  o th e r 
(F lyv b je rg , 20 0 6 , p .22 1-22 3 , 20 09).
2 POPPER PROPOSED THAT IF ONE OBSERVATION DOES NOT FIT WITH THE PROPOSITION, THE 
PROPOSITION MUST BE CONSIDERED INVALID AND BE REVISED OR REJECTED. IN ORDER 
TO ILLUSTRATE THIS HE USED THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. HE PROPOSED THAT JUST ONE 
OBSERVATION OF A SINGLE BLACK SWAN WOULD FALSIFY THE PROPOSITION THAT ALLS 
SWANS ARE WHITE. HE ARGUES THAT THIS OBSERVATION OF A BLACK SWAN HAS GENERAL 
SIGNIFICANCE AND STIMULATES FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND THEORY BUILDING (FLYVB­
JERG, 2006, P.228).
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Fin ally, F lyv b je rg  (20 0 6 , p .2 3 7 ) re fu te s  th e  critica l a rg u m e n t th a t  ca se  stu d ie s  co n ­
tain  a su b je c tiv e  b ias, b y  e m p h a s is in g  th a t th e  ca se  stu d y  co n ta in s  no  g re a te r b ias 
to w a rd s  v e rif ic a tio n  o f th e  re s e a rc h e r’s p re co n c e iv e d  n o tio n s  th a n  o th e r re se a rch  
m e th o d s. M a n y  re s e a rc h e rs  u s in g  th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  h a v e  c o n c lu d e d  th a t th e ir 
p re co n c e iv e d  v ie w s, a ssu m p tio n s, co n c e p ts  and  h y p o th e se s  w e re  w ro n g  and need 
to b e re v ise d . R e se a rch  e x p e rie n c e  in d ic a te s  th a t th e  c a se -stu d y  m e th o d  c o n ta in s  a 
g re a te r b ia s  to w a rd s  fa ls if ic a tio n  o f p re co n c e iv e d  n o tio n s  th a n  to w a rd s  v e rific a tio n . 
M o re o v e r, ch o ic e s  m a d e  in q u a n tita tiv e  re se a rch  a lso  are  su b je ctiv e .
A lso  th e  m e th o d  o f  te stin g  h y p o th e se s  w a s u sed . I se le cte d  a g e n e ra l th e o ry  (m o re  
sp e c ifica lly , th e  fo u r d im e n s io n s  o f th e  PA A ) to  e x p la in  lo cal g o v e rn m e n t re a ctio n s 
to w a rd s  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  m a d e  so m e  a d a p ta tio n s  to  th is  th e o ry . B ased  on 
th is  th e o ry , fo u r d iffe re n t te sta b le  h y p o th e se s  w e re  fo rm u la te d  (se e  C h a p te r 3), 
w h ic h  w e re  te ste d  in th is  stu d y. T h e  h y p o th e se s  g a v e  a p re d ictio n  a b o u t th e  re la t io n ­
sh ip  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  and  lo cal sp a tia l p o licy . T h e  o u tc o m e  o f th is 
te s tin g  is an e x p la n a tio n  o f th e  sp e c ific  c ircu m sta n c e s  u n d e r w h ich  lo cal d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  re su lts  in lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts  a d a p tin g  th e ir  p o lic ie s  u s in g  a g e n e ra l 
(o r a d a p te d ) th e o ry . T h e  o u tc o m e  m ay  a lso  b e c o n sid e re d  a re fin e m e n t o f the 
g e n e ra l th e o ry  and  re fo rm u la t io n  o f th e  h y p o th e se s.
4.3 CRITERIA FOR CASE-STUDY SELECTION
T h re e  ca se  stu d ie s  h a v e  b een  se le cte d : P a rkstad  L im b u rg , E e m sd e lta  and  Z e e u w s- 
V la a n d e re n . B e lo w , th e  crite r ia  are  p re se n te d  on w h ich  th e  se le ctio n  w a s b ased.
T h e  f irst se le ctio n  crite r io n  w a s th a t o n ly  ca se s fro m  one country w o u ld  b e se le cte d . 
T h is  a llo w e d  fo r c o m p a rin g  lo c a tit ie s  and  re g io n s w ith in  th e  sa m e  n a tio n a l in stitu ­
t io n a l, d e m o g ra p h ic  and  e c o n o m ic  c o n te x t. By k e e p in g  n a tio n a l fa c to rs  co n sta n t, 
e m p h a s is  m a y  b e p u t on lo cal p o licy  v a ria b le s.
T h e  se co n d  se le c tio n  crite rio n  w a s th a t o n ly  ca se s fro m  the Netherlands w o u ld  be 
se le cte d . A s  I am  fa m ilia r  w ith  th e  D u tch in stitu tio n a l c o n te x t, th is  m a d e  it e a s ie r to 
g a in  m o re  in -d e p th  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t lo cal g o v e rn m e n t re a c tio n s  and  th e  co n d it io n s  
th a t in flu e n ce  them .
T h e  th ird  se le c tio n  crite rio n  re la te d  to  th e  regions th a t w o u ld  b e se le cte d . O n the  
o n e  han d  I w a n te d  to  lo o k  at th e  lo w e st p o ss ib le  scale , w h ile , on th e  o th e r, a la rg e  
e n o u g h  sca le  w a s n e e d e d  on w h ic h  I co u ld  se e  th e  c le a re st in d ica tio n  o f sh rin k a g e .
I ch o se  th e  re g io n a l sca le  b e c a u se  th e re  sh rin k a g e , a rg u a b ly , w o u ld  b e a m o re
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stru ctu ra l p h e n o m e n o n . W h e n  so lita ry  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  sh rin k , th is  m ay  a lso  be 
a ttrib u te d  to te m p o ra ry  and  sp e c ific  fa cto rs , su ch  as su b u rb a n isa tio n .
In th is  re se a rch , ‘re g io n ’ d e scrib e s  a g e o g ra p h ica l re g io n . R e g io n s m a y  b e d efin ed  
in th re e  w a ys. T h e  f irst d e fin it io n  is th a t o f th e  a d m in istra t iv e  re g io n , su ch  as th e  12 
D u tch p ro v in c e s  and  th e  e ig h t u rb an  re g io n s (Wgr-plus re g io n s3) T h e  se co n d  d e fin i­
tio n  is th e  sta tistica l re g io n . D utch re g io n s m ay  b e d e fin e d  a cc o rd in g  to  c la ssifica ­
t io n s  used  in n a tio n a l o r  E u ro p e a n  sta tistics , such as th e  COROP a re a s4 o r th e  NUTS 
a re a s  (N o m e n c la tu re  o f  T e rrito ria l U n its  fo r S ta tist ics). T h e  th ird  d e fin it io n  re fe rs to 
g e o g ra p h ica l (c u ltu ra l-h isto rica l)  re g io n s in w h ic h  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h a v e  a s im ila r  id e n ­
t ity  and  cu ltu re . P a rkstad  L im b u rg , b e ca u se  o f its m in in g  h isto ry, is g e n e ra lly  kn o w n  
as th e  e a ste rn  m in in g  area. T h e  E e m sd e lta  is a lso  g e n e ra lly  re g a rd e d  as a reg io n, 
b e c a u se  o f its in d u str ia l and  m a rit im e  c h a ra c te r and its o p en  la n d sca p e , and  Zeeuw s- 
V la a n d e re n  b e c a u se  o f  its p e rip h e ra l lo ca tio n  and  its la n d sca p e . T h e se  re g io n s have 
a stro n g  id e n tity  and  cu ltu re . In so m e  ca se s d iffe re n t d e fin it io n s  co in c id e . Z e e u w s- 
V la a n d e re n  is b o th  a g e o g ra p h ica l and a sta tistica l (COROP) reg io n , w h ile  P a rkstad  is 
b o th  a g e o g ra p h ica l and an a d m in istra t iv e  reg io n .
T h e  fo u rth  se le ctio n  crite r io n  w a s th a t o f se le c t in g  o n ly  shrinking re g io n s. A  s h rin k ­
in g  re g io n , h ere, is d e fin e d  as a re g io n  in w h ich  th e  m a jo rity  o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s , in 
th e  19 9 5 -2 0 0 8  p e rio d , had  fa ce d  and  w o u ld  b e e x p e cte d  to  fa c e  in th e  fu tu re  (up 
to  20 25 ), a d e clin e  in at le a st o n e o f th e  th re e  d istin g u ish e d  sh rin k a g e  d im e n sio n s 
(p o p u la tio n , w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la tio n  and h o u se h o ld  n u m b e rs).
T h e  re a so n  fo r  se le c t in g  re g io n s th a t are  e x p e rie n c in g  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  not 
o n ly  to d a y, b u t fo r w h ich  th is  is a lso  e x p e cte d  to  c o n tin u e  in to  th e  fu tu re , is th at 
th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  and re g io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  in th e se  re g io n s are  e x p e cte d  to be 
u n d e r m o re  p re ssu re  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  p o lic ie s. A lso , re g io n s w e re  se le cte d  th a t had 
b e e n  c o n fro n te d  w ith  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  fo r se ve ra l ye a rs, fo r  p o lic ie s  do not 
c h a n g e  o ve rn ig h t: if  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  is to o  re ce n t, th e re  m ig h t b e no  p o licy  
re sp o n se  yet.
3 THE 8 WGR-PLUS REGIONS ARE CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT URBAN AREAS WITHIN 
THE NETHERLANDS (EU, 2008).
4 NAMED AFTER THE COORDINATION COMMISSION REGIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMME
(COÖRDINATIE COMMISSIE REGIONAAL ONDERZOEKSPROGRAMMA (COROP)), WHICH, IN 
1971, DESIGNED THIS CLASSIFICATION, DIVIDING THE NETHERLANDS INTO 40 COROP AREAS.
EACH AREA CONSISTS OF A CENTRAL CITY AND SURROUNDING MUNICIPALITIES THAT USE
THE LOCAL SERVICES OF THIS CITY. THESE AREAS ALSO COVER LABOUR AND HOUSING
RELATIONS.
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4.4 DATA COLLECTING STRATEGIES
For th is  re se a rch , d a ta  w e re  co lle cte d  in v a r io u s  w a ys: d e sc rip t iv e  sta tistics , in te r­
v ie w s, d o c u m e n t a n a ly s is  and  p a rt ic ip a to ry  o b se rv a tio n s. D e scrip tiv e  s ta tistic s  w e re  
used  to a n a ly se  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  in th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s and  th e ir  
sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s. T h e  d o c u m e n t a n a lys is , in te rv ie w s and p a rtic ip a to ry  o b s e rv a ­
t io n s  w e re  used  to a n a ly se  ch a n g e s in local p o lic ie s  and  in th e  in te rv e n in g  v a riab le s. 
Each o f th e se  m e th o d s is d e scrib e d  b elo w .
D e m o g ra p h ic  d ata  w e re  used  to  d e sc rib e  th e  past, p re se n t and  fu tu re  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e v e lo p m e n ts  in th e  N e th e rla n d  at n a tio n a l, p ro v in c ia l and  m u n ic ip a lity  leve l (see 
C h a p te r 2)5. In a d d it io n , th e se  d a ta  w e re  used  to se le c t c a se -stu d y  re g io n s (see 
p re v io u s  se c tio n ) and  to d e sc rib e  th o se  ca se s (se e  S e ctio n  4 .5). To d e sc rib e  th e  p ast 
and  p re se n t d e m o g ra p h ic  tre n d s, d ata  fro m  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (C B S , 20 0 9 a ) 
w e re  u sed . T h e  e x p e cte d  fu tu re  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  w e re  d e scrib e d  using  
th e  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s  (C B S , 20 0 8 b , 20 0 9 b ), and  the 
re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  p ro je c tio n s  b y  th e  P B L N e th e rla n d s E n v iro n m e n ta l A sse ssm e n t 
A g e n c y  and  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (PEARL, 20 0 6 , 20 0 8 , 20 0 9 ; RPB and  C B S, 2006; 
P B L and  C B S, 20 0 8 ; P B L and  C B S, 20 0 9 ).
PEARL is n o t th e  o n ly  so u rce  o f  re g io n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c t io n s  fo r 
th e  N e th e rla n d s: Primos (a lso  ca lle d  Primos-lokaal) (A B F  R e se a rc h 6), IPB-Primos 
m o d e l (A B F  R e se a rc h )7, Etil p ro je c tio n s  (Etil8), and  L Ife sty le  P R O je ctio n  ((L IP R O ) 
NIDI9) a re  a lso  a v a ila b le  (D e  Jo n g , 20 0 8 ). O n e  o f th e  re a so n s fo r  u s in g  PEARL p ro je c ­
t io n s  in ste ad  o f o th e r p ro je c tio n s  is th a t th e y  are  b a se d  on n a tio n a l p ro je ctio n s: 
it is th e  re su lt  o f a c o o p e ra tio n  b e tw e e n  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (CBS) and  th e  PBL
5 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA WERE ALSO USED TO DESCRIBE THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD (SEE APPENDIX 3).
6 THIS IS A CONSULTANCY FIRM.
7 IPB-PRIMOS IS A COMBINATION OF THE FORMER IPB MODEL OF THE JOINT PROVINCES AND 
THE PRIMOS PROJECTIONS BY ABF RESEARCH. THE IPB MODEL WAS DERIVED FROM THE 
PRIMOS PROJECTIONS.
8 THESE PROJECTIONS PRESENT POPULATIONS AS WELL AS HOUSEHOLDS AND WERE DEVEL­
OPED BY DERKS (DERKS, 1996A; ETIL, 2000; DERKS ET AL., 2003), WHO AT THE TIME WORKED 
FOR THE DUTCH REGIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE CALLED ETIL (E,TIL). EVERY 4 
YEARS ETIL MAKES POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG.
9 UNLIKE THE OTHER PROJECTIONS, THIS PROJECTION PRESENTS ONLY THE EXPECTED 
HOUSEHOLD DEVELOPMENT. THIS PROJECTION WAS STARTED IN 1988 BY THE NIDI, AND HAS 
BEEN DEVELOPED BY VAN IMHOFF AND KEILMAN (DE JONG, 2008).
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N e th e rla n d s E n v iro n m e n ta l A s s e s s m e n t A g e n cy . To g e th e r, th e se  in stitu te s  h a v e  d if­
fe re n tia te d  n a tio n a l p ro je ctio n s, re g io n a lly . B e ca u se  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s, fo r m an y 
ye a rs , h a s b een  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  n a tio n a l p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je c tio n s, it 
h a s a lo t o f  e x p e rie n c e  in m a k in g  p ro je c t io n s  and  is w e ll-k n o w n  in th is  fie ld . A n o th e r 
re a so n  fo r u s in g  PEARL is th a t it p re se n ts  b o th  p o p u la tio n  and  h o u se h o ld  p ro je ctio n s  
fo r  all D u tch m u n ic ip a lit ie s . T h is  e n a b led  a c o m p a riso n  b e tw e e n  ca se  stu d ie s. Primos 
a lso  m e e ts th e se  crite ria , b u t - u n lik e  PEARL -  it is o n ly  p a rt ly  a v a ila b le  on th e  in te rn e t 
(P B L  and  C B S, 20 0 9 ). M o re o v e r, th e  a ssu m p tio n s  on w h ich  th e  PEARL is b a sed  are 
p u b lish e d , w h ich  m a k e s it le ss  o f  a b la c k  b o x  th a n  o th e r p ro je ctio n s, su ch  as Primos 
(D e  J o n g  et al., 20 0 5 ). PEARL trie s  to  p re d ict th e  fu tu re  in an o b je c tiv e  w a y. It is 
c o n s iste n t w ith  th e  n a tio n a l p ro je c tio n s  (th e  sa m e  is tru e  fo r  IPB-Primos and  Primos 
p ro je c tio n s), and  uses th e  sa m e  a ssu m p tio n s  on fe rtility , m o rta lity  and  e x te rn a l m i­
g ra tio n . T h e  m ain  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  PEARL p ro je c tio n s  on th e  o n e  s id e  and 
IPB-Primos and  Primos p ro je c t io n s  on th e  o th e r, is th a t th e  la st tw o  b a se  th e ir 
a ssu m p tio n s  re g a rd in g  m ig ra tio n  on th e  p a st m ig ra tio n  m o v e m e n ts, w h ile  PEARL 
b a se s  its a ssu m p tio n s  on th e  cu rre n t h o u s in g  p lan s. It ta k e s  a cc o u n t o f lo cal p o lic ie s  
in its p re d ictio n s, b u t d o e s n o t do so, u n crit ica lly ; lo cal p o lic ie s  a re  so m e  o f th e  m a n y  
d a ta  used  as in p u t fo r  th e  p ro je ctio n s. A lso , PEARL ta k e s  th e  p a st d e v e lo p m e n ts  in 
th e  h o u s in g  m a rk e t into  a cco u n t.
T h e  PEARL m o d e l h a s d isa d v a n ta g e s  to o. M o st c ritic ism s a re  d ire cte d  at th e  fa c t th a t 
m u n ic ip a l and  p ro v in c ia l p o lic ie s  are  used  as an in p u t fo r th e  p ro je ctio n s. T h is  m ak e s 
re g io n a l p ro je c t io n s  m o re  ro b u st, b e c a u se  it e n a b le s  th e  d e m o g ra p h e rs  to  p re d ict 
th e  in te rn a l m ig ra tio n  flo w s (D e J o n g  and  G a rsse n , 20 0 9 ). It is im p o rta n t to  n o te  th at 
all d e m o g ra p h ic  p ro je c tio n s  n eed  to b e co n sid e re d  w ith  c a u tio n  b e ca u se  th e y  are 
su rro u n d e d  b y  u n ce rta in ty . B o x 4.1 e x p la in s  th e  u n ce rta in tie s  a ro u n d  d e m o g ra p h ic  
p ro je c t io n s  and  th e  w a y  th e  p ro je c tio n s  are  used  b y  th e  g o v e rn m e n ts.
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BOX 4.1 DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS
DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS ARE UNCERTAIN, FOR THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON SOCIAL, 
CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT, 
ESPECIALLY IN THE LONG TERM. FOR EXAMPLE, BIRTH RATES ARE INFLUENCED BY 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICES ABOUT FAMILY PLANNING, MORTALITY RATES ARE INFLUENCED 
BY TRENDS IN DIFFERENT CAUSES OF DEATH. GENERALLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT 
SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY IS (INWARD AND OUT-) MIGRATION, BOTH NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT,
AS IT DEPENDS ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY, ON 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ON MIGRATION POLICIES (GRANTING OF 
ASYLUM, FAMILY REUNIFICATION, LABOUR MIGRATION) (DE JONG AND GARSSEN, 2009, 
P.83; VAN DAM ET AL., 2006; VAN DAM ET AL., 2007A).
THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PROJECTIONS IS ALSO RELATED TO TIME PERIOD AND 
GEOGRAPHIC LEVEL. UNCERTAINTY INCREASES WHEN THE GEOGRAPHICAL DETAIL 
OF PROJECTIONS INCREASES AND WHEN THE TIME PERIOD BECOMES LONGER. THIS 
MEANS THAT PROJECTIONS AT NATIONAL LEVEL ARE MORE ROBUST THAN AT REGIONAL 
LEVEL, AND PROJECTIONS AT REGIONAL LEVEL ARE MORE ROBUST THAN AT LOCAL 
(MUNICIPALITY) LEVEL (DE JONG AND GARSSEN, 2009, P.83). THE REGIONAL POPULATION 
AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS (PEARL), USED IN THIS RESEARCH, ARE FOR A SHORTER 
PERIOD THAN THE NATIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS: THE 
FORMER PROJECTIONS OF 2006 AND 2008 BOTH USE 2025 AS THEIR END YEAR, AND 
PROJECT OVER 20 AND 18 YEARS, RESPECTIVELY (RPB AND CBS, 2006; PBL AND CBS,
2008). RECENTLY, THE TIME RANGE OF THE REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
PROJECTIONS WAS EXTENDED, AND NOW USES 2040 AS END YEAR (PBL AND CBS, 2009). 
THE NATIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS USE A LONGER TIME RANGE 
AND PROJECT THE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS UP TO 2050 (CBS, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008B, 2009B).
AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
PROJECTIONS (PEARL) IS THAT IT IS BASED NOT ONLY ON BIRTH, MORTALITY, AND 
MIGRATION RATES, BUT ALSO ON MUNICIPALITY AND PROVINCIAL HOUSING POLICIES AND 
PLANS (DE JONG ET AL., 2005). THE REASON FOR INCORPORATING THESE POLICIES AND 
PLANS IS THAT PEOPLE CAN ONLY MOVE TO PLACES WHERE ENOUGH HOUSES ARE. A 
DISADVANTAGE IS THAT THE PROJECTIONS ARE NOT POLICY NEUTRAL. MOREOVER, THE 
POLICY MIGHT NOT HAVE THE INTENDED EFFECT.
THE REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS (PEARL) ARE USED IN 
DIFFERENT WAYS BY THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. FIRST, GOVERNMENTS 
USE THEM AS INPUT FOR THEIR HOUSING PLANS, PROGRAMMES AND POLICIES. 
HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT ALWAYS AWARE THAT THEIR CURRENT HOUSING PLANS AND 
POLICIES HAVE BEEN USED AS INPUT FOR THE PEARL PROJECTIONS. THE FACT THAT 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REACT TO PROJECTIONS MAY INFLUENCE THE OUTCOMES 
OF FUTURE REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS. SOME OF THE 
MUNICIPALITIES THAT ARE EXPECTED TO DECREASE RESPOND TO THIS SITUATION BY 
FORMULATING A HOUSING POLICY THAT FOCUSES ON EXTENDING THE HOUSING STOCK. 
AS THIS POLICY IS ALSO INPUT FOR THE PEARL PROJECTIONS, ITS EFFECT MAY REDUCE 
THE DECREASE EXPECTED FOR THIS MUNICIPALITY IN THE NEXT REGIONAL POPULATION 
AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS.
SECOND, GOVERNMENTS USE THE PEARL PROJECTIONS IN A STRATEGIC WAY. THEY USE 
THEM, FOR EXAMPLE, AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR POLICIES OR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE. 
WHEN THEIR POLICY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROJECTIONS, POLITICIANS AND 
POLICYMAKERS REFER TO THE PROJECTIONS TO INDICATE THAT THEY DID THE RIGHT 
THING AND MADE THE RIGHT POLICY DECISIONS. USED IN THIS WAY, THE FACT THAT THE
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PROJECTIONS ARE UNCERTAIN AND THAT LOCAL POLICY IS USED AS INPUT FOR THE 
PROJECTIONS IS OFTEN NEGLECTED. WHEN THEIR POLICY IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE PROJECTIONS AND/OR THE PROJECTIONS ARE PESSIMISTIC, POLITICIANS 
AND POLICYMAKERS TEND TO NEGLECT OR REFER TO THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE 
PROJECTIONS11.
THIRD, POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD PROJECTIONS ARE ALSO USED BY GOVERNMENTS 
AS A BARGAINING TOOL IN NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER GOVERNMENT LEVELS ABOUT 
HOUSING PROGRAMMES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. THE FACT THAT PROJECTIONS 
ARE UNCERTAIN IS OFTEN NEGLECTED BY POLITICIANS AND POLICYMAKERS WHEN 
THEY USE THE PROJECTIONS IN THIS WAY. ACTORS USE PROJECTIONS THAT BEST FIT 
THEIR INTERESTS. DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS OFTEN USE DIFFERENT PROJECTIONS, 
SOMETIMES RESULTING IN DISCUSSIONS AND ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE PROJECTIONS 
USED AND ABOUT THE DECISIONS THAT ARE BASED ON THOSE PROJECTIONS.
D e scrip tiv e  sta tistics  w e re  used  n o t o n ly  to  d e sc rib e  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e v e lo p m e n ts  but 
a lso  to  fin d  o u t w h ic h  sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s  to o k  p la ce  as a re su lt  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e  in th e  se le cte d  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s. C h a n g e s w e re  a n a ly se d  in h o u s in g  prices, 
in th e  tim e  th a t p ro p e rtie s  a re  on th e  m a rk e t, v a ca n c y  ra te s and  tu rn o v e r ra te s fo r 
re n te d  so cia l h o u sin g , and  in c o n c e n tra t io n s  o f lo w -in co m e  h o u se h o ld s. Fo r h o u sin g  
p rice s, d a ta  fro m  th e  D u tch land  re g istry  o ffice  (Kadaster) w e re  u sed . F ig u res on the 
le n g th  o f tim e  p ro p e rt ie s  w e re  on th e  m a rk e t w e re  b a sed  on d ata  fro m  th e  NVM , the 
D u tch a sso c ia tio n  o f real e sta te  b ro k e rs  and  real e sta te  e x p e rts . F ig u res on v a ca n c y  
ra te s o f  re n te d  h o u s in g  w e re  b a se d  on d a ta  fro m  th e  C e n tra l H o u sin g  Fund 
(CFV-Bbsh), and  d a ta  on tu rn o v e r ra te s w e re  b a sed  on a n n u a l re p o rts  b y  in d iv id u al 
h o u s in g  a sso c ia t io n s  th a t are  a ctiv e  in th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s. In fo rm a tio n  a b o u t 
lo w -in co m e  h o u se h o ld s  in th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s w a s ta k e n  fro m  re g io n a l in co m e  re ­
se a rch  b y  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s (CBS-RIO ). T h e  re su lts  fro m  th is  p a rt o f th e  re se a rch  
are  p re se n te d  in C h a p te r 5.
For th e  a n a ly sis  in C h a p te r 6, se ve ra l e c o n o m ic  in d ic a to rs  w e re  used. E x a m p le s  are 
d e v e lo p m e n ts  in v a ca n c y  ra te s o f reta il p ro p e rtie s , in g ro ss  p a rt ic ip a tio n  leve l, in 
la b o u r fo rce , and  in u n e m p lo y m e n t rate , and ch a n g e s in th e  g ro ss  re g io n a l d o m e s­
t ic  p ro d u c t and  g ro ss  re g io n a l p ro d u c t p e r in h a b ita n t, in th e  n u m b e r o f  e stab lish e d  
firm s, n e w ly  e sta b lish e d  firm s, firm  c lo su re s  and  jo b s, in e a ch  e c o n o m ic  secto r. 
C h a n g e s  in p a rtic ip a tio n  leve l and u n e m p lo y m e n t rate  w e re  b a sed  on EBB d a ta  from  
S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s. To p re se n t v a c a n c y  ra te s fo r reta il p ro p e rtie s , d ata  fro m  
L o ca tu s w e re  u sed . D ata fro m  S ta tist ic s  N e th e rla n d s w e re  used  fo r p re se n tin g  the
10 THE LITERATURE ON DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE SHOWS THAT THIS BEHAVIOUR IS NOT EXCEP­
TIONAL AND OCCURS NOT ONLY IN THE NETHERLANDS BUT ALSO ABROAD. WIECHMANN,
WHO STUDIED GERMAN SHRINKING CITIES, ALSO SHOWED THAT LOCAL POLITICIANS OFTEN 
NEGLECT PESSIMISTIC PROJECTIONS (E.G. WIECHMANN, 2008).
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d e v e lo p m e n t in g ro ss  re g io n a l d o m e stic  p ro d u c t and  la b o u r fo rce . D ata fro m  the 
N e th e rla n d s C h a m b e r o f C o m m e rc e  w e re  used  fo r  p re se n tin g  th e  ch a n g e s in the  
n u m b e r o f e sta b lish e d  firm s, n e w ly  e sta b lish e d  firm s and  firm  c lo su re s. F inally, using  
LISA d ata, ch a n g e s in th e  n u m b e r o f jo b s  in ea ch  e c o n o m ic  s e c to r are  p re se n te d .
T h e  in te rv ie w s can b e d iv id e d  into  tw o  d iffe re n t typ e s. First, m o re  g e n e ra l in te r­
v ie w s w e re  held  w ith  e x p e rts, m o st o f  th e m  w o rk in g  fo r  u n iv e rs it ie s  and  k n o w le d g e  
in st itu te s  and  p o lic y m a k e rs  w o rk in g  fo r th e  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t. T h e  m ain  a im  w as 
to  g a in  in s ig h ts  into  th e  cau sal re la t io n sh ip s  b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h y  and  h o u sin g , and 
b e tw e e n  d e m o g ra p h y  and  e co n o m y , b u t a lso  to  o b ta in  in s ig h t in to  n a tio n a l g o v e rn ­
m e n t p o lic ie s. S e co n d ly , in te rv ie w s w e re  held  w ith in  th e  se le cte d  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s. 
T h e  m ain  g o al o f th o se  in te rv ie w s w a s to  g a in  in -d e p th  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  spatia l 
c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e , and  a b o u t local re a c tio n s  to  d e m o g ra p h ic  
d e clin e . In te rv ie w s w e re  held  w ith  g o v e rn m e n t o ffic ia ls fro m  lo cal, re g io n a l and 
p ro v in c ia l g o v e rn m e n ts  and  fro m  n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t. T h e  in te rv ie w s h e lp e d  n o t 
o n ly  to  tra ce  ch a n g e s in p o lic y  co n te n t, b u t a lso  to  re c o n stru c t th e  p o licy  p ro ce ss. In 
a d d it io n , th e y  p ro v id e d  in s ig h t into  th e  c o n d it io n s  th a t in flu e n ce  p o lic y  ch a n g e . To 
o b ta in  a c o m p re h e n s iv e  v ie w , a g e n ts w e re  a lso  in te rv ie w e d  fro m  p ro p e rty  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t co m p a n ie s, h o u s in g  a sso c ia tio n s, b u s in e sse s, c h a m b e rs  o f c o m m e rce , and 
th e  co n fe d e ra tio n  o f sm all and  m e d iu m -s iz e d  e n te rp rise s. T h e se  in te rv ie w s w e re  
co n d u cte d  to  re fle ct on local g o v e rn m e n t stra te g y , sp a tia l c o n se q u e n ce s  o f d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e, and co n d it io n s  th a t in flu e n ce  lo cal p o lic y  re a c tio n s  to w a rd s  d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e.
In to ta l, 81 p e rso n s  w e re  in te rv ie w e d . M o st in te rv ie w s w e re  co n d u cte d  in th e  p eriod  
b e tw e e n  20 08  and  2 0 0 9 11. A p p e n d ix  1 p ro v id e s  an o v e rv ie w  o f re sp o n d e n ts, 
m a k in g  a d ist in c tio n  b e tw e e n  g e n e ra l e x p e rts, n a tio n a l p o lic y m a k e rs, and  e x p e rts  in 
th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s. In each  c a se -stu d y  re g io n , a d iffe re n t n u m b e r of 
re sp o n d e n ts  w e re  in te rv ie w e d : 27 in P a rkstad  L im b u rg , 18 in th e  E e m sd e lta , and 16 in 
Z e e u w s-V la a n d e re n . T h e  re su lts  fro m  th e  in te rv ie w s w ith  g e n e ra l e x p e rts  h a ve  been 
d e scrib e d  in C h a p te r 2; C h a p te rs  5 and  6 p re se n t re su lts  fro m  in te rv ie w s in th e  c a s e ­
stu d y  re g io n s and  w ith  n a tio n a l p o licym a k e rs.
T h e  d o c u m e n t a n a ly sis  w a s used  to  tra ce  local re a c tio n s  (in  th e  fo rm  o f spatia l 
p o licy ) to  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e. T h e  d istin ctio n , m a d e  in C h a p te r 3, b e tw e e n  
s tra te g ic  and  o p e ra tio n a l p la n s and  a ctio n s  w a s used  fo r c a te g o ris in g  th e  ch a n g e s
11 A FEW INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED IN 2006 AND 2007 FOR THE RESEARCH ON 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT (VAN DAM ET AL., 2006) AND THE 
RESEARCH ON DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND HOUSING (VERWEST ET AL., 2008).
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th a t w e re  fo u n d  in th e  p lan s. A n  a n a ly sis  w a s m a d e  o f th e  lo cal sp a tia l p o lic ie s  and 
a ctio n s  in th e  fie ld  o f h o u s in g  and  th e  e co n o m y . T h is  in c lu d e s p o lic ie s  a n d /o r a ctio n s 
on h o u sin g , re g io n a l e co n o m y , la b o u r m arke t, re ta il, and  on b u sin e ss, in d u str ia l and 
o ffice  lo c a t io n s12.
In v e stig a te d  w e re  th e  sp a tia l p o lic ie s  on h o u s in g  and  th e  e co n o m y , fo rm u la te d  by 
lo cal, re g io n a l and  p ro v in c ia l a u th o ritie s  w ith in  th e  c a se -stu d y  re g io n s. N ext to  cu r­
re n t p o lic y  d o c u m e n ts  (up  to  A p ril 20 10 ), th o se  fro m  th e  p re ce d in g  y e a rs  a lso  w ere  
a n a ly se d . T h e  ye a rs  fo r  w h ic h  th e  f irst p la n s w e re  a n a lyse d  d iffer fo r each  c a se -stu d y, 
b e c a u se  o f d iffe re n ce s  in th e  d a te s  on w h ic h  th o se  re g io n s (and  m u n ic ip a lit ie s) 
f irst fa ce d  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (a lso  ca lle d  tu rn in g  p o in t) (se e  a lso  F ig u re  4.16).
T h e  d a te s  d iffe r n o t o n ly  p e r c a se -stu d y  re g io n , b u t a lso  p e r p o licy  on h o u s in g  and 
e co n o m y . For th e  e c o n o m ic  p o lic ie s, th e  d e clin e  in w o rk in g  age p o p u la tio n , w h ich  
in all re g io n s sta rte d  p r io r  to  p o p u la tio n  a n d /o r h o u se h o ld  d e clin e , is im p o rta n t, too 
(se e  a lso  F ig ure  4 .16 ). M o re  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  sta rt in g  d ate s o f th e  d o cu m e n t 
a n a ly se s  can  b e fo u n d  in S e ctio n s  5.3 and  6 .3. In clu d ed  w e re  n o t o n ly  s tra te g ic  and 
o p e ra tio n a l p lan s, but, fo r e x a m p le , a lso  p o litica l c o a lit io n  a g re e m e n ts, re p o rts  by 
c o n su lta n ts , n o te s  (m e m o s), in te rn e t p a g e s o f in v o lv e d  a cto rs , d o c u m e n ta rie s , in fo r­
m atio n  film s, p o s itio n  p a p e rs  and p u b lic  in fo rm a tio n . For each  c a se -stu d y  re g io n , an 
o v e rv ie w  w a s m a d e  o f th e  re le v a n t p o lic y  d o c u m e n ts, and  th e y  w e re  a n a ly se d  to see 
w h e th e r th e y  d isc u ss  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e, th e  p o lic y  re a c tio n s  to  it, p o licy  o b je c ­
t iv e s  o r p o lic y  fo cu s. T h is  d o c u m e n t a n a ly sis  p ro v id e d  in s ig h t into  p o licy  c o n te n t and 
in to  th e  w a y  th is  c h a n g e d , o v e r tim e . For each  c a se -stu d y  re g io n , ch a n g e s in stra te ­
g ic  and  o p e ra tio n a l p o lic ie s  and  ch a n g e s in a ctio n s  a re  d e scrib e d . T h e  re su lts  fro m  
th is  d o c u m e n t a n a ly sis  are  p re se n te d  in C h a p te rs  5 and  6.
In o rd e r to  d e sc rib e  th e  p o licy  re a ctio n , a d istin ctio n  b e tw e e n  p o licy  sta b ility , co n ­
s e rv a tiv e  lo cal p o licy  c h a n g e  and  ra d ica l local p o licy  c h a n g e  is used  (see  a lso  C h a p te r 
3). W h e n  a lo cal g o v e rn m e n t d o e s n o t e x p lic it ly  m e n tio n  d e m o g ra p h ic  d e clin e  in its 
p o lic y  th is  is ca lle d  p o lic y  sta b ility . T h is  m e a n s th a t th e  w o rd s th a t re fe r to  d e m o ­
g ra p h ic  d e clin e  (e.g. p o p u la tio n  d e clin e, h o u se h o ld  d e clin e , d e c lin e  in w o rk in g  age 
p o p u la t io n ) a re  n o t p re se n t in th e  p o licy  d o cu m e n ts. W h e n  th o se  w o rd s  a re  p re ­
s e n t th e re  can  b e a c o n se rv a tiv e  o r ra d ica l p o licy  ch a n g e . W e  sp e a k  o f a c o n se rv a ­
tiv e  c h a n g e  w h e n  th e  p o lic y  re a ctio n  and  p o lic y  o b je ctiv e  fo cu s  on c o m b a tin g  th is  
d e clin e ; w e  sp e a k  o f a ra d ica l c h a n g e  w h e n  th e se  re a c tio n s  fo cu s  on a cc e p tin g  this 
d e clin e . T h e  d iffe re n ce  b e tw e e n  b o th  ty p e s o f c h a n g e  can  b e d e rive d  fro m  th e  fo r­
m u la te d  p o lic y  o b je c tiv e  (se e  S e ctio n  3 .3 ) and  th e  se le cte d  re a c tio n s  (se e  F ig ure  3.1).
12 THESE PLANS, THUS, MAY BE STRATEGIC OR OPERATIONAL. ONLY THE PLANS ON LABOUR
MARKET ARE MAINLY STRATEGIC.
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The Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the local strategic plans in detail. Local operational 
plans also are described, but not every local operational plan within the case-study 
region was analysed separately. However, during the interviews, the question was 
asked whether local governments adapt their operational plans in order to deal with 
demographic decline. The distinction between strategic and operational plans made 
in Chapter 3 is not always clear in the plans. A  provincial structure plan (streekplan13), 
for example, could be both strategic and operational. It is called ‘operational’ when it 
contains specific policy statements (binding decisions). The rest of such a plan would 
then be strategic.
The document analysis focuses on the policy reactions in the shrinking region. How­
ever, Parkstad Limburg is the only case-study in a formal region (W gr-plus status14) 
and the description focuses on the policy reaction of its regional organisation. In 
the other two case studies, the inter-municipal cooperative reactions are discussed 
and attention is focused on the policy reactions in the central cities of the region 
(the largest municipalities of the region); Delfzijl in the Eemsdelta and Terneuzen in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. For all case-study regions, descriptions of policy changes are 
given also at provincial level.
It is important to note that the municipality, region and province are not uniform 
organisations. Different roles may be distinguished, such as those of mayor, alder­
man, local council, Provincial Council and member of the Provincial Executive. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 these different roles are referred to, because they may be relevant 
for explaining the policy reactions towards demographic decline.
The final data collecting strategy that was used, was participatory observation. 
During this research, I took part in or attended seminars, workshops, congresses, 
debates, talks, and open information evenings about demographic decline. There I 
could listen to actors’ reactions to demographic decline. This increased the insight 
into both government reactions (and possible changes) and the conditions that influ­
ence those reactions. During this study, I was also actively involved in the subject, 
in my position as researcher at the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency, which is the national institute for strategic policy analysis in the field of
13 SINCE THE APPROVAL OF THE NEW SPATIAL PLANNING ACT IN 2008, THE PROVINCIAL STRUC­
TURE PLAN (STREEKPLAN) HAS BEEN ABOLISHED.
14 IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING HOUSING (AND SOME OTHER POLICY 
FIELDS) HAVE BEEN PARTLY SHIFTED (SINCE 2006) FROM MUNICIPALITY LEVEL TO THAT OF 
THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION PARKSTAD LIMBURG; INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITIES RELIN­
QUISHED THEIR HOUSING POLICY FREEDOM IN FAVOUR OF THE REGION.
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environment, nature and spatial planning. From this position, I participated in the 
public and academic debate on demographic decline by writing reports and articles 
and giving presentations on this subject to a variety of parties, including adminis­
trators and politicians at local, regional and provincial governments and national 
government. I was, for example, co-author of a research on demographic decline 
and spatial development (Krimp en Ruimte. Bevolkingsafname, ruimtelijke gevolgen  
en beleid) (Van Dam et al., 2006) and lead author of a report on regional shrinkage 
and housing (Regionale krimp en woningbouw. Om gaan m et een transformatieopgave) 
(Verwest et al., 2008b). In this sense, I have been part of my own research area and 
have influenced my research subject to a greater or lesser extent. It is for example 
thinkable that the studies and articles I wrote and the presentations I gave inspired 
(urged) local governments to adapt their local spatial policies on demographic de­
cline.
4.5 DEMOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF CA SE­
STUDY REGIONS
This section describes the past, present and expected future demographic develop­
ments in the three case-study regions of Parkstad Limburg, Eemsdelta and Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen. The distinction between the decline in population, household numbers 
and working age population, as described in Chapter 2, is used in this description. In 
order to describe the demographic decline, the size and duration of the decline are 
used. As described in Chapter 3, the size (extent) of decline refers to the (percentage 
of the) decrease in population, household numbers and working age population, 
during a certain period of time. The duration of the decline refers to the length of 
time the region and its municipalities have been or are expected to be confronted 
with different types of decline.
The PEARL projections are used for describing future demographic developments in 
the three case-study regions. However, in these regions other projections are com­
monly used. In Parkstad Limburg, most actors use the Etil projections. In the other 
two case-study regions most actors use the Primos projections or the IPB model15.
The outcomes of the PEARL projections may differ from those outcomes of projec­
tions used by the actors in the case-study regions.
15 THE PROVINCES OF GRONINGEN AND ZEELAND, FOR EXAMPLE, USE THE IPB MODEL. THIS
MODEL PROVIDES THEM THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROJECTIONS FOR EACH MUNICIPAL­
ITY AND/OR REGION IN THEIR PROVINCE.
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4.5.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
Parkstad Limburg is located in the south of the Netherlands at the border with 
Germany, in the province of Limburg (see Figure 4.1). Parkstad Limburg encompasses 
178 km2 and has 237,663 inhabitants (CBS, 2009a). It contains seven municipalities, 
the largest of which is Heerlen with 89,356 inhabitants (CBS, 2009a) (see Figure 4.2).
In 1999, these seven municipalities decided on a collaboration. The objective of this 
regional collaboration was to strengthen the socio-economic position of the region 
by characterising it as one urban area. In population numbers, the seven municipali­
ties together form the fifth ‘city’ of the Netherlands. Initially, the region contained 
eight municipalities (including Nuth). However, in 2002, Nuth pulled ouf ot the 
regional collaboration, as it considered that the collaboration did not pay enough 
attention to the differences between urban and rural municipalities16.
These seven municipalities form a region under the Joint Regulations Act (Wgr-plus), 
which means that they w ork together in the fields of housing, spatial planning, land 
use, environment, traffic, public transport and the economy (Ministerie van VRO M  et 
al., 2006). In 2006, the municipalities received this W gr-plus status. Unlike the other 
Wgr-plus regions, Parkstad Limburg applied for this status itself. This W gr-plus region 
has a number of statutory tasks, including the formulation of a regional housing 
policy, acting as a commissioning authority for public transport, subsidising regional 
infrastructure, and organising youth welfare (EU, 2008). In order to improve coop­
eration between the seven municipalities and to implement those tasks, a regional 
organisation has been set up, under the name Parkstad Limburg17. In this study, the 
term Parkstad Limburg is used to refer to the region, and the term regional organisa­
tion Parkstad Limburg is used in reference to the regional organisation.
16 ON 2 NOVEMBER 2009, NUTH DECIDED TO JOIN PARKSTAD LIMBURG AGAIN. WHEN IN THE 
FOLLOWING CHAPTERS PARKSTAD LIMBURG IS MENTIONED, IT REFERS TO THE SEVEN 
MUNICIPALITIES (EXCLUDING NUTH). WHEN NUTH DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG, THE DATA GATHERING FOR THIS STUDY ALREADY HAD BEEN COMPLETED.
17 THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION PARKSTAD LIMBURG DOES NOT HAVE A DIRECTLY ELECTED 
COUNCIL. THE PARKSTAD LIMBURG COUNCIL CONSISTS OF 31 MEMBERS. THE NUMBER 
OF MEMBERS APPOINTED PER MUNICIPALITY DEPENDS ON ITS SIZE. THE EXECUTIVE OF 
PARKSTAD LIMBURG CONSISTS OF ONE ALDERMAN FROM EACH MUNICIPALITY, A SECRETARY 
AND A CHAIRMAN (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2009E).
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F IG U RE 4.1 PARKSTAD  LIMBURG. SOURCE: ESRI.
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FIGURE 4.2 POPULATION, HOUSEHOLDS AND WORKING AGE POPULATION NUMBERS IN 2009. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A.
WORKING AGE
POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS POPULATION
BRUNSSUM 29,532 13,618 17,933
HEERLEN 89,356 44,395 55,206
KERKRADE 48,076 22,802 30,121
LANDGRAAF 38,713 17,250 24,081
ONDERBANKEN 8,147 3,443 4,956
SIMPELVELD 11,090 4,772 6,695
VOERENDAAL 12,749 5,478 7,590
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 237,663 111,758 146,582
PROVINCE LIMBURG 1,122,604 501,215 685,782
THE NETHERLANDS 16,485,787 7,312,579 10,080,387
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Parkstad Limburg is also known as the eastern mining district (Oostelijke Mijnstreek). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the coal mining industry and related industries (e.g. DSM) 
were flourishing, which resulted in a peak in the population of 250,000 inhabitants. 
After the demise of the mining industry, the region was exposed to considerable 
structural changes, resulting in high unemployment, rapidly decreasing prosperity, 
and decreasing birth rates (INTERREG IIIb, 2006, p.5). The area is characterised by a 
polycentric urban structure; the cities of Heerlen, Kerkrade, Landgraaf and Brunssum 
are more urban, the other three municipalities are more rural in nature. The urban 
areas are separated from each other by a green and hilly countryside. This country­
side makes this area popular am ong tourists.
Since 1997, the population has declined in Parkstad Limburg. Between 1997 and 
2008, it declined by 15,800, which is about 6.2%18. This demographic decline is mainly 
due to a negative natural balance caused by low birth rates, an increase in youth 
emigration and by an ageing population19. The region is one of the first in the Neth­
erlands with a substantial demographic decline. It is not only declining in population, 
but also in household numbers and working age population. Since 2002, the number 
of households in Parkstad Limburg has declined, and, since 1993, so has the working 
age population.
According to the regional population and household projections (PBL and CBS,
2009), Parkstad Limburg is expected to continue to decline. In 1997, it had 254,498 
inhabitants and this number is expected to decrease to 222,945 inhabitants by 2025 
(-12.4%) and to 200,115 by 2040 (-21.4%) (see Figure 4.3). The decline in household 
numbers and in working age population also is expected to continue; household 
numbers are expected to decrease from 111,556 in 2002 to 108,932 by 2025 (-2.4%) 
and to 98,186 by 2040 (-12.0%) (see Figure 4.4). For the working age population, num­
bers are expected to decline from 160,495 (in 1993) to 121,624 by 2025 (-24.2%) and to 
100,957 by 2040 (-37.1%) (see Figure 4.5).
The province of Limburg, as a whole, also experiences demographic decline. The 
population has been decreasing since 2002; from 1,143,296 down to 1,123,705 in 
2008 (-1.7%). Between 2008 and 2025, the population of the province is expected to 
continue to decline by 3.6%, and between 2008 and 2040 by 7.8% (see Figure 4.3). The 
province’s working age population reached its peak of 721,213 in 1995, after which it
18 FROM 254,498 IN 1997 TO 238,698 IN 2008 (CBS, 2008A).
19 VERWEST ET AL. (2010) ILLUSTRATE FOR EACH DUTCH MUNICIPALITY WHETHER THE NATURAL 
BALANCE AND MIGRATION BALANCE HAVE BEEN POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, BETWEEN 2000 AND 
2008.
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decreased by 4.7% (33,791 people) between 1995 and 2008. According to the projec­
tions, this decline will continue; 13.2% between 2008 and 2025, and 23.0% between 
2008 and 2040 (see Figure 4.5). To date, there has been no decline in number of 
households in the province as a whole. According to the projections, the number 
of households in the province as a whole will reach a peak of 517,664 by 2023, and 
subsequently will decline to 493,525 by 2040 (-4.7%).
Certain municipalities in the Parkstad Limburg region were already experiencing a 
declining population in 1997. In Kerkrade, one of the first, this started in 1992. 
Between 1992 and 2008, its resident numbers fell from 55,364 to 48,334, a drop of 
12.7%. According to the regional population projections (PBL and CBS, 2009), this 
population decline will continue (see Figure 4.3). By 2025, Kerkrade is expected 
to have 6.7% fewer inhabitants than it had in 2008 (see Figure 4.3). The number of 
households in Kerkrade reached its peak of 22,946 in 2004. Thereafter, this number 
fell by 0.5% to 22,821 by 2008. The regional population and household projections 
(PBL and CBS, 2009) predict that, between 2008 and 2025, the number of house­
holds in Kerkrade will decrease by 2.2% (see Figure 4.4).
In Heerlen, the largest city in Parkstad Limburg, the population started to decline 
in 1995. Between 1995 and 2008, the number of inhabitants fell from 96,274 to 
89,671 (-6.9%). In 2002, the number of households was the highest (44,979), and, by 
2008, 794 households had been lost (-1.8%). The regional population and household 
projections (PBL and CBS, 2009) predict that, between 2008 and 2025, the number 
of inhabitants will decrease by -6.2% (see Figure 4.3) and the number of households 
by -4.3% (see Figure 4.4). This means that the largest (1,902) decline in household 
numbers, between 2008 and 2025, is expected to take place in Heerlen (PBL and 
CBS, 2009).
The demographic decline expected for Parkstad Limburg, between 2008 and 2025 
(and between 2008 and 2040), will be caused mainly by a negative natural balance 
and negative net migration. The negative natural balance is the result of low fertil­
ity rates and high mortality rates. The latter because of ageing and health problems 
caused by, for example, working in the mines. The out-migration (to other Dutch re­
gions as well as to countries such as Germany and Belgium) is expected to be higher 
than the inward migration (Jong and Verwest, 2009; Borgman and Renooy, 2009).
The population composition in the case-study regions differs from the national aver­
age (Chapter 1). This difference is expected to continue. The share of 65-year-old or 
older inhabitants of Parkstad Limburg is expected to increase and to stay above the
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Dutch average, and the share of under-19-year-olds is expected to decrease and to 
stay below the Dutch average (PBL and CBS, 2009).
FIGURE 4.3 NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, AND 
TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AND 2040. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
BRUNSSUM 30,464 29,742 29,200 27,537 -2.4 +1.8
HEERLEN 96,274 89,671 84,100 73,303 -6.9 -6.2
KERKRADE 52,647 48,334 45,100 40,495 -8.2 -6.7
LANDGRAAF 41,165 38,748 35,125 30,683 -5.9 -9.4
ONDERBANKEN 8,463 8,240 7,886 8,012 -2.6 -4.3
SIMPELVELD 11,935 11,206 9,907 8,811 -6.1 -11.6
VOERENDAAL 13,197 12,757 11,627 11,274 -3.3 -8.9
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 254,145 238,698 222,945 200,115 -6.1 -6.6
PROVINCE LIMBURG 1,130,050 1,,123,705 1,083,651 1,035,919 -0.6 +3.6
THE NETHERLANDS 15,424,122 16,405,399 17,221,070 17,473817 +6.4 +5.0
FIGURE 4.4 NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, AND 
TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AND 2040. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
BRUNSSUM 12,937 13,605 13,883 12,902 +5.2 +2.0
HEERLEN 43,292 44,185 42,283 37,554 +2.1 -4.3
KERKRADE 22,496 22,821 22,317 20,064 + 1.4 -2.2
LANDGRAAF 16,501 17,097 16,827 14,805 +3.6 -1.6
ONDERBANKEN 3,303 3,460 3,603 3,597 +4.8 +4.1
SIMPELVELD 4,683 4,755 4,609 4,075 + 1.5 -3.1
VOERENDAAL 5,002 5,441 5,410 5,189 +8.8 -0.6
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 108,214 111,364 108,932 98,186 +2.9 -2.2
PROVINCE LIMBURG 459,157 497,564 516,871 493,525 +8.4 +3.9
THE NETHERLANDS 6,468,677 7,242,202 8,053,081 8,264,984 +12.0 +11.2
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FIGURE 4.5 WORKING AGE POPULATION NUMBERS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG, AND TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 
AND 2040. SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
BRUNSSUM 18,771 18,079 16,100 13,920 -3.7 -10.9
HEERLEN 60,269 55,306 46,634 37,409 -8.2 -15.7
KERKRADE 33,282 30,269 24,619 20,816 -9.1 -18.7
LANDGRAAF 26,418 24,188 18,776 15,274 -8.4 -22.4
ONDERBANKEN 5,454 4,988 4,233 3,897 -8.5 -15.1
SIMPELVELD 7,717 6,803 5,299 4,296 -11.8 -22.1
VOERENDAAL 8,495 7,653 5,963 5,345 -9.9 -22.1
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 160,406 147,286 121,624 100,957 -8.2 -17.4
PROVINCE LIMBURG 721,213 687,422 596,350 528,998 -4.7 -13.2
THE NETHERLANDS 9,630,391 10,050,123 9,800,627 9,194,441 +4.4 -2.5%
4.5.2 EEMSDELTA
The Eemsdelta is situated in the north of the Netherlands, at the German border 
(see Figure 4.6). It consists of four municipalities, of which Delfzijl is the largest with 
26,744 inhabitants (CBS, 2009a). The Eemsdelta is 457 km2 in size and has 65,888 
inhabitants (CBS, 2009a). Since 2003, the municipalities of Delfzijl, Appingedam and 
Eemsmond have been working together on a voluntary basis, under the name of 
Eemsdelta; Loppersum started to participate in 2008.
The Eemsdelta has an industrial character and two seaports: Eemshaven and Delfzijl. 
The opening of the Eemshaven in 1973 was the result of industrial developments 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Initially, the aim was to facilitate large-scale industrial de­
velopment, incorporating oil refineries and the (petro-) chemical industry. However, 
this initiative was frustrated by the oil crisis of the 1970s and the following reces­
sion (Eemshaven, 2009; Knol, 2004). As a result, in the 1990s, authorities decided 
to develop the Eemshaven -  not into an industrial port but into a more logistically 
oriented port. The area is characterised by the location of energy-related and chemi­
cal industries. Examples are D SM  and Akzo Nobel. Recently, energy suppliers NUON  
and RWE decided to build new power stations in the Eemsdelta.
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F IG U RE 4.6 EEMSDELTA. SOURCE: ESR I
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FIGURE 4.7 POPULATION, HOUSEHOLD AND WORKING AGE POPULATION NUMBERS, IN 2009. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A.
POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS
WORKING AGE 
POPULATION
APPINGEDAM 12,114 5,443 7,109
DELFZIJL 26,744 11,816 15,574
EEMSMOND 16,487 6,895 9,657
LOPPERSUM 10,543 4,382 6,356
EEMSDELTA 65,888 28,536 38,696
PROVINCE GRONINGEN 574,092 274,160 357,292
THE NETHERLANDS 16,485,787 7,312,579 10,080,387
The Eemsdelta is part of the Province of Groningen. This province can be divided into 
two parts: the prosperous part central and west Groningen, and the less prosperous 
part of east and north Groningen20. In the latter part, the population is declining and 
also ageing, whereas in the former part, the population continues to grow  (Van Til et 
al., 2007, p.2). The province is divided not only according to population numbers, but 
also to employment, unemployment, income, level of education, and housing prices.
20 NORTH GRONINGEN IS ALSO KNOWN AS THE EEMSDELTA.
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In north and east Groningen, unemployment rates are higher and growth in employ­
ment is slower than in central and west Groningen. With respect to income, Delfzijl 
and its environs continue to lag behind the rest of the province. The level of educa­
tion of the population in this region remains stable, whereas it is rising in the rest of 
the province (Van Til et al., 2007c, p.2).
Since 1981, the population of Eemsdelta has been decreasing. Between 1995 and
2008, the decrease was 2.6%. Since 2003, the number of households have also 
declined, and since 1993, so has the working age population. The demographic 
decline is caused primarily by the negative domestic migration balance (Van Til et al., 
2007c, p.3). People move, following the opportunities for employment or housing, 
from the Eemsdelta to Groningen or to other Dutch or German regions. The natural 
balance is also negative (Borgman and Renooy, 2009).
According to the regional population and household projections (PBL and CBS,
2009), the Eemsdelta will continue to shrink. For the period between 2008 and 2025, 
the population is expected to decrease by 7,033 inhabitants (-10.5%) (see Figure 4.8), 
the number of households by 1,181 (-4.1%) (see Figure 4.9), and working age popula­
tion numbers by 7,610 (-19.3%) (see Figure 4.10).
Within the region, the municipality of Delfzijl was the first to be hit by demographic 
decline. In the 1960s, it was expected that Delfzijl would grow  to 80,000 inhabitants 
by 2000. This was based on the national spatial planning policy of the 1950s, which 
was to spread industry throughout the country. Delfzijl was chosen by the national 
government to be one of the 27 Dutch industrial centres (industrialisatiekernen) 
(Knol, 2004). This expected growth was also based on the demographic growth 
experienced in the 1950s and 1960s (Knol, 2004)21. Because employment was expect­
ed to rise, the local housing stock was expanded greatly. Those high expectations 
were not fulfilled. During the 1970s, the industrial sector suffered hard setbacks (Van 
Til et al., 2007c, p.6), employment levels dropped by more than expected, and from 
1981 the population of Delfzijl declined. In 1981, Delfzijl was at its peak, with 34,491 
inhabitants (CBS, 2009a).
The province of Groningen as a whole is also confronted with decline. Population 
numbers have started to decrease from 2005, and, from 2006, so has the working 
age population. Between 2005 and 2008, the population numbers fell from 575,072
21 IN 1964, DELFZIJL REACHED A POPULATION OF 18,000 INHABITANTS, WHILE IN THE 1950S IT 
WAS PROJECTED THAT DELFZIJL WOULD NOT REACH THIS POPULATION NUMBER UNTIL 1975 
(KNOL, 2004).
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in 2005 to 573,459 in 2008 (-0.3%), and the working age population from 358,800 in 
2006 to 357,652 in 2008 (-0.3%). Despite this recent decline, the regional population 
and household projections (PBL and CBS, 2009) expect the province’s population 
to grow  from 573,459 in 2008 to 592,067 by 2025 (+3.2%) (see Figure 4.8)22. In this 
period, the number of households also is expected to grow  by 8.2%, reaching its peak 
in 2033 with 298,177 households. Its working age population, however, is expected 
to decline by 3.5%, between 2008 and 2025 (see Figure 4.10).
The population in the case-study region has a composition different from the 
national average, a difference which is expected to continue. The share of 65-year- 
old or older inhabitants is expected to increase and to stay above the Dutch average 
(during 2008-2040), and the share of under-19-year olds is expected to decrease.
Until 2031 this share of under-19-year olds is expected to stay below the Dutch 
average. From 2031 onwards, this is expected to reach levels of above the Dutch 
average (PBL and CBS, 2009).
FIGURE 4.8 NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN EEMSDELTA, AND TOTALS 
FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AND 2040. SOURCE: CBS, 
2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
APPINGEDAM 12,401 12,131 11,321 10,336 -2.2 -6.7
DELFZIJL 30,744 27,314 22,583 19,299 -11.2 -17.3
EEMSMOND 16,236 16,542 15,941 15,604 + 1.9 -3.6
LOPPERSUM 11,094 10,702 9,811 9,790 -3.5 -8.3
EEMSDELTA 70,475 66,689 59,656 55,029 -5.4 -10.5
PROVINCE GRONINGEN 558,080 573,459 592,067 596,051 +2.8 +3.2
THE NETHERLANDS 15,424,122 16,405,399 17,221,070 17,473,817 +6.4 +5.0
22 THE EXPECTED GROWTH IS BASED PARTLY ON THE EXISTING PLANS FOR NEW HOUSING IN 
GRONINGEN AND THE GRONINGEN-ASSEN CORRIDOR.
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F IG U RE 4.9 N U M BER  OF H O U SEH O LDS  IN EACH  MUNICIPALITY WITHIN EEMSDELTA, AN D  TOTALS
FO R  THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AN D  THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AN D  2040. SO U R C E :
CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
APPINGEDAM 5,258 5,424 5,288 4,980 +3.2 -2.5
DELFZIJL 12,470 11,934 10,485 8,913 -4.3 -12.1
EEMSMOND 6,330 6,885 7,175 6,991 +8.8 +4.2
LOPPERSUM 4,152 4,401 4,515 4,515 +6.0 +2.6
EEMSDELTA 28,210 28,644 27,463 25,322 + 1.5 -4.1
PROVINCE GRONINGEN 251,344 272,445 294,703 297,009 +8.4 +8.2
THE NETHERLANDS 6,468,677 7,242,202 8,053,081 8,264,984 + 12.0 +11.2
FIGURE 4.10 WORKING AGE POPULATION NUMBERS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN EEMSDELTA, 
AND TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AND 2040. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
APPINGEDAM 7,454 7,156 6,084 5,120 -4.0 -15.0
DELFZIJL 18,985 16,013 11,925 9,312 -15.7 -36.9
EEMSMOND 9,531 9,741 8,275 7,335 +2.3 -15.0
LOPPERSUM 6,482 6,471 5,487 5,052 -0.2 -15.2
EEMSDELTA 42,452 39,381 31,771 26,819. -7.2 -19.3
PROVINCE GRONINGEN 350,787 357,652 345,029 319,993 +2.0 -3.5
THE NETHERLANDS 9,630,391 10,050,123 9,800,627 9,194,441 +4.4 -2.5%
4.5.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen covers an area of 745 Km2, is located in the south-west of the 
Netherlands, and borders on Belgium (see Figure 4.11). It is part of the province of 
Zeeland, which, with about 380,984 residents, is one of the smallest Dutch 
provinces. The province itself includes a number of islands that are connected with 
the mainland by dams, tunnels and bridges. Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is connected with 
the island of Walcheren by the W esterschelde Tunnel, which was opened in March of 
2003.
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F IG U RE 4.11 ZEEU W S-VLAANDEREN . SOURCE: ESRI.
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FIGURE 4.12 POPULATION, HOUSEHOLD AND WORKING AGE POPULATION NUMBERS, IN 2009. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A.
WORKING AGE
POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS POPULATION
HULST 27,886 12,183 16,617
SLUIS 24,156 11,169 14,108
TERNEUZEN 55,149 24,533 32,490
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 107,191 47,885 63,215
PROVINCE ZEELAND 380,984 1664,484 223,389
THE NETHERLANDS 16,485,787 7,312,579 10,080,387
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen contains three municipalities, Terneuzen being the biggest with 
55,149 inhabitants (CBS, 2009a). Terneuzen is located on the southern shore of the 
W esterschelde estuary and has an industrial character and a harbour. The other two 
municipalities are Hulst and Sluis, both rural municipalities. Sluis belongs to P10, a 
partnership between the ten largest rural municipalities in the Netherlands (P10,
2010)23.
23 THEY PROMOTE THE SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF RURAL MUNICIPALITIES AT NATIONAL GOVERN­
MENT LEVEL.
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The three municipalities occasionally w ork together. In the past, they have under­
gone several municipal reorganisations, the last of which was in 200324. A s a result, 
each municipality now consist of several centres, which previously were separate 
municipalities. The municipality of Sluis, for example, has 17 centres, Hulst 15, and 
Terneuzen 14.
M ost companies located in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen are port-related, logistic and chemi­
cal industries. A  famous example is the D o w  Chemical Company, which is one of 
the largest companies in the area. The tourist industry also is important. The region 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, because of its polder landscapes, dunes and beaches, and the 
fortified town of Sluis, is popular am ong tourists. The tourists come to the area for 
both long and short periods of time, and Belgians visit the area to shop.
The population of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen was already declining in the 1980s. Population 
numbers recovered in the 1990s, but started to decline again in 2004. One year ear­
lier, in 2003, the working age population began to decline. Between 2003 and 2008, 
the working age population declined from 64,829 to 63,579 (-1.9%). Between 2004 
and 2008, the population decreased from 107,885 to 107,337 (-5.1%). The main cause 
of the demographic decline in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is negative natural balance, which 
is the result of an ageing population and high mortality rates (De Jong and Garssen,
2009, p.2). In contrast to the other two case-study regions, in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 
household numbers have not declined yet.
According to the regional population and household projections, the population of 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is expected to continue to decline. It is expected that, between 
2008 and 2025, the population will decrease by 5.5%, and the working age popula­
tion by 15.6% (PBL and CBS, 2009) (see Figures 4.13 and 4.15). A  decline in household 
numbers is expected from 2013 onwards (see Figure 4.14). Sluis is expected to be the 
first to be hit by this household decline (2011), followed by Terneuzen (2013) (PBL 
and CBS, 2009). For the period between 2013 and 2025, the number of households 
in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is expected to decrease from 48,252 to 47,752 (-1.0%), and 
between 2008 and 2040 by 6.8%.
An important difference between Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and the other two case-study 
regions is that Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is located within a grow ing province, while the 
other two are located in provinces with a declining population. Between 1995 and
24 IN THAT YEAR, THE MUNICIPALITIES OF AXEL, SAS VAN GENT AND TERNEUZEN MERGED. THE
SAME HAPPENED TO HULST AND HONTENISSE, BECOMING THE MUNICIPALITY OF HULST.
SLUIS-AARDENBURG AND OOSTBURG ALSO MERGED INTO THE MUNICIPALITY OF SLUIS.
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2008, the population of Zeeland grew  by 4.0%, which is less than the Dutch average 
(6.4%) (see Figure 4.13). From 2010 onwards, the population of Zeeland is expected 
to decline slightly, from 381,403 to 379,127 by 2025 (-0.6%). The working age popu­
lation started to decrease from 2007 onwards, and this decrease is expected to 
continue (for the period between 2008 and 2025, the expected decrease is 9.5%) (see 
Figure 4.15). The number of households, however, is expected to increase up to 2027. 
For the period between 2027 and 2040, this number is expected to decrease slightly, 
from 173,380 to 169,066 (-2.5%) (see Figure 4.14).
The population composition of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is different from the national 
average, with a larger share of elderly people (those 65 years old and older) and a 
smaller share of young people (under the age of 19). For the future, these differences 
are expected to continue.
FIGURE 4.13 NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN,
AND TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AND 2040. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
HULST 26,652 27,944 27,055 25,744 +4.8 -3.2
SLUIS 24,302 24,238 22,082 19,860 -0.3 -8.9
TERNEUZEN 56,206 55,155 52,304 49,155 -1.9 -5.2
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 107,160 107,337 101,441 94,759 +0.2 -5.5
PROVINCE ZEELAND 365,846 380,585 379,127 369,696 +4.0 -0.4
THE NETHERLANDS 15,424,122 16,405399 17,221,070 17,473,817 +6.4 +5.0
FIGURE 4.14 NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, 
AND TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 2025 AND 2040. 
SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
HULST 10,607 12,115 12,740 12,157 + 14.2 +5.2
SLUIS 10,301 11,159 10,799 9,780 +8.3 -3.2
TERNEUZEN 23,230 24,455 24,213 22,535 +5.3 -1.0
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 44,138 47,729 47,752 44,472 +8.1% 026
PROVINCE ZEELAND 148,411 165,569 173,350 169,066 + 11.6 +4.7
THE NETHERLANDS 6,468,677 7,242,202 8,053,081 8,264,984 +12.0 +11.2
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FIGURE 4.15 WORKING AGE POPULATION NUMBERS IN EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN, AND TOTALS FOR THE REGION, THE PROVINCE, AND THE COUNTRY; IN 1995, 2008, 
2025 AND 2040. SOURCE: CBS, 2009A; PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995 2008 2025 2040
%1995-
2008
%2008-
2025
HULST 16,496 16,770 14,899 12,601 + 1.7 -11.2
SLUIS 14,133 14,210 11,092 9,133 +0.5 -21.9
TERNEUZEN 34,133 32,599 27,638 24,294 -4.5 -15.2
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 64,762 63,579 53,629 46,028 -1.8 -15.6
PROVINCE ZEELAND 217,289 224,148 202,773 183,584 +3.2 -9.5
THE NETHERLANDS 9,630,391 10,050,123 9,800,627 9,194,441 +4.4 -2.5
4.6 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE THREE 
CASE-STUDY REGIONS
DURATION OF THE DECLINE
In all three case-study regions, the population has been declining for many years.
The Eemsdelta was the first in 1981, followed by Zeeuws-Vlaanderen in 1982, and 
Parkstad Limburg in 1997 (see Figure 4.16). According to the regional population 
and household projections, this decline will continue (see Figure 4.17) (PBL and CBS, 
2009).
The working age population also has been declining in all three case-study regions. In 
Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta, this started in 1993, and ten years later in Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen (2003) (see Figure 4.16). According to the regional population and house­
hold projections, this decline will continue in all three regions (PBL and CBS, 2009) 
(see Figure 4.17).
A  decline in household numbers has already hit Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta 
(see Figure 4.17); since 2002 in Parkstad Limburg and since 2003 in Eemsdelta (see 
Figure 4.16). In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, such a decline has not yet started. However, 
according to the latest regional household projections (PBL and CBS, 2009) it can 
expect this to happen, from 2013 onwards (PBL and CBS, 2009).
25 -0.04
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F IG U RE 4.16 START O F D EM O G RAPH IC  D ECL IN E26 IN THE SELE C T ED  C ASE -STU D Y  R EG IO N S27.
SO U R C E : CBS, 2009A; RPB  AN D  CBS, 2006.
START OF DECLINE, PER REGION28
WORKING AGE
CASE POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS POPULATION
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 1997 2002 1993
EEMSDELTA 1981 2003 1993
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 1982 ACCORDING TO RPB AND CBS (2006), 
THIS DECLINE WAS EXPECTED TO 
START IN 2007 HOWEVER, TO DATE, 
IT HAS NOT.
2003
SIZE OF DECLINE
Percentages of demographic decline differ between the cases (see Figure 4.17). 
Between 1995 and 2008, the population decline was the largest in Parkstad Limburg 
(-6.1%) and the smallest in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. In all three cases, there was a striking 
difference with the national average, which was a population increase of 6.4% over 
that period. For the future, the population decline is expected to be the largest in 
Eemsdelta (-10.5%) (see Figure 4.17).
In the same period of 1995 to 2008, in all three cases, the working age population 
decreased. Again, the largest decline was found for Parkstad Limburg (-8.2%) (see 
Figure 4.17). For the future, the largest decline is expected to take place in Eemsdelta 
(see Figure 4.17). In all three regions, the decline in working age population is 
expected to continue. This decline is expected to be far above the national average.
Unlike population and working age population numbers, the number of households 
in all case-study regions has increased, between 1995 and 2008 (see Figure 4.17). The 
smallest growth was found for Eemsdelta (1.5%), the largest for Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 
(8.1%). In all case-study regions, the increase in household numbers was below the 
Dutch average. For the period between 2008 and 2025, the number of households 
is expected to decline, except for Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. This decline is expected to be 
largest in Eemsdelta (-4.1%). Although Zeeuws-Vlaanderen also is expected to face a
26 THE TABLE PRESENTS THE YEARS IN WHICH THE MAXIMUM POPULATION (NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE), NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS OR WORKING AGE POPULATION WAS REACHED.
27 THE YEAR IN WHICH THE REGION REACHED ITS MAXIMUM POPULATION NUMBER AND 
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF WORKING AGE POPULATION SINCE 1960. THE YEAR IN WHICH THE 
REGION REACHED ITS MAXIMUM NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS SINCE 1995.
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decline in household numbers, from 2013 onwards, this is expected to be only frac­
tional and is not shown in Figure 4.17.
FIGURE 4.17 THE EXTENT OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN THE SELECTED CASE-STUDY REGIONS, 
IN THE PAST AND FOR THE FUTURE. SOURCE: CBS, 2009A & PBL AND CBS, 2009.
1995-2008 (%) 2008-2025 (%)
WORKING WORKING
POPU­
LATION
HOUSE­
HOLDS
AGE
POPU­
LATION
POPU­
LATION
HOUSE­
HOLDS
AGE
POPU­
LATION
PARKSTAD LIMBURG -6.1 +2.9 -8.2 -6.6 -2.2 -17.4
EEMSDELTA -5.4 + 1.5 -7.2 -10.5 -4.1 -19.3
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN +0.2 +8.1 -1.8 -5.5 029 -15.6
THE NETHERLANDS +6.4 +12.0 +4.4 +5.0 +11.2 -2.5
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28 -0.04
5 DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND 
HOUSING MARKET 
POLICY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates the relationship between demographic decline and changes 
in the local housing policy in the three case-study regions, Parkstad 
Limburg, Eemsdelta and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. This should provide a partial answer to 
the central questions: h o w  do local governm ents react to dem ographic decline, and 
under which circumstances do they adapt their policies to it?
Before presenting the housing market strategies, Section 5.2 describes the con­
sequences of demographic decline for housing markets in the case-study regions. 
Section 5.3 presents an analysis of how the three shrinking regions react to demo­
graphic decline, and whether and how they change their housing market policies.
This chapter uses the same distinction made in Chapter 3 between no policy change, 
conservative policy change, and radical policy change. It also provides insight into 
the conditions that influence policy change in those regions. In order to explain the 
observed policy processes, a distinction is made between the dimensions of the 
policy arrangement (Section 5.4), congruence (Section 5.5), local spatial conditions 
(Section 5.6), and aspects of demographic decline (Section 5.7) (see also Chapter 3).
5.2 DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND HOUSING 
MARKET
In Chapter 2 it was concluded that a decrease in the number of households in the 
owner-occupied housing stock may lead to an increase in the length of time that 
properties stay on the market. In addition, housing prices will be below the national 
average. For the social housing stock1 this decrease in the number of households 
may lead to an oversupply, which is reflected in high vacancy and turnover rates.
1 BY SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK IS MEANT THE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES OWNED BY THE SOCIAL
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS.
135
Also, a decrease in household numbers may lead to a concentration of low-income 
groups in certain locations. This section describes the investigation into whether the 
expected consequences as described in Chapter 2 actually occur in the three case­
study regions. First, it must be noted that there are large differences in housing stock 
composition in the case-study regions: in Parkstad Limburg, 55% of housing is owner- 
occupied and 30% consists of social housing, in the Eemsdelta this is 62% and 33%, in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 72% and 20%, respectively (ABF Research, SYSteem  W O ningV oor­
raad (Sysw ov2) in Combimonitor, May 2009) (see Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9).
5.2.1 OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 
HOUSING PRICES AND PRICE CHANGES
Figure 5.1 shows that in all of the municipalities in all the three case-study regions, in 
2008, the average sales price of owner-occupied housing was below the Dutch aver­
age; in some of those municipalities, lower by no less than one hundred thousand 
euros. It is important to realise that prices depend on property characteristics and on 
residential environment. This is probably the reason that the price of owner-occupied 
housing in Voerendaal and Onderbanken is higher than in Kerkrade and Heerlen, for 
in the first two municipalities the share of single family homes is higher3 and that of 
apartments lower4 (ABF Research -  Syswov in Combimonitor, May 2009). Voerendaal 
is also an attractive ‘green’ village, which drives up housing prices.
In the case-study regions, housing prices did not drop between 1999 and 20075.
Figure 5.2 shows that, in all the three regions, the (weighted) average housing price
2 AN ESTIMATION OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSING STOCK AT MUNICI­
PAL LEVEL. THIS IS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL 
PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT (FILE ABOUT WOZ VALUE) AND INFORMATION FROM 
STATISTICS NETHERLANDS ABOUT MUTATIONS IN THE HOUSING STOCK.
3 IN 2008, IN VOERENDAAL, 69% OF THE TOTAL OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING STOCK CONSISTED 
OF OWNER-OCCUPIED FAMILY HOMES, AND IN ONDERBANKEN THIS WAS 68%. IN HEERLEN,
IN THE SAME YEAR, 40% OF THE TOTAL HOUSING STOCK CONSISTED OF OWNER-OCCUPIED 
FAMILY HOMES (ABF RESEARCH -  SYSWOV IN COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009).
4 IN 2008, IN VOERENDAAL, 1.9% OF THE TOTAL OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING STOCK 
CONSISTED OF OWNER-OCCUPIED APARTMENTS, AND IN ONDERBANKEN THIS WAS 0.4%. IN 
HEERLEN, IN THE SAME YEAR, 6.7% OF THE TOTAL HOUSING STOCK CONSISTED OF OWNER- 
OCCUPIED APARTMENTS (ABF RESEARCH -  SYSWOV IN COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009).
5 THE DATA USED FOR THIS SECTION WERE GATHERED PRIOR TO THE HOUSING MARKET 
CRISIS THAT STARTED IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2008.
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(see footnote 7) increased during that period. The figure also shows that, for the 
whole of that period, in each of the regions, the (weighted) average sale price of 
owner-occupied housing was below the Dutch average6: which was also true for the 
individual municipalities.
In contrast to what might be expected (see Chapter 2), the housing price increase 
(1999-2007) in two of the shrinking regions was above instead of below the national 
average: in Eemsdelta this was 93% and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 96%, while the national 
average was 72%. In the third region, Parkstad Limburg, the increase was only 37%.
FIGURE 5.1 RANKING OF EACH MUNICIPALITY WITHIN THE CASE-STUDY REGIONS, ON A SCALE OF 
ALL 441 MUNICIPALITIES, ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE PRICE OF OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING, 
AND THE NATIONAL AVERAGE, IN THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 2008.
SOURCE: WWW.WONINGMARKTCIJFERS.NL, BASED ON DATA FROM THE DUTCH LAND REGISTRY 
OFFICE (KADASTER, 2008).
POSITION MUNICIPALITY AVERAGE PRICE (EUROS)
270 VOERENDAAL 246,600
367 ONDERBANKEN 207,300
382 SIMPELVELD 200,300
385 LOPPERSUM 199,700
400 HULST 191,900
408 EEMSMOND 185,600
415 LANDGRAAF 180,800
417 APPINGEDAM 179,600
424 SLUIS 176,500
434 TERNEUZEN 158,500
435 BRUNSSUM 156,700
437 HEERLEN 154,300
438 KERKRADE 153,900
440 DELFZIJL 153,300
NATIONAL AVERAGE 254,900
6 BECAUSE IN SOME MUNICIPALITIES WITHIN THOSE REGIONS, BETWEEN 1999 AND 2007,
ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF HOUSES WERE SOLD, THE REGIONAL AVERAGE NEEDS TO BE 
INTERPRETED CAREFULLY. FOR SHRINKING REGIONS, THE AVERAGE IS BASED ON A SMALL 
NUMBER OF SALES (A FEW HUNDRED). HOWEVER, THE PERCENTAGE OF PROPERTIES SOLD 
IN SHRINKING REGIONS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT IN THE NETHERLANDS; THIS WAS ABOUT 6%.
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FIGURE 5.2 THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE SALES PRICES7 (IN 1,000 EUROS) OF OWNER-OCCUPIED 
HOUSING (EXCLUDING NEW HOUSING) IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, EEMSDELTA, ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN, AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL AVERAGE, BETWEEN 1999 EN 2007. SOURCE: THE 
DUTCH LAND REGISTRY OFFICE (KADASTER8, 2007).
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The relatively steep increase in housing prices in the Eemsdelta and Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen can be explained by the quality of the houses sold. In Delfzijl, the housing 
stock changed drastically because of the restructuring and demolition of social 
housing and the replacement by relatively expensive owner-occupied houses in that 
period. The share of owner-occupied single family homes in the total housing stock 
(owner-occupied and social housing) increased from 46% in 1999 to 59% in 2007 (ABF 
Research -  Sysw ov  in Combimonitor, May 2009).
THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT PROPERTIES STAY ON THE 
MARKET
In the case-study regions, a property put up for sale stays longer on the market than 
elsewhere in the Netherlands. Figure 5.3 shows that this has been the case since 
2000. In 2007, the average sales time for a house in Parkstad Limburg was 184 days, 
in Eemsdelta 169 days, and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 183 days, while the Dutch average 
was 121 days. Between 1999 and 2007, the weighted average length of time (in days)
7 THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF SALES PRICES PER CASE-STUDY REGION WAS CALCULATED AS 
FOLLOWS:
- FOR EACH MUNICIPALITY IN THE REGION, THE NUMBER OF HOUSES SOLD WAS 
MULTIPLIED BY THE AVERAGE SALE PRICE IN THE MUNICIPALITY;
- THE RESULTS FOR ALL MUNICIPALITIES WERE THEN ADDED AND DIVIDED BY THE TOTAL 
NUMBER OF HOUSES SOLD WITHIN THE REGION.
8 THIS CONTAINS DATA ON ALL HOUSES SOLD WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS, ACCORDING TO 
REGISTRATION OF THE NOTARIAL TRANSPORT ACT OF THE PROPERTY.
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that properties stayed on the market increased in the case-study regions, and in two 
of the three regions faster than in the Netherlands (112%): in Parkstad Limburg this 
increase was 384% and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 125%. In the Eemsdelta this increase 
was 80%. Those differences between shrinking regions and the Dutch average seem 
to have been grow ing since 2005: from that year onwards, the national average 
length of time that properties stayed on the market decreased, while in the shrinking 
regions it continued to increase, and especially after 2006.
FIGURE 5.3 THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE LENGTH OF TIME (IN DAYS)9 THAT PROPERTIES STAYED 
ON THE MARKET (EXCLUDING NEW HOUSING) IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, EEMSDELTA, ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN, AND IN THE NETHERLANDS AS A WHOLE, BETWEEN 1999 AND 2007. SOURCE: 
DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND REAL ESTATE EXPERTS (NVM - 
UITWISSELINGSSYSTEEM10, 2007).
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9 THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE LENGTH OF TIME (IN DAYS) THAT PROPERTIES STAY ON THE 
MARKET, WAS CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS:
- FOR EACH MUNICIPALITY IN THE REGION, THE NUMBER OF HOUSES SOLD WERE 
MULTIPLIED BY THE AVERAGE LENGTH OF TIME THAT PROPERTIES STAYED ON THE 
MARKET IN THE INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITY;
- THE RESULTS FOR ALL MUNICIPALITIES WERE THEN ADDED AND DIVIDED BY THE TOTAL 
NUMBER OF HOUSES SOLD IN THE REGION.
10 THIS CONTAINS INFORMATION ONLY ON HOUSING THAT WAS SOLD THROUGH REAL ESTATE 
AGENTS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 
AND REAL ESTATE EXPERTS (NEDERLANDSE VERENIGING VOOR MAKELAARS - NVM). THE 
NVM REGISTERS THE MOMENT THE DEED OF PURCHASE IS SIGNED AT THE REAL ESTATE 
AGENT. THE DUTCH LAND REGISTRY OFFICE, HOWEVER, REGISTERS A SALE NOT UNTIL THE 
NOTARIAL DEED OF PURCHASE IS SIGNED. NVM DATA WERE USED INSTEAD OF DATA FROM 
THE REGISTRY OFFICE, BECAUSE THE LATTER DO NOT CONTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT WHEN 
THE PROPERTY WAS PUT ON THE MARKET.
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To summarise, in the three case-study regions, housing prices were below the 
national average, and the length of time that properties stayed on the market was 
also longer. However, the rate of price change was not noticeably different.
5.2.2 SOCIAL HOUSING
VACANCY RATES
Figure 5.4 shows that, between 2002 and 2008, vacancy rates in the case-study 
regions were almost always above the national average. During this period, of 
the three regions, the rate was almost always highest in Eemsdelta and lowest in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. It is important to realise that this figure contains not only the 
market-related vacancies but also vacancies in housing projects. Market-related 
vacancies are properties that are vacant for more than three months because of 
a lack in demand. Vacancies in housing projects (project-related vacancies) relate 
to properties owned by housing associations that have been vacant for more than 
three months and that have been nominated for demolition11.
FIGURE 5.4 TOTAL VACANCY RATE12 FOR THE SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK (OWNED BY HOUSING 
ASSOCIATIONS) IN THE CASE-STUDY REGIONS, BETWEEN 2002 AND 2008. SOURCE: CENTRAL 
HOUSING FUND (CFV - BBSH13, 2008).
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11 A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE TWO TYPES OF VACANCIES HAS BEEN MADE SINCE 2007. 
FOR THIS STUDY, ESPECIALLY MARKET-RELATED VACANCIES ARE RELEVANT.
12 THE FIGURE CONTAINS PROJECT- AND MARKET-RELATED VACANCIES.
13 THE BBSH (BESLUIT BEHEER SOCIALE HUURSECTOR), IN 1993 FORMULATED BY THE MINISTRY
OF HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT, CONTAINS THE RULES FOR DUTCH 
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS. CENTRAL HOUSING FUND (CENTRAAL FONDS VOOR
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FIGURE 5.5 MARKET-RELATED VACANCY RATES14 IN SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK (OWNED BY 
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS) IN THE MUNICIPALITIES WITHIN THE CASE-STUDY REGIONS, AND THE 
NATIONAL TOTAL, IN 2007. SOURCE: CENTRAL HOUSING FUND (CFV - BBSH, 2007).
NUMBER OF
VACANCIES IN SOCIAL TOTAL SOCIAL SHARE OF VACANCY
MUNICIPALITIES HOUSING STOCK HOUSING STOCK (%)
SLUIS 82 2,582 3.18
HULST 58 2,566 2.26
KERKRADE 118 6,706 1.76
HEERLEN 218 15,754 1.38
BRUNSSUM 60 4,464 1.34
SIMPELVELD 14 1,275 1.10
LANDGRAAF 40 5,370 0.74
TERNEUZEN 39 5,398 0.72
ONDERBANKEN 3 622 0.48
LOPPERSUM 5 1,344 0.37
APPINGEDAM 8 2,575 0.31
EEMSMOND 6 2,416 0.25
DELFZIJL 7 2,892 0.18
VOERENDAAL 0 1,128 0
THE NETHERLANDS 9,133 3,512,600 0.26
Figure 5.5 presents only the rates for market-related vacancies in social housing 
stock15 in the municipalities, within the three case-study regions. The figure shows 
that in all but three of the municipalities - Eemsmond, Delfzijl and Voerendaal -  the 
vacancy rates are higher than the national average. The data per region show  that, in 
2007, the vacancy rates in Parkstad Limburg (1.3%) and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen (1.7%)
VOLKSHUISVESTING - CFV) IS A FINANCIAL SUPERVISOR OF HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS AND 
MONITORS THE PERFORMANCES OF THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS.
14 THESE ARE VACANT PROPERTIES OWNED BY SOCIAL HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS THAT HAVE 
BEEN VACANT FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AND ARE NOT NOMINATED FOR DEMOLITION.
15 IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK IS RELATIVELY LARGE, COMPARED TO
THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IN 2008, 32% OF THE DUTCH HOUSING STOCK CONSISTED OF 
RENTED SOCIAL HOUSING (ABF RESEARCH -  SYSWOV COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009).
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were above, and in Eemsdelta (0.3%) below, the national average (o.4%)16. These 
results are in keeping with the expectations discussed in Chapter 2.
Vacancy rates need to be interpreted carefully, because they are closely related to 
the character of the current social housing stock. In some municipalities, some of 
this stock has already been restructured, which has improved its quality and attrac­
tiveness. In other municipalities, the social housing stock has been reduced through 
demolition or sale to private owners. These measures may influence vacancy rates. In 
Delfzijl, for example, much of the formerly vacant social housing owned by the hous­
ing association has been demolished (see Figure 5.5).
TURNOVER
There is no direct information about the turnover rates17 in the housing stock owned 
by housing associations, per municipality; the turnover rate for each housing as­
sociation is known, but these associations often own properties in more than one 
municipality. Nor is there an overview of the turnover rate for the case-study regions 
as a whole, except for Parkstad Limburg, for which the Central Housing Fund (CFV) 
investigated the social housing stock owned by housing associations active in the 
region. The CFV concluded that, in 2005, the turnover rate for the social housing 
stock in Parkstad Limburg was 10.6%, and thus above the national average (9.6%) 
(CFV, 2007).
For the other two regions, turnover rates for the various housing associations active 
in those regions were extracted from their annual reports. In 2006, the turnover rate 
for social housing owned by the biggest housing association in the Eemsdelta (Acan- 
tus), was 13.4% (Acantus-groep, 2006, p.35), while the national average was 8.7% 
(CFV-Bbsh, 2006). In 2007, the turnover rate for social housing owned by housing 
association W oo ngo ed  Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, which is mainly active in the rural areas of 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen (e.g. in Sluis), was 11.3% (Woongoed Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 2007, 
p.28), while nationally the average was 8.2% (CFV-Bbsh, 2007).
16 THIS OUTCOME IS DIFFERENT FROM THE DATA PRESENTED IN FIGURE 5.4 WHICH SHOWS 
THAT VACANCY RATES IN ALL THOSE REGIONS ARE HIGHER THAN THE NATIONAL AVERAGE.
AN EXPLANATION FOR THIS DIFFERENCE IS THAT FIGURE 5.4 CONTAINS NOT ONLY THE 
MARKET VACANCY RATES BUT ALSO THE PROJECT-RELATED VACANCIES, WHICH ARE CAUSED 
BY RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOLITIONS PROGRAMMES.
17 TURNOVER RATE IS THE ANNUAL PROPORTION OF SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK OCCUPIED BY
NEW TENANTS. THE EXPECTATION IS THAT THIS IS HIGHER IN SHRINKING REGIONS THAN THE 
NATIONAL AVERAGE. FOR IF THERE IS AN OVERSUPPLY OF SOCIAL HOUSING, IT IS EASIER 
FOR TENANTS TO MOVE TO SOCIAL HOUSING THAT MEETS THEIR WISHES.
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Similar to vacancy rates, turnover rates are also closely related to the quality of the 
social housing stock. For that reason it is important to realise that turnover rates 
are likely to be lower than they would normally be in those shinking regions where 
housing associations have already made a great effort to improve the quality of their 
housing, and, therefore, have demolished a large part of their social housing stock. 
For example, it can be expected that the turnover rate in Delfzijl, a municipality that 
has already demolished much of its least attractive housing stock, will be lower than 
if that had not been done.
5.2.3 CONCENTRATION OF LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS
In the case-study regions, the average disposable income (net income) of house­
holds18 is less than the national average. For 2006, in Eemsdelta, this was 27,900 
euros, in Parkstad Limburg 28,400 euros, and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 29,900 euros, 
while the national average was 31,400 euros (CBS (RIO19), 2006). Households in 
shrinking regions have a lower income than the Dutch average. Looking at the 
growth in income over time, we see that this is lower in the case-study regions than 
the Dutch average. Between 2001 and 2006, income growth in the Netherlands was 
12.2%, in Eemsdelta it was 12.0%, in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 9.9%, and in Parkstad Limburg 
8.4% (CBS (RIO), 2006).
Figure 5.6 presents the share of low-income households. In 2005, this was higher 
than the national share in Parkstad Limburg, about the same as the national share in 
the Eemsdelta, and lower in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Between 2001 and 2005, the share 
of low-income households increased, both nationally and in the case-study regions. 
The increase was larger than the national average (12.6%) in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 
(22.7%) and Eemsdelta (21.1%).
18 THE AVERAGE DISPOSABLE INCOME OF A HOUSEHOLD WAS CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS:
- FOR EACH REGION, THE INCOMES OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, PER 
HOUSEHOLD WERE ADDED TOGETHER. THE INCOME CONSISTS OF THE GROSS INCOME 
(EARNINGS FROM WORK PLUS INCOMES FROM SOCIAL SECTURITY AND SUBSIDES) 
MINUS PREMIUMS OF SOCIAL SECURITY, OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSFERS, AND TAX ON 
WAGES, EARNINGS (REVENUES) AND CAPITAL (RIO) (CBS, 2010B);
- THE RESULTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DIVIDED BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS IN THE REGION.
19 STATISTICS NETHERLANDS (CBS) ANNUALLY INVESTIGATES THE HOUSEHOLD AND PER-CAPITA 
INCOMES IN THE NETHERLANDS, FOR COUNTRY REGIONS, PROVINCES, COROP AREAS, 
METROPOLITAN AGGLOMERATIONS, CITY REGIONS AND MUNICIPALITIES. THIS RESEARCH IS 
CALLED REGIONAAL INKOMENS ONDERZOEK (RIO).
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Both sets of information confirm that in shrinking regions there is a concentration 
of low-income households. Whether these income groups concentrate in specific 
districts and neighbourhoods, described in Chapter 2 as an expected consequence, 
could not be investigated, because the information is not available at a scale smaller 
than municipal.
FIGURE 5.6 DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS20, BETWEEN 2001 AND 2005, IN 
PARKSTAD LIMBURG, EEMSDELTA, ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, AND IN THE NETHERLANDS AS A 
WHOLE. SOURCE: STATISTICS NETHERLANDS (CBS - RIO, 2006) (COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009).
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To summarise, in the three shrinking regions, both vacancy and turnover rates for 
social housing were above the national average. In addition, the share of low-income 
households was above the national share, in two of the three shrinking regions.
5.3 HOUSING MARKET POLICIES
This section describes the content of the housing market policy of each case-study 
region separately, and relates changes in local policies to demographic decline. Start­
ing point for the description of the local housing policy, per case-study region, is the 
time when the regions were first experiencing a decline in population and/or number 
of households. In all three regions, the decline in population came first, followed by a 
decline in the number of households. In the Eemsdelta, population 
decline started in 1981, in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen in 1982, and in Parkstad Limburg in 
1997 (see Chapter 4). As is described in Chapter 2, the housing market is thought
20 LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS ARE ALL HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAD AN ANNUAL FISCAL (NET) 
INCOME THAT WAS LOWER THAN OR EQUAL TO 9,249 EUROS. THE INCOMES FROM 2001 TO
2005 HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED TO THE INCOME LEVEL OF 2000 (CBS (RIO) 2010B; ABF RESEARCH 
2009).
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to be affected more by a decline in the number of households than in population. 
Therefore, for this study, the housing market policy in the period after the number of 
households had started to decline is especially relevant. The policy reactions during 
that period are discussed in more detail. The decline in the number of households 
started in Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta at about the same time (from 2002 and 
2003, respectively). To date, Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is not experiencing such a decline, 
however, it is expected to do so from 2014 onwards 21 (PBL and CBS, 2009). The 
description of the situation in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen starts from 1981. However, for the 
period from mid-2000, the policy reactions are discussed in more detail, because, 
from that time onwards, the growth in the number of households in the three sepa­
rate municipalities in this region was marginal compared to that in the former period 
(1995-2005)22. Additional information about the demographic situation in the differ­
ent case-study regions was presented in Chapter 4.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the document analysis focuses on the policy reactions in 
a shrinking region. For Parkstad Limburg the description focuses on the policy reac­
tion of its regional organisation. In the other two case studies, the inter-municipal 
cooperative reactions are discussed and attention is focused on the policy reaction 
in the central cities of the region. For all case-study regions, descriptions of policy 
changes are given also at provincial level.
In order to investigate whether demographic decline leads to a change in local 
policy in the field of housing, the distinction between no policy change, conservative 
change and radical change is made, as is that between changes in strategic plans, 
operational plans, and in actions (see Chapter 3). As most shrinking regions have 
only recently (or not at all) been confronted with a decline in household numbers, 
it is in strategic plans that most changes can be expected, with fewer changes in 
operational plans and even fewer in actions. Changes in strategic plans are discussed 
in the greatest detail, changes in local operational plans are also described, but not 
for all operational plans in the case-study region. However, during the interviews, the 
question was asked whether local governments adapted their operational plans and/ 
or actions (concerning demolition, restructuring and new housing) in order to deal 
with demographic decline.
21 THE INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITIES OF SLUIS AND TERNEUZEN ARE EXPECTED TO FACE A 
DECLINE IN HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS, SOONER: FROM 2011 ONWARDS IN SLUIS AND 2013 IN 
TERNEUZEN (PBL AND CBS, 2009).
22 BETWEEN 1995 AND 2005, THE GROWTH IN HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS IN HULST WAS 12.2%, IN 
TERNEUZEN WAS 4.1%, AND IN SLUIS 6.1%. BETWEEN 2005 AND 2008, THIS GROWTH IN HULST
WAS 1.8%, IN TERNEUZEN 1.2%, AND IN SLUIS 1.6% (CBS, 2009A).
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This section describes how  local housing policy was changed in response to decreas­
ing population and household numbers. It does not describes how  local housing 
policy changed in response to changes in the composition of population and house­
holds (although the latter also poses a challenge to local governments).
5.3.1 HOUSING MARKET POLICY IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG FROM 1997 TO 2009
1997-2004: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE RESULTED IN EITHER NO 
CHANGE IN LOCAL POLICY, OR ONLY IN CONSERVATIVE 
POLICY CHANGES
Since 1997, Parkstad Limburg has been experiencing population decline, and, since 
2002, also a decline in household numbers. For some individual municipalities (e.g. 
Kerkrade and Heerlen) this even occurred at an earlier date (see Chapter 4). Despite 
the decline and the forecasts by research institute Etil (Derks, 1996a) that indicated 
that this decline was likely to continue, the municipalities and the regional organisa­
tion of Parkstad Limburg, in the early days of decline, mostly ignored the matter. 
They did not mention it, or only briefly, in their local strategic plans, nor in their 
local operational housing plans. An example of one of the latter is the strategic plan 
by the municipality of Heerlen (a developmental vision), called Ontwikkelingsvisie  
Heerlen 2010 (Gemeente Heerlen, 1997). In this plan, the municipality argued that the 
decline projected for Heerlen was not going to occur (Derks, 1996a). Instead, the 
municipality expected that, between 1997 and 2010, its population would rise stead­
ily23. In order to meet this development, the municipality considered that a policy 
change was needed, towards an active city development policy, focused on develop­
ing an attractive spatial environment and stimulating the economy and employment 
(Gemeente Heerlen, 1997, p .39 and 42). The municipality expected that, between 
1997 and 2010, 3,000 new houses would be needed24 instead of the earlier projected 
2,325 (Gemeente Heerlen, 1997, p. 41). In addition, the municipality argued that more 
owner-occupied housing should be built in medium-priced and expensive segments
23 THE MUNICIPALITY EXPECTED THAT, BY 2010, HEERLEN WOULD COUNT MORE THAN 100,000 
INHABITANTS (GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 1997, P.39), WHILE DERKS (1996A) EXPECTED THAT 
HEERLEN WOULD COUNT 94,232 INHABITANTS.
24 300 NEW HOUSES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN SUBURBAN TOP LOCATIONS, 1,800 NEW
HOUSES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN SUBURBAN LOCATIONS AND 900 IN URBAN LOCATIONS
(GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 1997, P.44-45).
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(op.cit., p.44). The development in top locations should be given priority (op.cit., 
p.47), and the quality of current housing stock be improved by restructuring. These 
policy changes can be considered conservative strategic policy changes.
In the strategic housing plan Lekker thuis in Parkstad Lim burg  (Stipo Consult, 2004), 
of the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg, demographic decline is not 
mentioned25. Similar to the housing plans of the individual municipalities, the prime 
objective of this regional strategic plan was to stimulate demographic growth, to 
retain the local population, and to attract new residents to the region by identifying 
six target groups26 and building innovative housing27. Because demographic decline is 
not mentioned in this regional housing policy, this is considered policy stability.
For a long time, the provincial government also paid no attention to demographic 
decline in its strategic or operational plans. In 2001, this started to change. In its 
provincial environmental plan (Provinciaal Om gevingsplan), which is a strategic plan, 
the province noted that the total population would decrease28, but did not adapt the 
content of its provincial spatial policy accordingly29, but argued merely that in the 
next plan period flexibility would be necessary to deal with this population decline 
(Provincie Limburg, 2001).
25 THE SAME IS TRUE FOR THE REPORT OP HETE KOLEN PUBLISHED IN 2003 (PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG, 2003). IT PRESENTED A VISION ON THE FUTURE OF THE REGION OF PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG AND FORMULATED RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE REGIONAL STRUC­
TURE.
26 THE TARGET GROUPS ON WHICH THE STRATEGY FOCUSED WERE: LOWER-INCOME GROUPS; 
YOUNG, HIGHLY EDUCATED PEOPLE; THE MIDDLE AND HIGH SEGMENT OF PEOPLE WORKING 
FOR LARGE COMPANIES WITHIN PARKSTAD LIMBURG BUT WHO WERE LIVING ELSEWHERE; 
ACTIVE, WELL-OFF (AFFLUENT) ELDERLY PEOPLE (SENIORS) WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD LEFT 
PARKSTAD LIMBURG BUT NOW WANTED TO RETURN TO THEIR ROOTS; PEOPLE FROM NEIGH­
BOURING REGIONS WHO WERE SEARCHING FOR A HOUSE; AND THE CREATIVE CLASS.
27 IN THE STRATEGY, EIGHT DIFFERENT INNOVATIVE HOUSING CONCEPTS WERE DEVELOPED 
(STIPO CONSULT, 2004).
28 THE PROVINCE EXPECTED THAT, FROM 2004 ONWARDS, THE POPULATION WOULD DECREASE. 
IT ALSO EXPECTED THIS DECREASE TO BE STRUCTURAL (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2001, P.26).
29 THE REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT THE PROVINCE EXPECTED TO BE CONFRONTED WITH A 
PARADOXICAL SITUATION OF A POPULATION DECLINE COMBINED WITH AN INCREASE IN THE 
DEMAND FOR SPACE (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2001, P.24).
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2005-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID RESULT IN RADICAL AND 
CONSERVATIVE CHANGES IN LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
From 2005 onwards, the region and the province not only mentioned demographic 
decline in their plans, but also started to adapt the content of their strategic hous­
ing plans accordingly (local policy change). The regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg formulated a regional housing vision in 200630, with a content adapted to 
demographic decline. In this strategy, the municipalities decided to reduce their new 
housing plans between 2006 and 2010, and to stimulate demolition and regenera­
tion. The planned net new housing additions to the housing stock would be reduced 
from 10,000 to 2,000 dwellings31: Of these, 600 would be built in the city centre of 
Heerlen, 900 in the semi-urban areas (Brunssum, Landgraaf, Kerkrade, Heerlen), and 
500 in the rural areas (Onderbanken, Simpelveld, Voerendaal) (Parkstad Limburg, 
2006b)32. The objective was to balance the housing supply with the demand for hous­
ing, and to prevent an oversupply.
Next to reducing new housing plans, the regional housing plan was aimed at qualita­
tive improvement of the current housing stock and the spatial environment. The 
idea was that such improvements could counter the exodus of existing residents and 
attract new people (especially those well educated and with high incomes). Restruc­
turing the current housing stock and developing new housing concepts (ideas put 
forward in Lekker thuis in Parkstad Lim burg) were thought to improve the image of 
Parkstad Limburg as a place to live (Parkstad Limburg, 2006b). These strategies were 
mainly aimed at stimulating the demand side. With this regional housing vision, the 
growth-based housing strategies of the individual municipalities were replaced by a
30 PREVIOUSLY, IN 2006, AN AREA PERSPECTIVE (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2006A) WAS FORMU­
LATED, WHICH GAVE AN OVERVIEW OF THE ACTIONS TO BE INITIATED (E.G. FORMULATION OF 
A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN, AND THE SET UP OF A REGIONAL MONITOR) AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THESE ACTIONS NEEDED TO BE STARTED.
31 THIS REDUCTION IN PLANNED NEW HOUSING FROM 10,000 TO 2,000 WAS NOT IN KEEPING 
WITH THE ESTIMATIONS BY DERKS (2005), WHO EXPECTED THAT, BETWEEN 2006 AND 2010, 
1,400 NEW DWELLINGS WOULD BE NEEDED. THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG ARGUED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS FOR NOT FOLLOWING THE ESTIMA­
TIONS BY DERKS. FIRST, IT COULD BE CONSIDERED A STRATEGIC CHOICE FOR SELECTIVE 
GROWTH. SECOND, PAST EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN SUCH HOUSING MARKET PRODUCTIONS 
TO BE REALISTIC (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2006B, P.16).
32 BETWEEN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG THERE WAS A LOT OF DISAGREE­
MENT ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE 2,000 NEW HOUSING PLANS OVER THE DIFFERENT 
MUNICIPALITIES.
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collective regional housing strategy that took demographic decline into account and 
was adapted to it (local policy change).
Nevertheless, this did not result in the individual municipalities changing their opera­
tional housing plans. The regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg tried to reduce 
the development plans for new housing by applying a ‘sieve’-like procedure of 
selecting and prioritising the various building plans on the basis of their contribution 
to the region, quantitatively and qualitatively, rather than to the locality (Parkstad 
Limburg, 2006b). Before using this ‘sieve’, an accurate view for the housing plan was 
needed, describing all planned net additions to the housing stock. Under the author­
ity of the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg, an inventory of all planned net 
additions to the housing stock was made33. In the end, the ‘sieve’ mechanism was 
not used (Parkstad Limburg, 2009a). The involved parties decided that all plans that 
had already received a building permit would be allowed to proceed (3,449 houses 
in total) (see also Parkstad Limburg, 2008c). This number was greater that the 2,000 
that were needed according to the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg34. Nev­
ertheless, the regional organisation accepted this surplus (Parkstad Limburg, 2008c, 
p.8) because it expected that only 70% of the plans (2.491 houses) would actually 
be realised. In this way, decisions that would have tested the regional collaboration 
were avoided. In 2007, all Parkstad Limburg authorities agreed on a regional housing 
programme that indicated the maximum number of houses each municipality would 
be allowed to build (Parkstad Limburg, 2007b), even though the qualitative and 
quantitative criteria set out by the regional organisation in its plan of 2006 would not 
be met (Parkstad Limburg, 2009a).
In response to demographic decline, the region did change its strategic plans for 
new housing (Parkstad Limburg, 2006b, 2007b, 2008c), but individual municipalities 
did not adjust their operational spatial plans accordingly (local land-use plans).
The local policy changes that the region initially made were mainly related to a reduc­
tion in building plans. The second objective of the regional housing vision of 2006 
was to restructure the existing housing stock (Parkstad Limburg, 2006b). In Septem­
ber 2008, the Parkstad Limburg municipalities, the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg, and the housing associations signed an intention to formulate a joint vision 
on the matter (Parkstad Limburg, 2008a). The joint restructuring vision (Parkstad
33 IT PROVED TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE OVERVIEW OF ALL PLANNED 
HOUSES AS THEY EXISTED AT THE INDIVIDUAL PARKSTAD LIMBURG MUNICIPALITIES.
34 THIS NUMBER OF HOUSES (3,449) ALSO EXCEEDED THE 1,400 NEEDED ACCORDING TO DERKS
(PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2006B, 16).
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Limburg, 2009d) was approved by the council of the regional organisation on 14 
December 2009 (Parkstad Limburg, 2009f). The municipalities agreed that, between 
2008 and 2020, at the least 6,245 and at the most 13,157 dwellings were to be demol­
ished, and that 12,748 houses would be restructured (Parkstad Limburg, 2009f). This 
was specified per municipality (Etil and Parkstad Limburg, 2008 a, b, c, d, e, f, g). This 
joint restructuring vision is intended for local authorities to translate it to their local 
strategic and operational plans. Because this regional vision was formulated only 
recently, this has not happened yet. Thus, at local level, no radical operational plans 
have yet been formulated.
Before that, in March 2009, the regional organisation had formulated an inter­
municipal structure vision (Parkstad Limburg, 2009b). This plan, which can be consid­
ered a strategic plan, mentioned demographic decline and adapted the content ac­
cordingly35. In total, five agreements were formulated for the municipalities to take 
into account when developing new housing plans or adapting current housing plans. 
First, restructuring would have priority over extensions. Second, building outside re­
stricted areas (rode contour) was not allowed. Third, the qualitative principles formu­
lated by the regional organisation needed to be applied (Parkstad Limburg, 2009a)36. 
Fourth, the Parkstad Limburg’s centre (Heerlen centre) would be developed and 
priority was to be given to specific target groups. Fifth, the identity of areas was to 
be determined and strengthened, and the ambitions concerning renewable energy 
and health care pursued (Parkstad Limburg, 2009b, p.93).
From 2005 onwards, the province also paid attention to demographic decline, but 
it barely changed the content of its policies towards it. This can be found in the 
provincial housing strategy (Provincie Limburg, 200537) as well as in the provincial
35 THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION FORMULATED THREE AMBITIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE FORMU­
LATED IN THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN LEKKER THUIS IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, WHICH 
DID NOT PAY ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (STIPO CONSULT, 2004). THE THREE 
AMBITIONS WERE OFFERING A UNIQUE HOUSING STOCK, INCREASING THE SOCIAL DIVER­
SITY, AND STRENGTHENING THE IDENTITY AND IMAGE OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG (PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG, 2009B, P.90).
36 THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES WERE: QUALITY, RESTRUCTURING PRIOR TO EXTENSION, RETRAIN 
TARGET GROUPS, SPACE FOR UNIQUE HOUSING CONCEPTS, PARKSTAD CENTRE (HEERLEN 
CENTRE) IS THE PRIORITY, INTEGRAL APPROACH OF LIVEABILITY OF NEIGHBOURHOODS, AND 
DESIGN URBAN EDGES (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2009B, P.91).
37 IT EXPECTED THAT, UNTIL 2020, THE POPULATION OF LIMBURG WILL DECREASE BY 50,000
INHABITANTS (4%). IN ADDITION, THE PROVINCE IS EXPECTED TO EXPERIENCE A DECLINE IN
HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS, BETWEEN 2018 (ACCORDING TO THE MID VARIANT) AND 2022 (MID
VARIANT PLUS) (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2005, P.8-10).
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environmental plan (Provincie Limburg, 2006c). In both plans, the province argued 
that changes were needed in new housing plans and those for existing housing38, but 
the only change that the province formulated was for new housing: in its provincial 
housing plan it concluded that fewer new houses were needed39. Unlike the previous 
provincial housing strategy, the province gave an indication of the size of new hous­
ing development permitted per region instead of per municipality40, hoping to stimu­
late cooperation between the municipalities, housing associations and developers41.
From 2007 onwards, provincial policy attention for demographic decline started to 
increase. It published various policy notes about demographic decline. Examples are 
the vision document Demografische proefregio Limburg: Versnellen van vernieuwing  
(Provincie Limburg, 2007a) and the note Demografische proefregio Limburg: Ruimte  
voor vernieuw ing (Provincie Limburg, 2008a). The province said that it was not only 
the local authorities42, but also the province itself which should adapt its policy; the 
province should focus on qualitative growth instead of quantitative growth (Provin­
cie Limburg, 2008a, p.12). Moreover, the province wanted to take a more directive 
role and to stimulate regions to formulate a regional housing strategy. This was nec­
essary to overcome the competition between municipalities; many of them denied
38 THE PROVINCE ARGUED THAT MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO ADAPTATION, AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CURRENT HOUSING STOCK (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2005). 
HOWEVER, HOW SUCH INTERVENTIONS (E.G. RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOLITION) WOULD 
RELATE TO THE DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS (E.G. POPULATION DECLINE, 
EXPECTED DECLINE IN HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS AND CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE 
POPULATION) REMAINED UNCLEAR.
39 THE PROVINCE ARGUED THAT SOME NEW HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS WOULD STILL BE 
NEEDED, BECAUSE THE FORECAST SHOWED THAT, OVER THE NEXT YEARS, HOUSEHOLD 
NUMBERS WOULD INCREASE. IN ADDITION, THE POPULATION STRUCTURE WOULD CHANGE 
(INCREASE IN ELDERLY PEOPLE), WHICH WOULD CAUSE A CHANGE IN THE DEMAND FOR 
CERTAIN TYPES OF DWELLINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE 
DEMAND FOR SENIOR APARTMENTS (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2005, P.32).
40 THE PROVINCE EMPHASISED THAT THE REQUIRED EXTENSIONS PROPOSED FOR EACH 
REGION WERE AN INDICATION ONLY, AND NOT A HARD AND LIMITED PROGRAMME.
41 THE PROVINCE AGAIN (AS IN ITS PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN) STRESSED THE IMPOR­
TANCE OF FLEXIBILITY, AND UNDERLINED THE NECESSARY OF CLOSELY MONITORING THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, SO THAT, IF NEEDED, THE POLICY COULD 
BE ADAPTED (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2005, P.21).
42 IN THOSE POLICY DOCUMENTS THE PROVINCE NOTED THAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHOULD 
TAKE A SPECIFIC POLICY APPROACH TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE; MUNICIPALITIES 
SHOULD PRO-ACTIVELY ANTICIPATE POPULATION DECLINE INSTEAD OF TRYING TO COMBAT 
IT. THE LATTER COULD NAMELY PROVOKE COMPETITION BETWEEN MUNICIPALITIES.
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the existence of demographic decline or tried to combat it by extending their hous­
ing stock (Provincie Limburg, 2008a). Also, this provincial policy for its constituent 
regions emphasises the regional differences within the province (Provincie Limburg, 
2008a, 16). But, although the province concluded that it should change its policy, it 
proposed very few changes. One of them was the indication of a maximum number 
of new houses permitted in each region, which can be seen as a conservative policy 
change.
In September 2009, in response to demographic decline, the province together with 
the 19 municipalities of the Maastricht region43 and various private companies, set 
up the ‘Maastricht region branding foundation’. This can be considered a local policy 
change. The foundation created a website (bilingual) (Stichting regiobranding Zuid- 
Limburg, 2009) that gives an overview of the houses, jobs and cultural entertain­
ment available in the Maastricht region. The foundation aims to improve the image 
of the Maastricht region and to attract new inhabitants. This initiative mainly focuses 
on stimulating the housing demand and can be seen as a conservative concrete ac­
tion.
This section describes how  both the province and the regional organisation of 
Parkstad Limburg adapted the content of their strategic plans towards demographic 
decline (local strategic policy change). M ost of these policy changes are considered 
conservative changes. An exception is the reduction in new housing plans, which can 
be considered a radical strategic policy change. Recently, the regional organisation 
also reached an agreement about the reduction and improvement of the existing 
housing stock44, which also can be called a radical strategic policy change. Some of 
the agreements in the inter-municipal structure vision - such as restructuring having 
priority over extension - can also be considered a radical strategic policy change. So 
far, demographic decline has not resulted in a change in local, operational spatial 
policies. Finally, a few actions were initiated (e.g. the set up of a regional branding 
foundation and lauch of a website). These can be considered conservative changes.
43 MAASTRICHT REGION INCLUDES PARKSTAD LIMBURG AND 12 OTHER MUNICIPALITIES.
44 BEFORE, THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS HAD CONCENTRATED ON POLICIES THAT WOULD DEAL
WITH THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN THE SOCIAL HOUSING SECTOR.
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5.3.2 HOUSING MARKET POLICY IN EEMSDELTA, 
FROM 1981 TO 2009
1981-2001: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE RESULTED EITHER IN NO 
CHANGE IN LOCAL POLICY, OR ONLY IN CONSERVATIVE 
POLICY
Despite the fact that the Eemsdelta has been experiencing population decline since 
1981, it has taken a long time before local governments paid attention to it in their 
policies45: municipalities neither mentioned demographic decline nor adapted their 
housing and spatial planning policies accordingly.
From the mid 1990s, Delfzijl, together with the housing association W oningstichting  
Delfzijl46, started to pay attention to their housing market problems (such as high 
vacancy rates), and related them to demographic decline: in 1996, they published a 
report (Kiezen en delen: Op w eg  naar een nieuwe volkshuisvestingsvisie) (Gemeente 
Delfzijl and Woningstichting Delfzijl, 1996), in which they presented a plan for a 
large housing improvement scheme, including the demolition, restructuring, and 
sale of social housing, and the development of new housing. The aim of the housing 
improvement scheme was to improve the image of the city and the residential envi­
ronment, in order to create an upward spiral and to reverse demographic decline. In 
February 1998, these plans were specified and approved by the local administration 
(revitalisation programme Kiezen en Delen Gemeente Delfzijl, 1998), and 
subsequently the municipality and the housing association entered into agreements 
to implement the housing improvement scheme (Commissie Tielrooij, 2000, p.9).
45 IN EAST GRONINGEN, IN 1990, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COOPERATING HOUSING 
ASSOCIATIONS OF EAST GRONINGEN, A STUDY (POMPEN OF VERZUIPEN) ABOUT THE 
REGIONAL HOUSING MARKET WAS PUBLISHED. THIS STUDY POINTED TO THE PROBLEMS 
THAT COULD EMERGE AS A RESULT OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (SUCH AS LIMITED SUPPORT 
FOR LOCAL SERVICES, DECREASE IN THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING, REDUCTION IN QUALITY 
OF THE SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT, LESS INCOME FOR THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS). BY 
POINTING TO THESE PROBLEMS, THE COOPERATING HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS INTENDED TO 
OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM LOCAL, PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FOR TACKLING 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (NIEKERK AND REKERS, 1990). DESPITE THIS WARNING, MOST 
MUNICIPALITIES IN EAST GRONINGEN, SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE EEMSDELTA, DID NOT PAY 
ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE NOR DID THEY ADAPT THEIR POLICIES ACCORDINGLY
46 IN 2002, THREE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS (WOONSTICHTING DELFZIJL, ACANTUS, AND
WOONSTICHTING OSTERKIM) MERGED AND CONTINUED UNDER THE NAME ACANTUS.
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This can be considered a conservative policy change regarding demographic decline, 
because it was focused on reversing demographic decline into demographic growth.
The province, in the 1990s, also changed the content of its strategic plan. It added 
a new goal to its allocation policy47, which had been introduced in the 1970s. The 
allocation policy was designed not only to control the number of new houses and 
to prevent sprawl, which was its original goal, but also to prevent an oversupply of 
houses (Provincie Groningen, 1997; Provincie Groningen, 2005b, p.23)48. However, 
this policy change was not related to demographic decline (demographic decline was 
not mentioned as an argument49) and therefore was not included in this study.
Demographic decline was not mentioned in the provincial environment plan (Pro­
vincie Groningen, 2000) or in the policy note on building and housing (nota Bouw en  
en W onen ) (Provincie Groningen, 2001). Through the latter, the province wanted to 
make agreements with the individual municipalities about the maximum number of 
new houses, and also about transformation of the existing stock, in order to prevent 
more vacancies from arising (Provincie Groningen, 2001, p.9). However, this provin­
cial policy change was not made in response to demographic decline either, as the 
expansion of the housing stock was considered to be the problem.
47 ALLOCATION POLICY MEANS THAT FOR EACH MUNICIPALITY THE PROVINCE INDICATED THE 
MAXIMUM ALLOWED NUMBER OF NEW DWELLINGS.
48 THE OBJECTIVE, FORMULATED BY THE PROVINCE FOR THE MUNICIPALITIES OF DELFZIJL, 
APPINGEDAM, LOPPERSUM AND EEMSMOND, WAS TO STABILISE THEIR POPULATION 
NUMBERS (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 1995, P.13).
49 THE PROVINCE CONSIDERED THE HIGH VACANCY RATES OF THE SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK
A PROBLEM, BUT DID NOT RELATE IT TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. IN 1996, THE MINISTRY OF 
HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT INVESTIGATED VACANCY RATES OF
SOCIAL HOUSING IN GRONINGEN, FRIESLAND, DRENTHE AND ZEELAND AND CONCLUDED 
THAT THE VACANCY RATE IN GRONINGEN (0.94%) WAS THE HIGHEST. THE NATIONAL GOVERN­
MENT CONSIDERED THE LARGE PRODUCTION OF NEW DWELLINGS TO BE THE MAIN CAUSE 
OF THIS. HOWEVER, THE PROVINCE ARGUED THAT THERE WERE OTHER CAUSES, TOO, SUCH
AS THE MONOTONEOUS POST-WAR HOUSING STOCK, AND THE CURRENT RESTRUCTURING
AND SALE POLICY OF HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 1997, P.9).
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2002-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID RESULT IN CONSERVATIVE 
AND RADICAL CHANGES IN LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY 
AND ACTIONS
From 2001 onwards, the municipality of Delfzijl started to change its local strategic 
policy more radically in response to demographic decline50. To deal with demograph­
ic decline, Delfzijl formulated a two-pronged strategy in the masterplan for revitalisa­
tion of Delfzijl (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2001)51; its local housing plan of 2002 (Gemeente 
Delfzijl, 2002a)52 and its structure vision (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2003), in which the 
recommendations of the Tielrooij Commission were adopted (Commissie Tielrooij, 
2000, 2001)53. It tried to adapt its current housing stock to the diminished demand, 
by demolishing the oversupply of cheap houses. This can be considered a radical 
strategic policy change. At the same time, Delfzijl tried to stimulate the demand for 
houses by adding new houses and improving the quality of the stock, thus trying to 
attract new inhabitants and to limit out-migration (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2002a). This 
can be considered a conservative strategic policy change. This two-sided policy was 
also formulated in the structure vision for north Delfzijl (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2003)54.
50 COMMISSION TIELROOIJ, WHICH WAS INSTALLED BY THE PROVINCE AND THE LOCAL AUTHOR­
ITY OF DELFZIJL, PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS (MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS IS 
PRESENTED IN SECTION 5.4.2).
51 IN THE MASTERPLAN FOR NORTH DELFZIJL, THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE MUNICIPALITY, 
PROVINCE AND HOUSING ASSOCIATION ACANTUS (SEE THE FOLLOWING FOOTNOTE) WERE 
WORKED OUT. THE PROGRAMME FOR NORTH DELFZIJL WAS TO DEMOLISH 1,200 DWELLINGS 
AND TO BUILT 700 NEW ONES (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2001; GEMEENTE DELFZIJL 2006A, P.40).
52 DELFZIJL, THE PROVINCE AND THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION ACANTUS AGREED TO DEMOLISH
1,600 DWELLINGS AND TO BUILT 900 NEW ONES, UP TO 2006 (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2002A; 
GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006A, P.39).
53 THE COMMISSION TIELROOIJ ADVISED DEMOLISHING 1,360 DWELLINGS BETWEEN 2000 AND
2010 IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE OVERSUPPLY OF HOUSES AND TO FOLLOW THE DECREASE 
IN THE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO 
BUILD 1,650 NEW HOUSES IN ORDER TO MEET THE QUALITATIVE DEMAND OF THE CONSUM­
ERS (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006A, P.39). IT CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO WITHDRAW 
HOUSES BECAUSE OF THE EXPECTED DECREASE OF 500 HOUSEHOLDS BETWEEN 2000 
AND 2010. IT EXPECTED THAT THE RESTRUCTURING OPERATION WOULD RESULT IN THE 
OUT-MIGRATION IN THE 2000S BEING LESS THAN IN THE 1990S (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006A, 
P.39).
54 DELFZIJL WAS NOT THE ONLY MUNICIPALITY THAT WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF TURNING DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE INTO DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH. IN 2005, THE PROVINCE
CONCLUDED THAT MOST INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITIES (IN LOW-DEMAND AREAS SUCH AS
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In addition, the local organisation changed. In 2002, the development company of 
Delfzijl (Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Delfzijl (O M D)), as recommended by the Tiel­
rooij Commission (2000), was set up by the municipality of Delfzijl, the province of 
Groningen and the housing association Acantus55. Between 2002 and 2009, the O M D  
implemented the policy, as agreed in the local strategic plan and started to demolish, 
restructure and build houses.
In 2006, Delfzijl revised its structure vision (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2006a) and formu­
lated a new housing policy (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2006b)56. The differences with the 
former local housing plan (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2002a) and structure vision (Gemeente 
Delfzijl, 2003) were in the programme for new housing. The focus of this new 
programme changed from being on low-income groups and cheap housing (houses 
which cost less than 175,000 euros), to middle-income groups and housing in middle 
segments (houses which cost between 175,000 and 225,000 euros)57 (Gemeente 
Delfzijl, 2006b, p.1-2)58: new housing aimed at owner occupation should be suitable
NORTH GRONINGEN) WERE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DOING THIS, AND THAT THEY CONTINUED TO 
EXPAND THEIR HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 2005, 25).
55 THE OMD IS A TEMPORARY ORGANISATION AND UNTIL THE SPRING OF 2010 IT WAS RESPON­
SIBLE FOR RESTRUCTURING AND NEW HOUSING IN DELFZIJL. THE OMD CARRIED THE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR TASKS THAT NORMALLY MUNICIPALITIES WOULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH: 
ACQUIRING LAND, PREPARING BUILDING SITES, AND SETTING UP PROGRAMMES OF REQUIRE­
MENTS THAT DEVELOPERS HAVE TO MEET. THE OMD MANAGED ALL BUILDING ALLOCATIONS 
(WONINGBOUWCONTINGENTEN) THAT THE PROVINCE HAS GIVEN TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF 
DELFZIJL. IN 2010, THE INVOLVED PARTIES DECIDED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
OMD SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF DELFZIJL.
56 THIS REVISION WAS BASED ON A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NEW HOUSING PROGRAMMES 
OF APPINGEDAM AND DELFZIJL (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006B). IT WAS ALSO BASED ON A 
CHECK OF THOSE PROGRAMMES AGAINST FUTURE HOUSING DEMAND (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 
2006B), WHICH CONCLUDED THAT DELFZIJL WAS CONFRONTED WITH AN OVERSUPPLY
OF CHEAP HOUSING AND A LACK OF HOUSING SUITABLE FOR MIDDLE-INCOME GROUPS 
(GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006B, P.1-2).
57 THE SHARE OF NEWLY BUILT HOUSING IN THE MIDDLE SEGMENT WAS INCREASED FROM 31% 
OF ALL NEW HOUSES (UNDER THE OLD HOUSING PROGRAMME) TO 70% (THE NEW HOUSING 
PROGRAMME). THE AMBITION TO BUILD CHEAP HOUSING DECREASED FROM 65% (UNDER 
THE OLD HOUSING PROGRAMME) TO 10% (THE NEW HOUSING PROGRAMME) (GEMEENTE 
DELFZIJL, 2006B, P.1-2).
58 THIS CHANGE WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE CONCLUSIONS BY THE COMMISSION TIELROOIJ THAT
THE EMIGRATION OF FINANCIALLY STRONG HOUSEHOLDS SHOULD BE REDUCED. DELFZIJL 
NEEDED TO BECOME MORE ATTRACTIVE AND IMPROVE ITS IMAGE. SUCH MEASURES COULD
STOP SOCIAL SEGREGATION (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006B, P.1).
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for the middle segment and the elderly59, and new social housing should be suitable 
for the elderly.
In order to attract middle-income groups, the municipality of Delfzijl also set up a 
marketing campaign, which translated would read ‘Real stars live in Delfzijl’, with 
the aim of improving the image of Delfzijl and thus attracting new inhabitants (OMD, 
2009). Those changes can be called conservative policy changes, because the policy 
focuses on increasing population and household numbers (‘planning for growth’).
In 2009, Delfzijl reaffirmed (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2009) that it would continue its two­
pronged strategy. On the one hand, through demolition and restructuring it would 
attempt to turn demographic decline into opportunities, for example, by transform­
ing urban areas into green and ‘blue’ areas (op.cit., p .26 and 32). On the other hand, 
it would try to limit demographic decline to an absolute minimum, by not accepting 
it but combating it. This would be done by improving Delfzijl’s image and by con­
ducting promotional campaigns to attract new inhabitants, not only from within the 
Netherlands but also from the northern parts of Germany (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2009, 
p .25 and 30).
Similar to Parkstad Limburg, the informal Eemsdelta collaboration of municipali­
ties also formulated a policy, at regional level, in response to demographic de­
cline. In 2008, the municipalities agreed to set up a joint regional housing strategy 
(Stuurgroep Eemsdelta, 2008)60. One year later, the municipalities of Delfzijl and 
Appingedam together formulated a development strategy (Van Vliet and Dijkstra, 
2009)61. In the same year, the municipalities in the Eemsdelta, together with the
59 BESIDES, THE MUNICIPALITY DECIDED THAT 15% OF THE NEW OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING 
SHOULD CONSIST OF ONE-OFF HOUSING AND 85% OF MASS CONSTRUCTION (GEMEENTE 
DELFZIJL, 2003, P.43-44).
60 SOME YEARS EARLIER, IN 2003, DELFZIJL, APPINGEDAM AND EEMSMOND AGREED TO SET UP 
A JOINT HOUSING STRATEGY (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN ET AL., 2003). DURING THE FOLLOW­
ING YEARS, THE MUNICIPALITIES REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED THEIR AMBITION TO DO THIS 
(GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2005; GEMEENTE DELFZIJL, 2006B). HOWEVER, DESPITE THIS INTEN­
TION, BY 2008, SUCH A REGIONAL HOUSING STRATEGY HAD STILL NOT BEEN FORMULATED. IN 
THAT YEAR, THE MUNICIPALITIES, ONCE MORE REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION AND LOPPER­
SUM ALSO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT
61 THE MUNICIPALITIES CONCLUDED THAT BOTH OF THEM SHOULD DEMOLISH AND RESTRUC­
TURE PARTS OF THEIR HOUSING STOCK. THEY AGREED THAT APPINGEDAM HAD THE MOST
OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTRACT INHABITANTS. FOR THAT REASON, IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS, 
MOST NEW HOUSES HAD TO BE BUILT THERE. DELFZIJL SHOULD REPLACE ONLY 30% OF 
DEMOLISHED HOUSING. BOTH MUNICIPALITIES ADOPTED THE CONCLUSION BY THE CONSUL-
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province, formulated a regional policy for housing and services, called Pact regio 
Eemsdelta (Gemeente Appingedam, et al., 2009), in which they concluded that, in 
order to deal with the continuing demographic decline, they would need to change 
their housing market policy. They decided that, between 2009 and 2018, they would 
demolish 3,300 and add 2,600 dwellings, in the region of Eemsdelta (reducing the 
current housing stock by 700 dwellings). Unlike Parkstad Limburg, the municipalities 
in Eemsdelta have not yet reached an agreement about how  these numbers should 
be divided between them. This regional policy for housing and services can be con­
sidered a regional, radical strategic policy change.
For a long time, the province paid no attention to demographic decline. From 2005 
to 2007, it did note that some areas in the province were experiencing this62, but 
it hardly changed its strategic provincial policy. An exception is the provincial note 
on building and housing that set priorities for implementation (Provincie Gronin­
gen, 2005). In this note, the province extended the planning period by two years, 
to give low-demand areas (such as Eemsdelta) where implementation of housing 
programmes was delayed due to demographic and economic developments, the 
possibility to realise the agreed housing programme (Provincie Groningen, 2005). In 
addition, the province argued that in areas outside the regional-vision area (regio- 
visiegebied63) (e.g. north and east Groningen) and where demand was low, transfor­
mation should become the prime policy priority64 (Provincie Groningen, 2005, p.14;
TANCY FIRM COMPANEN (2009B) (MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS STUDY IS PRESENTED IN 
SECTION 5.4.2) THAT DETAILED HOUSING PLANS (FOR ABOUT 1,000 NEW HOUSES) DID NOT 
MATCH THE DEMAND FOR QUALITY HOUSING. APPINGEDAM NEEDED TO FOCUS MORE ON 
THE SOCIAL HOUSING SECTOR AND LESS ON OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING (VAN VLIET AND 
DIJKSTRA, 2009, P.44-46).
62 IN THIS NOTE ON BUILDING AND HOUSING (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 2005) AND IN THE 
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 2006), THE PROVINCE 
MENTIONED THAT SOME PARTS OF THE PROVINCE (E.G. THE EEMSDELTA) WERE EXPERIENC­
ING DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. HOWEVER, IN BOTH PLANS, THE PROVINCE PAID LITTLE ATTEN­
TION TO THIS, MENTIONING IT ONLY IN THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EAST AND NORTH 
GRONINGEN (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 2006, P.84-87).
63 REGIOVISIEGEBIED INCLUDES THE CITY OF GRONINGEN AND ITS SURROUNDINGS, WHICH 
COVERS THE AREA FROM GRONINGEN CITY TOWARDS ASSEN, UP TO THE PROVINCIAL 
BORDER.
64 THE PROVINCE DID NOT LINK THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION TO POPULATION DECLINE, 
BUT RATHER TO ‘LIVEABILITY' ISSUES. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR THE NEW HOUSING PROJECT
CALLED BLAUWE STAD (BLUE CITY). THIS HOUSING PROJECT INITIALLY WAS MEANT TO 
IMPROVE THE SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF OLDAMBT, WHICH IS NOT PART
OF THE CASE-STUDY REGION EEMSDELTA (AND THEREFORE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY),
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Provincie Groningen, 2006, p.33-37). Housing stocks should still be increased (with 
expected growth in the number of households), but should be concentrated in one 
of the six urban centres indicated by the province, of which Delfzijl is one (Provin­
cie Groningen, 2006). The province argued that the housing programme of Delfzijl 
should improve the image of Delfzijl and attract higher-income groups in order to 
improve the quality of the spatial environment in the region of Hogeland65 (Provincie 
Groningen, 2006, p.84-87). North Groningen, due to its ageing population, should 
pay more attention to senior housing66 (Provincie Groningen, 2005) and municipali­
ties in regions with low housing demand should cooperate (op.cit. p.27). With the 
Eemsdelta region (Gemeente Appingedam et al., 2009), the region responded to this 
call.
Between 2007 and 2009, the province of Groningen increased its policy attention for 
demographic decline. In preparation for the provincial environmental plan (Provin­
cie Groningen, 2009), various studies were made to investigate this decline and its 
consequences67. Despite this, the provincial environmental plan did not pay much 
attention to it, nor did it adapt its content accordingly (Provincie Groningen, 2009). 
The same can be said of the provincial ordinance (provinciale verordening), which can 
be considered an operational plan (Provincie Groningen, 2008c).
This section describes how  most policy changes took place at local level. Delfzijl 
adapted the content of its strategic housing plan to demographic decline (local sta- 
tegic policy change). Initially, the changes were focused mainly on the current hous­
ing stock; in 2001 and 2002, Delfzijl decided to demolish and restructure large parts
AND STIMULATE THE SOCIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA (PROVINCIE GRONIN­
GEN, 2006, P.33-37).
65 HOGELAND IS THE UPPER NORTHERN PART OF THE PROVINCE OF GRONINGEN, WHICH 
INCLUDES EEMSMOND AND A PART OF DELFZIJL.
66 THE PROVINCE EXPECTED THAT BETWEEN 2000 AND 2015 THE GROUP OF PEOPLE OF THE 
AGE OF 55 AND OVER WOULD INCREASE BY 44,000 PEOPLE. FOR THAT REASON, THEY STATED 
THAT MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THIS TARGET GROUP (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 
2005, P.27).
67 EXAMPLES ARE LUCKEY ET AL. (2007), ADRIAANS AND HEINZ (2007), POULUS (2007), TIL ET AL. 
(2007A,B), LOUTER AND EIKEREN (2007), AND BUREAU PAU (2007). THE FIRST TWO STUDIES 
FOCUSED ESPECIALLY ON EAST GRONINGEN. THE RESEARCH BY POULUS (2007) AND TIL ET 
AL. (2007A,B) FOCUSED ON BOTH EAST AND NORTH GRONINGEN. THE STUDIES BY LOUTER 
AND EIKEREN (2007), AND BUREAU PAU (2007) FOCUSED ON NORTH GRONINGEN. ALSO, THE 
PROVINCE ITSELF COMISSIONED RESEARCH INTO DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS, ITS 
CONSEQUENCES, AND THE STRATEGIES THAT WERE NEEDED (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 2009). 
IN THE NEXT SECTIONS, MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE STUDIES ARE PRESENTED.
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of that stock. This can be considered a radical policy change. Gradually, the policy 
attention of Delfzijl turned more towards plans for new housing and to improving its 
image. The policy response of Delfzijl towards demographic decline is two-sided. On 
the one hand, accepting the demographic decline and acting on it (a radical policy 
change), on the other hand, trying to attract new inhabitants (a conservative policy 
change).
To date, demographic decline has not resulted in a change in local operational spatial 
policies. The municipality of Delfzijl has not adapted its local plans (local land-use 
plan), but has started to directly implement the policy that was agreed on in the local 
strategic plans. Several actions have been initiated, such as the marketing campaign 
and demolition of houses.
Recently, at regional and provincial levels also, policy attention for demographic 
decline has increased. At regional level, this has resulted in a radical, strategic policy 
change, with municipalities agreeing to reduce their current housing stock by 700 
dwellings. In contrast, at provincial level, hardly any policy change has occurred. An 
exception is the extention of the planning period within which the municipalities 
should achieve the formulated objectives concerning new housing developments, 
which can be considered a conservative policy change. Also, the province has stimu­
lated the municipalities to cooperate.
5.3.3 HOUSING MARKET POLICY IN ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN FROM 1982 TO 2009
1982-2004: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN LOCAL 
POLICY CHANGES
Since 1982, the population of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen has been decreasing, especially 
in Terneuzen and Sluis. Initially, neither the province nor the local authorities paid 
attention to demographic decline in their plans: they did not mention it, nor did they 
change their strategic or operational plans accordingly.
Around 2001, the province started to acknowledge that, in the long run, the prov­
ince as a whole and some of its regions would start losing some of their population 
(Provincie Zeeland, 2001; Provincie Zeeland, 2003). However, the province expected 
that, over the next 25 years, the population of the province would increase by 3 to 
6% (Provincie Zeeland, 2003, p.43). It formulated the ambition of modest popula­
tion growth, by encouraging inward migration from the Randstad, North Brabant
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and from abroad (Provincie Zeeland, 2001, p.14). This would be done by developing 
unique projects and rural housing (Provincie Zeeland, 2003, p.41). This policy was 
incorporated in the provincial housing vision and the provincial environmental plan 
(Provincie Zeeland, 2004b; Provincie Zeeland, 2006a).
2005- 2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE RESULTED IN CONSERVATIVE 
LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY CHANGES
In 2005, both Sluis and Terneuzen, in their local strategic housing strategies, men­
tioned demographic decline and decided to adapt their local strategic housing policy 
to it by reducing their development ambitions. Sluis reduced its growth ambition 
from 5,000 inhabitants to between 2,600 and 3,20068 for the subsequent ten-year 
period69 (Ecorys-Kolpron, 2004, p.16). Terneuzen decided to try to stabilise rather 
than grow  and maintain its current population of around 55,400 (Gemeente 
Terneuzen, 2005b, p.3). Both policy changes can be considered as conservative 
changes, because they were in keeping with the traditional planning policy of stimu­
lating demographic growth. Hulst, however, did not change its strategic policy; it did 
not mention demographic decline nor did it adapt its housing strategy.
In order to realise their objectives, the individual municipalities of Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen decided to build more houses and to develop attractive housing con­
cepts. Hulst decided to build 150 new dwellings a year (Gemeente Hulst, 2005), Sluis 
155 (Ecorys-Kolpron, 2004), and Terneuzen 200 (Gemeente Terneuzen, 2005b)70.
Both Terneuzen and Hulst wanted to develop attractive housing concepts, such as 
more possibilities for people to design their own homes, for using sustainable mate­
rials, improving the quality of the spatial environment, and green space (Gemeente 
Terneuzen, 2005b). In addition, Hulst focused on rural living, luxurious living, living 
close to services, and living on the waterfront (Gemeente Hulst, 2005).
In 2007, the municipalities of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, together with the housing associa­
tions and project developer A M  W onen, started a joint marketing campaign in order
68 AS THE MUNICIPALITY COUNTS 24,600 INHABITANTS IN 2004, THIS MEANS A MINIMAL GROWTH 
OF 11% AND A MAXIMAL GROWTH OF 13%.
69 SLUIS DOWNSIZED ITS HOUSING PROGRAMME FROM 200 TO 155 NEW DWELLINGS A YEAR 
(ECORYS-KOLPRON 2004, 16).
70 THE MUNICIPALITIES USED DIFFERENT TIME-FRAMES. TERNEUZEN FORMULATED THIS 
STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS (2005 UNTIL 2009) AND SLUIS FOR THE NEXT TEN
YEARS (2004 UNTIL 2014).
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to improve the image of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and to attract new inhabitants (espe­
cially from the Randstad)7'. They employed a trend watcher to investigate which 
target group they should focus their marketing campaign on (the advice was to 
focus on people from Rotterdam and surrounding areas). They twice organised a fair 
in the theatre of Terneuzen and took part in a real estate exhibition in Gent, and in 
emigration fairs held in Nieuwegein (2008 and 2009) (Lieshout, 2008; Taskforce U w  
Nieuw e Toekomst, 2009). They launched the website uw.nieuwetoekom st.nl (‘your 
new future’), which gave an overview of available housing and job vacancies in the 
area. They financed these activities from municipal funds and with a subsidy from 
the European Union. This can be considered a regional strategic policy change, but 
one that is conservative, because the individual municipalities focused their policy 
on increasing the population, household numbers and/or working age population by 
attracting new inhabitants from the Randstad through marketing.
From 2008 onwards, the province started to increase its attention for demographic 
decline. It published an explorative study (Onverkende paden Provincie Zeeland, 
2008) that paid attention to demographic decline, its possible consequences for 
housing, and housing policy strategy. In this explorative study, the province argued 
that it still wanted to grow, by 0.5% annually, between 2007 and 2011, which equals 
an annual increase of 1,900 inhabitants (Provincie Zeeland, 2008, p.18). In addi­
tion, the province considered that new housing would be necessary, in total 17,000 
houses up to 2030, with the fastest increase occurring up to 2015 (1,000 new houses 
a year) (Provincie Zeeland, 2008, p.27). The explorative study showed that the prov­
ince had no intention to change its plans radically (but only conservatively)72.
Since 2008, the province of Zeeland has been participating in the Interreg project 
DC Noise, together with the province of Groningen. The province has formulated 
three projects. One of these projects focuses on housing. A  housing ambassador 
was assigned in the municipality of Sluis, who advises both private homeowners and 
candidate buyers about the possibilities for improving their property. This can be 
considered a conservative concrete action.
To date, demographic decline has not resulted in radical strategic policy changes in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. This does not mean that there have been no changes. Sluis and
71 ALSO CWI, DOW CHEMICAL AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES TRIED TO FIND AN 
ANSWER TO THE LABOUR MARKET PROBLEMS (SEE FOR MORE INFORMATION CHAPTER 6). 
BOTH INITIATIVES WERE COMBINED.
72 IT MAINTAINS THE SAME GROWTH AMBITION AS FORMULATED IN THE PROVINCIAL ENVIRON­
MENTAL PLAN OF 2006 (PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2006A).
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Terneuzen decreased their growth ambition in their local strategic plans and the 
three municipalities jointly (at regional level) set up marketing campaigns to attract 
new inhabitants (stimulating the demand side). Those can be considered conserva­
tive changes. M ost of these changes took place at local and regional government 
level, and most were focused on new housing. Recently, Terneuzen started to focus 
on restructuring its social housing sector73, but, to date, this has not resulted in a 
local government policy change, because it is mainly the housing associations and 
not the municipalities which have formulated policies to deal with the negative ef­
fects of demographic decline for the social housing sector. So far, there have been 
no changes in local operational policies in response to population decline. The prov­
ince has started to recognise demographic decline, but has not yet done anything 
about it.
5.3.4 THE THREE CASES COMPARED
In all case-study regions, at all local government levels (municipalities, regions and 
provinces) the policy attention towards demographic decline has increased and at 
some government levels this resulted in local policy changes. Those changes mainly 
took place in strategic plans.
Local policies were changed in the Eemsdelta earlier than in Parkstad Limburg and 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. This could be explained by the fact that the Eemsdelta first has 
been experiencing demographic decline. Another difference between the case­
study regions is that policy changes took place at different government levels. In 
the Eemsdelta, the local and provincial levels were first, followed by the region; in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen the policy changes took place at local and regional levels only; 
and in Parkstad Limburg they occurred mainly at regional and provincial levels.
The various regions all displayed similar policy reactions. Examples are marketing 
campaigns, development of new residential concepts, reductions in new housing 
plans, and reductions in housing stock through restructuring and demolition. Their 
strategies have been related to existing as well as new housing stock, and to both 
the demand and supply side of the housing market.
73 IN 2008, TERNEUZEN AND THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS CLAVIS AND WOONGOED ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN JOINTLY INVESTIGATED THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS REGARDING THE 
SOCIAL HOUSING SECTOR (GEMEENTE TERNEUZEN AND STICHTING CLAVIS, 2008; GEMEENTE 
TERNEUZEN AND STICHTING WOONGOED ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, 2008)
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F IG U RE 5.7 O V ERV IEW  O F POLICY CH AN G ES  AND  ACT IO NS IN D IFFEREN T  C A SE -STU D Y  REG IO NS
CONSERVATIVE POLICY CHANGES AND RADICAL POLICY CHANGES AND 
ACTIONS ACTIONS
MUNICIPALITY ADDING NEW HOUSING FOR SPECIFIC 
TARGET GROUP (IN THE MEDIUM AND 
EXPENSIVELY PRICED SEGMENT) IN 
HEERLEN;
REDUCING THE CURRENT SOCIAL 
HOUSING STOCK BY TRANSFORMING 
SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK INTO OWNER- 
OCCUPIED HOUSING BY SELLING 
THOSE HOUSES IN DELFZIJL;
ADDING NEW HOUSING FOR SPECIFIC 
TARGET GROUP (MIDDLE- AND HIGH- 
INCOME GROUPS) IN DELFZIJL;
INCREASING THE SHARE OF PRIVATE 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN DELFZIJL;
MARKETING CAMPAIGN ‘REAL STARS 
LIVE IN DELFZIJL';
MAINTAINING THE AMBITION TO GROW 
IN SLUIS AND HULST.
DEVELOPING NEW (ATTRACTIVE) 
HOUSING CONCEPTS IN ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN (COMBINATION OF 
HOUSING, NATURE AND RECREATION).
DELFZIJL DECIDED (IN 2001-2002) ON 
DEMOLITION: NUMBER OF HOUSES TO 
BE DEMOLISHED WAS HIGHER (1,200) 
THAN THE NUMBER OF NEW BUILDS 
(ESPECIALLY OWNER OCCUPIED ) (700) 
(IN THE HIGHER SEGMENT).
REGION ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN DEVELOPED
A JOINT MARKETING CAMPAIGN TO 
ATTRACT NEW INHABITANTS (2007).
PARKSTAD LIMBURG DECIDED (2006­
2007) TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF 
NEW HOUSING PLANS AND TO BUILT 
MAXIMALLY 3,449 HOUSES UNTIL 2010;
PARKSTAD LIMBURG FORMULATED 
A REGIONAL RESTRUCTURING 
VISION (2009) IN WHICH IT DECIDED 
TO DEMOLISH MINIMALLY 6,245 
AND MAXIMALLY 13,157 AND TO 
RESTRUCTURE 12,748 HOUSES 
BETWEEN 2008 AND 2020;
PARKSTAD LIMBURG DECIDED THAT 
RESTUCTURING SHOULD HAVE 
PRIORITY OVER EXTENSION;
IN THE EEMSDELTA, ALL 
MUNICIPALITIES JOINTLY DECIDED 
TO DEMOLISH 3,300 AND TO ADD
2,600 HOUSES WHICH MEANS A NETT 
REDUCTION OF 700 HOUSES FROM 
THE EXISTING HOUSING STOCK (2009).
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CONSERVATIVE POLICY CHANGES AND RADICAL POLICY CHANGES AND 
ACTIONS ACTIONS
PROVINCE THE PROVINCE OF GRONINGEN
DECIDED TO PROLONG THE PLANNING 
PERIOD (2005);
THE PROVINCE OF GRONINGEN 
STIMULATED THE EEMSDELTA TO 
FORMULATE A REGIONAL HOUSING 
PLAN (2009);
THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG 
STIMULATED ITS REGIONS TO 
FORMULATE A REGIONAL HOUSING 
PLAN (2005);
THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG,
TOGETHER WITH OTHER ACTORS, SET 
UP MAASTRICHT REGION BRANDING 
AND LAUNCHED A WEBSITE (2009).
THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND ASSIGNED 
A HOUSING AMBASSADOR IN SLUIS.
The order in which the case-study regions put the different strategies into practice 
did differ. The individual municipalities in Parkstad Limburg first focused on new 
housing and tried to increase the number of new houses that should be developed. 
When this did not seem to work, the municipalities decided to cooperate. The 
regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg also first focused on new housing by 
reducing the number of plans74, and subsequently turned its attention to restructur­
ing and demolishing the existing housing stock. Recently, various public and private 
actors set up a foundation to improve the image of the Maastricht region within and 
outside the Netherlands. The Eemsdelta, particularly Delfzijl, first focused on restruc­
turing and demolishing the existing housing stock and replacing it with new housing, 
before they turned to marketing. Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, started by developing attrac­
tive housing concepts and adapted its growth ambitions, after which the different 
municipalities jointly set up marketing campaigns.
To date, the policy response to demographic decline has been mainly through 
conservative policy changes (see Figure 5.7 for an overview of the different types of 
policy changes). In all case-study regions, this was the first reaction to demographic 
decline; all regions started with strategies focused on increasing the number of 
inhabitants and/or households. In Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta, a few radical 
policy changes were also found. M ost of these radical changes were in strategic
74 THEY ALSO DEVELOPED NEW HOUSING CONCEPTS (STIPO CONSULT, 2004), BUT DID NOT 
RELATE THIS STRATEGY TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
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policy at regional level. Both regions intend to translate these regional agreements 
into their local strategic and operational plans, but this has not happened yet.
5.4 POLICY ARRANGEMENTS
In the following three sections, an analysis is given of the policy processes that led to 
the policy changes described in the previous section. Each case-study has been struc­
tured around the policy changes, and these are described separately per govern­
ment level. The three sets of conditions mentioned in the theoretical framework as 
possibly influencing the policy reaction (see Chapter 3) are discussed; policy arrange­
ments and the changes in their dimensions are described in Section 5.4, the strategic, 
structural-internal and structural-external congruence in Section 5.5, and the local 
spatial conditions in Section 5.6. Finally, the aspects of demographic decline, which 
may influence the relationship between demographic decline and local spatial policy, 
as already discussed in Chapter 4, are referred to in Section 5.7.
Chapter 3 hypothesises that, in order to realise a new policy arrangement and there­
with a radical policy change, demographic decline must result in a radical change in 
all dimensions of the policy arrangement. Examples of those changes are new ideas 
about the nature of the problem and its possible solution; new actors and/or ‘chal­
lenging (new) coalitions’, and changes in the pattern of interaction; new formal and 
informal rules; new resources (new subsides, new knowledge, changes in political 
legitimacy) and/or new power balance between actors (redistribute resources) (see 
Section 3.5 and 3.6).
In order to realise a conservative policy change, a renewal of the existing policy 
arrangement is sufficient. This is much easier to realise than a new policy arrange­
ment. It only asks for a marginal change in one dimension of the policy arrangement 
(which is absorbed by the other dimensions of the existing policy arrangement).
A s argued in Chapter 3, the analysis of the policy arrangements starts from the 
discourse dimension. The way discourse is defined in this study is closely linked to 
the dimension ‘actors and coalitions’, so both are discussed together. In order to 
make clear when which dimension of the policy arrangement is discussed those 
dimensions are put in italics.
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5.4.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
1997-2004: 
STABILITY AND PROCESS TOWARDS CONSERVATIVE 
CHANGE IN LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
Between 1997 and 2004, most municipalities, the region and the province paid no 
attention to demographic decline, nor did they adapt their strategic and operational 
(housing and spatial planning) policies accordingly. This can be explained by the fact 
that the majority of the actors did not perceive demographic decline as a problem 
(discourse).
This situation has been challenged by different actors. The regional economic re­
search institute Etil, which published the regional population and household projec­
tions commonly used by the municipalities and the province, for many years had 
shown that population (since 1997) and number of households (since 2002) had been 
declining, and predicted that this would continue. However, most individual munici­
palities and the province did not perceive demographic decline as a problem 
(discourse). They even openly cast doubt on the downward demographic projec­
tions. The problem perception of some individual municipalities (e.g. Heerlen) 
changed (discourse) and those municipalities thought demographic decline was a 
temporary problem that could be reversed into demographic growth. This marginal 
change in the problem perception (discourse) can be an explanation for the fact that 
some municipalities (especially urban municipalities) formulated conservative policy 
changes in their local strategic policy.
2005-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS RADICAL CHANGE IN REGIONAL 
STRATEGIC POLICY
Between 2005 and 2009, a gradual but ultimately radical policy change took place at 
the regional level; the individual municipalities jointly decided to reduce the number 
of houses to be built. This radical policy change was influenced by the fact, that from 
2005 onwards, (not only Etil but) other actors also perceived demographic decline as 
a structural problem (discourse), and they challenged the current situation 
(‘challenging coalition’). This was especially the case for the urban municipalities 
within Parkstad Limburg (Heerlen and Kerkrade) and the housing associations. These 
actors were the first to be confronted with housing market problems that were 
related to the persistent decline, and they argued that a (read: radical) policy change 
was needed, for those problems could not be solved by the traditional housing policy
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of stimulating and accommodating demographic growth. This idea (discourse) was 
also triggered by the fact that the urban municipalities already had formulated con­
servative policy changes which did not seem to be effective.
In 2006, a new  actor entered the stage, also challenging the traditional way of plan­
ning (discourse). This was the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg, set up as 
a result of the region’s W gr-plus status75. This new organisation meant additional 
governance capacity, which made it easier to think about policy changes and helped 
to make a discourse coalition76.
The challenging actors (urban municipalities and housing associations) and the new  
actor (regional organisation) tried to convince the other actors (rural municipalities 
and local politicians), that demographic decline is a structural problem and a radical 
housing policy change was needed. Although there was no shared problem percep­
tion (discourse) among the seven Parkstad municipalities and there was a lack of 
knowledge (resource) about demographic decline, the involved actors agreed, in 
2006, on the changes that were needed in the strategic housing market policy, and 
they decided to reduce their plans for new housing (which can be considered a radi­
cal policy change).
Gradually next to the urban municipalities (Heerlen, Kerkrade), housing associa­
tions and regional organisation Parkstad Limburg, other actors (local politicians and 
other urban municipalities) also became convinced that demographic decline is a 
problem and a radical policy change was needed, as the housing market problems 
that confronted the different actors as a result of demographic decline became more 
visible. In addition, the difference between the population projections and the plans 
for future housing of the individual municipalities (new knowledge -  resource) made 
it clear to the involved actors that it was necessary to reduce their new housing 
plans77. Finally, the outcomes of the different studies, published by national research 
institutes in 2006 (Derks et al., 2006a,b; Van Dam et al., 2006), and conferences (RPB 
and Ministerie van VROM, 2007; BNA, 2007) about demographic decline (knowledge
75 PRIOR PARKSTAD LIMBURG ALREADY EXISTED. IT WAS SET UP IN 1999. HOWEVER, IN 2006, IT 
RECEIVED A WGR-PLUS STATUS BY WHICH TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WERE REMOVED 
FROM INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITIES TO THE REGION.
76 HOWEVER, THE NEW ACTOR AND THE ACCOMPANYING NEW RULES MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO 
REACH RADICAL OPERATIONAL POLICY CHANGES. THIS WILL BE EXPLAINED LATER IN THIS 
SECTION.
77 THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION PARKSTAD LIMBURG EXPECTED AN OVERSUPPLY OF 8,000 
HOUSES (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2006).
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resource) supported the argument of the ‘challenging’ actors in Parkstad Limburg 
and contributed to the policy change. All studies concluded that demographic 
decline is a new (and structural) policy context which asks for a policy change. This 
affected the regional discourse within Parkstad Limburg, which subsequently also 
affected the national discourse.
Despite the above mentioned studies of national research institutes, the ‘challeng­
ing’ actors complained that little was known about demographic decline, its con­
sequences and the possible strategies (lack of knowledge resource). But, because 
Parkstad Limburg was already confronted with housing market problems, there was 
no time to gain more knowledge (resource) before formulating the policy answer. 
Therefore, the formulation of a new regional housing policy and the gathering of 
relevant knowledge (resource) took place simultaneously.
The research initiative (Krimp als Kans I), which was set up by the regional organisa­
tion Parkstad Limburg together with the province, the joint housing associations 
and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, to increase the 
knowledge (resource) about demographic decline and its consequences, resulted 
in a shared problem perception (discourse) also. First, the general conclusion was 
reached that population decline should be perceived a structural phenomenon. 
Second, the way in which the regional policy and the research (Gerrichhauzen and 
Dogterom, 20007) were organised helped to arrive at a shared problem perception. 
Both were organised in an open fashion, which meant that many different actors 
(municipalities, housing associations and property developers) were involved. The 
problem perception (discourse) of the actors changed from demographic decline is 
no or a temporary problem into demographic decline is a structural problem.
In its regional housing strategy (2006), the regional organisation said that more 
attention should be paid to the restructuring and demolition of social housing. How­
ever, it took a long time, before this regional restructuring vision was formulated. 
The reason was the disagreement between the involved actors (the municipalities 
and housing associations) about who should do what. The regional organisation and 
the municipalities waited for housing associations to take up the gauntlet, arguing 
that this was their responsibility. These associations complained they could not solve 
the problems of demographic decline by themselves, because the financial burden 
was too high. This disagreement made it difficult for the actors to cooperate and to 
reach a radical regional policy change concerning restructuring.
Another explanation why it took a long time before the regional restructuring vision 
was formulated was that, in Parkstad Limburg, as many as 14 different housing
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associations own the social housing stock (Bbsh, 2008)78. This fact alone made it dif­
ficult to reach agreement about a radical policy change.
Recently, the involved actors agreed to formulate a joint vision for restructuring the 
housing stock of Parkstad Limburg; this can be considered a radical regional policy 
change (Parkstad Limburg, 2008a). The reason for this about turn is the confirma­
tion from various studies (published in 2007) of the argument expressed by housing 
associations, that they were unable to solve the problems by themselves (resource 
knowledge). The research project Krimp als Kans I, pointed out that the financial 
burden attached to demographic decline is substantial; the costs of demolition 
in Parkstad Limburg are expected to be around 1.1 billion euros for the 2010-2014 
period79 (Gerrichhauzen and Dogterom, 2007, p.33-37). The advisory institute RO 
Groep, commissioned by the province of Limburg to carry out a study, concluded 
that because the restructuring task in Limburg was so complex, radical and large, 
no actor could meet this challenge on its own. To transform the housing stock in all 
of the province of Limburg, according to the RO groep, during the next ten years, 25 
billion euros would be needed. The study recommended that the province, munici­
palities and housing associations enter into (binding) arrangements (RO Groep 2007, 
p.22-24). These studies80 strengthened the opinion of the involved actors that a joint 
restructuring strategy would be needed. Later, the regional organisation Parkstad 
Limburg calculated the transformation costs in Parkstad Limburg for the period 2010­
2020 and expected it to be 1,3 billion euros (Parkstad Limburg 2008c, 10; Dijkstal and 
Mans, 2009a)81.
78 WONEN LIMBURG, WONINGCORPORATIE DE WOONPLAATS, VITALIS, WOONINVESTERINGS- 
FONDS, STICHTING WONEN ZUID, WOONMAATSCHAPPIJ ZO WONEN, WONEN LIMBURG, STICH­
TING WELLER, HESTIA GROEP, WONINGVERENIGING UBACH OVER WORMS, WONINGSTICH­
TING DE VOORZORG, WONINGSTICHTING LAND VAN RODE, WONINGSTICHTING SIMPELVELD, 
AND WONINGSTICHTING VOERENDAAL (BBSH, 2008). SEVEN OF THESE FOURTEEN HOUSING 
ASSOCIATIONS ACTIVE IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, OWN HOUSING ONLY IN THIS REGION.
79 BETWEEN 2010 AND 2024, 20,340 DWELLINGS WILL NEED TO BE DEMOLISHED. THE ESTIMATED 
COST PER DWELLING IS 54,075 EUROS (GERRICHHAUZEN AND DOGTEROM, 2007, P.36).
80 THE REGIONAL MONITOR (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2008B) ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS.
81 THESE COSTS ARE BASED ON RESEARCH BY THE RO GROEP (2007) AND ANOTHER RESEARCH 
BY ETIL (2008); THIS LATTER WAS COMMISSIONED BY REGIONAL ORGANISATION PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG. THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG EXPECT THAT 13,450 
DWELLINGS WOULD NEED TO BE DEMOLISHED AND THAT RESTRUCTURING WOULD BE 
NEEDED FOR 14.600 DWELLINGS (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2008C, P.10). THIS CHALLENGE TO 
TRANSFORM THE HOUSING STOCK OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG IS NOT ONLY THE RESULT OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, BUT ALSO OF CHANGES IN POPULATION COMPOSITION (E.G. DUE TO 
AGEING) (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2008C). IN 2008, PARKSTAD LIMBURG FACED AN
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2005-2009: 
NO RADICAL CHANGE IN LOCAL OPERATIONAL POLICY
The policy change in regional strategic housing policy concerning new housing 
described above did not result in a change in the operational housing plans of the 
individual municipalities. In 2006, the municipalities agreed to reduce their housing 
plans; but it was difficult to agree on the regional housing programme, especially on 
the reduction in the number of the houses to be built in each municipality (Parkstad 
Limburg, 2007b). This change in local operational policy did not take place, because 
of the lack of agreement about the nature of the problem (discourse). Because the 
processes of gaining more knowledge and of formulating new policy (read: decid­
ing about the reduction in the number of the houses to be built in each munici­
pality) took place simultaneously, at the time the municipalities agreed to reduce 
the number of new houses (in 2006) and to operationalise these agreements (in 
2007), municipalities were not completely convinced of the necessity to do so. Some 
municipalities (e.g. rural municipalities) did not perceive demographic decline as a 
structural problem (discourse).
Another explanation why this change in local operational policy did not take place 
is that the involved actors did not change their pattern of interactions (actors) 
radically. Although municipalities did agree to reduce the number of houses to be 
built, some municipalities did not seem willing to actually cut their own plans. Some 
municipalities (e.g. rural municipalities) did not appear to have incorporated the new 
idea (discourse) that demographic decline is structural problem, and kept on acting 
as if demographic decline is a temporary (and reversible) problem. This means that 
they kept on acting the way they were used to do. This behaviour can be explained 
by the prisoners’ dilemma (and the fear for free-riders). When all authorities except 
one reduce their housing plans in accordance with the regional housing strategy, 
the authority that does not (the free-rider), will benefit the most. For an individual 
municipality it is therefore rational to ignore the regional housing strategy and not to 
cut its own plans.
This pattern of interaction (actors) was influenced also by the fact that local politi­
cians considered their declining population as a political failure. The pattern of in­
teraction (actors) was also influenced by the existing power relations (and competi­
tion) between municipalities within one region. There was a lack of spatial hierarchy
OVERSUPPLY OF 3,400 DWELLINGS AND HAD A VACANCY RATE OF 4.9% (WELL ABOVE THE 
FRICTION VACANCY OF 2.0%) (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2008C).
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within the region (see Section 5.682), as a result of which Heerlen was not accepted 
by all municipalities as the centre of the region.
The reason why no radical policy change occurred could also be explained by the way 
in which the region Parkstad Limburg is organised and the lack of formal rules 
(related to the W gr-plus status). The regional organisation Parkstad Limburg pro­
posed their municipalities to jointly formulate an answer to the housing market 
problems. But the municipalities were afraid that their neighbours would not act in 
accordance with the regional agreements (fear for free riders) and therefore would 
not reduce their plans nor change their local operational plans; in addition, there 
were no legal instruments (lack of formal rules) at regional level to prevent free 
riding, to oblige municipalities to act in accordance with the regional housing 
programme and to punish them if they do not act accordingly.
The lack of various resources (political legitimacy, finances, knowledge) also made 
it difficult to change local operational policy. The regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg had little political legitimacy. So local councillors were not willing to approve 
of measures -  such as reducing building plans for which a building permit had already 
been issued, or the closure of a primary school in the village -  because they were 
afraid the electorate would not support such decisions.
There was a shortage of financial resources too, and, coupled with the distribu­
tion of those resources over the different municipalities, this was a reason for not 
changing local operational housing plans, according to the involved actors. If fewer 
houses would be built, local authorities would earn less money from the sale of land 
for construction; municipalities would not easily make this financial sacrifice (espe­
cially not when they are not sure that their neighbouring municipalities will do the 
same). This effect is strengthened by the fact that, in times of demographic decline, 
municipalities often receive less financing (resources) from the national government 
(Gem eentefonds). Another reason why most shrinking municipalities are not eager to 
voluntarily decrease their earnings, is because they need this money (resources) to 
finance the restructuring of the least attractive housing stock. In addition, municipali­
ties could be afraid of financial claims (planschadeclaims) from developers as a result 
of changes in the local plans.
82 THE TOP TEAM DIJKSTAL AND MANS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THIS PROBLEM AND RECOM­
MENDED TO FORM A THREESOME (DRIEMANSCHAP) TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. THE INVOLVED 
LOCAL COUNCILS SHOULD GIVE THIS THREESOME ENOUGH ELBOW-ROOM TO MAKE DECISIVE
MEASURES TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (DIJKSTAL AND MANS, 2009A, P.7).
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Finally, the lack of knowledge (resources) makes it difficult to change local opera­
tional plans. Municipalities complained that little was known about strategies for 
decline and instruments for implementing them. In order to solve this problem, 
the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg, together with the province and the 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, set up a new research 
project (Krimp als Kans II)83. The outcomes of this research were incorporated in the 
documents for the urban municipalities (Envelop stedelijk) (Parkstad Limburg 2008d) 
and for the rural municipalities of Parkstad Limburg (Envelop Landelijk) (Parkstad 
Limburg 2008e), which presents the restructuring tasks until 2020 in both areas84.
The radical regional policy change concerning restructuring also did not result in a 
radical change in the operational housing plans of the individual municipalities. This 
can be explained by the fact that this regional policy change only recently (2009) 
took place. Besides, similar explanations as described above can be found here. 
Housing associations, for example, were afraid to take the first step and to invest in 
restructuring processes in neighbourhoods where other housing associations were 
also active, because those other housing associations could then profit from this 
while doing nothing. Municipalities could try to solve this problem by stimulating 
housing associations to exchange property.
The regional organisation Parkstad Limburg tries to convince municipalities that they 
need to act in accordance with the regional restructuring vision by referring to the 
conclusion of the research of Eichholtz, that investigated the housing stock in Hoens- 
broek, a neighbourhood of Heerlen. He concluded that the value of real estate in 
Hoensbroek yearly decreases by 3 to 7% and argues that policy stability is no option. 
When local governments do not interfere, the value of real estate in the neighbour­
hood Hoensbroek yearly might reduce by 45 to 105 million euros85 (Parkstad Limburg
2010, 24; Gemeente Heerlen, 2009).
The Parkstad Limburg case has been proven that, in order to reach a strategic policy 
change, it might be sufficient to gain knowledge (resources) and to change the
83 BNA TOGETHER WITH KEI AND AEDES ALSO ORGANISED A REGIONAL ATELIER IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE ABOUT STRATEGIES TO DECLINE (BNA, 2008). THIS ATELIER 
ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW PROBLEM PERCEPTION (DISCOURSE) 
AMONG ACTORS THAT DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM.
84 THIS DOCUMENT WAS THE BASIS FOR THE INTENTIONAL AGREEMENT TO FORMULATE A JOINT 
RESTRUCTURING VISION (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2008A).
85 IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED THAT THE HOUSING STOCK TOTALS 10,000 HOUSES, WITH AN
AVERAGE VALUE OF 150,000 EUROS PER HOUSE (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2010).
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problem perception (discourse) radically, but to reach an (radical) operational policy 
change as well that these conditions are not sufficient. To achieve the last, more 
attention would need to be paid to finances, political legitimacy (resources) and 
rules. These, however, are more difficult to change. In order to reach an operational 
policy change, a radical change in one of the dimensions of the policy arrangement 
alone is not sufficient but a new  policy arrangement (all dimensions of the policy ar­
rangement need to change radically in a congruent way) has to evolve.
2002-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS CONSERVATIVE CHANGES IN THE 
PROVINCIAL HOUSING POLICY
M ost policy changes took place at the regional level, not at the provincial level. 
Between 2000 and 2005, the province ignored the problem. From 2005 onwards, 
although it now recognised the problem, it hardly made any policy adaptations. The 
main reason for this was that the province did not perceive demographic decline as 
a problem (discourse). It argued in its provincial housing plan (Provincie Limburg, 
2005), that there was no need to worry about population decline; it was not a new 
phenomenon86 and, compared to neighbouring Belgian and German regions, the 
demographic situation in South and central Limburg was better (op.cit., p.17-18)87.
The problem perception of the province gradually changed. From 2006 onwards, it 
organised meetings about demographic decline to gain knowledge (resource) about 
the subject88 and participated in research project (Krimp als Kans I & II) initiated by 
the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg. In this way, the province increased 
its knowledge (resource) about demographic decline. The province decided to 
investigate the exact consequences of demographic decline and their effects on the 
different policy fields. It wrote various policy notes about this, but did not change 
the content of its housing policy nor its spatial policy. The province considered that it 
was up to the region to deal with demographic decline (no shared perception of how 
to solve these problems - discourse).
86 ALSO, IN THE PAST, MANY DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES AND SUBREGIONS HAD EXPERIENCED 
POPULATION DECLINE (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2005, P.17).
87 IN SOUTH LIMBURG, THE AVERAGE POPULATION AGE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WAS BELOW 
THE AVERAGE OF THOSE IN THE EUROPEAN MHAL REGION (MAASTRICHT, HEERLEN, AACHEN 
AND LIÈGE) (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2005, P.18).
88 EXAMPLES ARE PROVINCIE LIMBURG (2006B) AND TASKFORCE DEMOGRAFISCHE
VOORSPRONG (2006).
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After the provincial elections of March 2007, attention for demographic decline 
am ong provincial administrators increased. To increase their focus on demographic 
decline, the province appointed a manager responsible for demographic issues 
(m anager demografische voorsprong)89 (resource). In 2007, this resulted in a provin­
cial policy change; the province decided that it should take a more directive role and 
stimulate regions to formulate a regional housing strategy.
Individual municipalities and the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg com­
plained that this policy change was not drastic enough. They asked for stronger pro­
vincial supervision. As previously stated, the regional organisation’s powers to oblige 
municipalities to act in accordance with the regional housing strategy were weak; it 
wanted the province to exercise its powers, as well by formulating a provincial ordi­
nance (formal rules). Despite this criticism, the province did not change its role. The 
provincial initiatives that, in fact, were taken, between 2007 and 2009, all focused 
on increasing policy attention for demographic decline am ong different actors and 
on increasing knowledge (resources) about it90. The province of Limburg was also 
active in the exchange of knowledge (resources) between Dutch and foreign shrink­
ing regions. The province put a lot of effort into influencing the problem perception 
(discourse), and accepted the idea that demographic decline is a structural problem, 
and increasing knowledge (resource)9'. However, little attention was paid to finances 
and political legitimacy (resources), while those two seem to be the largest hurdles in 
reaching a radical operational policy change.
89 THIS MANAGER IS PART OF THE PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT FOR STRATEGY AND INNOVATION 
(PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2009).
90 THE PROVINCE INVESTIGATED THE RELATION BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND 
URBANISATION (PROVINCE LIMBURG, 2007B) AND COMMISSIONED RO GROEP TO INVESTI­
GATE THE DIFFICULTIES OF RESTRUCTURING THE HOUSING STOCK WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (RO GROEP, 2007).
91 IN 2009, THE PROVINCE INSTALLED A COMMISSION, CHAIRED BY DEETMAN (ANP, 2009), WITH 
THE TASK OF ADVISING THE PROVINCE OF MEASUREMENTS NEEDED FOR DEALING WITH 
POPULATION DECLINE. AFTER THE LOCAL ELECTIONS OF MARCH 2010, THIS COMMISSION 
ENCOURAGED THE NEGOTIATORS INVOLVED IN THE FORMULATION OF THE LOCAL COALITION 
AGREEMENTS TO TAKE DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE INTO ACCOUNT (DEETMAN ET AL., 2010).
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5.4.2 EEMSDELTA
1981-2001: 
STABILITY OF LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY AND THE 
PROCESS TOWARDS CONSERVATIVE CHANGES IN 
LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
Between 1981 and 1995, the municipalities in the Eemsdelta and the province of 
Groningen hardly paid attention to demographic decline in their plans, nor did they 
adapt their strategic and/or operational policies to it. This situation was challenged 
by the housing associations (actors) when, in 1990, they concluded that the sense 
of urgency on this topic was low by the municipalities and the province. The hous­
ing associations warned that demographic decline would continue and would cause 
major problems for the social housing sector, and that restructuring was needed 
in order to deal with the ensuing problems92. Initially, neither the municipalities nor 
the province heeded this warning. The main reason was that they did not perceive 
demographic decline as a problem (discourse). The municipalities continued to focus 
on expanding their housing stock, and the provincial council continued to focus its 
policy on steering demographic growth and deciding how  many houses to be built in 
each municipality.
In the mid-1990s, both the central municipality and the province decided to change 
their strategic housing market policy. In 1996, Delfzijl, together with housing associa­
tion W oningstichting Delfzijl, formulated a new vision on the housing market, focused 
on demolition, restructuring, selling off social housing, and housing development. In 
1997, the province changed its allocation policy, thus trying to control the number of 
houses built in each municipality to prevent an oversupply.
The main reason why the municipality of Delfzijl decided to change its policy was that 
the large housing market problems became visible, and the municipality acknowl­
edged that they were related to demographic decline. The actors involved (munici­
pality and Woningstichting Delfzijl) agreed that, in order to tackle these problems, a
92 THEY ALSO ARGUED THAT THE NEEDED INTERVENTIONS WOULD BE EXPENSIVE AND COULD 
NOT BE CARRIED OUT BY THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS ALONE; ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT (RESOURCES) FROM MUNICIPALITIES, THE PROVINCE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
WAS NEEDED. THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS CALCULATED THAT BECAUSE OF THE POPULA­
TION DECLINE THE DEMAND FOR SOCIAL HOUSING WOULD DECREASE, RESULTING IN A 
MONTHLY LOSS IN RENT OF 175,000 DUTCH GUILDERS (79,412 EUROS) (NIEKERK AND REKERS, 
1990, P.6).
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policy for adapting housing supply was needed93. This can be considered a conserva­
tive strategic policy change. The municipality expected that adapting the housing 
supply through restructuring and demolition would generate an upward spiral; the 
restructured neighbourhoods would become more popular, the propensity to depart 
would decrease, and there would be a positive effect on neighbouring districts.
The actors expected the policy to reverse demographic decline and to turn it into 
demographic growth. They thus perceived demographic decline as a temporary (and 
reversible) problem (discourse).
2002-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS CONSERVATIVE AND RADICAL 
CHANGES IN LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
In 2002, Delfzijl decided to demolish and restructure more of its existing housing 
stock and, by demolishing more housing than was being built, reduce the total num­
ber of houses. This can be called a radical strategic policy change. It was influenced 
by the Tielrooij Commission (new actor and knowledge resource); research carried 
out by that commission contributed to the policy change. Similar to the housing 
associations, the Tielrooij Commission also challenged the traditional way of planning 
focused on ‘planning for demographic growth’. They perceived demographic decline 
as a structural problem (discourse).
Within Delfzijl, all the actors involved (municipality, province and housing associa­
tions) agreed on the manner in which to solve the housing market problems 
(restructuring and demolition), but not all of these actors agreed on the causes and 
the nature of the problems; there was no shared problem perception (discourse). 
Even within the municipality of Delfzijl itself, not everyone perceived demographic 
decline as a structural phenomenon, nor did they expect that Delfzijl would continue 
to decline (discourse). Local politicians, for example, did not abandon their ambitions 
for growth. A s indicated before, the local policy was two-pronged.
This lack of shared problem perception am ong the actors (discourse) was probably 
caused by the fact that the gaining of knowledge (resource) and the formulation of 
the strategy took place mainly outside the municipality. The municipality was barely 
involved in the research done by the Tielrooij Commission, and most of the members
93 THE MUNICIPALITY AND THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION WONINGSTICHTING DELFZIJL CALCU­
LATED THAT WHEN THEY WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR POLICY THE VACANCY RATE IN DELFZIJL 
WOULD INCREASE FROM 500 HOUSES (IN 1996) TO MINIMALLY 1,300 AND MAXIMALLY 1,500 
HOUSES IN 2002 (GEMEENTE DELFZIJL AND WONINGSTICHTING DELFZIJL, 1996, P. 8).
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of that commission came from outside Delfzijl. Another explanation for the two­
pronged strategy was the installation of a new actor, the development company 
of Delfzijl (OMD), as recommended by the Tielrooij Commission. This shifted the 
responsibility for housing (partly) from the municipality towards the new develop­
ment company.
In addition to the radical changes, such as demolition and restructuring, various 
conservative changes were formulated, namely to build housing that would attract 
middle- and high-income groups and a marketing campaign to attract those target 
groups. The reason for this change was the mismatch between the housing plans 
(until 2010), the demographic changes, and the resulting changes in the housing 
demand (in 2010). The analysis which compared the new housing plans with the 
future demand (knowledge resource) showed that, in 2010, Delfzijl would have an 
oversupply of cheap housing and a shortage of housing in the middle and expensive 
housing segments (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2003), and that the current housing plans 
were not geared to accommodate the expected increase in elderly inhabitants and 
young starters on the housing market. Initially, local politicians were hesitant about 
making a shift; they were concerned that their grassroot supporters, who would be 
losing their houses through demolition, would not be able to find new and affordable 
homes. The inventory which compared the new housing plans with future demand 
showed an expected oversupply of cheap housing, and this convinced local politi­
cians to make this policy shift.
Those conservative policy changes were in accordance with the traditional way 
of planning; no changes in discourse, rules, or resources would be needed to real­
ise them. They were in keeping with the perception by the local politicians, who 
perceived demographic decline as a temporary (reversible) and not as a structural 
problem (discourse). Moreover, between 2003 and 2006, the municipality barely 
mentioned demographic decline in its local policy plans, but instead focused on 
changes in the demographic composition and adapted the new housing programme 
accordingly. This had probably also to do with the fact that, at the time, there was a 
lot of political unrest in Delfzijl, with many changes of mayors and aldermen. The lack 
of political continuity (the changes of power) and local disputes can be an explana­
tion for the fact that there was not much attention for demographic decline nor 
radical policy change.
Recently, the problem perception of Delfzijl has changed. It perceives demographic 
decline as a structural phenomenon (discourse). This changed problem perception is 
probably stimulated by the various researches (knowledge resource) that lately have 
been conducted, mainly under authority of the region. Research carried out
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elsewhere has also influenced the problem perception, as have various conferences, 
and provincial and national attention. This changed problem perception was prob­
ably also caused by the failure of the strategy of building more houses and attracting 
new inhabitants.
Nevertheless, to date, Delfzijl continues to follow a two-sided strategy. By doing so, 
Delfzijl combines two different strategies that are each based on a different 
discourse: planning for growth (with its associated pattern of interaction (actor), 
re sources and rules), and planning for decline. The new discourse  does not fit the 
other three dimensions of the policy arrangement, which are still shaped by the old 
growth discourse.
2002-2009: 
NO RADICAL CHANGES IN LOCAL OPERATIONAL POLICY
Although Delfzijl radically changed the content of its strategic local policy, it still has 
not done so for its local operational housing plans. The reason is the lack of (shared) 
problem perception (d iscourse ) within the municipality as mentioned earlier (and 
only recently resolved). In addition, the changed rules, which emerged as a result 
of installing the OMD, prevented a radical change in operational policy. Some tasks 
that formerly were implemented by the municipality were delegated to the O M D  
(e.g. implementation of the masterplan). This caused tensions within the municipal­
ity between the regular local administrative system, that was responsible for the 
formulation of local land-use plans, and the project organisation of O M D  (see also 
Rekenkamercommissie, 2007). The set up of the O M D  had a paralysing effect on the 
municipality94, and this is another reason why no radical operational changes were 
made.
Finally, there was no radical change in local operational policy because of the lack 
of political legitimacy (resource). The O M D  was a temporary organisation and not 
a legally constituted body. For certain decisions, the O M D  had a mandate, while 
other policy decisions needed to be approved by the local council. The local council 
(especially the representatives of the local parties95) criticised the O M D  for focusing
94 THE SPEED IN WHICH THE MUNICIPALITY FORMULATED PLANS WAS SLOW (REKENKAMER­
COMMISSIE, 2007).
95 AT THE LOCAL ELECTIONS OF MARCH 2002, THE SUPPORT FOR LOCAL INTEREST PARTIES IN 
DELFZIJL ROSE DRAMATICALLY. THE LOCAL INTEREST PARTY RECEIVED 24.6% OF THE VOTES,
WHICH EQUALLED 6 OF THE 21 SEATS ON THE LOCAL COUNCIL. COUNCILLORS BELONGING 
TO THE LOCAL INTEREST PARTIES WERE NOT WILLING TO APPROVE DECISIONS THAT, FROM
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too much on a few urban neighbourhoods near the city centre and neglecting the 
interests of the individual centres96. It was difficult for the O M D  to get approval by 
the local council for radical operational policy changes. Besides, also the information 
exchange (re source s) between the O M D  and the local councillors was insufficient 
(Rekenkamercommissie, 2007), which made it also difficult to reach those changes.
For a long time, this was not seen as a problem. The O M D  focused its attention on im­
plementing the masterplan Delfzijl (of 2001) and the local housing plan (of 2002), for 
which changes in the local land-use plan - an operational plan - were not necessary. 
Recently (January 2010), Delfzijl published a draft local land-use plan for north Delfzijl 
(Gemeente Delfzijl, 2010a), which was adopted by the local council in June 2010. Even 
in this operational plan, the content was not really adapted to demographic decline. 
The municipality admitted that, viewed from the current perspective of demographic 
and economic recession, the ambitions for the construction of new housing are 
rather optimistic (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2010a; Gemeente Delfzijl, 2010b). Moreover, this 
plan is not in keeping with the most recent regional policy, called Pact regio Eem sdel­
ta (Gemeente Appingedam et al., 2009), in which Delfzijl promised to reduce its new 
housing plans97 (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2010a). In spite of this, the province has accepted 
the local plan, in order to guarantee the implementation of the redevelopment of 
north Delfzijl; but only on condition that the municipality promises to act in accord­
ance with regional agreements.
2002-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS CHANGES IN POLICY ACTIONS
Although the local operational plans were not changed, the changes formulated in 
the strategic local policy of 2002 and 2006 resulted in certain policy actions. This took 
place because the housing market problems were so large that, according to the
THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, WERE NECESSARY, BUT DID NOT FIT THE 
LOCAL INTERESTS OF THEIR ELECTORATE.
96 DELFZIJL CONSISTS OF 13 VILLAGES AND 24 CENTRES. IN LOCAL POLITICS, THE LOCAL 
INTERESTS OF THOSE DIFFERENT VILLAGES AND CENTRES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE.
AS A RESULT, EACH LOCAL COUNCILLOR HAS SUPPORTERS IN DIFFERENT VILLAGES AND 
CENTRES. OFTEN, COUNCILLORS PUT THE INTERESTS OF THOSE VILLAGES BEFORE THE 
INTERESTS OF THE MUNICIPALITY AS A WHOLE. THIS LOCAL PERSPECTIVE MAKES IT DIFFI­
CULT FOR THE MUNICIPALITY TO MAKE RADICAL POLICY CHANGES.
97 IN THIS REGIONAL POLICY, DELFZIJL AGREED TO THE BUILDING OF ONLY 287 DWELLINGS
UNTIL 2017 (GEMEENTE APPINGEDAM ET AL., 2009).
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actors involved, there was no time to first change the operational plan before 
starting to redevelop north Delfzijl, in accordance with the agreed strategic policy 
changes.
The independent development company of Delfzijl (O M D ) also stimulated the taking 
of policy actions. It was a n e w  a cto r  and it brought with it additional government 
resources (resource). The O M D  facilitated the demolition process and, between 2002 
and 2008, 1,142 dwellings in Delfzijl were demolished (CFV-Bbsh, 2008). In addition, 
Delfzijl introduced a new financial structure (financial re sources) to support the 
implementation of local policy changes98. The traditional financial re sources which 
Delfzijl received were not sufficient to implement the demolition and restructuring 
programme. In order to obtain additional funding, the O M D  entered into a public- 
private partnership with a building consortium consisting of housing association 
A can tu s  and two project developers, B A M  and Geveke. However, this partnership 
delayed instead of speeding up the implementation of the new local housing plan, 
especially the construction of new houses. As a result of the partnership, the private 
companies changed their patterns of interaction (actors); the O M D  granted the 
building rights in Delfzijl exclusively to this building consortium, and the consortium 
would not have to pre-finance the land before selling the newly built houses. These 
conditions did not stimulate the building consortium to develop quickly, but rather 
to wait for the housing market to get stronger99. In 2010, the O M D  was transformed
98 IN 1990, THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS (NIEKERK AND REKERS, 1990) ALREADY WARNED 
THAT THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS WOULD BE EXPENSIVE AND ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT FROM THE MUNICIPALITY, PROVINCE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE 
NEEDED. INITIALLY, THE MUNICIPALITY AND PROVINCE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE HOUSING 
ASSOCIATIONS SINGLE-HANDEDLY COULD NOT FINANCE THE INTERVENTIONS THAT WERE 
NECESSARY FOR SOLVING THE HOUSING MARKET PROBLEMS. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE 
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS HAD LARGE FINANCIAL RESERVES. IN ADDITION, MUNICIPALITIES 
(AMONG WHICH DELFZIJL) COMPLAINED THAT HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS WERE TOO MUCH 
REAL-ESTATE MINDED, INSTEAD OF FOCUSING ON THE SOCIAL ASPECT. LOCAL GOVERN­
MENTS (AMONG WHICH DELFZIJL) ALSO CRITICISED THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS FOR 
SELLING PARTS OF THEIR SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK TO TENANTS. THE HOUSING ASSOCIA­
TIONS, HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT THEY NEEDED TO DO THIS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR 
INCOME LEVELS AND TO FINANCE THE NECESSARY RESTRUCTURING OF THEIR HOUSING 
STOCK. IN THE END, ALL INVOLVED ACTORS (MUNICIPALITY DELFZIJL, PROVINCE AND 
HOUSING ASSOCIATION) CONTRIBUTED FINANCIALLY TO THE SET UP OF THE OMD.
99 USUALLY THE RISK OF RISING INTEREST PAYMENTS STIMULATES DEVELOPERS TO START
BUILDING. BUT WHEN THESE RISKS HAD BEEN SHIFTED ON TO THE OMD, THERE WAS NO 
LONGER A FINANCIAL INCENTIVE (RESOURCES) TO BUILD QUICKLY. THE BUILDERS COULD 
EASILY AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL THE ECONOMY WOULD FLOURISH AGAIN.
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into a local development company that became a subdivision of the municipality 
Delfzijl (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2010b).
The implementation of the restructuring process was also facilitated by the fact that 
in the neighbourhoods involved, there were only a few land owners100. In addition, 
there were only a few housing associations active in Delfzijl101, and the housing 
association A can tu s  (the largest) and the municipality were dependent on each other 
for solving the problem. The fact that there were only a few actors  involved and 
that they had an interdependent relationship made it easier to co-operate and reach 
agreement about radical operational policy changes.
2002-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS RADICAL POLICY CHANGES AT 
REGIONAL LEVEL
For a long time, there were intentions to formulate a regional housing policy, but 
only recently the municipalities in the region have started to cooperate in the field 
of housing. The most important reason why it took so long was the lack of shared 
problem perception am ong the actors (d iscourse). This was caused by the demo­
graphic differences throughout the region. Not all municipalities within the Eemsdel- 
ta had yet been confronted with demographic decline, and the problems caused by 
demographic decline were unevenly divided between them. Delfzijl has had these 
problems for many years, whereas in neighbouring Appingedam, Loppersum and 
Eemsmond, the population and households only recently have started to decrease.
In addition, in neighbouring municipalities, such as Loppersum and Eemsmond, 
this problem perception has not yet been incorporated into local housing policy 
(d iscourse). Moreover, there was no regional organisation - no administrative and 
financial capacity (re sou rces) at regional level.
100 MOST LAND IN NORTH DELFZIJL WAS OWNED BY ACANTUS AND THE MUNICIPALITY. THE 
OMD BOUGHT THIS LAND FROM THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION FOR A RELATIVELY LOW PRICE. 
HOWEVER, SOME LAND IN THE AREA WAS OWNED BY PRIVATE LAND OWNERS.
101 NEXT TO ACANTUS, THERE ARE TO DATE FOUR OTHER HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS ACTIVE IN 
DELFZIJL (WOONINVESTERINGSFONDS, STICHTING WOONZORG NEDERLAND, STICHTING 
MENTERWOLDE WONINGBOUW, CHRISTELIJKE W OONGROEPMARENLAND). THOSE HOUSING 
ASSOCIATIONS OWN A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF (SOCIAL) HOUSES IN DELFZIJL (BBSH,
2008). IN EEMSDELTA, A TOTAL OF NINE DIFFERENT HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS ARE ACTIVE. THE 
OTHER HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS ACTIVE IN THE REGION ARE: WONINGSTICHTING WIERDEN 
EN  BORGEN, VESTIA GROEP, WONINGSTICHTING DE DELTHE, STICHTING UITHUIZEN WONING­
BOUW  (BBSH, 2008). THREE OF THE NINE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS OWN HOUSES ONLY IN THE 
EEMSDELTA REGION.
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The recently formulated radical, strategic policy change, at the regional level 
(Gemeente Appingedam et al., 2009), was stimulated mainly by demographic projec­
tions and various studies (Oude Velthuis et al., 2009; Companen, 2009a; Companen, 
2009b) (knowledge re source) that all concluded that demographic decline is a struc­
tural phenomenon, causing problems for the housing market. In addition, C om panen  
(2009b) concluded that the future household decline would be lowest if the region 
were to radically change its policy and adapt housing supply to future housing 
demand102. There were also changes in the pattern of interaction between actors. 
The province pushed the municipalities in the Eemsdelta to take demographic 
decline into account, and the new mayor of Delfzijl (new actor), who was the former 
mayor of Appingedam, was now chairman of the Eemsdelta steering committee and 
played an important role in reaching these regional agreements.
2002-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS CHANGES AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL
From 2005 onwards, the province started to mention demographic decline, but 
mostly did not change its strategic provincial plans accordingly. This was because 
the province was afraid of undermining its relationship with the municipalities.
This relationship was already fragile because of the housing allocation policy of the 
province. The province attached great importance to a constant policy, because this 
would contribute to a stable relationship with the municipalities (‘reliable govern­
ment’). From 2007 onwards, the policy attention of the province of Groningen for 
demographic decline gradually started to grow; although without this resulting in a 
policy change. The province of Groningen mainly played a facilitating role; it initiated 
research in order to increase the knowledge (resource ) about demographic decline 
and its consequences (Poulus, 2007; Til et al., 2007a; Til et al., 2007b; Bureau Pau, 
2007)103.
102 COMPANEN (2009B) CONCLUDED THAT HOUSEHOLD DECLINE WOULD BE HIGHER IF MUNICI­
PALITIES WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR LOCAL HOUSING POLICIES, AND IF THEY WOULD IMPLE­
MENT THE HOUSING POLICIES AND PLANS FOR RESTRUCTURING THAT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE 
SINCE 2009. IF THE MUNICIPALITIES WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT HOUSING AND 
RESTRUCTURING POLICIES, THIS, BETWEEN 2008 AND 2018, WOULD LEAD TO A DECREASE IN 
HOUSEHOLDS OF 3,300 AND A REDUCTION IN THE VALUE OF THE TOTAL HOUSING STOCK OF 
220 MILLION EUROS.
103 ALL STUDIES EXPECTED THAT THE DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE WOULD BE PERSISTENT AND 
COULD LEAD TO TOO MANY HOUSING PLANS, WITH THE NUMBER OF PLANS EXCEEDING THE 
DEMAND FOR HOUSING (SEE ALSO HANSSEN, 2008). THEY ALL WARNED THAT, IF MUNICIPALI­
TIES WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR LOCAL HOUSING POLICIES, THE OVERSUPPLY OF HOUSES
AND THE VACANCY RATES WOULD INCREASE DRAMATICALLY.
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The province tried to increase its knowledge not only about demographic decline, 
but also about the possible strategies for dealing with it. It participated in a Euro­
pean project by Interreg IVB, called DC Noise104, with nine partners from the Nether­
lands (including the province of Zeeland) and abroad, working together to find ways 
of dealing with demographic change and population decline in a positive way105. 
These studies (knowledge re source) have increased the attention for demographic 
decline within the province, and also in the municipalities within the Eemsdelta. They 
have convinced individual municipalities to perceive demographic decline as a struc­
tural problem (d iscourse ) and to cooperate at regional level.
Within the province of Groningen, so far, it had been mainly the officials, espe­
cially from the department of spatial planning (Ruimtelijke P lannen) who had been 
concerned with the subject of demographic decline. Recently this changed, with 
members of the provincial executive deciding to appoint a project leader for demo­
graphic decline (appointed in the summer of 2009 (resource  - additional government 
capacity)).
5.4.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
1982-2004: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN LOCAL 
POLICY CHANGES
Since 1982, Zeeuws-Vlaanderen has been experiencing population decline, in 
Terneuzen and Sluis, but not in Hulst. In spite of this, none of the municipalities nor 
the province mentioned it in their housing plans, nor did they change the content of 
their plans accordingly. This was mainly because they did not perceive demographic 
decline as a problem (discourse). Unlike in the other two case-study regions, popula­
tion decline in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen had not yet led to a decline in household numbers 
(see Section 5.7).
104 MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THIS PROJECT CAN BE FOUND AT THE WEBSITE 
WWW.DCNOISE.EU
105 THE NINE PARTNERS ARE: FOR THE NETHERLANDS, THE REGION OF TWENTE (LEAD BENEFI­
CIARY), AND THE PROVINCES OF ZEELAND AND GRONINGEN; FOR BELGIUM, THE PROVINCES 
OF WEST AND EAST FLANDERS; FOR NORWAY, KNUTEPUNKT S0RLANDET; FOR GERMANY,
THE CITY OF HAMBURG AND THE REGION OF BREMEN; AND FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF ABERTAY DUNDEE. THE TWENTE CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN TECHNOLOGY AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (CSTM) IS INVOLVED IN DC NOISE AS AN EXTERNAL EXPERT
WHO COORDINATES AND IMPLEMENTS THE PILOT PROGRAMME ON DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
AND THE LABOUR MARKET.
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2005-2009: 
PROCESS TOWARDS CONSERVATIVE CHANGES IN 
LOCAL AND REGIONAL STRATEGIC POLICY
From 2005 onwards, the municipalities of Terneuzen and Sluis gradually started to 
pay more attention to demographic decline. They introduced conservative changes 
into their local strategic housing plans, for example, by reducing their ambitions for 
growth. They changed because they were confronted with the decline, and were 
informed about projections (e.g. provincial population projections of 2004 - Provincie 
Zeeland 2004a) that this would continue (knowledge resource). In addition, the study 
by Ecorys-Kolpron  (2004), which concluded that the current policy ambition of Sluis 
was unrealistic, also contributed to this.
The changes were conservative; the municipalities continued to behave (actors) as 
they always had, and the policy changes were in keeping with the traditional way 
of ‘planning for growth’. The population level aimed for by the municipalities still 
exceeded the predicted population level, and the municipalities perceived demo­
graphic decline as a temporary problem that could be reversed (discourse). This 
problem perception was also supported by research (knowledge resource). Several 
studies were optimistic about the possibilities of attracting people from other Dutch 
regions (e.g. Ran d stad ) and from abroad106 107. Together, the municipalities formulat­
ed a policy for growth, by setting up a promotional campaign for the region, togeth­
er with some private parties108; this, too, can be considered a conservative regional 
strategic policy change.
106 AMONG WHICH THE STUDY OF THE TREND WATCHER, WHO -M UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS AND PROJECT 
DEVELOPER AM WONEN - INVESTIGATED THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE HOUSING MARKET 
OF ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, AND THE STUDY BY THE CONSULTANCY FIRM GERRICHHAUZEN 
AND PARTNERS (KHANDEHAR, 2007) WHO, UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION 
CLAVIS, INVESTIGATED THE HOUSING MARKET IN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN.
107 GERRICHHAUZEN AND PARTNERS CONCLUDED THAT, AS LONG AS ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 
WOULD BE ABLE TO ATTRACT NEW INHABITANTS TO THE REGION, THE PROBLEMS THAT GO 
WITH POPULATION DECLINE WOULD REMAIN LIMITED. THEY WERE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE 
POSSIBILITIES FOR ATTRACTING PEOPLE FROM OTHER DUTCH AND FOREIGN REGIONS, 
BECAUSE THE REGION OF ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN IS AN ATTRACTIVE AREA TO LIVE IN, AND 
THE LABOUR DEMAND WAS INCREASING (KHANDEHAR, 2007).
108 THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS TOGETHER WITH THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND ALSO SET
UP ANOTHER INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO PROMOTE ZEELAND AS A WHOLE. IN 2009, THEY 
PUBLISHED THE MAGAZINE ZILT ZEELAND, AS AN ANNEX OF THE NATIONAL NEWSPAPER DE  
VOLKSKRANT (CEUSTER ET AL., 2009A, B, C).
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2007-2009: 
NO RADICAL POLICY CHANGE IN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
From 2007 onwards, different parties (including the province and the housing 
associations) began to criticise the conservative reaction to demographic decline 
(cha lleng ingacto rs). They argued that municipalities should not only focus on con­
servative strategies (e.g. marketing campaigns and new housing), but also on radical 
strategies (e.g. restructuring and demolishing of existing housing stock). Despite this 
criticism, there was no radical policy change.
The first explanation for this is the lack of shared problem perception; the hous­
ing associations and municipalities disagreed about the nature of the problem and 
about how to solve the problems (discourse). The housing associations argued that 
the social housing stock needed to be improved and reduced, and that they could 
not solve the problems without additional (financial) support from municipalities109. 
The municipalities were hesitant; were housing associations really lacking the funds 
to do so?. Nor were the municipalities pleased with the strategy of the housing as­
sociations for reducing their housing stock by selling it to tenants110. In Terneuzen 
and Sluis, the housing associations argued that this was necessary for financing the 
restructuring and demolition of their properties. In Sluis, the housing association and
109 THE PUBLICATION BY THE CONSULTANCY FIRM GERRICHHAUZEN AND PARTNERS (KHANDE- 
HAR, 2007) SUPPORTED THIS PROBLEM PERCEPTION (DISCOURSE). THEY CONCLUDED THAT 
RADICAL POLICY CHANGES AND ACTIONS WOULD BE FINANCIALLY (RESOURCES) DIFFICULT 
TO REALISE. FIRST, THE CAPACITY TO EARN MONEY FROM NEW HOUSING WOULD BE LIMITED, 
DUE TO THE LOW SALE PRICES AND THE LIMITED EXPANSION OF THE HOUSING DEMAND. 
SECOND, THE SELLING OFF OF SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK COULD INCREASE THE REVENUES, 
BUT COULD ALSO NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE REDEVELOPMENT OF NEIGHBOURHOODS. WHEN 
HOUSES ARE SOLD TO PEOPLE WITH RELATIVELY LOW INCOMES, THIS MAY NEGATIVELY 
AFFECT TOTAL MAINTENANCE COST (REPAIRS) FOR PRIVATE HOME OWNERS (KHANDEHAR, 
2007).
110 BY SELLING SOME OF THEIR PROPERTIES, HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS CHANGED THE PATTERN
OF THEIR INTERACTIONS (ACTORS), AND, ACCORDING TO SLUIS AND TERNEUZEN, WOULD 
INCREASE THE PROBLEMS ON THE HOUSING MARKET. THEY WARNED THAT THIS STRATEGY
COULD INCREASE THE OVERSUPPLY OF CHEAP OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING AND COULD 
LEAD TO FRAGMENTED OWNERSHIP, WHICH WOULD HINDER RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES 
IN THOSE NEIGHBOURHOODS. THEY ARGUED THAT HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS SHOULD 
TAKE MORE ACCOUNT OF THE QUALITY OF THE HOUSES THEY WOULD BE SELLING AND OF 
THE CONSEQUENCES THIS STRATEGY MIGHT HAVE (ECORYS-KOLPRON, 2004; GEMEENTE 
TERNEUZEN, 2005B).
186
the municipality strongly disagreed about which target group to build for111. There 
was, thus, disagreement between the actors about each other’s responsibilities. In 
particular, who was responsible for social housing?
The second explanation for why there was no radical policy change, would be that 
the municipalities felt that the traditional policy arrangement and the traditional 
policy answers were sufficient for dealing with the problems. All involved actors 
were, for example, very enthusiastic about the region’s promotional campaign and 
perceived it as an effective way of attracting new residents112. In 2009, the emigration 
fair, for example, brought 22 new families to Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.
In addition, the unstable political situation prevented a change in the problem 
perception (d iscourse ) of the municipalities, and prevented them (actors) from radi­
cally changing their housing market policy. Local politicians (actors), because of a 
recent local reorganisation113, were primarily focused on internal issues, instead of on 
external contextual changes such as demographic decline. And those local politicians 
(actors) had often been elected to represent the interests of the local centres, and 
they were afraid that radical changes would harm those interests; local councillors 
believed demographic growth to be necessary in order to preserve local services in 
the various local centres. This explains why they perceived demographic decline
111 SLUIS WANTED TO ADD NEW HOUSING FOR STARTERS IN THE HOUSING MARKET, IN ORDER 
TO ATTRACT AND RETAIN THEM, AND PREVENT THEM FROM MOVING AWAY FROM SLUIS. 
ACCORDING TO HOUSING ASSOCIATION WOONGOED ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, THERE WERE 
ALREADY ENOUGH POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS GROUP TO BUY A HOUSE. ADDING NEW HOUSING 
FOR THIS TARGET GROUP WOULD STRENGTHEN THE OVERSUPPLY OF CHEAP HOUSING, 
WHICH DUE TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE WAS ALREADY ENORMOUS, AND WOULD INCREASE 
THE PROBLEMS FOR OWNER OCCUPIERS AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS THAT WOULD WANT 
TO SELL THEIR PROPERTIES. DESPITE THIS COMPLAINT, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECIDED 
TO COOPERATE WITH A HOUSING ASSOCIATION FROM BRABANT, WHICH DEVELOPED CHEAP 
SEMI-DETACHED DWELLINGS AND SOLD THEM TO STARTERS.
112 EXCEPT FOR THE PROVINCE THAT WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THE SET UP OF A SEPARATE 
PROMOTIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR THIS REGION, BECAUSE IT COMPETED WITH THE PROVINCIAL 
PROMOTION CAMPAIGN. BESIDES, THE PROVINCE FEARED THAT THE SEPARATE CAMPAIGN 
WOULD STIMULATE REGIONAL COMPETITION WITHIN THE PROVINCE.
113 IN 2001, AXEL, SAS VAN GENT AND TERNEUZEN BECAME ONE MUNICIPALITY. IN 2003, SLUIS-
AARDENBURG AND OOSTBURG BECAME ONE MUNICIPALITY, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF 
HULST WAS FORMED. ESPECIALLY IN SLUIS, THE PERIOD AFTER THIS LOCAL REORGANISA­
TION, WAS CHARACTERISED BY MUCH POLITICAL UNREST. THERE WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, 
MANY CHANGES OF ALDERMEN.
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to be no problem or only a temporary (reversible) problem, instead of a structural 
problem (d iscourse )114.
In 2008, Terneuzen and the housing associations active there made a quick scan, in 
which they jointly investigated the problems and solutions regarding the social hous­
ing sector (Gemeente Terneuzen and Stichting Clavis, 2008; Gemeente Terneuzen 
and Stichting W oongoed Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 2008)115. Housing association Clavis 
gave the municipality insight into its financial situation, as a result of which the mu­
nicipality became convinced that the association could not single-handedly resolve 
the problems in the social housing sector. Later, the outcomes of the quick scan 
were presented (behind closed doors) to the local councillors of Terneuzen. Their 
reaction was that the (restructuring) plans were too progressive. Clearly, there was 
no shared problem perception among the local politicians116 nor did they share a 
strategic view about how  to solve certain problems (discourse).
Actions were taken by various actors to increase awareness of demographic de­
cline and its structural character. A  group of designers (from within and outside 
of Zeeland) analysed the consequences of demographic decline in Terneuzen and 
developed different strategies for dealing with it (BNA, 2009b). In January 2009, the 
Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG ) organised a meeting (called VNG 
battle) in Sluis, in which local councillors were asked to produce different scenarios 
(am ong which demographic decline). The province also took a number of initiatives 
to increase the knowledge (resource ) about demographic decline and to come to a 
shared problem perception (discourse). It commissioned research into the relation­
ship between demographic developments and local services117, to test the policy
114 THEY FEARED THAT IF THEY WOULD ACCEPT DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, LOCAL SERVICES 
WOULD DISAPPEAR, THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THEIR MUNICIPALITY WOULD BE REDUCED, 
AND THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS AND HOUSEHOLDS WOULD DECREASE EVEN FURTHER.
115 IN GENERAL, CONFLICTS BETWEEN MUNICIPALITIES AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS DO NOT 
LAST LONG IN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, BECAUSE OF THE INTERDEPENDENT RELATION­
SHIPS BETWEEN THESE PARTIES. IN THIS REGION, ONLY SEVEN HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS 
ARE ACTIVE, AND FOUR OF WHICH OWN HOUSES ONLY IN THIS REGION (BBSH, 2008). THE 
HOUSING STOCK OF EACH HOUSING ASSOCIATION IS CONCENTRATED VERY LOCALLY. 
WOONGOED ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, FOR EXAMPLE, IS MAINLY ACTIVE IN SLUIS, WHICH IS 
A RURAL MUNICIPALITY. CLAVIS OWNS PROPERTIES PARTICULARLY IN TERNEUZEN, AND 
WOONSTICHTING HULST IN HULST. AS A RESULT, THE PARTIES KNOW EACH OTHER VERY 
WELL AND ARE DEPENDENT ON EACH OTHER FOR SOLVING HOUSING MARKET PROBLEMS.
116 THE ABOVE MENTIONED LOCAL INTERESTS PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS.
117 ALSO, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SLUIS AND HOUSING ASSOCIATION WOONGOED ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN WERE INVOLVED IN THIS RESEARCH AND CO-FINANCED IT. THE RESEARCH
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assumption that formed the basis of much of the local housing policy (demographic 
growth is needed to support local services) and of the behaviour of actors (Van der 
W ouw  et al., 2009)118. The province organised various meetings about demographic 
decline (regional dialogue) and launched a special website (Provincie Zeeland, 
2009d).
To date, there has been no radical policy change as a result of those initiatives. 
Knowledge (resource ) has been improved, but there is still no shared problem 
perception. The majority of actors did not perceive demographic decline to be a 
structural problem (discourse).
2005-2009: 
NO CHANGES IN THE PROVINCIAL HOUSING POLICY
Although the provincial population projections of 2004 showed that some munici­
palities within Zeeland already were experiencing demographic decline, and others 
were expected to do so in the future, initially, the province paid no attention to 
demographic decline in its strategic policies. This attention started to grow  from 
2007 onwards (Gedeputeerde Staten van Zeeland, 2007), but did not result in a 
provincial policy change. The province, however, did begin to criticise the policy reac­
tions of municipalities to demographic decline.
The province carried out an explorative study into the consequences of existing and 
future demographic developments for different policy fields (among which hous­
ing, economy, local services, mobility and finances) (Provincie Zeeland, 2008). This 
raised the attention within the province for demographic changes and increased 
the knowledge (re source s) about it. Nevertheless, the province did not change its 
strategic policy. This was mainly due to the large differences in the (current and 
prospective) demographic developments in the municipalities and the regions of the
CONSISTED OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR 2015 (BASED ON PROVINCIE ZEELAND 
(2008A)) AND A RESEARCH ABOUT THE PRESUPPOSED AND EXPERIENCED LIVEABILITY.
118 SCOOP, THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH FOR THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND,
CONCLUDED THAT THREE-QUARTERS OF THE INHABITANTS WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR
VILLAGES AND ONE QUARTER FELT INDIFFERENT OR DISSATISFIED. IN ADDITION, SCOOP 
CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO UNIVOCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
IN THE TEN VILLAGES THAT BELONG TO SLUIS AND THE DEGREE OF SATISFACTION OF THEIR 
CITIZENS ABOUT AVAILABLE LOCAL SERVICES (VAN DER WOUW ET AL., 2009). FROM THIS CAN 
BE CONCLUDED THAT THE POLICY ASSUMPTION AND FEAR OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS THAT 
A DECREASE IN LOCAL SERVICES NECESSARILY WOULD RESULT IN DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, 
IS NOT VALID.
189
province of Zeeland: some would be confronted with demographic growth and were 
expected to continue to grow, while for others, the current and future situation was 
of decline. Demographic decline, in the eyes of the province, was considered a future 
policy challenge that would lead to a new situation unlike any that the involved 
actors had experienced before. It would be necessary to break new ground and to 
develop new instruments (e.g. restructuring funds119). From this, the conclusion can 
be drawn that the province expects municipalities to radically change their policy on 
demographic decline. It was said that a lack of re sources (knowledge and finances) 
would make it difficult for municipalities to deal with demographic decline, and that 
more knowledge (resource ) was needed. In addition, the province indicated that 
some policy changes would conflict with agreements made between the national 
government and the province (formal rules), such as about building a certain number 
of houses (Provincie Zeeland, 2008).
In subsequent initiatives, the province tried to increase the knowledge (resource) 
about demographic decline and to stimulate municipalities to reach a shared prob­
lem perception (d iscourse). One of these initiatives was a regional dialogue, meant 
to increase the attention of the municipalities for demographic decline. In 2009, the 
province organised meetings with, among others, local officials and politicians, citi­
zens, societal groups and entrepreneurs. In this way, the province tried to increase 
the support among citizens for radical policy changes, thus taking away the fear of 
local politicians that the electorate would not support radical policy changes120.
Moreover, the provincial executive acknowledged that administrative reflexes 
needed to be tackled and that new basic principles and other solutions were needed. 
In other words, it noticed that patterns of interactions (actors) and discourse  needed 
to be changed in order to deal with the demographic changes121. The province also 
argued that additional financial and knowledge re sources were needed, and that 
obstructing rules needed to be removed (Provincie Zeeland, 2009c). Finally, the 
province cooperated with two other provinces - Groningen and Limburg - to raise the
119 FINANCIAL LINKS CAN BE MADE BETWEEN THE PROFITS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 
HOUSING AND THE COSTS OF RESTRUCTURING EXISTING HOUSING.
120 IN ADDITION, THE PROVINCE PARTICIPATED IN THE EUROPEAN PROJECT OF DC NOISE IN 
ORDER TO INCREASE ITS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT POSSIBLE STRATEGIES (DC NOISE, 2009).
121 IT FORMULATED THE FOLLOWING BASIC PRINCIPLES FROM MORE (QUANTITY) TO BETTER 
(QUALITY) AND TO COOPERATION. IT ALSO FORMULATED NEW PRINCIPLES FOR EACH POLICY 
FIELD. EXAMPLES ARE JOINT DIRECTION, MAINTAIN PROPERTY VALUE, STIMULATE OWNER­
SHIP OF SECOND HOMES, SOCIAL COHESION, INCREASE PROSPERITY PER INHABITANT, AND 
GOOD BALANCE BETWEEN DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF LABOUR (PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2009C).
190
policy attention for demographic decline at national level, by commissioning 
research in order to learn more (knowledge re source) about how national rules 
hinder governments in dealing with demographic decline (Klinkers et al., 2009). In 
spite of all those actions, to date, there has been no radical change in local policy.
5.4.4 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 3 is hypothesised that, in order to reach a radical policy change, radical 
changes in all the dimensions of the policy arrangement would be needed. The find­
ings in this section do not support this in all respects; it appears to be true for radical 
changes in operational policy, but not in strategic policy.
We have seen that in Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta there were radical changes in 
strategic policy, with only a few of the dimensions of the policy arrangement chang­
ing. What did play an important role in reaching radical changes in strategic policy 
were the new problem perception that demographic decline is a structural problem 
(d iscourse), challenging coalitions and new actors (actors a n d  coalitions), and new 
knowledge (resources). However, radical changes in re source  dimension (money and 
political legitimacy) and rules dimension (formal and informal rules) did not occur. 
From this, it can be concluded that, in order to reach radical strategic policy changes, 
changes in only a few dimensions (discourse, actors a n d  coalitions, and knowledge 
re source) of the policy arrangement would be sufficient.
In order to reach a radical change in operational policy, however, radical changes 
in all the dimensions appear to be needed. In Parkstad Limburg and the Eemsdelta, 
some actors involved wanted to radically change the operational policy, but did not 
succeed. This can be explained by the fact that there were no radical changes in the 
dimensions re sources (money and political legitimacy) and rules. Those dimensions in 
their existing form were focused on stimulating and accommodating demographic 
growth, and they did not match the radical changes that took place in the other two 
dimensions of the policy arrangement (‘d iscou rse ’ and ‘actors a n d  coalitions').
Another reason why a radical operational policy change did not occur could be the 
time aspect. Often, actors  first change their strategic plans before they change their 
operational plans. And it is only recently that actors have started to pay attention to 
demographic decline.
Unlike in the other two case-study regions, in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen no radical policy 
change has yet been formulated. This can be explained by the lack of change in prob­
lem perception (d iscourse). A  majority of the actors perceive demographic decline
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as no, or a temporary problem, instead of a structural problem. This is explained in 
Sections 5.6 and 5.7.
Within the Eemsdelta, policy actions have been taken only in Delfzijl, because that 
municipality has been confronted with demographic decline the longest and the 
decline had been largest there (see also Section 5.7). Especially the actions related 
to the new housing stock (additional new housing) seemed to be difficult to realise. 
The main reason for this was the behaviour of the private companies (actors) that 
waited for better times to redevelop neighbourhoods and to (re)build new housing. 
The actions related to the demolition of existing houses did take place. Some argued 
that because these activities did not occur simultaneously, the demographic decline 
in those neighbourhoods increased.
In contrast to radical changes, conservative policy changes have been made in all 
three case-study regions. The reason for this is that conservative policy changes are 
easier to agree on, because they match with the traditional policy arrangement. 
When demographic decline results in a marginal change of one of the dimension of 
the policy arrangement, it can be absorbed. When the actors involved in the field of 
housing, for example, perceive demographic decline as a temporary problem that 
can be reversed (d iscourse), this fits the existing pattern of interaction (actors and  
coalitions), the resources, a n d  the rules focused on planning for growth. In order to 
achieve a conservative policy change, the actors involved do not need to change 
anything else; no new policy arrangement is needed. These findings are in keeping 
with the hypothesis in Chapter 3.
5.5 CONGRUENCE
This section presents an analysis of the congruence in the three different case-study 
regions, distinguishing between strategic, structural-internal and structural-external 
congruence. Boonstra (2004, p.272; 2006, p.195) argues that strategic congruence 
and both types of structural congruence are needed for the stability of a new policy 
arrangement. Based on this, in Chapter 3 it is hypothesised that, for a radical policy 
change, all the dimensions of the policy arrangements and also the national insti­
tutional context need to be changed. An investigation of this is presented in this 
section.
5.5.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
In the previous section, Parkstad Limburg has been shown to have strategic con­
gruence. The involved actors (municipalities, the regional organisation of Parkstad
192
Limburg, the province of Limburg, housing associations and developers) agreed that 
demographic decline was a structural problem, that it caused housing market prob­
lems, and that radical local policy change was needed. This strategic congruence was 
reached by making available new knowledge (resource); hardly any other resources  
were needed. This strategic congruence resulted mainly in radical policy changes in 
strategic plans, but not in changes in operational plans.
There are two factors that explain why it was difficult for the regional organisation 
of Parkstad Limburg to radically change their operational plans. The first factor was 
the lack of structural-internal congruence; the four dimensions of the policy arrange­
ment were not coherent. The involved actors shared a problem perception 
(d iscourse ) and acknowledged that the policy solutions that were needed (reduc­
tion in housing plans and stimulating restructuring and demolition); however, the 
re sources (finance, political legitimacy) and rules (W gr-p lus  status) made it difficult 
for them to reach agreement on the details (operational level) of the policy and to 
implement the strategy. The lack of financial re sources and of political legitimacy was 
identified by the actors  as a problem, but no solution was found.
The second factor that makes it difficult for the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg to radically change its housing policy in the face of demographic decline was 
the lack of structural-external congruence. The strategy formulated by the region 
(reduction in housing plans and stimulating restructuring and demolition) did not 
match the national institutional context, which was mainly focused on demographic 
growth (see Box 5.1). As a result, the agreements made by municipalities at a re­
gional level conflicted with the agreements made earlier by the national government 
and individual municipalities (e.g. see Gemeente Heerlen, 2007).
The two factors mentioned above did not prevent the regional organisation of 
Parkstad Limburg from formulating a radical change in strategic policy, but they 
would clearly be crucial to a radical change in operational policy.
Various initiatives were taken to resolve this structural-internal and structural- 
external incongruence122. The province, the regional organisation of Parkstad
122 IN THIS SECTION, ESPECIALLY THE INITIATIVES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE
THE STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL AND STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL INCONGRUENCE ARE DISCUSSED, 
BECAUSE THE INITIATIVES TO RESOLVE THESE INCONGRUENCE FROM LOCAL, REGIONAL
AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY BEEN MENTIONED. EXAMPLES ARE THE 
RESEARCH PROJECT KRIMP ALS KANS II AND THE PILOT PROJECT CALLED PARKSTAD 
ONORTHODOX (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2010). OTHER EXAMPLES ARE BESTUURLIJKE
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Limburg and the municipalities, on many occasions and in different ways123, have 
tried to raise policy attention at the national level for demographic decline, to 
convince government to adapt national policy and the national financial system124. In 
2009, the Minister of Housing, Communities and Integration acknowledged this for 
the first time. At a conference (NICIS and Parkstad Limburg, 2009), he argued that 
national financial re sources and the current formal rules indeed made it difficult for 
municipalities to deal with demographic decline (Ministerie van VROM, 2009).
The national government then took various initiatives to resolve both types of incon­
gruence. It appointed a top team (Topteam  Krim p), Dijkstal and M ans (2009a)125, who 
advised the local governments of Parkstad Limburg on how  to deal with demo­
graphic decline (Dijkstal and Mans, 2009a). The top team especially supported the 
regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg with tackling the lack of structural-internal 
congruence; the team pointed out that the new rules, resulting from the region’s 
W gr-p lu s status, made it difficult for the region to adequately deal with demographic 
decline. The top team advised the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg to set 
up an influential triumvirate. The idea is to appoint three powerful individuals (one 
independent chairman and two of the executive of Parkstad Limburg) and make 
them responsible for the implementation of the recommendations of the top team. 
This would facilitate the decision-making process at regional level and would make 
it easier to reach radical policy changes. Also, the top team said that demographic 
decline was a structural problem (d iscourse ) and that financial solutions (resources) 
were needed. They acknowledged that the financial consequences of demographic
TASKFORCE DEMOGRAFISCHE VOORSPRONG (2006), PROVINCIE LIMBURG (2008F), PROVIN­
CIE LIMBURG, AND PARKSTAD LIMBURG (2009).
123 THROUGH PRESENTATIONS AT NATIONAL CONFERENCES (ESSEN, 2007; SEVEREIJNS,
2007; LATTEN, 2009), LETTERS (GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 2007; PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2008D), 
PRESS COMMUNIQUÉS, AND STUDIES (GERRICHHAUZEN AND DOGTEROM, 2007; PROVINCIE 
LIMBURG, 2007B; LATTEN AND MUSTERD, 2009).
124 GRADUALLY, THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG, THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG AND THE INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITIES CHANGED THEIR COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 
INITIALLY, THEY USED SLOGANS SUCH AS DEMOGRAFISCHE VOORSPRONG  AND KRIMP ALS 
KANS, WHICH EMPHASISED THE ADVANTAGES OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND OPPORTUNI­
TIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE AS A RESULT OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. EVENTUALLY THESE 
ACTORS CHANGED THE TONE OF THEIR MESSAGE AND STARTED TO PUT MORE EMPHASIS 
ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WERE CAUSED BY DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND THE DIFFICUL­
TIES THEY MET WHEN DEALING WITH IT. IN THIS WAY, THEY HOPED TO RAISE THE SENSE OF 
URGENCY AT NATIONAL LEVEL TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS.
125 THE TOP TEAM WAS ASKED ALSO TO PUBLISH AN ADVICE FOR ZEELAND AND GRONINGEN.
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decline for housing had been calculated only roughly126 127. They argued that addi­
tional financial support for shrinking municipalities was necessary, coming from the 
national funds for municipalities and provinces (G em eentefonds and Provinciefonds, 
respectively), and from national subsidies, such as those for stimulating housing 
production (BLS), urban renewal (ISV), and rural areas (ILG). In addition, the 
possibility of additional financial support from the multi-annual programmes for 
infrastructure, spatial planning and transport (MIRT) and the programme to stimu­
late the strongest economic regions and sectors (Pieken in de Delta) would need to 
be investigated (Dijkstal and Mans, 2009a, p.31). Such changes to the national finan­
cial system could increase the structural-external congruence.
In the autumn of 2009, the ministries, the province of Limburg, and the regional 
organisation of Parkstad Limburg reached an agreement about the multi-year 
programme concerning the housing stock. All actors considered it necessary to 
reduce the housing stock of Parkstad Limburg by 6,200 dwellings, between 2008 
and 2020128; 13,100 dwellings were to be demolished and 6,900 new dwellings to be 
built (Ministerie van VenW et al., 2009, p.2)129. This agreement should improve the 
structural-external congruence.
126 THEY ARGUED THAT FOR OTHER POLICY FIELDS AS WELL (E.G. EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, 
SOCIAL WELFARE, LABOUR MARKET, MOBILITY) THE COSTS WOULD NEED TO BE INVESTI­
GATED (DIJKSTAL AND MANS, 2009A, P.6).
127 THE MINISTER OF HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND INTEGRATION TOGETHER WITH THE 
PROVINCE AND THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG ALSO COMMIS­
SIONED THE CONSULTANCY FIRM RIGO  AND EIB, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTE FOR THE 
BUILDING INDUSTRY (ECONOMISCHINSTITUUT VOOR DE BOUWNIJVERHEID) TO MAKE AN 
ANALYSIS ABOUT THE SOCIETAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RESTRUCTURING IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG (ROSENBERG ET AL., 2010). THE MAIN CONCLUSION DRAWN FROM THIS ANALYSIS 
WAS THAT IF THE MUNICIPALITIES ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
FORMULATED IN RELATION TO NEW HOUSING, RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOLITION FOR EACH 
MUNICIPALITY (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2008D, E) THE VACANCY RATES WOULD REDUCE AND THE 
DECREASE IN HOUSING PRICES WOULD DIMINISH. THE DECREASE IN THE HOUSING PRICE OF 
SOCIAL HOUSING AND CHEAP OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING WAS EXPECTED TO BE AROUND 
2% INSTEAD OF 10 TO 30%, THE LATTER BEING WHAT WAS EXPECTED TO HAPPEN IF NO OR 
NOT MUCH REGIONAL (RESTRUCTURING) POLICY WAS FORMULATED (ZERO ALTERNATIVE) 
(PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2010, P.4; ROSENBERG ET AL., 2010, P.4).
128 THE URBANISATION AGREEMENTS ARE MADE FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2010 AND 2020. 
HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENT FOR PARKSTAD LIMBURG TO REDUCE ITS HOUSING STOCK BY 
6,200 DWELLINGS, COVERS THE PERIOD FROM 2008 TO 2020 (MINISTERIE VAN VENW ET AL., 
2009, P.2).
129 THESE AGREEMENTS ARE BASED ON ETIL (2009) AND PRIMOS (2007) (MINISTERIE VAN VENW 
ET AL., 2009, P.2).
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BOX 5.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
CHAPTER 1 (SEE SECTION 1.4) DESCRIBES THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AT 
NATIONAL LEVEL. BELOW, THIS IS DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL, AND IS RELEVANT TO ALL 
THE THREE CASE-STUDY REGIONS.
INITIALLY, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS NOT VERY RECEPTIVE TO THE COMPLAINT 
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE MADE IT 
DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO RESPOND TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. THE MINISTER OF 
HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND INTEGRATION AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
INTERIOR AFFAIRS BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SHRINKING MUNICIPALITIES WOULD 
RECEIVE LESS MONEY FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (GEMEENTEFONDS), BUT 
ARGUED THAT BECAUSE THOSE MUNICIPALITIES WOULD ALSO HAVE FEWER COSTS, NO 
ADAPTATION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE SHOULD BE NEEDED (TWEEDE 
KAMER 2009A) NOR WOULD THERE BE A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO 
SHRINKING REGIONS (VAN DER LAAN, 2008A; VAN DER LAAN, 2008B) (SEE ALSO CHAPTER 1).
GRADUALLY, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STARTED TO CHANGE ITS PERCEPTION OF 
THE SITUATION. THE VISIT OF MINISTER VAN DER LAAN TO HEERLEN, IN EARLY 2009,
MADE HIM AWARE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM (MINISTERIE VROM, 2009)
AND OF THE STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL INCONGRUENCE. HE APPEALED TO THE BIG 
CITIES (AMSTERDAM, ROTTERDAM, UTRECHT, AND THE HAGUE) TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT TO THE SHRINKING REGIONS130. HE ALSO PROMISED TO TAKE POPULATION 
DECLINE INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING THE URBANISATION AGREEMENTS MADE 
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE URBAN REGIONS (AMONG WHICH THE 
REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG) FOR THE 2010-2020 PERIOD, IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE MULTI-YEAR PROGRAMME FOR INFRASTRUCTURE, SPATIAL PLANNING 
AND TRANSPORT (MIRT).
VAN DER LAAN REFERRED ALSO TO THE RULES, RESO U RCES  AND DISCOURSE. HE 
EMPHASISED THAT TRADITIONAL INSTRUMENTS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR SHRINKING 
MUNICIPALITIES TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, AND HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS 
NECESSARY TO ANALYSE WHETHER THE NATIONAL LAW AND REGULATION STRUCTURE 
WERE ‘DECLINE PROOF'. HE SAID THAT DECLINE AND GROWTH WERE TWO DIFFERENT 
WORLDS (READ: DISCOURSE), EACH NEEDING ITS OWN APPROACH AND INSTRUMENTS 
(READ: RESO U RCES  AND RULES) (VAN DER LAAN, 2009A; MINISTERIE VROM, 2009).
EARLY 2009, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR AFFAIRS, BIJLEVELD, ALSO BEGAN 
TO PERCEIVE THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH SHRINKING CITIES AND REGIONS WERE 
CONFRONTED. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NEEDED TO CHANGE THEIR PARADIGM (D ISCOURSE) 
FROM PLANNING FOR GROWTH TOWARDS PLANNING FOR DECLINE. SHE UNDERSTOOD 
THAT, BECAUSE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WERE USED TO GROWTH, THIS SHIFT WOULD BE 
DIFFICULT (BIJLEVELD, 2009).
IN ORDER TO RESOLVE STRATEGIC INCONGRUENCE, DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE BECAME 
A THEME IN THE PROGRAMME TO STIMULATE ADMINISTRATIVE POWER (PROGRAMMA 
KRACHTIG BESTUUR), BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS AND KINGDOM RELATIONS. 
IN THIS PROGRAMME, SPECIAL ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR MUNICIPALITIES AND LOCAL POLITICIANS TO DEAL WITH 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PAID ATTENTION NOT ONLY TO THE 
LACK OF STRATEGIC CONGRUENCE, BUT ALSO TO THE LACK OF STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL
130 VAN DER LAAN CALLED TO MIND THAT, IN THE PAST (1990S), WHEN THE CITIES WERE
CONFRONTED WITH LARGE PROBLEMS, THE REVERSE HAD HAPPENED (MINISTERIE VROM,
2009; VAN DER LAAN, 2009A; VAN DER LAAN, 2009B).
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CONGRUENCE. SHE ARGUED THAT THE SPECIFIC NATIONAL RULES MIGHT MAKE IT 
DIFFICULT FOR MUNICIPALITIES TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
NEVERTHELESS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ARGUED THAT MUNICIPALITIES HAVE THE 
FIRST RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEALING WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (TWEEDE KAMER, 
2009A131), AND IT STARTED SOME INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT THEM. THOSE INITIATIVES 
WERE MAINLY FOCUSED ON INCREASING KNOWLEDGE (RESOURCE) AND REACHING 
STRATEGIC CONGRUENCE132.
IN ADDITION, THE MINISTER OF HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND INTEGRATION, TOGETHER 
WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS, THE ASSOCIATION OF 
NETHERLANDS MUNICIPALITIES (VNG) AND THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PROVINCES OF 
THE NETHERLANDS (IPO) FORMULATED AN ACTION PLAN ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE 
(INTERBESTUURLIJK ACTIEPLAN BEVOLKINGSDALING), IN WHICH THEY PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS FOR REMOVING THE BARRIERS THAT MUNICIPALITIES FACE WHEN DEALING 
WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, AND INDICATED WHICH GOVERNMENT LEVEL WOULD BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT THESE SOLUTIONS (MINISTERIE VAN BZK ET AL., 2009).
OTHER INITIATIVES, TAKEN BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, WERE TO RESOLVE THE 
STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL INCONGRUENCE. IN 2009, IT APPOINTED A TOP TEAM, DIJKSTAL 
AND MANS, WHICH ADVISED THE WGR-PLUS REGION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG, THE 
PROVINCES OF ZEELAND AND GRONINGEN ON HOW TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE (DIJKSTAL AND MANS, 2009A). THIS ADVICE CONTRIBUTED TO STRATEGIC 
AND STRUCTURAL-INTERNAL CONGRUENCE, AND WAS AN INPUT FOR THE NATIONAL 
ACTION PLAN AND, THUS, ALSO HELPED TO IMPROVE THE STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL 
CONGRUENCE.
IIN 2009, VAN DER LAAN, THE THEN MINISTER OF HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND 
INTEGRATION, DECIDED TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT (RESOURCES) TO THE 
SHRINKING REGIONS; 31 MILLION EUROS TO PARKSTAD LIMBURG, NORTH-EAST 
GRONINGEN, AND ZEELAND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR AFFAIRS, 
BIJLEVELD, WANTED TO RESERVE 22 MILLION EUROS FOR RESOLVING ANY PROBLEMS 
THAT SHRINKING MUNICIPALITIES MIGHT FACE AS A RESULT OF THEIR DECREASING 
INCOME FROM THE NATIONAL FUND FOR MUNICIPALITIES (GEMEENTEFONDS) (TWEEDE 
KAMER, 2010)133. IN SPITE OF ALL THESE ACTIONS, THE LACK OF STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL 
CONGRUENCE, TO DATE, HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. AFTER ALL, THE NATIONAL POLICIES, 
RULES AND RESOURCES ARE STILL FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH 
AND ARE NOT ADAPTED TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
131 THIS WAS BASED ON THE ADVICE BY ROB/RFV (2008) AND REPEATED IN THE ACTION PLAN 
ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE (MINISTERIE VAN BZK ET AL., 2009).
132 EXAMPLES ARE THE SETTING UP OF A NATIONAL NETWORK ON POPULATION DECLINE (NATIO­
NAAL NETWERK BEVOLKINGSDALING (NNB)) (MINISTERIE VAN BZK, 2009); THE ORGANISATION 
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE (MINISTERIE VAN VROM AND 
MINISTERIE VAN BZK, 2009A); SEVERAL STUDIES COMMISSIONED BY THE MINISTRIES (LOUTER 
ET AL., 2009; GROEN ET AL., 2009); SEVERAL BUS TOURS, AND A CHAT SESSION BETWEEN 
LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLITICIANS AND EXPERTS (SEE CHAPTER 1).
133 THE FINANCIAL AGREEMENT FOR PRIORITY NEIGHBOURHOODS (VOGELAAR HEFFING) WAS
CRITICISED, AS WELL. THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS COMMITTED AN ADDITIONAL ANNUAL 
INVESTMENT OF 250 MILLION EUROS TO THE 40 PRIORITY NEIGHBOURHOODS OVER A 
TEN-YEAR PERIOD (MINISTERIE VAN VROM, 2007). THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN THE
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5.5.2 EEMSDELTA
The previous section showed three factors that made it difficult for Delfzijl to radi­
cally change its local housing plan, in order to take account of demographic decline. 
First, within Delfzijl itself, for a long time there was no strategic congruence. The 
actors involved (the province, the municipality and the housing associations) agreed 
that Delfzijl had housing market problems. They agreed also about the solutions 
needed to deal with those problems (restructuring, demolition, new housing and 
marketing). They even jointly implemented policy strategies. However, these actors 
did not agree about the causes and the nature of the problem (no shared problem 
perception). The past troubles between the province and the municipalities could 
be part of the explanation for the fact that the province did not change its policies, 
radically134.
The housing association was one of the first to relate the housing market problems 
to demographic decline, and it argued that other strategies were needed. The 
Tielrooij Commission also said that there was a relation between the two, and that 
Delfzijl would continue to decline. Despite this warning, for a long time the munici­
pality refused to perceive demographic decline as a structural problem (discourse). 
This lack of strategic congruence could explain why there were both conservative 
and radical strategic policy changes in Delfzijl. Recently, the municipality has accept­
ed the idea that demographic decline is a structural phenomenon135. And now, there 
is strategic congruence.
The second factor that made it difficult for Delfzijl to radically change its local hous­
ing plans, especially the operational plans and policy actions, was the lack of struc­
tural-internal congruence. For example, there was too little money to restructure 
north Delfzijl. In order to resolve this, Delfzijl set up a new organisation, the develop­
ment company of Delfzijn (O M D ), and started a public-private partnership. However,
SHRINKING REGIONS ARGUED THAT IT WAS UNFAIR THAT THEY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE 
PROBLEMS IN THE 40 PRIORITY NEIGHBOURHOODS, WHICH ARE MAINLY LOCATED IN THE 
RANDSTAD. DESPITE THIS CRITIQUE, VAN DER LAAN DID NOT CHANGE THIS FINANCIAL 
REGULATION.
134 DUE TO THE ALLOCATION POLICY OF THE PROVINCE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITIES DETERIORATED. THE PROVINCE WAS HESITANT TO 
CHANGE ITS POLICY BECAUSE IT WAS AFRAID THAT THIS WOULD WORSEN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES.
135 IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION, WE HAVE SEEN THAT VARIOUS RESEARCH INITIATIVES COMMIS­
SIONED BY THE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITIES CONTRIBUTED TO THIS.
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this only made the structural-internal incongruence larger. A  special bridging team 
was formed by the national government, in 2007, to help Delfzijl to solve this lack of 
structural-internal congruence136.
The third factor that made it difficult for Delfzijl to radically change its policy is the 
lack of structural-external congruence. The province of Groningen tried to convince 
the national government that it needed additional financial support to deal with 
demographic decline. In 2009, it published a study on the consequences of popula­
tion decline, in which it calculated that, between 2010 and 2020, 980 million euros 
would be needed to deal with demographic decline, of which approximately 561 
million funded by the (national, provincial and local) government (Provincie Gronin­
gen, 2009, p.11-12). The housing associations also tried to convince the then Minister 
of Housing, Communities and Integration (Van der Laan) that additional financial sup­
port was needed. The housing associations of east and north Groningen jointly wrote 
a letter to this effect, addressed to the minister (Kremer et al. 2009)137. Minister Van 
der Laan visited Groningen twice in 2009 to discuss demographic decline, and he 
noticed the lack of structural-external congruence.
The top team (Dijkstal and Mans) also advised Groningen on how to deal with demo­
graphic decline by increasing the structural-internal and structural-external congru­
ence (Dijkstal and Mans, 2009c). At first, however, the minister gave no financial 
support to the province nor to Delfzijl138. In the end, the minister did provide financial 
support to all shrinking regions (and thus also to north-east Groningen). However, as 
national policies have not yet been adapted to demographic decline, the structural- 
external incongruence has not been resolved (see Box 5.1). M ost national policies do
136 IN 2007, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO PROVIDE DELFZIJL WITH SOME 
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT. A ‘BRIDGING TEAM DELFZIJL' (OVERBRUGGINGSTEAM DELFZIJL) WAS 
FORMED. THE TEAM, EXISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, 
SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM 
RELATIONS AND THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, WORKS UNDER SUPERVISION OF THE 
ROYAL COMMISSIONER OF GRONINGEN. THIS TEAM WAS SET UP FOR THE 2007-2011 PERIOD. 
ITS MISSION IS TO TEMPORARILY ASSIST THE MUNICIPALITY OF DELFZIJL WITH FINDING 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE MOST DIFFICULT POLICY BOTTLENECKS, SUCH AS THE FINANCIAL 
PROBLEMS THE MUNICIPALITY HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING.
137 IN THIS LETTER, THEY ALSO TRIED TO CONVINCE THE MINISTER TO ADD THE SHRINKING 
AREAS AS 41ST ON THE LIST OF PRIORITY NEIGHBOURHOODS, AND TO ALLOCATE CORPORA­
TION TAX REVENUES (VENNOOTSCHAPSBELASTING) TO FINANCE MEASURES FOR DEALING 
WITH POPULATION DECLINE (KREMER ET AL., 2009).
138 THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, DUE TO THE ECONOMIC 
RECESSION, SIMPLY LACKS THE REQUIRED FUNDING. BESIDES, IT BELIEVED THAT DEALING
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not pay attention to demographic decline and most national planning concepts are 
focused on growth. In addition, most national resources (e.g. BLS a n d  ISV ) are still 
focused on demographic growth, and the formal rules (urbanisation agreements 
made between the national government and local governments and the procedures 
followed when the municipalities do no meet those agreements within time) stimu­
late municipalities to grow. The financial support given by the minister cannot solve 
this because the support is rather marginal in relation to the challenge that face 
these regions. To date, this structural-external incongruence makes it difficult for 
Delfzijl and the region of Eemsdelta to formulate a radical policy change.
At the regional level, a radical strategic policy change has recently been formulated. 
This has come about because the two municipalities of Appingedam and Delfzijl, 
which previously were always in competition, now  see the problem of demographic 
decline in the same way; there is strategic congruence. Nevertheless, at that govern­
ment level, there is still no structural-internal or structural-external congruence. 
There is no regional organisation, nor financial resources, nor formal rules requiring 
parties to act in accordance with what has been regionally agreed. The municipalities 
cooperate on a voluntary basis.
5.5.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, in response to demographic decline, the municipalities, both 
individually and jointly, made conservative policy changes, mainly based on stimu­
lating growth by increasing inward migration. Examples of this are the reduction in 
growth ambition and the marketing campaign. Within Zeeuws-Vlaanderen there was 
strategic congruence. All actors involved agreed that demographic decline was a 
temporary problem that was reversible (d iscourse). Moreover, there was also both 
structural-internal and structural-external congruence, because the discourse was in 
accordance with the traditional patterns of interaction (actors a n d  coalitions), rules 
and re sources (at both local and national government level) which were focused on 
planning for growth. Therefore, those strategies were easy to formulate and imple­
ment.
Gradually, housing associations and the province began to contest (challenge) these 
policy strategies. They started arguing that demographic decline was a structural 
phenomenon (d iscourse ) and radical policy changes (focused on restructuring and 
demolition of existing housing stock) were needed. Nevertheless, hardly any radical
WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE WAS PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS.
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policy change occurred. The lack of strategic congruence seemed to be the main 
reason139.
Structural external congruence was also a reason why in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen no 
radical policy changes occurred. The province of Zeeland actively tried to tackle this 
through lobbying in The Hague (see above)140. Minister Van der Laan visited Zeeland 
(8 July 2009) to discuss population developments. As in the other two shrinking 
regions, the top team Dijkstal and M ans (Dijkstal and Mans, 2009b) published an 
advice on how  to deal with demographic decline in this region. But, as described in 
Box 5.1, national policies, to date, are still not adapted to demographic decline, and 
there is still structural-external incongruence.
5.6 LOCAL SPATIAL CONDITIONS
This section describes how  local spatial conditions influence local policy changes, in 
the three different case-study regions.
5.6.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
Characteristics of the local housing stock influenced the way in which municipali­
ties in Parkstad Limburg reacted to demographic decline. Because in the urban 
municipalities the least attractive housing was geographically concentrated, it was 
here that the problems related to demographic decline first became visible141. The 
reaction was also influenced by the fact that the share of the social housing stock 
was relatively high in the urban municipalities of Heerlen, Brunssum, Landgraaf and
139 WE HAVE SEEN THAT ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE PROVINCE AND FROM OUTSIDE 
THE REGION (BY BNA AND VNG) TO IMPROVE THE STRATEGIC CONGRUENCE AMONG THE 
INVOLVED ACTORS (VNG, 2009A).
140 FOR EXAMPLE, THEY (TOGETHER WITH THE PROVINCES OF GRONINGEN AND LIMBURG) 
COMMISSIONED CONSULTANCY FIRM KENNISCENTRUM VOOR BEVOLKINGSDALING EN  
BELEID  TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER NATIONAL RULES MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR MUNICIPALI­
TIES TO DEAL WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (KLINKERS ET AL., 2009). THE RESEARCH WAS 
PRESENTED BY A MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE OF ZEELAND, VAN WAVEREN, TO 
THE MINISTER OF HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND INTEGRATION AT THE NATIONAL CONFER­
ENCE KRIMP ALS KANS (MINISTERIE VAN VROM AND BZK, 2009A).
141 FOR EXAMPLE, IN HEERLEN THE HOUSING MARKET PROBLEMS EMERGED IN THE NEIGH­
BOURHOODS OF MEEZENBROEK, SCHAESBERGERVELD AND PALEMIG (MSP) AND IN 
HOENSBROEK IN HEERLEN. IN KERKRADE, THE PROBLEMS ESPECIALLY EMERGED IN WEST 
KERKRADE (E.G. IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF HEILUST) (BNA, 2008).
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Kerkrade (see Figure 5.7)142. In those areas, housing associations had difficulties find­
ing tenants for their social housing stock, and vacancy rates in some neighbourhoods 
were higher than elsewhere in the city (and the region). The visibility of the problem 
increased the perception that demographic decline was a problem for the housing 
market, and it stimulated the actors to change their policies accordingly.
The characteristics of the local housing stock, however, made it difficult for the re­
gion to introduce radical change. This is because the housing market problems were 
unevenly spread over the region (see Figure 5.7) and were concentrated in certain 
neighbourhoods in the urban municipalities. This made it difficult to reach regional 
commitment and to convince all actors (including the rural municipalities) that radi­
cal regional policy change was necessary.
Another relevant aspect of local spatial conditions is that there was no clear spatial 
hierarchy within Parkstad Limburg. Heerlen, the largest town, was indicated as the 
centre of the region, but this was constantly contested by Kerkrade. This made it dif­
ficult to reach agreement, especially about radical changes in the operational plans 
(e.g. the distribution of new housing over the different municipalities).
FIGURE 5.7 OWNERSHIP OF THE HOUSING STOCK, PER MUNICIPALITY, AND NATIONALLY, IN 2008. 
SO URCE: ABF RESEARCH (COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009).
TOTAL
HOUSING
STOCK
OWNER- 
OCCUPIED 
HOUSING STOCK
SOCIAL HOUSING 
STOCK
RENTED PRIVATE 
HOUSING STOCK
BRUNSSUM 14,102 8,843 62.7% 4,351 30.9% 908 6.4%
HEERLEN 45,020 21,054 46.8% 15,520 34.5% 8,446 18.8%
KERKRADE 23,380 11,848 50.7% 6,691 28.6% 4,841 20.7%
LANDGRAAF 17,644 11,250 63.8% 5,126 29.1% 1,268 7.2%
ONDERBANKEN 3,566 2,452 68.8% 621 17.4% 493 13.8%
SIMPELVELD 4,885 3,215 65.8% 1,276 26.1% 394 8.1%
VOERENDAAL 5,478 3,879 70.8% 1,128 20.6% 471 8.6%
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 114,075 62,541 54.8% 34,713 30.4% 16,821 14.7%
THE NETHERLANDS 7,028,606 4,021,451 57.2% 2,251,401 32.0% 755,754 10.8%
142 IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD HOENSBROEK, THE SHARE OF SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK, WITH 45%,
IS RELATIVELY LARGE COMPARED TO THAT IN OTHER NEIGBOURHOODS IN HEERLEN (SEV,
2009; GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 2009).
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Finally, regional policy was influenced also by the characteristics of the housing stock 
in the neighbouring regions, namely across the border in Germany and Belgium. The 
cheap housing prices there (in combination with the fact that Dutch people who buy 
a house abroad are entitled to tax deductions) stimulated out-migration (Latten and 
Musterd, 2009). This kept parties from radically changing their policies. They were 
afraid that if they focused only on reducing new housing programmes and restruc­
turing current housing stock instead of extending new and attractive housing supply, 
this would increase the outward migration even further. If no new houses were 
developed, people in search of a new house would be pushed off to neighbouring 
regions to find a new house which meets their wishes.
5.6.2 EEMSDELTA
The housing market problems in Delfzijl were concentrated in the northern city re­
gion of Delfzijl. They arose because, in the neighbourhood Tuikwerd, many new fami­
ly homes were developed for new inhabitants who were expected to come to Delfzijl 
when it was indicated as an industrial centre in the national spatial planning policy143. 
But those inhabitants never arrived144. Some of the family homes in Tu ikw erd  were 
occupied by people moving from social housing apartments in north Delfzijl. This 
increased the vacancy rate in the social housing stock (which was considerably large 
- see Figure 5.8) in north Delfzijl. The vacancy rate in these areas was also increased 
by the uniformity145 of the housing stock, and because the demand for the types of 
houses present in these areas was much lower than the supply. The concentration 
of the housing market problems in certain areas of the town made those problems 
visible, which triggered various actors in Delfzijl to change their policy. However, this 
concentration of housing market problems in Delfzijl made it difficult to convince 
neighbouring municipalities to change their policies, as well.
143 IN ANTICIPATION OF THE SETTLEMENT OF XANTAR (SUBDIVISION OF DSM), IN THE 1970S, 324 
NEW HOUSES WERE PLANNED AND BUILT IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD TUIKWERD.
144 AS A RESULT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE 1970S, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SETTLE­
MENT OF XANTAR IN DELFZIJL WAS CANCELLED. THE FAILURE TO ATTRACT THIS SETTLEMENT 
WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED AS THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
145 MOST OF THE HOUSES WERE BUILT AROUND THE SAME TIME FOR THE SAME TARGET 
GROUPS (INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES).
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FIGURE 5.8 OWNERSHIP OF THE HOUSING STOCK, PER MUNICIPALITY, AND NATIONALLY, IN 2008. 
SOURCE: ABF RESEARCH. (COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009)
TOTAL OWNER-
HOUSING OCCUPIED SOCIAL HOUSING RENTED PRIVATE
STOCK HOUSING STOCK STOCK HOUSING STOCK
APPINGEDAM 5,513 2,830 51.3% 2,449 44.4% 234 4.2%
DELFZIJL 11,969 7,745 64.7% 3,675 30.7% 549 4.6%
EEMSMOND 6,985 4,228 60.5% 1,204 27.0% 458 6.6%
LOPPERSUM 4,464 3,181 71.3% 2,299 32.9% 79 1 .8%
EEMSDELTA 28,931 17,984 62.2% 9,627 33.3% 1,320 4.6%
THE NETHERLANDS 7,028,606 4,021,451 57.2% 2,251,401 32.0% 755,754 10.8%
5.6.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
As indicated in Section 5.2, the effects of demographic decline on the housing market 
are different for owner-occupied housing than for social housing146. The major part 
of the housing stock in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is owner-occupied (72.0%) (see Figure 
5.9). Demographic decline affected the housing market there (see Section 5.2), but 
not in the form of high vacancies. So the problems were not very visible and the 
decline was not perceived to be a problem. Moreover, individual home-owners were 
not united and did not have a powerful spokesperson or representative (such as the 
housing associations have, for example, united in Aedes) to focus attention on this 
problem.
FIGURE 5.9 OWNERSHIP OF THE HOUSING STOCK, PER MUNICIPALITY, AND NATIONALLY, IN 2008. 
SOURCE: ABF RESEARCH (COMBIMONITOR, MAY 2009).
TOTAL
HOUSING
STOCK
OWNER- 
OCCUPIED 
HOUSING STOCK
SOCIAL HOUSING 
STOCK
RENTED PRIVATE 
HOUSING STOCK
HULST 12,581 9,331 74.2% 2,467 19.6% 783 6.2%
SLUIS 13,825 10,195 73.7% 2,582 18.7% 1,048 7.6%
TERNEUZEN 25,482 17,855 70.1% 5,333 20.9% 2,294 9.0%
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 51,888 37,381 72.0% 10,382 20.0% 4,125 7.9%
THE NETHERLANDS 7,028,606 4,021,451 57.2% 2,251,401 32.0% 755,754 10.8%
146 SOCIAL HOUSING STOCK IS CONFRONTED WITH VACANCIES AND HIGH TURNOVER RATES, 
AND OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING STOCK WITH INCREASES IN THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT 
PROPERTIES ARE ON THE MARKET AND WITH HOUSING PRICES OF BELOW THE NATIONAL 
AVERAGE (SEE SECTION 5.2).
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5.7 ASPECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
This section describes how  aspects of demographic decline influence local policy 
changes, in the three different case-study regions. Because the analyses focus on 
explaining the policy reactions in the shrinking region and central cities (see Chapter 
4) this section focuses especially on the aspects of demographic decline in the region 
and the central cities. However, it is important to note the large differences in extent 
and duration of the demographic decline within the region, which may influence the 
policy reactions at regional level, as well. More detailed information about the extent 
of demographic decline in the different municipalities is presented in Section 4.5.
5.7.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
The region of Parkstad Limburg (and the municipality of Heerlen) has been experi­
encing a decrease in the number of households since 2002 (see Chapter 4). Between 
2002 and 2008, the region lost 192 households (0.2%). Moreover, regional popula­
tion and household projections (Etil and PEARL) expect this decline to be persistent. 
PEARL expects that, between 2008 and 2025, the number of households in the region 
will fall by 2,432 (2.2%), and, between 2008 and 2040, by 13,178 (11.8%). In addition, 
the province of Limburg as a whole faces population decline, and is expected also 
to experience a decline in household numbers, in the future. It is expected that, 
between 2008 and 2040, the number of households in the province will fall by 4,039 
(0.8%).
These aspects of regional and provincial demographic decline have stimulated actors 
to formulate a radical strategic policy change at regional level. However, due to the 
demographic differences (extent and duration of the demographic decline) between 
the municipalities within the region, not all of them supported this radical regional 
change from the beginning. The first supporters (mainly large urban municipalities, 
such as Heerlen and Kerkrade) were the ones with the longest and largest popula­
tion and household decline. The municipalities with te shortest and smallest popula­
tion and household decline (mainly rural municipalities, such as Voerendaal) were 
more reserved in their support of this radical change. In the end, studies and projec­
tions, among other things, convinced them to support the radical changes.
To date, the province of Limburg has not changed its policy radically147. This could be 
explained by the fact that, to date, it has not faced any household decline.
147 THE PROVINCE SET UP THE DEETMAN COMMISSION TO ANALYSE WHETHER THIS IS NECES­
SARY.
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5.7.2 EEMSDELTA
The municipality of Delfzijl has had a declining population since 1981, and a decline 
in household numbers since 2002. Between 2002 and 2008, it lost 473 households 
(3.8%). This has stimulated it to formulate a radical strategic policy change.
In the region of Eemsdelta, the number of households has been declining since 2003, 
and different demographic projections (P rim os  and PEARL) expect this to continue. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the region lost 808 households (2.7%), between 2008 and 
2025, it is expected to lose an additional 1,181 households (4.1%), and, between 2008 
and 2040, another 3,322 households (11.6%). This has stimulated the municipalities 
jointly to formulate a radical policy change. Due to the demographic differences (in 
extent and duration of the demographic decline) between the municipalities, not all 
of them supported this change, straight away. Delfzijl, that had been facing popula­
tion and household decline for the longest period of time, and where the decline had 
been the largest, was one of the first municipalities that urged the need for a radical 
policy change at regional level. The municipalities that had been facing household 
decline the shortest, and where the decline had been the smallest (e.g. Eemsmond 
and Loppersum) were more reserved in their support of this radical change. Studies 
and projections helped to gain support among these municipalities for the change at 
regional level.
To date, the province of Groningen has not changed its policy. This can be explained 
by the fact that the demographic differences in the province are large. Eemsdelta 
and east Groningen are shrinking, while the city of Groningen is growing. As a result, 
the province has a dual policy; it needs to stimulate new housing in some regions, 
and in other regions it needs to slow down the development of new housing and 
trigger local governments to change their housing policies radically. It is difficult for 
the province to get this message across.
5.7.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
In both the region of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and in individual constituent municipalities, 
populations have been declining, but the number of households not (yet). Therefore, 
the consequences of demographic decline are hardly visible, demographic decline is 
not perceived as a structural problem, and there have been no radical policy 
changes.
In the province of Zeeland as a whole, the demographic differences are large. So 
here too, the province needs a dual policy. Some municipalities and regions are
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grow ing (and are expected to continue to grow) and must try and adjust their hous­
ing plans to this growth (by creating more new housing), while others are declining 
(and are expected to continue to decline) and must try and adjust their housing plans 
to this decline (by focusing more on their existing housing stock instead of creating 
more new housing). This complicates the raising of policy attention among the differ­
ent actors, and in that way hinders policy change at municipal and regional levels.
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6 DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates the relationship between demographic decline and local 
spatial policy reactions in the field of economy, specifically policies and/or actions af­
fecting the regional economy, the labour market, retail, office and business locations.
First, Section 6.2 describes the economic situation in these regions and the conse­
quences that demographic decline has for their local economy. Section 6.3 analyses 
if and how  the case-study regions of Parkstad Limburg, Eemsdelta and Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen have changed their economic policies in reaction to demographic 
decline; in this analysis, a distinction is made between no policy change, conservative 
policy change, and radical policy change (see also Chapter 3). The following sections 
provide insight into the conditions that influence those policy reactions, applying the 
same distinction as made in Chapter 3 between policy arrangement (Section 6.4), 
congruence (Section 6.5), local spatial conditions (Section 6.6), and aspects of demo­
graphic decline (Section 6.7).
6.2 DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND THE 
ECONOMY
In Chapter 2 the conclusion is drawn that the relationship between demographic and 
economic developments is very complex and less direct than between demographic 
developments and housing. In that chapter it is stated that a decrease in population 
and household numbers may affect the demand for private services (population- 
related industries, such as retail), which may cause an oversupply of commercial 
real estate, reflected in the high vacancies of commercial properties. A  decrease in 
working age population may affect labour supply. Whether this will happen depends 
on the development of labour participation. M ost researchers agree about the 
consequences mentioned above. However, there is much disagreement about other 
possible economic effects of a decrease in working age population. Economists, for 
example, disagree about if and how a decrease in working age population would 
affect unemployment rates, welfare levels (economic growth), establishment and
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closures of firms, and demand for business and office locations (which is reflected in 
vacancy rates in business and office locations).
This section investigates whether the possible consequences as described in Chapter 
2 actually occur in the three case-study regions, using the distinction made in that 
chapter between the demand for goods and services, the supply of labour, labour 
market, and the regional (spatial) economy. The economic effects are described us­
ing a variety of data sets1. Data permitting, changes over time are also presented.
6.2.1 DEMAND FOR GOODS AND SERVICES
A  decrease in population and household numbers is expected to reduce the demand 
for private services, which may result in an oversupply of commercial real estate. 
Figure 6.1 supports this expectation. It shows that, between 2001 and 2009, in the 
case-study regions, vacancy rates in retail property were almost always above the 
national average. In 2009, in Parkstad Limburg, this was 10.4%, in Eemsdelta 8.4%, 
and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 6.3%, while the national average was 4.9%. The figure also 
shows that, between 2001 and 2009, vacancy rates in retail property in the case­
study regions increased, while in the Netherlands they remained constant.
FIGURE 6.1 VACANCY RATES IN RETAIL PROPERTY (SHOPS) BETWEEN 2001 AND 2009, IN 
PERCENTAGES, IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, EEMSDELTA, ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, AND IN THE 
NETHERLANDS. SO URCE: LOCATUS2 (2009).
12%
10%
0% _______________________________________________
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1 AS A RESULT, DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS ARE PRESENTED.
2 THE INFORMATION LOCATUS PROVIDES ON RETAIL IS BASED ON FIELDWORK. IT HAS BEEN
CRITICISED FOR NOT BEING ACCURATE OR FOR BEING MISLEADING. A VACANCY RATE, FOR
EXAMPLE, COULD BE TEMPORARILY HIGHER DUE TO PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
RESTRUCTURING PLANS FOR COMMERCIAL LOCATIONS OR INNER CITIES.
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 
EEMSDELTA 
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 
THE NETHERLANDS
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A  possible explanation for the increase in vacancy rates in the case-study regions is 
that a decline in population and/or household numbers caused a decrease in de­
mand. This would explain why the vacancy rate is lower in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen than 
in Eemsdelta and Parkstad Limburg, for in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, unlike the other two 
regions, to date, there is no decline in household numbers. However, as mentioned 
in Chapter 2, there are also other explanations for this, such as changing behaviour 
of consumers and suppliers.
Raspe et al. (2009) concluded that vacancy rates for shops and other real estate 
is not beneficial to business activity within the same neighbourhood. Vacancies in 
shops and in the hotel and catering industry may trigger businesses (especially those 
that are active in consumer services) to leave or may reduce their opportunities to 
survive or grow.
6.2.2 LABOUR SUPPLY
In Chapter 2 it is concluded that, whether a decrease in working age population leads 
to a reduction in the supply of labour depends on changes in the labour participation 
level. Between 1997 and 2008, the gross labour participation level3 in the case-study 
regions was lower than the national average (see Figure 6.2). In all case-study re­
gions, the participation rate increased in this period, but this could not compensate 
for the decrease in working age population. Between 1996 and 2007, the labour 
force decreased in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and Parkstad Limburg4 by 1.3 and 0.4%, re­
spectively; in the Eemsdelta5 it increased by 3.2%, and nationally it increased by 13.7% 
(CBS, 2010a) (see Figure 6.3). Renes et al. (2009) expects that the labour force (peo­
ple aged between 20 and 65) of the three provinces Limburg, Zeeland and Groningen 
will decrease, as well. For the period between 2008 and 2020, the labour
3 TWO PARTICIPATION LEVELS CAN BE DISTINGUISHED. THE NET PARTICIPATION LEVEL IS 
THE PERCENTAGE OF THE LABOUR FORCE (15-65 YEAR) (WHO HAVE PAID EMPLOYMENT 
FOR AT LEAST 12 HOURS A WEEK) (CBS, 2009A). THE GROSS PARTICIPATION LEVEL IS THE 
PERCENTAGE OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION THAT IS WILLING TO WORK FOR AT LEAST 
TWELVE HOURS A WEEK. THIS STUDY REFERS TO THE GROSS LABOUR PARTICIPATION LEVEL, 
BECAUSE THIS GIVES AN INDICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THE SUPPLY OF 
LABOUR.
4 PARKSTAD LIMBURG CONTAINS ONLY DATA ON BRUNSSUM, HEERLEN, KERKRADE, 
LANDGRAAF AND VOERENDAAL, AS DATA ON THE OTHER MUNICIPALITIES (ONDERBANKEN 
AND SIMPELVELD) ARE INCOMPLETE.
5 EEMSDELTA CONTAINS ONLY DATA ON DELFZIJL AND EEMSMOND, AS DATA ON LOPPERSUM 
AND APPINGEDAM ARE INCOMPLETE.
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force of the province of Limburg is expected to decline by 9.3%, that of the province 
of Zeeland by 3.4%, and for Groningen this is 3.2%.
FIGURE 6.2 GROSS PARTICIPATION LEVELS BETWEEN 1997 AND 2008, IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 
EEMSDELTA, ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, AND IN THE NETHERLANDS. SO URCE : STATISTICS 
NETHERLANDS (CBS - ENQUÊTE BEROEPSBEVOLKING6 (EBB), 2009).
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FIGURE 6.3 LABOUR FORCE7, BETWEEN 1996 AND 2007, IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, EEMSDELTA, 
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, AND IN THE NETHERLANDS, INDEX NUMBER, 1996 = 100. SO URCE: 
STATISTICS NETHERLANDS (CBS - STATLINE, 2010).
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6 THIS INFORMATION, PROVIDED BY EBB, IS BASED ON A SURVEY OF 90,000 PEOPLE.
7 THE DEFINITION OF LABOUR FORCE USED BY STATISTICS NETHERLANDS IS PEOPLE OF THE
AGES OF 15 TO 65 WHO ARE PROFESIONALLY EMPLOYED, PEOPLE WHO HAVE ACCEPTED 
EMPLOYMENT OR ARE WILLING TO WORK, ARE AVAILABLE TO WORK, AND THOSE THAT ARE 
ACTIVELY SEARCHING FOR WORK FOR AT LEAST 12 HOURS A WEEK.
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6.2.3 LABOUR MARKET
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
As can be seen from Figure 6.4, between 1997 and 2008, the unemployment rate8 in 
the three case-study regions was above the Dutch average. The trend, however, was 
the same as the national trend, even though the working age population in Parkstad 
Limburg and Eemsdelta had decreased since 1993 and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen since 
2003. Apparently, a decrease in working age population did not necessarily go hand 
in hand with a decrease in unemployment rate. The reason could be a mismatch be­
tween labour supply and demand: qualifications sought by employers may not match 
those of people seeking employment. Another reason could be that the demand for 
labour has decreased. However, the latter does not seem the case, because the total 
employment (total number of jobs) in the case-study regions (and in the Nether­
lands), between 1996 and 2008, grew (see Section 6.2.4). However, this growth in 
the three case-study regions was below the Dutch average9.
FIGURE 6.4 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN 1997 AND 2008, IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG, EEMSDELTA, 
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, AND IN THE NETHERLANDS. SOURCE: EBB (CBS, 2008).
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8 THE DEFINITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS THE PERCENTAGE OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
(15-65 YEAR) THAT ARE WILLING TO WORK MORE THAN 12 HOURS A WEEK BUT CURRENTLY 
ARE WITHOUT A JOB.
9 BETWEEN 1996 AND 2008, THE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE NETHERLANDS WAS 25.8%, IN
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 13.7%, IN EEMSDELTA 7.9%, AND IN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 2.1%.
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6.2.4 REGIONAL (SPATIAL) ECONOMY
GROSS REGIONAL DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Figure 6.5 shows that, between 1995 and 2007, in all CO R O P  regions including the 
case-study regions, the regional gross domestic product grew10. However, in the 
C O R O P  regions containing the case-study regions11 this growth was below the 
national average. This was especially the case in the C O R O P  region of Delfzijl and sur­
roundings with a growth of 40%, while the national average was 86.3%. In the same 
period (1995-2007), in South Limburg, the regional gross domestic product grew by 
74.3%, and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen by 60.7%.
FIGURE 6.5 DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1995-2007, PER 
COROP REGION. SO URCE: STATISTICS NETHERLANDS (CBS - STATLINE, 2009).
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10 THE REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IS THE TOTAL VALUE ADDED GENERATED BY 
RESIDENT PRODUCERS IN A REGION. IT INDICATES THE ABILITY OF RESIDENT PRODUCERS TO 
GENERATE VALUE ADDED (SCHUT AND VET, 2002, P.4).
11 THE COROP REGION OF DELFZIJL AND ITS SURROUNDINGS (CONTAINING APPINGEDAM, 
DELFZIJL AND LOPPERSUM) IS SMALLER THAN THE CASE-STUDY REGION OF EEMSDELTA 
(WHICH CONTAINS EEMSMOND AS WELL). THE COROP REGION OF ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN IS
SIMILAR TO THE CASE-STUDY REGION OF ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN. THE COROP REGION OF
SOUTH LIMBURG (BESIDES THE SEVEN PARKSTAD MUNICIPALITIES ALSO CONTAINING STEIN, 
BEEK, SITTARD, GELEEN, SCHIMMEN, MEERSSEN, MAASTRICHT, VALKENBURG AAN DE GEUL, 
NUTH, EIJSDEN, VAALS, MARGRATEN AND GULPEN-WITTEM) IS LARGER THAN THE CASE­
STUDY REGION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG (WHICH HOLDS BRUNSSUM, HEERLEN, KERKRADE, 
LANDGRAAF, ONDERBANKEN, SIMPELVELD AND VOERENDAAL).
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In 2007, the absolute regional gross domestic product, per inhabitant12, in two of the 
three C O R O P  regions, including the case-study regions, was above the national aver­
age (the national gross domestic product per inhabitant is 34,713 euros). In Delfzijl 
and surroundings, this was 35,008 euros, and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 39,788 euros 13 
(CBS, 2009a). This can be explained by the large chemical industries and port-related 
industries in both regions, for these contribute greatly to the regional gross domes­
tic product.
Between 1995 and 2007, in all C O R O P  regions, including the case-study regions, the 
regional gross domestic product per inhabitant increased. However, this increase 
was below the national average of 75.8% in Delfzijl and surroundings (50.3%) and in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen (60.0%) (CBS, 2009a). In South Limburg, the growth in regional 
gross domestic product per inhabitant was above the national average (84.4%). We 
can conclude that the growth in regional gross domestic product in Delfzijl and its 
surroundings and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen was less than the decrease in population.
DYNAMIC IN BUSINESSES 
NUMBER OF FIRMS
Between 2001 and 2007, in the case-study regions, the number of established firms 
grew14. This was in keeping with the national trend, although growth was lower (see 
Figure 6.6).
12 THE REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, PER CAPITA, WAS CALCULATED BY DIVIDING THE 
REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS (CBS, 
2010A).
13 IN 2007, SOUTH LIMBURG HAD A REGIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF 31,243 EUROS 
PER INHABITANT (CBS, 2009A).
14 THE DATA DO NOT CONTAIN INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF JOBS THAT ARE CREATED AS A
RESULT OF THOSE SETTLEMENTS.
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FIGURE 6.6 CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHED FIRMS (BEDRIJFSVESTIGINGEN)15, 
BETWEEN 2001 AND 2007, PER CASE-STUDY REGION AND NATIONALLY. SOURCE:
NETHERLANDS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TRADE REGISTER (KAMER VAN KOOPHANDEL (KVK) - 
HANDELSREGISTER, 2007).
2001 2007 %2001-2007
PARKSTAD LIMBURG 10,078 11,568 14.8%
EEMSDELTA 2,794 3,396 21.5%
ZEEUWS-
VLAANDEREN
5,936 6,598 11.2%
THE NETHERLANDS 895,277 1,090,314 21.8%
NEWLY ESTABLISHED FIRMS
Between 2001 and 2007, the number of newly established firms in the case-study 
regions, grew  (see Figure 6.7). Parkstad Limburg experienced a growth of 55.1% and 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen of 33.5%. This was in keeping with the national trend, although 
the growth was below the national average of 63.5%16. There could be two expla­
nations for this fact. One explanation is that in shrinking regions the market for 
consumer services becomes smaller, which can discourage people from starting a 
new firm. The other explanation could be related to the composition of the popula­
tion, as shrinking regions have a share of highly educated and high income groups 
that is smaller than the national average. Raspe et al. (2009) concluded that such 
circumstances can effect the establishment of certain types of new firms (especially 
in business services) 17. Finally, it is important to note that this growth in settlements 
does not automatically result in employment growth (growth in the number of jobs). 
Whether this will happen depends on the sizes of these firms.
15 THE NETHERLANDS CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE REGISTERS TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN THE 
TRADE REGISTER (HANDELSREGISTER). THIS DATA FILE RECORDS THE APPEARANCE AND 
DISAPPEARANCE OF FIRMS. IT DOES NOT CONTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT FIRMS IN THE PUBIC 
SECTOR. AGRICULTURE AND FISHERY ARE ONLY PARTLY INCLUDED AND THE MAJORITY OF 
THE FREE PROFESSIONS (DOCTOR, LAWYER, ARTIST, ETC.) ARE NOT INCLUDED. FIRMS WHICH 
ARE PURE BUSINESS HOLDINGS ARE ALSO EXCLUDED.
16 IN EEMSDELTA THE NUMBER OF NEWLY ESTABLISHED FIRMS INCREASED, BETWEEN 2001 AND
2007, BY 83.2% (KVK, 2007).
17 RASPE ET AL. (2009) CONCLUDE THAT, IN NEIGHBOURHOODS WHERE THE SHARE OF HIGHLY 
EDUCATED PEOPLE OR HIGH INCOME GROUPS IS LARGE, RELATIVELY MANY NEW FIRMS 
(ACTIVE IN BUSINESS SERVICES) ARE STARTED, AND IN NEIGHBOURHOODS WITH RELATIVELY
SMALL SHARES OF HIGHLY EDUCATED PEOPLE OR HIGH-INCOME GROUPS RELATIVELY FEW 
FIRMS (ACTIVE IN BUSINESS SERVICES) ARE STARTED (RASPE ET AL., 2009, P.79).
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FIGURE 6.7 CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF NEWLY ESTABLISHED FIRMS, BETWEEN 2001 AND 200718, 
PER CASE-STUDY REGION AND NATIONALLY, INDEX NUMBER, 2001 = 100. SO URCE: NETHERLANDS 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TRADE REGISTER (KVK - HANDELSREGISTER, 2009).
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FIGURE 6.8 CHANGE IN NUMBER OF FIRM CLOSURES BETWEEN 2001 AND 2007, PER CASE-STUDY 
REGION AND NATIONALLY, INDEX NUMBER, 2001 = 100. SOURCE: NETHERLANDS CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, TRADE REGISTER (KVK - HANDELSREGISTER, 2007).
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FIRM CLOSURES
Between 2001 and 2007, the number of firms closing down19 in the case-study regions 
(except for the Eemsdelta) increased (see Figure 6.8). Contrary to what might be
18 THE DATA INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF NEWLY ESTABLISHED FIRMS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. 
THE OPENING OF FIRMS WHICH ALREADY HAVE BEEN REGISTERED BY THE NETHERLANDS 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARE EXCLUDED.
19 THE NUMBER OF FIRM CLOSURES IN ONE YEAR, INCLUDING FORCED CLOSURES.
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expected (see Chapter 2), the increase in Parkstad Limburg (17.7%) was lower than 
nationally (18.7%), and in Eemsdelta there even was a decrease of 2%. In Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen, however, the increase was larger (21.2%). Again, this does not say 
anything about the sizes of those firms and the employment development in those 
regions.
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY
Figure 6.9 shows that the economic structure, in 2008, in terms of jobs, in the case­
study regions was different from the national average. In the Netherlands, consumer 
services (22.4%) and business services (18.7%) were the largest sectors. In Parkstad 
Limburg and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, consumer services were the largest sector, with 
24.0% and 27.5%, respectively. However, in Parkstad Limburg, the second-largest sec­
tor was that of health care and public services (19.7%), and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen this 
was the industrial sector (20.4%). In the Eemsdelta, the largest sector was the 
industrial sector (24.0%), and the second-largest sector was that of consumer 
services (20.7%). In all case-study regions, the share of the industrial sector was 
larger20 than the national average (12.5%).
FIGURE 6.9 SHARE OF JOBS IN THE CASE-STUDY REGIONS AND NATIONALLY, IN 2008, PER 
SECTOR. SO URCE: LISA (2008).
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20 IN THE EEMSDELTA THIS IS 24.0%, IN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 20.4%, AND IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG 16.3%.
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Figure 6.10 indicates that, between 1996 and 2008, in the case-study regions as well 
as in the Netherlands, employment grew in almost all sectors except in industry. 
However, the decrease in this sector was larger in the case-study regions than in the 
Netherlands as a whole. In addition, in some case-study regions, the number of jobs 
in other sectors decreased, as well. Examples are decreases in the number of jobs in 
government and education in the Eemsdelta, and the decrease in the number of jobs 
in the construction sector in the Eemsdelta and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen21. The decline in 
household numbers in Eemsdelta, and the decrease in the demand for housing could 
be a reason for these decreases in employment (see Chapter 5). However, this does 
not explain the downward trend in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, where the number of house­
holds has not yet decreased. Neither can it explain the upward trend in Parkstad 
Limburg after 2005, where household numbers continued to decline.
Although, in the case-study regions, the number of jobs in most sectors grew, this 
growth was below the national average. Figure 6.10 shows that between 1996 and 
2008, in the Netherlands as a whole, employment in business services, health care, 
public welfare, and consumer services grew. In the case-study regions they did too, 
albeit more slowly. The decline in population and number of households in the case­
study regions could be the reason for this difference in employment growth in busi­
ness services and consumer services between the Netherlands as a whole and the 
case-study regions. However, other reasons, such as changing behaviour of consum­
ers and suppliers could also have influenced this. Only in logistics, the growth in the 
number of jobs in Parkstad Limburg was larger than the national average.
DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS AND OFFICE LOCATIONS
Some researchers argue that demographic decline may negatively affect the demand 
for business and office locations (see Chapter 2). Vacancy rates may be an indication 
of this. However, there are no reliable countrywide data on the vacancy rate for busi­
ness and office locations 22.
21 BETWEEN 1996 AND 2008, THE EMPLOYMENT IN CONSTRUCTION DECREASED IN ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN BY 6.8% AND IN EEMSDELTA BY 4.5%, WHILE NATIONALLY EMPLOYMENT 
INCREASED BY 20%.
22 INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ABOUT THE VACANCY RATE OF RENTAL PROPERTIES ONLY.
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FIGURE 6.10 CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF JOBS IN THE CASE-STUDY REGIONS AND IN THE 
NETHERLANDS, BETWEEN 1996 AND 2008, PER SECTOR, INDEX NUMBER, 1996=100. SO URCE : LISA 
(2008).
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6.3 ECONOMIC POLICIES
This section describes the content of the economic policy in each case-study re­
gion, separately, and how  it has changed in response to demographic decline. The 
description starts from the moment the region was first confronted with a decline 
in working age population and/or number of households. In all three regions the 
decline in working age population came first. This means that the description for 
Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta starts in 1993, and for Zeeuws-Vlaanderen in 2003. 
Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta also suffer a decline in household numbers, but 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen not yet. More information about the demographic situation in 
the case-study regions is presented in Chapter 4.
The distinction is made between no policy change, conservative policy change, and 
radical policy change, and between changes in strategic plans, operational plans and 
actions (see Chapter 3). Policies and/or actions were analysed when they concerned 
the regional economy, the labour market, retail, and business and office locations. 
Policy in other fields, such as transport, education, housing, culture, may also influ­
ence the economy and demography, but are not discussed here.
It is not always easy to relate changes in economic policy to demographic decline. 
The most direct relation can be found between demographic developments and 
policy aimed at the retail and labour markets. However, other relations too might be 
important. For example, because of its economic policy, a region may attract busi­
nesses and employment, and in this way increase inward migration and/or reduce 
out-migration of people. This was investigated by De Graaff et al. (2008), who con­
cluded that in some economic sectors and some regions jobs not only follow people 
but people also follow jobs. For this reason, policies in relation to business locations,
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marketing and acquisition, and economic clustering (profiling) are relevant too and 
will be described here.
6.3.1 ECONOMIC POLICY IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG FROM 1993 TO 2009
1993-2006: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN POLICY 
CHANGES
During the 1990s and early 2000s, municipalities in their strategic and operational 
policies on economy, retail, and business and office locations, did not pay attention 
to demographic changes23. They did in their labour market policy, but this focused 
mainly on changes in demographic composition (e.g. education and age), rather 
than on changes in absolute numbers. At the regional level, no attention was paid to 
demographic decline either. The regional retail vision (2002) ignored both the demo­
graphic forecast by Etil (that said the decline would continue) and the warnings by 
the consultancy firm BRO24 (that said that, given the current demographic situation, 
the maximum retail capacity had been reached)25. The situation was similar for the 
province. Its labour market policy was adapted to changes in demographic composi­
tion (e.g. education and age), and it tried to improve the quality of labour supply, 
and to strengthen the economic opportunities related to ageing (e.g. increase in the 
demand for health care products and services) (Provincie Limburg, 2004). The prov­
ince wanted to expand the number of business, industrial and commercial locations. 
In its spatial policy, the province did mention the decline in population and working
23 THE MUNICIPALITIES CHANGED THEIR POLICY AND REDUCED THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL 
SHOPS (E.G. GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 2003). HOWEVER, DEMOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS DID 
NOT PLAY A ROLE IN THIS POLICY CHANGE. IN ITS OFFICE POLICY, THE MUNICIPALITY OF 
HEERLEN ALSO DID NOT MENTION DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (GEMEENTE HEERLEN, DATE 
UNKNOWN). IN THE DEVELOPMENT VISION HEERLEN 2010 (ONTWIKKELINGSVISIE HEERLEN  
2010), DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IS MENTIONED. HOWEVER, ONLY THE HOUSING SECTION 
REFERRED TO BOTH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND THE ECONOMY (SEE CHAPTER 5); THE 
ECONOMIC SECTION DID NOT (GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 1997). THE VISION DOCUMENT ARGUED 
(GEMEENTE HEERLEN, 1997, P.39) THAT, NEXT TO AN ATTRACTIVE SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT, IT 
WAS IMPORTANT TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY AND INCREASE EMPLOYMENT, IN ORDER TO 
COUNTER THE POPULATION DECLINE PROJECTED BY DERKS (1996A).
24 THE BRO  WAS COMMISSIONED BY PARKSTAD LIMBURG TO INVESTIGATE ITS RETAIL SECTOR.
25 BY THAT TIME, NO REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY HAD BEEN FORMULATED.
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age population (Provincie Limburg, 2001), but it did not adapt the content of its pro­
vincial environmental plan (provinciaal om gev in gsp lan )  accordingly26.
Summarising, up to 2006, neither municipalities, region, nor province changed their 
strategic or operational economic policies in response to demographic decline.
2007-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID RESULT IN LOCAL 
ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES
From 2007 onwards, a few policy changes were made, mostly regarding the labour 
market. The regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg acknowledged demographic 
decline and its relation to the labour market (e.g. Parkstad Limburg, 2009b). And the 
province emphasised this relationship in discussion papers (e.g. Provincie 
Limburg, 2007a; Provincie Limburg, 2008a) and in its labour market policies 
(Provincie Limburg, 2008b; Provincie Limburg, 2008e). The province concluded that 
the decline in working age population caused problems in certain sectors, such as 
health care (Provincie Limburg, 2008b, p.17)27, and that, with a declining labour force, 
it would be difficult for businesses to find enough qualified personnel (Provincie 
Limburg, 2008b, p.33). However, it did not work out the consequences, nor change 
its policies radically (but only conservatively28). In its other economic policies, the 
province did not refer to demographic decline29.
26 THE PROVINCE EXPECTED THAT, FROM 2004 ONWARDS, THE POPULATION WOULD DECREASE, 
AND THAT AROUND 2010 THE GROWTH IN LABOUR FORCE WOULD STABILISE (PROVINCIE 
LIMBURG, 2001, P.26-27).
27 THE PROVINCE PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY OF LABOUR IN DIFFERENT SECTORS, BETWEEN 2000 AND 2020 (SEE PROVINCIE 
LIMBURG 2006A), AND CONCLUDED THAT A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MISMATCH MAY 
OCCUR. IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR, FOR EXAMPLE, IT EXPECTED A SHORTAGE OF 17,000 
PEOPLE BETWEEN 2008 AND 2018 (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2008B, P.18).
28 THESE POLICIES FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ATTRACTING NEW EMPLOYEES TO THE REGION.
29 THESE POLICIES PRIMARILY FOCUS ON AGEING RATHER THAN ON DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE 
(E.G. PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2004). AN EXCEPTION WAS THE ‘AGENDA FOR ACCELERATION’ 
(VERSNELLINGSAGENDA 2008-2011), WHICH BRIEFLY PAID ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE. IT MENTIONED THAT AGEING AND POPULATION DECLINE MAY CAUSE QUANTITATIVE
AND QUALITATIVE SHORTAGES IN KNOWLEDGE WORKERS. THE PROVINCE ARGUED THAT, IN 
ORDER TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO RETAIN PEOPLE
WHO GRADUATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MAASTRICHT AND TO ATTRACT KNOWLEDGE 
WORKERS FROM OTHER DUTCH OR FOREIGN REGIONS. IN ORDER TO REALISE THIS AGENDA, 
THE PROVINCE PROPOSED PROMOTING THE REGION (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2008E, P.43-44).
225
Two labour market initiatives can be mentioned that are related to demographic 
decline. First, the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg stimulated the set­
ting up of a Care Academy30. Health care institutes (A trium  M C  and M ond riaan )  and 
knowledge institutes (Regional educational centre Arcus college, Zuyd University 
(H oge schoo l Zuid), O pen  Universiteit Nederland31), together, developed this initiative 
(Zorgacademie Parkstad Limburg, 2009). This Care Academy was intended to solve 
the labour shortages in the health care sector, caused partly by the demographic 
decline (decrease in numbers of young people and in working age population) (Zor­
gacademie Parkstad Limburg, 2009)32.
In a second initiative, the province, together with 19 municipalities and some private 
partners (among which Rabobank, DSM  Nederland BV, APG, Hogeschool Zuyd,
ING Limburg, and housing associations), decided to set up the ‘Maastricht region 
branding foundation’ in order to promote the region of South Limburg. Also, they 
launched a special website (www.zuidlimburg.nl) that provides an overview of the 
available jobs (and houses) in the region. These initiatives are intended to attract 
people from outside the region from other parts of the Netherlands and from 
abroad, such as from the German region of Aken. They especially tried to attract 
highly educated people, because they would spend more money, contributing to the 
economic vitality of the region. The Netherlands Chamber of Commerce, together 
with an organisation that represents the interest of various businesses in Limburg
30 IN THE NOTE KADERNOTA ECONOMIE REGIO PARKSTAD LIMBURG 2007-2010, PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG ALREADY BRIEFLY PAID ATTENTION TO THE RELATION BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AND THE LABOUR MARKET (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2007A, P.9-10). IN ORDER TO 
IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION, WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE 
AN IMPORTANT CONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PARKSTAD LIMBURG TRIED TO 
STIMULATE THE COOPERATION BETWEEN BUSINESS AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES (TO 
JOINTLY DEVELOP EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES). IN THIS WAY, THE LABOUR SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND COULD BETTER BE MATCHED. ANOTHER ADVANTAGE OF THIS COOPERATION WOULD 
BE ITS EFFECT OF KEEPING BUSINESSES WITHIN THE REGION OR ATTRACTING THEM THERE.
31 OPEN UNIVERSITEIT NEDERLAND  IS AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT-FUNDED INSTITUTE FOR 
DISTANCE LEARNING AT UNIVERSITY LEVEL (OPEN UNIVERSITEIT NEDERLAND, 2009).
32 ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES (UNIVERSITY 
OF MAASTRICHT) AND BUSINESSES (DSM) WAS THE CHEMATERIALS CAMPUS THAT WAS 
LAUNCHED IN 2008 IN SITTARD-GELEEN (CHEMICAL INNOVATION COMMUNITY, 2009). BECAUSE 
THIS CAMPUS IS LOCATED IN SITTARD-GELEEN, WHICH IS CLOSE TO BUT NOT PART OF
THE CASE-STUDY REGION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG, IT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY 
BESIDES, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IS A REASON FOR THIS POLICY 
IN ADDITION, THE PROVINCE COOPERATES WITH DSM  AND THE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT IN 
MAASTRICHT, IN ORDER TO ATTRACT KNOWLEDGE WORKERS FROM CHINA.
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(O n d e rn em en d  L im burg33), also emphasised that, due to the decline in population, 
it is important to attract sufficient well-educated people, to create an attractive 
place for businesses to settle (Ondernemend Limburg and Kamer van Koophandel,
2008, p.8-9). There are other initiatives, too (e.g. expanding the international school 
in Maastricht), which focus on making the region more attractive for people from 
abroad.
The regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg recently decided to update its 
regional retail vision from 2002, which is a strategic plan. The old vision had not taken 
demographic decline into account, but now  the regional organisation argued 
(Parkstad Limburg, 2009b, p.7) that the amount of retail space needed to be adapted 
to the downward demographic developments. This update was realised in Septem­
ber 2010. As, for this study, only documents up to April 2010 were analysed (see 
Chapter 4), this update was not incorporated in this analysis.
2007-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN CHANGES 
IN OTHER ECONOMIC POLICIES
Between 2007 and 2009, the municipalities, the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg, and the province of Limburg changed their policies on business locations 
and regional economy, too. However, because demographic decline is originally not 
mentioned as a reason for these policy changes, in this study they are not considered 
as policy changes but as policy stability (see Chapter 3).
First, in 2006, both the province and the regional organisation decided to change 
from expanding to restructuring business locations. The province intends, up to 
2020, to revitalise about 1,000 hectare of business locations (Provincie Limburg, 
2006d; Provincie Limburg, 2008c). In 2004, the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg set up a special project34, later (in 2006) turned into a foundation for
33 COOPERATION BETWEEN EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION OF LIMBURG (LIMBURGSE WERKGE­
VERSVERENIGING ABBREVIATION LWV), SME (SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES) 
(MIDDEN- EN KLEINBEDRIJF (MKB)), AND THE LIMBURG FARMERS AND HORTICULTURISTS 
UNION (LIMBURGSE LAND- EN TUINBOUWBOND (LLTB)).
34 IN 2005, THIS BTM PROJECT FORMULATED AN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME FOR REVITALIS­
ING BUSINESS LOCATIONS. IT CONCLUDED THAT THE QUALITY OF BUSINESS LOCATIONS
IS IMPORTANT FOR ATTRACTING AND RETAINING BUSINESSES, AND FOR MAINTAINING AND 
ATTRACTING JOBS (BTM 2005, P.8). THE BTM PROJECT CONCLUDED THAT, IN PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG, 17 BUSINESS LOCATIONS NEEDED TO BE RESTRUCTURED, COSTING ABOUT 56 
MILLION EUROS. ABOUT 30 OF THE 56 MILLION WAS THOUGHT TO BE RAISED FROM THE SALE
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business park management (Bedrijventerre inenm anagem ent (BTM )), which can be 
seen as a public-private partnership, in order to speed up this restructuring35 (BTM, 
2009). In the regional programme for employment locations (business locations and 
service locations36) (Programma werklocaties Limburg 2020) (Provincie Limburg, 
2008c)37 and in the inter-municipal structure vision (Parkstad Limburg, 2009b), (both 
strategic plans), the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg repeated that restruc­
turing business locations is its priority (Provincie Limburg, 2008c; Parkstad Limburg, 
2009b). So far, this restructuring has been done for four business locations in 
Parkstad Limburg (BTM, 2009).
Second, the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg reconciled itself to the fact 
that the demand for new business locations would be limited, and that, until 2020, 
only a small amount of land (98 net hectare) would be needed for new business 
and service locations (Royal Haskoning, 2008). This agreement between the munici­
palities was written down in the provincial programme for employment locations 
(Provincie Limburg, 2008c, p.107).
Third, the regional organisation put more effort into promoting its region (improving 
its reputation) so as to attract new businesses (and employment) (Parkstad Limburg, 
2007a, p.23). This was organised by the already existing Limburg development and 
investment company (LIOF).
Fourth, the regional organisation decided to focus on three specific economic sec­
tors - renewable energy; health care; and recreation and tourism, and to try to
OF LAND, LEAVING ANOTHER 26 MILLION EUROS TO BE FOUND. ALL MUNICIPALITIES (EXCEPT 
ONDERBANKEN WHICH HAS NO BUSINESS LOCATIONS) TOGETHER WOULD PROVIDE 13 
MILLION EUROS. THEY HOPED TO RECEIVE THE OTHER 13 MILLION EUROS FROM NATIONAL 
AND EUROPEAN GRANTS.
35 THIS FOUNDATION INTENDS TO SUPPORT MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE RESTRUCTURING 
OF THEIR BUSINESS LOCATIONS. IT ASSISTS THEM WITH FORMULATING RESTRUCTURING 
PROGRAMMES AND MANAGEMENT PLANS (BEHEERSPLANNEN). IN ADDITION, IT OFFERS 
SERVICES (E.G. SECURITY, ENERGY) TO BUSINESSES (BTM, 2009).
36 THIS INCLUDES LOCATIONS FOR OFFICES, RETAIL, LEISURE, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH CARE.
37 THE PROVINCE STIMULATED ALL REGIONS IN LIMBURG TO FORMULATE A PROGRAMME FOR
EMPLOYMENT LOCATIONS. BESIDES, IT SET UP A REGIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM (REBIS) TO
GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUPPLY AND QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT LOCATIONS
(BUSINESS AND SERVICE LOCATIONS).
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cluster them spatially (Parkstad Limburg, 2007a; Parkstad Limburg, 2009b)38. The 
municipality of Heerlen, together with the German town of Aken, set up a cross­
border business location (called Avantis).
As mentioned before, originally, these changes in provincial and regional policy on 
business locations and on the regional economy were not explicitly related to demo­
graphic decline. The strengthening of the economic structure39 and efficient land use 
(SER scale)40 were the reasons given. From 2007 onwards, the regional organisation 
has added demographic decline to the arguments in favour of those policy changes; 
changes are necessary to retain firms (jobs) and attract people. This is based on 
the assumption that people follow jobs. The regional organisation, for example, 
argued that restructuring of outdated business locations is important for attract­
ing and retaining firms, jobs and people. In addition, demographic decline is seen 
as something that makes it more difficult to restructure business locations. For, in 
those circumstances, business locations cannot easily be transformed into residential 
areas, because there is not much demand for new housing41. Moreover, in shrinking
38 HEALTH CARE IS THE ONLY CLUSTER WHICH HAS A CONNECTION WITH DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHANGES (AGEING) IN THE REGION (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2007A, P.31). HOWEVER, THIS HAS 
NOTHING TO DO WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. AN ADVANTAGE OF THE TOURIST SECTOR IS 
THAT THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS WOULD SUIT THE EXISTING WORKING AGE POPULA­
TION IN PARKSTAD LIMBURG.
39 SUFFICIENT AND HIGH QUALITY BUSINESS LOCATIONS, A GOOD IMAGE AND A WELL- 
EDUCATED WORKING AGE POPULATION ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE MAIN CONDITIONS FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2007A).
40 IN 1999, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF THE NETHERLANDS (ABBREVIATION SER) 
FORMULATED THE SER  SCALE, WHICH IS AN APPROACH ABOUT HOW TO USE LAND FOR 
HOUSING, BUSINESS LOCATIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE. IT SAYS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO 
FIRST USE THE LAND WHICH IS AVAILABLE AND DESIGNATED FOR THESE FUNCTIONS BEFORE 
USING NEW LAND FOR THESE FUNCTIONS. BESIDES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO PAY ATTENTION TO 
MULTI FUNCTIONAL USE (SER, 2008).
41 IN THE NOTE ABOUT THE ECONOMY IN THE REGION PARKSTAD (KADERNOTA ECONOMIE 
REGIO PARKSTAD LIMBURG 2007-2010), THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION EMPHASISES THAT 
ECONOMIC CHANGES (THE SHIFT TO A SERVICE ECONOMY) WOULD REQUIRE DIFFER­
ENT BUSINESS LOCATIONS. IT WONDERED HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS, WITH, ON THE ONE 
HAND, A DECREASING POPULATION AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY AVAILABLE BUSINESS 
LOCATIONS. IT ARGUED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REVITALISE BUSINESS LOCATIONS 
RATHER THAN TRANSFORM THEM, BECAUSE THE DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE MADE IT IMPOS­
SIBLE TO TRANSFORM THESE LOCATION INTO HOUSING AREAS (PARKSTAD LIMBURG, 2007A, 
P.21). IN THIS NOTE THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG BRIEFLY REFERS 
TO THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHY, BUT DOES NOT EXPLAIN IT IN 
DETAIL. DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AS AN ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY, AS
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regions, there is less pressure to restructure business locations, as land is less scarce 
and there is lower demand for it, than in the grow ing regions (Parkstad Limburg, 
2007a, p.21; Parkstad Limburg, 2009c). Finally, the lack of money also complicates 
the restructuring of business locations in shrinking regions (Bekkum, 2009).
This section shows that most changes that have been formulated are conservative 
strategic policy changes regarding labour market. Rather than accepting the decline, 
municipalities focus these policies on attracting new employees from other regions. 
Also, several actions have been initiated in this field (e.g. the set up of the Care 
Academy). An exception is the intention of the regional organisation of Parkstad Lim­
burg to formulate a new regional retail vision that takes demographic decline into 
account. The intention is to make an inventory of the existing plans for new retail 
locations in the municipalities and then to reduce those plans. This could be consid­
ered a radical strategic policy change. However, because the regional retail vision is 
expected to be ready by the autumn of 2010, it is unclear whether they will able to 
realise this radical change in strategic policy. So far, demographic decline, has not 
resulted in a change in local, operational policies.
6.3.2 ECONOMIC POLICY IN EEMSDELTA FROM 
1993 TO 2009
1993-2000: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN POLICY 
CHANGES
During the 1990s, neither the municipalities nor the province paid attention to de­
mographic decline in their strategic and operational policies on the economy, labour, 
retail, or business locations.
2001-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND LOCAL POLICY CHANGES
From the beginning of 2000, the municipality of Delfzijl and the province started 
to pay attention to demographic decline in their housing plans (see Chapter 5), but 
not in their economic policies. It is precisely this lack which was criticised by actors 
involved in the economy (the interest group for small to medium-sized enterprises, 
and the Rabobank). The Masterplan Delfzijl (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2001), which is a
A RESULT OF WHICH SOME POLICY SOLUTIONS (E.G. TRANSFORMING BUSINESS LOCATIONS 
INTO RESIDENTIAL AREAS) ARE NOT POSSIBLE.
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strategic plan, for example, included no proposals to stimulate employment, and 
those economic actors argued that employment is an important factor for people 
when they decide where to live (Van der Velden and Aalders, 2002, p.13).
The local retail plan (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2002b) is the only part of economic policy 
in which Delfzijl paid attention to demographic decline, and retail is also the only 
economic field that is discussed in the Masterplan Delfzijl. The municipality focused 
on retaining the existing shopping facilities, instead of expanding on them; there 
needed to be more space in the centre of Delfzijl, and less space in north Delfzijl (Van 
der Velden and Aalders, 2002; Gemeente Delfzijl, 2006a). There were two possibilities 
for the location in the northern part of Delfzijl: demolish all shops, or just some of 
them. The municipality chose the second option, but even that can be considered a 
radical local policy change (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2006a, p.21-23).
At the local level, there were actions, as well. The above mentioned plan for north 
Delfzijl (Ku ilsburg) - to demolish the old centre and replace it with a new, smaller 
shopping centre - has been implemented, as part of the restructuring plan for north 
Delfzijl, which was formulated and implemented by the development company 
of Delfzijl (O M D ) to deal with the problems in this region caused by the decline in 
household numbers (see Chapter 5).
Recently, the attention for demographic decline has increased, at the regional level 
also. But still, only the policy field of retail makes specific reference to it. In 2009, the 
municipalities of Appingedam, Delfzijl, Eemsmond and Loppersum and the province 
agreed, in the pact region Eemsdelta, that spatial concentration of services (includ­
ing retail42) in urban areas (stedelijk gebied), central villages (centrum dorpen ) and cer­
tain residential villages (w o o n d o rp e n )  was necessary in order to secure the economic 
support for these services (Gemeente Appingedam et al., 2009, p.3). Previously, the 
municipalities of Appingedam and Delfzijl noticed in the development perspective 
(Van Vliet and Dijkstra, 2009)43 that, as a result of population decline, the support for
42 THEY DECIDED TO SPATIALLY CONCENTRATE SERVICES, IN GENERAL. TWO CATEGORISA­
TIONS WERE USED. THE SERVICES WERE DIVIDED INTO COMMERCIAL SERVICES (FOOD 
AND NON-FOOD), NON-COMMERCIAL (E.G. EDUCATION, SPORT, CULTURE) AND HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES (OUDE VELTHUIS ET AL., 2009). THE SERVICES WERE ALSO DIVIDED INTO CULTURAL 
SERVICES, SHOPS, CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, RELIGIOUS SERVICES, HEALTH CARE, CLUBS 
(E.G. SPORT), AND MEETING POINTS (COMPANEN, 2009B).
43 THE MUNICIPALITIES OF APPINGEDAM AND DELFZIJL AGREED TO FORMULATE A JOINT
STRUCTURE VISION. THE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (VAN VLIET AND DIJKSTRA, 2009) IS A
PRELIMINARY STUDY, COMMISSIONED BY BOTH MUNICIPALITIES.
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services was diminishing44. They expected that, over the next ten years, this would 
result in an oversupply of 20,000 square metres of retail floor space45 and in an 
increase in vacancy rates for shops, which would damage the quality of the inner city 
(Van Vliet and Dijkstra, 2009). Appingedam and Delfzijl agreed that a restructuring, 
reduction and spatial concentration46 of shopping areas were needed. However, they 
said that they had limited possibilities for intervening in this field, so they agreed to 
investigate how  the shopping areas could be restructured (Van Vliet and Dijkstra,
2009, p.69).
These agreements in the development perspective and the pact region Eemsdelta, 
which is a strategic plan, can be considered a radical policy change, because, previ­
ously, each municipality wanted to retain or expand the shopping area in every vil­
lage or neighbourhood. Now, the municipalities decided to adapt the supply of retail 
space to the actual demand, which, partly due to demographic decline, had become 
smaller.
2001-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN CHANGES 
IN OTHER ECONOMIC POLICIES
In its local economic plans (e.g. Gemeente Delfzijl, 1999) the municipality of Delfzijl 
paid no attention to demographic decline (Van der Velden and Aalders, 2002), nor 
was this the subject of the regional economic policy. For example in the regional 
action programme (Stuurgroep Eemsdelta, 2005) formulated by the municipalities of 
Appingedam, Delfzijl and Eemsmond, who decided, in 2003, to cooperate in the field 
of economy, no mention was made of demographic decline (Provincie Groningen et 
al., 2003). In the regional agreement of June 2008 (Stuurgroep Eemsdelta, 2008),
44 THE MUNICIPALITIES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, NEXT TO DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS, OTHER 
DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS CHANGING BEHAVIOUR OF CONSUMERS AND SCALING UP OF 
BUSINESSES, ALSO MAY NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE SUPPORT FOR SERVICES.
45 THE TOTAL AVAILABLE SHOPPING AREA IN BOTH CITIES IS 70,000 SQUARE METRES, WHEREAS 
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT, OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS, ONLY ABOUT 50,000 SQUARE METRES 
WILL BE NEEDED (VAN VLIET AND DIJKSTRA, 2009, P. 43).
46 THIS MEANS THAT MUNICIPALITIES NEED TO SPATIALLY CONCENTRATE THEIR SHOPPING
AREAS, AND THAT OTHER SHOPPING AREAS THAT ARE NOT INDICATED AS A CENTRAL
SHOPPING AREA, WILL LOSE THEIR SHOPPING FUNCTION: THEY SHOULD CHANGE TO OTHER
USES SUCH AS GALLERIES, SMALL BUSINESSES OR TOURIST ACCOMMODATION (VLIET AND 
DIJKSTRA, 2009, P.43).
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both declines in population and the economy were mentioned47, albeit unrelated to 
each other.
Since 2003, the municipalities of Appingedam, Delfzijl and Eemsmond have been co­
operating in the field of acquisition, business locations, and economic development 
(Provincie Groningen et al., 2003). They have formulated four economic focal points: 
port, energy (infrastructure, and an ‘energy valley’), labour market and education, 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (Stuurgroep Eemsdelta, 2005, p.4)48. Later, 
‘tourism and recreation’ was added by Appingedam and Delfzijl (Van Vliet and 
Dijkstra, 2009, p.60). Groningen Seaports49 had already been set up in 2000 in order 
to attract port-related industries (Groningen Seaports, 2009).
In 2003, Appingedam, Delfzijl and Eemsmond formulated a joint vision on business 
locations (Oranjewoud, 2003), in which they agreed to cluster energy industries in 
Eemsmond, metal industries in Delfzijl, and small and medium-sized businesses in 
Appingedam. Between 2003 and 2006, Appingedam, Delfzijl and Groningen Seaports 
jointly developed a new business location (called Fivelpoort) for small and medium­
sized businesses. Because the demand for business locations was limited, the munici­
palities of Appingedam and Delfzijl decided to cooperate instead of competing with 
each other to attract and accommodate businesses50. In both municipalities there is a 
sufficient number of business locations (Van Vliet and Dijkstra, 2009; Provincie Gron­
ingen 2008b). In addition, these municipalities have been trying to get local compa­
nies to work together. An example is the chemical industry business park A kzo  Nobel,
47 IN 2003, THREE MUNICIPALITIES, EEMSMOND, APPINGEDAM AND DELFZIJL, DECIDED TO 
COOPERATE IN AN ECONOMIC SENSE AND FORMULATE A JOINT ECONOMIC POLICY. IN 
2008, THIS REGIONAL COOPERATION WAS REAFFIRMED, AT WHICH TIME ALSO LOPPERSUM 
DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE.
48 WHEN, IN 2008, THE REGIONAL COOPERATION WAS REAFFIRMED, THE ECONOMIC FOCAL 
POINTS STAYED THE SAME.
49 GRONINGEN SEAPORTS IS THE PORT AUTHORITY FOR THE PORTS OF EEMSHAVEN AND 
DELFZIJL AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MARKETING AND ACQUISITION WITH RESPECT TO 
THE EEMSDELTA (GRONINGEN SEAPORTS, 2009).
50 THIS CHANGE FROM COMPETITION TO COOPERATION BETWEEN MUNICIPALITIES WAS STIMU­
LATED BY THE PROVINCE, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY (THE COOPERATING BUSINESSES 
EEMSDELTA (SBE), THE BUSINESS CLUB DELFZIJL, THE ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION 
APPINGEDAM (OKA)), AND VARIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES THAT SUPPORTED THIS COOPERA­
TION. EACH ACTOR PAID 333,333 EUROS TO DEVELOP THIS BUSINESS LOCATION. BECAUSE
IT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED ON APPINGEDAM TERRITORY, APPINGEDAM RECEIVES THE TAXES 
THAT BUSINESSES NEED TO PAY. DELFZIJL DOES NOT HAVE TO PAY FOR THE MAINTENANCE 
OF THE LOCATION, BECAUSE IT RECEIVES NO INCOME FROM IT.
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in Delfzijl. Here, there are 11 companies with possible links to each other; by-products 
(remnants, such as chlorine, hydrogen, salt, hydrochloric acid, methanol) from one 
plant could be used by another (Chemiepark Delfzijl, 2009).
The above mentioned changes in economic policy (in relation to business locations, 
acquisition and marketing) do not mention demographic decline, and, therefore, in 
this study they are not considered a policy change, but a policy stability (see Chapter 
3). Although demographic decline is not a reason for the policy changes, they may 
influence demographic developments. The policy changes have been made to retain 
and attract businesses and create jobs. For example, an added advantage of the sup­
ply links between businesses on the A kzo  Nobel business location is that it discourag­
es companies from relocating. Also, one of the primary arguments for province and 
region to develop tourism is that it creates jobs. From the perspective that people 
follow jobs, these policies for retaining and attracting businesses and creating jobs 
can keep people in the region or attract them. However, the latter is not explicitly 
mentioned in the policies, and therefore it is considered policy stability.
Labour market policies are not related to demographic decline either, but rather to 
changes in demographic composition (e.g. age and education). The municipalities 
agreed that, in order to strengthen the regional economy, it would be important to 
have a large enough and properly qualified working age population. They 
acknowledged the existing mismatch between the demand and supply of labour, 
and that this is expected to increase because of new developments planned for 
the port areas of Eemsmond and Delfzijl (e.g. power stations). To resolve this issue 
(which according to the cooperating businesses of Eemsdelta (SBE) is only a qualita­
tive mismatch51), the municipalities formulated four types of action; to invest in the 
quality of the working age population, develop talent, increase labour participation, 
and stimulate entrepreneurship (Stuurgroep Eemsdelta, 2008, p.12)52. To date, vari­
ous private initiatives have been taken. In September 2009, G ron ingen  Seaports, ISD
51 ACCORDING TO THE COOPERATING BUSINESSES EEMSDELTA (SBE) (SBE, 2009B), WHO 
INVESTIGATED THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR IN THE EEMSDELTA BETWEEN 2009 AND 2020 AND 
COMPARED IT WITH THE SUPPLY OF LABOUR.
52 THOSE ACTIONS ARE SIMILAR TO THE ACTIONS FORMULATED BY THE PROVINCE (PROVINCIE
GRONINGEN, 2008B). IN THE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE FORMULATED BY THE MUNICIPALI­
TIES OF APPINGEDAM AND DELFZIJL, THE EXISTENCE OF THIS PROBLEM WAS CONFIRMED. 
BOTH MUNICIPALITIES NOTICED THAT, FOR NEW BUSINESSES IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO 
FIND ENOUGH PROPERLY EDUCATED EMPLOYEES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE FOR 
TECHNICAL AND HEALTH CARE POSITIONS (VAN VLIET AND DIJKSTRA, 2009, P.19). THIS 
PROBLEM WAS ALSO CONFIRMED IN THE LOCAL POLICY PLAN OF DELFZIJL. THE MUNICIPAL­
ITY ARGUED THAT, AS MANY PEOPLE ARE EXPECTED TO RETIRE DURING THE NEXT YEARS,
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Noord-O ost/W erkplein  Eem sdelta, Hanze University Groningen, Noordelijke  
Regieraad  Bouw , and the province, together set up the Seaports Xperience Center 
(SEC, 2009), which is an intermediary between businesses and educational institutes. 
It helps businesses to find employees, it stimulates educational institutes to develop 
educational programmes that match the demand for labour, it improves the image 
of technical professions, and it motivates pupils to choose a technical education 
(Koenis and Kwant, 2009; Seaports Xperience Center, 2009; Gemeente Delfzijl, 2009; 
Van Vliet and Dijkstra, 2009). In addition, energy company N U O N  and Noorderpoort- 
college, a school for intermediate vocational education, set up a training course to 
increase the labour supply needed for building the power stations that are planned 
in the Eemshaven (Dagblad van het Noorden, 2008)53. In order to help businesses 
find enough employees, the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers 
(VNO-NCW) for the northern part of the country cooperates with the German Centers 
of Competence in north-west Germany54.
The above mentioned initiatives cannot be considered a response to demographic 
decline, because they make no mention of this issue. Those policies, therefore, are 
considered policy stability.
2001-2009: 
POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY STABILITY AT PROVINCIAL 
LEVEL
In the provincial environmental plan (Provincie Groningen 2008b), demographic 
decline is mentioned only in relation to the retail and labour markets55. The province
THE SUPPLY OF WELL-EDUCATED PEOPLE WILL BECOME EVEN MORE LIMITED (GEMEENTE 
DELFZIJL, 2009, P.15).
53 IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED INITIATIVES, THERE ARE ALSO INITIATIVES SUCH 
AS ‘REAL STARS LIVE IN DELFZIJL' (SEE CHAPTER 5), WHICH TRY TO IMPROVE THE IMAGE OF 
DELFZIJL AND TRY TO ATTRACT PEOPLE FROM ELSEWHERE TO COME AND WORK AND LIVE IN 
EEMSDELTA.
54 IN THE PAST, THIS COOPERATION SUPPORTED GERMAN FIRMS (E.G. VOLKSWAGEN 
FACTORY IN EMDEN & MEIJER WERFT IN PAPENBURG) TO FIND DUTCH EMPLOYEES. IN THE 
FUTURE, THIS COOPERATION MIGHT HELP THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED ENERGY FIRMS IN THE 
EEMSHAVEN TO FIND GERMAN EMPLOYEES.
55 IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEW PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, VARIOUS STUDIES 
(LOUTER AND EIKEREN, 2007; BUREAU PAU, 2007) HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THAT PAY
ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, BOTH 
SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED SEPARATELY, APART FROM A BRIEF DISCUSSION IN BOTH 
STUDIES IN RELATION TO THE LABOUR MARKET. THESE STUDIES WARN THAT THE EEMSDELTA
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argued that it is important to maintain and strengthen the spatial concentration of 
shopping centres, and that in a region confronted with population decline, the avail­
ability and accessibility of shopping centres is a specific issue (Provincie Groningen, 
2008b, p.104).
With respect to labour, the province noted that, partly as a result of the expected 
population changes, there will be increasing numbers of unfilled job vacancies, and a 
shortage of people of intermediate vocational education level (Provincie Groningen, 
2008b, p.103). The main policy challenge, according to the province, is the increasing 
qualitative and quantitative mismatch between the demand and supply of labour. 
The province, therefore, focuses on realising a well-educated working age popula­
tion, by upgrading the labour force, paying attention to the development of talent, 
increasing labour participation, and stimulating entrepreneurship (Provincie Gronin­
gen, 2008b, p.103; Provincie Groningen, 2008a).
The province does those things primarily by playing a facilitating role, which means 
that it gathers information56 and supports initiatives. Since 2008, for example, it has 
participated -  together with Zorgplein  Noord57, health care employers, educational 
institutes, and the municipalities of east Groningen -  in the European INTERREG 
project DC Noise ‘Demographic change, new opportunities in shrinking Europe‘. In 
total, four different projects are formulated, one of which focused on the labour 
market. Within this project, the aim is to develop labour market strategies for health
IS EXPECTED TO BE CONFRONTED WITH VARIOUS DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES SIMULTANE­
OUSLY: AGEING, DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE AND A DECLINE IN WORKING 
AGE POPULATION. AS A RESULT OF THESE DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES, IT 
MIGHT BECOME DIFFICULT FOR BUSINESSES IN THE EEMSDELTA TO FIND ENOUGH SUITABLE 
EMPLOYEES (BUREAU PAU, 2007, P.15).
56 THE PROVINCE, IN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES (SAMENWER­
KINGSVERBAND NOORD-NEDERLAND (SNN)) AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE UWV 
WERKBEDRIJF WHICH ASSISTS PEOPLE WITH FINDING A JOB (THEN CALLED CWI, BUT IN
2008, THE CWI AND UWB MERGED TO FORM THE UWV WERKBEDRIJF), COMMISSIONED THE 
UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN TO CONDUCT AN ANNUAL EXPLORATION OF THE NORTHERN 
LABOUR MARKET (BROERSMA ET AL., 2008). IN 2008, THE EXPLORATIVE STUDY CONCLUDED 
THAT THERE WAS A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY OF LABOUR. IN ADDITION, IT CONCLUDED THAT LABOUR PARTICIPATION NEEDED TO 
INCREASE IN ORDER TO KEEP THE LABOUR FORCE AT THE SAME LEVEL (DIJKSTAL AND MANS, 
2009C, P.26). ALSO, THE PROVINCE REGULARLY PUBLISHES STUDIES ABOUT CHANGES IN 
EMPLOYABILITY (WESTERHOF, 2007).
57 THE FOUNDATION THAT ADVISES AND SUPPORTS EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, AND PEOPLE
WHO ARE LOOKING FOR A JOB IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES REGARDING LABOUR MARKET
AND MOBILITY IN HEALTH CARE SECTOR.
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care, to solve the labour shortage that is expected in the health sector, in the short 
term (DC Noise, 2009). The only policy change found at provincial level that can be 
related to demographic decline is this INTERREG project, which can be considered 
a conservative policy action. This action tries to solve the labour shortage in health 
care by attracting new employees and preventing the outflow of employees active in 
health care. Because only eastern Groningen municipalities and no municipalities in 
the Eemsdelta participated in this project, it was not included in this study.
In addition, the association of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises northern Nether­
lands (M KB-N oord ), together with the Chamber of Commerce, the province of 
Groningen, the municipalities, and educational institutes (e.g. University of Gronin­
gen, Hanze University, Hanze C onnect58), organised meetings to increase the coop­
eration between entrepreneurs (O ndernem ers in bew eging). The challenge for this 
initiative is to inform entrepreneurs about developments (e.g. demographic decline) 
without damaging the reputation of the region and assist them by solving problems 
related to those developments.
In its other economic policies, the province paid no attention to demographic 
decline. It has chosen to change from expanding business locations to restructuring 
them59, as there are sufficient business locations available already60. The province 
argues that vacancies in large industrial business locations are already a policy prob­
lem and, because it is difficult to finance the restructuring of business locations, it 
will support municipalities by subsidising them (Provincie Groningen, 2008b, p.101).
The province has decided to focus on certain economic core regions, one of which 
being the Eemsdelta (Delfzijl, Eemsmond and Appingedam)61. The aim is to strength-
58 HANZE CONNECT IS A SUBDIVISION OF THE HANZE UNIVERSITY. IT OFFERS ADVICES, 
RESEARCH AND TRAINING SESSIONS FOR PROFESSIONALS AND ORGANISATIONS.
59 ALTHOUGH THIS POLICY CHANGE CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, 
VARIOUS ACTORS (INCLUDING THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES) 
COMPLAINED THAT THE PROVINCE WAS USING THE DISCUSSION ABOUT DEMOGRAPHIC 
DECLINE AS AN ARGUMENT FOR THIS POLICY CHANGE NOT TO INVEST IN BUSINESS 
LOCATIONS NOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE.
60 AN EXCEPTION IS THE EEMSHAVEN AND DELFZIJL. IN THOSE AREAS, AFTER 2014, ADDITIONAL 
BUSINESS LOCATIONS MAY BE NEEDED FOR THE ENERGY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES.
61 THREE OTHER ECONOMIC CORE REGIONS INDICATED BY THE PROVINCE ARE THE AREA
ALONG THE HIGHWAYS A28/A7 (LEEK, GRONINGEN, HAREN, HOOGEZAND-SAPPEMEER,
VEENDAM, MENTERWOLDE, WINSCHOTEN AND SCHEEMDA), RENGERS (SLOCHTEREN), AND 
SOUTH GRONINGEN ALONG THE TER APEL CANAL (PROVINCIE GRONINGEN, 2008B, P.99).
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en the economic structure through spatial concentration62 and expanding the 
sectors which have already settled in this region. The Eemsdelta should continue to 
focus on the energy sector (‘Energy Valley’63) and the chemical industry. The 
province has also decided to promote tourism, in order to realise new jobs and 
to generate additional income from tourist spending. The tourist industry is not a 
strong sector within Groningen and for that reason this can be considered as an 
effort to create a new economic sector for the whole province (Provincie Groningen, 
2008b)64.
In these provincial policies on economy and business locations, demographic 
decline played no role. This, therefore, can be considered as being no policy change. 
Obviously, there have been changes in economic policy, and those changes were 
designed to create employment and to retain and attract people, but they were not 
presented as policy on demographic decline.
This section shows that changes in response to demographic decline can be found 
only in retail policy. These changes are formulated at regional and local government 
level and can be considered radical. They have been implemented in strategic and 
operational plans, and, in addition, the municipalities in Eemsdelta jointly have 
decided to spatially concentrate their services and the municipality of Delfzijl has 
taken actions to reduce the amount of shopping areas in north Delfzijl.
62 IN THE FORMER PROVINCIAL SPATIAL POLICY, SPATIAL CONCENTRATION ALSO WAS A POLICY 
PRIORITY.
63 THE INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY FOR THE NORTHERN NETHERLANDS (NOM) 
SUPPORTS THE MUNICIPALITIES IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ATTRACTING INTERNATIONAL COMPA­
NIES TO THE REGION.
64 IN ORDER TO STIMULATE TOURISM, THE PROVINCE LAUNCHED A PROMOTIONAL CAMPAIGN
FOR THE PROVINCE AS A WHOLE. BESIDES, THE PROVINCE INVESTS IN SEVERAL PROJECTS
TO IMPROVE TOURIST ROUTES, AMONG WHICH THE DAMSTERDIEP AREA, WHICH IS THE AREA
ALONG THE CANAL BETWEEN DELFZIJL AND GRONINGEN.
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6.3.3 ECONOMIC POLICY IN ZEEUWS- 
VLAANDEREN FROM 2003 TO 2009
2003-2007: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE DID NOT RESULT IN LOCAL 
POLICY CHANGE
The local economic policies that were formulated by the three municipalities in 2005, 
paid no or hardly any attention to demographic decline. Terneuzen did mention it, 
but did not adapt its economic policy accordingly (Gemeente Terneuzen, 2005a). The 
same applies to the local spatial economic plan of Sluis (Gemeente Sluis, 2003) and 
the regional retail plan of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen (Droogh Trommelen Broekhuis BV, 
2003; Provincie Zeeland, 2006a65).
A  similar situation applies to the provincial social economic plan (Provincie Zeeland, 
2005). In its environmental plan, the province considered population decline to be 
a societal challenge (Provincie Zeeland, 2006a, p.14), but barely related this to the 
economy66. The province focused on strengthening and developing the ports of 
Vlissingen and Terneuzen67 (Provincie Zeeland, 2006b, p.27), with energy, food and 
tourism being its other economic priorities.
The province argued that, in Zeeland, there were already sufficient business loca­
tions68, and that regions needed to formulate a regional business location pro­
gramme. It warned that the practice, according to which municipalities acted 
separately, would result in an oversupply of business locations. This was expected to 
damage the business climate, lead to bad government investments, and create a 
situation which discourages restructuring (Provincie Zeeland, 2006a; Provincie 
Zeeland, 2006b, p.27). Demographic decline was not a reason for this decision by the
65 THE REGIONAL RETAIL AGREEMENTS WERE RECORDED IN THE PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PLAN OF 2006.
66 THE PROVINCE CONCLUDED THAT DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE 
ECONOMY. HOWEVER, DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE ECONOMIC 
CHAPTER OF THE PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN (PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2006A).
67 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW PORT AREAS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CANAL ZONE, AND 
TERNEUZEN WEST IS INDICATED AS NEW PORT AREA.
68 THE LAND AREA FOR BUSINESS LOCATIONS (EXISTING AND PLANNED) IS 468,8 HECTARES,
WHILE THE EXPECTED DEMAND BETWEEN 2005 AND 2020 IS BETWEEN 144 (BASIS VARIANT)
AND 259 HECTARES (ACCORDING TO THE DYNAMIC VARIANT) (PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2006A, 
P.110). THIS IS BASED ON RESEARCH BY BUCK CONSULTANT INTERNATIONAL (2005).
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province to oblige regions to formulate regional business programmes, and, there­
fore, in this study it is not considered a policy change.
In 2007, the province, together with municipalities69, Chamber of Commerce and the 
business community (Dow  and certain banks, such as the ABN AMRO, Rabobank, the 
bank voor Dutch municipalities (B an k  N ederlandse G em eenten)) set up a develop­
ment authority for the province of Zeeland called ‘Impuls’ (N.V. Econom ische  Im puls 
Zeeland), responsible for acquisition and promotion, for attracting new business to 
Zeeland, and for cooperation between businesses and educational institutes (NV 
Economische Impuls, 2009)70. An example of the last is the development of the 
Valuepark Terneuzen. The idea is to cluster contractors and subcontractors and the 
businesses located at the Valuepark, and the educational institutes (e.g. the univer­
sity of applied sciences (H oge schoo l Zeeland) and the intermediate vocational educa­
tion training centres in Terneuzen (R O C  W estersche lde) and Vlissingen (ROC Zeeland)) 
jointly offer an educational programme. This clustering of and interdependency be­
tween contractors and subcontractors is intended to attract new businesses and to 
discourage businesses from relocating (Valuepark Terneuzen, 2009)71. The develop­
ment authority ‘Impuls’ and its initiatives were not related to demographic decline.
Demographic decline was not the (immediate) reason for the above mentioned 
provincial policies nor for the policy changes. The aim was economic growth; how to 
reach this in a situation of population or working age population decline, was not an 
issue. Therefore, this period is considered as policy stability.
69 ELEVEN OF THE THIRTEEN MUNICIPALITIES IN ZEELAND SUPPORTED THE DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND, CALLED ‘IMPULS', AND BECAME SHAREHOLDERS. 
ALL MUNICIPALITIES OF ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN PARTICIPATED.
70 IT WAS PRIMARILY MEANT TO FOCUS ON ATTRACTING BUSINESSES IN THE FIELD OF TOURISM, 
FOOD AND ENERGY, WHICH, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE DUTCH MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC 
AFFAIRS, ARE INDICATED AS THE STRENGTHS OF THE DELTA. ANOTHER REASON WHY THE 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND (N.V. ECONOMISCHE IMPULS 
ZEELAND) FOCUSED ON THESE SECTORS WAS BECAUSE THIS WOULD CREATE A SUPPLE­
MENT TO ZEELAND SEAPORTS, WHICH ALREADY FOCUSED ON PORT-RELATED INDUSTRIES. 
ZEELAND SEAPORTS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE MANAGE­
MENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE PORTS OF ZEELAND (ZEELAND SEAPORTS,
2009).
71 THE PROVINCE FORMULATES STRATEGIES NOT ONLY TO ATTRACT NEW BUSINESSES (CREAT­
ING EMPLOYMENT), BUT ALSO TO ATTRACT NEW INHABITANTS (SEE CHAPTER 5). IN ADDITION, 
THE PROVINCE TRIES TO ATTRACT YOUNG PEOPLE TO ZEELAND BY INVESTING IN EDUCA­
TIONAL ACTIVITIES.
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2008-2009: 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE RESULTED IN LOCAL 
ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES
In 2008, the province published an explorative study (O nverkende Paden) in which it 
paid attention the demographic decline, the possible economic consequences, and 
strategies for economic policy. This study concluded that the working age popula­
tion was already decreasing and that from 2020 onwards, the labour force in Zeeland 
was expected also to decrease (Provincie Zeeland, 2008, p.30). The province argued 
that these downward demographic developments could have different economic 
consequences and the following policy answers would be needed.
First, the decrease in labour force could result in a decrease in the GDP. This would 
only happen if the labour productivity and/or labour participation stabilised or 
decreased. In order to prevent this, the province argued that it would be important 
to stimulate innovations, because these could increase labour productivity. Other 
policy options could be attracting new employees from other Dutch regions or from 
abroad, or encouraging employees to work longer hours (Provincie Zeeland, 2008, 
p .30 and 32).
Second, the decrease in labour force could affect the labour market. The province 
noticed that it would be important to continue its efforts to increase the labour par­
ticipation. In the past, these efforts primarily were focused on women, but now  also 
needed to focus on the elderly. Also, it would be important to invest in education 
and retraining (Provincie Zeeland, 2008, p.32).
The province argued that the decline in working age population and the future de­
cline in labour force would not mean that the province needed to abandon its 
objective to stimulate employment. Because the economic structure of Zeeland 
is vulnerable, the province would need to continue its effort to strengthen the 
economy by attracting new businesses. It would be important to shift the focus 
from quantity to quality, in relation to employment, and to attract businesses and 
employment that would fit the current and future labour supply. However, it would 
also be important to attract quality businesses (creating employment), and to create 
employment for highly educated people (Provincie Zeeland, 2008, p.32).
Finally, the province expected that, in the future, the demand for business loca­
tions would diminish because of a decrease in labour force. Therefore, the province 
argued that it would be important to focus on restructuring business locations. In 
order to balance demand for and supply of business locations, it argued that for
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each region a regional business location strategy needs to be developed, aimed at 
improving the quality of the locations by transforming and upgrading them (Provin­
cie Zeeland, 2008, p .32 and 33).
In 2009, in its new social economic policy, which can be considered a strategic plan, 
the province mentioned the demographic decline and investigated the possible 
economic consequences (Provincie Zeeland, 2009a; Provincie Zeeland, 2009b).
The province recognised that the working age population in Zeeland was already 
decreasing72, and expected that from 2020 the labour force73, and from 2025, the 
population of Zeeland, would decrease also. The province considered that demo­
graphic decline would affect the labour market and services negatively, seeing it as a 
threat (Provincie Zeeland, 2009b, p .18 and 19). Nevertheless, in its economic policy, 
the province paid little attention to that decline; it was mentioned in only three of 
the nine programmes74.
In one of these three programmes, ‘labour market and knowledge’, the province 
argued that in order to balance the labour demand and supply with a decreasing 
working age population, it would be important to increase the participation75 and/ 
or productivity rate. In the past, such a policy had focused on women. Now, the 
province tried to also encourage elderly people to w ork more. Moreover, it wanted 
to attract new employees to Zeeland and to also find employment for the partners 
of these people. In the programme, the province argued that maintaining and devel­
oping new educational institutes could retain and attract young people to Zeeland 
(Provincie Zeeland, 2009b, p.38).
72 DUE TO INCREASED LABOUR PARTICIPATION, THIS DECREASE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION 
HAS NOT YET RESULTED IN A DECREASE IN LABOUR FORCE.
73 THE PROVINCE EXPECTS THAT, BETWEEN 2010 AND 2020, THE LABOUR FORCE WILL STABI­
LISE AND, FROM 2020 ONWARDS, IT WILL DECREASE, BECAUSE BY THEN, THE INCREASE 
IN LABOUR PARTICIPATION WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO COMPENSATE THE DECREASE IN 
WORKING AGE POPULATION.
74 IN TOTAL, THE PROVINCE FORMULATED THE FOLLOWING NINE PROGRAMMES: 1. ECONOMY 
EDUCATION AND LABOUR MARKET, 2. KNOWLEDGE, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
3. CARE ECONOMY, 4. ENERGY AND CLIMATE, 5. PORT AND INDUSTRY, 6. RECREATION AND 
TOURISM, 7. AGRICULTURE, AND 8. FISHERY AND AQUA CULTURE (PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2009).
75 THE PROVINCE AIMS TO INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION RATE FROM 68 TO 70%, BY 2012. THE 
MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION RATE FOR THE NETHERLANDS IS CONSIDERED TO BE 73% (PROVIN­
CIE ZEELAND, 2009, P.37).
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In the second programme, ‘knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship’, the prov­
ince argued that innovations contributed not only to economic growth, but could 
also absorb demographic changes (e.g. a decline in working age population), by 
increasing labour productivity. Because the exchange of knowledge is an important 
condition for innovations, the province tried to stimulate cooperation between busi­
nesses and educational institutes (Provincie Zeeland 2009b, p .42 and 45).
In the third programme, ‘health care economy’, newly set up by the province, it tried 
to stimulate the development of new care products in the fields of health care, 
tourism and wellness services, because it expected that the ageing population would 
increase the demand for these services. At the same time, the province acknowl­
edged that the number of people who could provide such care was diminishing. 
Therefore, it tried to retain and attract enough employees for the health care sector 
(Provincie Zeeland, 2009b, p.50). Since 2008, the province of Zeeland has been 
participating in the INTERREG project DC Noise, together with the province of 
Groningen76. The province formulated three projects, two of which regarding 
economy and one regarding housing (see Chapter 5). One of these projects focuses 
on the opportunities for using ICT in health care. The other project tries to answer 
the question of how  to prevent the loss of knowledge when many people leave the 
production process at the same time, as the baby boom generation retires.
In 2009, the province also published a provincial vision, Op pad77, in which it pre­
sented its plans for dealing with demographic decline (Provincie Zeeland, 2009c)78. 
The following economic strategies were formulated. The province, together with 
Scoop  (an institute for social research for the province of Zeeland), initiated a project 
(which can be considered a concrete action) called ‘seven to seven’, to extend the 
opening hours of child care centres (from seven in the morning to seven in the 
evening), so as to increase the labour participation for women (Provincie Zeeland, 
2009c, p.28). In addition, the province argued that it would be important to encour­
age young people, who have left Zeeland to study elsewhere, to return. This could 
be done in various ways, such as by offering internships at companies in Zeeland,
76 PREVIOUSLY, IN 2003, THE PROVINCE ALSO PARTICIPATED IN ANOTHER EUROPEAN PROJECT 
CALLED EURES SCHELDEMOND, WHICH INTENDED TO STIMULATE CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY 
OF THE LABOUR MARKET (SEE WWW.EURESSCHELDEMOND.INFO).
77 OP PAD CAN BE TRANSLATED IN ‘ON ROUTE'.
78 THIS PROVINCIAL VISION IS THE OUTCOME OF THE REGIONAL DIALOGUE, CALLED NIEUW- 
ZEELAND!, WHICH THE PROVINCE ORGANISED, TOGETHER WITH SCOOP (THE INSTITUTE FOR 
SOCIAL RESEARCH FOR THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND) (SEE SECTION 5.4.3) (SEE ALSO WWW. 
ZEELANDOPPAD.NL).
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presenting job opportunities, and by organising meetings between entrepreneurs 
who want to retire and young people as their possible successors (Provincie Zeeland, 
2009c, p.31).
M ost of the recently formulated policy changes introduced by the province in 
response to demographic decline can be considered radical policy changes, because 
they adapt to the demographic decline. The idea is that the economy can grow  with­
out a growth in working age population.
The municipalities paid no or hardly any attention to demographic decline in their 
current economic policies (Gemeente Sluis, 2003; Gemeente Terneuzen, 2005a), nor 
in their retail policies (Seerden and Welten, 2008). An exception is the joint regional 
programme for business locations, which the municipalities formulated at the 
request of the province (Regio Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and provincie Zeeland, 2008). In 
this programme, they mentioned the stagnating population. However, the demo­
graphic consideration played only a marginal role in the agreement. It was decided 
that, until 2012, Terneuzen could develop 18 hectares, and Sluis and Hulst each 9 
hectares. It took a long time to reach this agreement; municipalities and the province 
disagreed, the province arguing that there were sufficient business locations (and us­
ing demographic decline as an argument) whereas Terneuzen wanted to expand. It 
argued that new business locations would attract new businesses (employment) and 
inhabitants. This was based on the assumption that people follow jobs.
Although the municipalities paid hardly any attention to demographic decline, 
some actions have been formulated which can be considered as conservative policy 
reactions to demographic decline. First, in 2008, municipalities together with other 
public and private partners (e.g. U W V  Werkbedrijf, Rabobank (financial institute), D ow  
Chemicals and temporary employment agencies) started to cooperate in the fields 
of promotion and the economy79. They tried to find an answer to the labour market 
problems of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. In a separate initiative, the municipalities, project 
developer (AM Wonen), and housing associations tried to find an answer to the hous­
ing market problem (see Chapter 5). A long the way, the involved actors decided to 
merge both initiatives. In 2009, they instituted a special task force, ‘your
79 IN 2007, THE MUNICIPALITIES AND THE WATER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY ASKED ECORYS 
TO FORMULATE A FUTURE VISION AND ACTION PROGRAMME FOR THE REGION OF ZEEUWS-
VLAANDEREN. ECORYS CONCLUDED THAT THE MUNICIPALITIES SHOULD PROMOTE THEIR 
REGION TOGETHER (BOECKHOUT ET AL., 2007).
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new future’ (Uw nieuwe toekom st)80. This taskforce set up a promotional campaign 
to attract people (new employees), launched a website (www.uwnieuwetoekomst. 
nl) on which job vacancies and housing opportunities are published, and presented 
the region at the Emigration fairs of 2008, 2009 and 2010 (see Chapter 5). They also 
set up a special programme for partners of these new employees, helping them to 
also find a job in the region.
Second, Terneuzen intended to increase the amount of retail locations and to attract 
new shops to the area. To date, the municipalities have paid little attention to the 
relationship between population decline and the amount of shops (and other 
services) present in an area. Recently, the province, together with the municipality 
of Sluis, commissioned Scoop  to investigate the relationship between services and 
population decline81 (Van der W ouw  et al., 2009).
Besides, different private initiatives have also been set up. For example, in June
2008, two former entrepreneurs (Karlie van de Vijver and Frans Reijniers), together 
with the Junior Chamber of Commerce (Junior Kamer82), organised a fair in the 
Schelde  theatre in Terneuzen, where entrepreneurs who wanted to retire were given 
the opportunity to meet possible successors. As a result of the ageing and declining 
working age population, the lack of successors is a problem for small and medium­
sized enterprises in this region. This fair intended to solve this problem and maintain 
the employment in the region83 (Hoonhorst, 2008).
Next to the above mentioned actions which were formulated as an answer to the 
demographic decline, the municipalities formulated other policies and actions
80 THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CONSISTS OF THE THREE MAYORS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MUNICI­
PALITIES. PARTICIPATORS IN THIS INITIATIVE ARE UWV WERKBEDRIJF (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
SERVICE), BRABANTS ZEEUWSE WERKGEVERSVERENIGING (EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION 
FOR BRABANT AND ZEELAND), FINANCIAL INSTITUTES, REAL ESTATE AGENTS, DEVELOPERS, 
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, LARGE FIRMS (E.G. DOW  CHEMICALS), TOURIST INFORMATION 
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN, HOTEL AND CATERING INDUSTRY, AND THE EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
CARE SECTORS.
81 IT CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT OF SERVICES PRESENT IN A MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT 
DETERMINE THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THIS MUNICIPALITY TO THE INHABITANTS AND POTEN­
TIAL INHABITANTS. THE FEAR THAT THE DECREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF SERVICES (CAUSED 
BY DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE) WILL RESULT IN A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND 
HOUSEHOLD (DOWNWARD SPIRAL) IS NOT CORRECT.
82 A NETWORK FOR ENTREPRENEURS UNDER THE AGE OF 40.
83 THIS INITIATIVE IS NOW UNITED UNDER THE WING OF ‘YOUR NEW FUTURE' (UW NIEUWE
TOEKOMST).
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which were not made in reaction to demographic decline, and thus are considered 
as policy stability in this study. Nevertheless, those policies and actions can affect 
demographic developments (from the perspective that people follow jobs and jobs 
follow people). The municipalities had taken initiatives, separately, to attract new 
businesses (and not only together through the development authority ‘Impuls’).
The municipality Terneuzen, for example, attended a fair called Contacta to meet 
businesses and to attract new businesses to Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Besides, public and 
private partners set up specific educational programmes, in order to solve the short­
age of qualified personnel. The municipality of Terneuzen, together with Rabobank, 
University of Gent, and the biochemical industry in the region (e.g. D ow  Chemicals), 
tried to set up the Bio Base Europe Training Center, to train and educate process 
operators and technical maintenance specialists for various bio-based industries84 
(Biopark Terneuzen and Ghent Bio-energy Valley, 2009; Biocampus, 2009). Zeeland 
Seaports, together with two educational institutes (ROC W esterschelde and ROC 
Zeeland), and logistics businesses ( ISA  and Jonkm an logistiek) set up a logistics 
training centre to train and educate logistical personnel. Zeeland Seaports, together 
with ROC Westerschelde, Public Employment Service U W V  WERKbedrijf and Deton, 
a sheltered workshop for the disabled (sociale werkplaats), have set up a training 
centre for people who work in greenhouses85. Another example is the action of Zee­
land Seaports, responsible for attracting businesses to the ports of Terneuzen and 
Vlissingen, which has been trying to increase the interdependence between different 
businesses settled in the region in order to prevent them relocating to other regions 
(which could cause a loss of employment).
This section shows that hardly any policy changes took place in reaction to demo­
graphic decline. The few that did, occurred mainly at provincial level in strategic 
plans. Several actions were taken. M ost of them by the municipalities, and can be 
considered conservative, because they focus on increasing the population, house­
hold numbers and/or working age population. Recently, the province has formulated 
two radical policy changes in its strategic plan, which focus on stimulating innova­
tions and increasing labour participation. To realise the latter, the province has taken 
concrete action to stimulate extending the opening hours of child care centres.
84 THE TRAINING CENTRE IS PLANNED TO BECOME OPERATIONAL BY 2011. FOR MORE INFORMA­
TION, SEE WWW.BIO-CAMPUS.NL
85 FOR MORE INFORMATION, SEE WWW.WERKENINDEKAS.NL.
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6.3.4 THE THREE CASES COMPARED
In the case-study regions, municipalities have hardly taken demographic decline into 
account in their strategic or operational economic policies. Zeeland is the only 
province that has investigated the possible economic consequences of demographic 
decline. The economic policies that did take demographic decline into account 
mainly were in strategic policy (rather than in operational policy) and concerned the 
policies on the labour market and on shopping facilities. M ost policy changes are 
conservative; they focus on attracting new employees, residents and households86. 
There were very few radical policy changes in the case-study regions and they some­
times used decline as an argument for continuation of policy.
The policy changes in relation to the labour market can be considered as conserva­
tive, for they tried to combat demographic decline. M ost of them focused on solv­
ing qualitative rather than quantitative mismatches. An exception is Zeeland; the 
province argued that it would be important to stimulate innovations, because in this 
way more can be achieved with fewer people, and to increase labour participation, 
because that can increase labour supply when the working age population decreas­
es. Both can be considered radical strategic policy changes, because they accept that 
the working age population is diminishing. Although other provinces also have tried 
to stimulate innovations, they did not relate this to demographic decline.
Some of the changes formulated for retail policy, however, can be considered radi­
cal. The regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg and the municipalities of Delfzijl 
and Appingedam acknowledged that, in the light of demographic decline, they 
needed a new ‘regional retail vision’ (which is a strategic plan) for reducing retail 
floor space87. The region Eemsdelta also agreed to concentrate its services spatially, 
but that has not been worked out in detail, in contrast with the actions of the 
municipality of Delfzijl. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the municipalities have not contem­
plated reducing their plans for retail, let alone reducing retail floor space.
In relation to business locations, acquisition and promotion, many changes were 
found. However, most of these could not be connected to demographic decline, for 
that is not mentioned as a reason for the changes. Only in Zeeland, did the province
86 THOSE STRATEGIES THAT FOCUS ON ATTRACTING RESIDENTS, HOUSEHOLDS AND 
EMPLOYEES ASSUME THAT JOBS FOLLOW PEOPLE.
87 PARKSTAD LIMBURG DID FORMULATE A REGIONAL RETAIL VISION IN 2002. HOWEVER, THIS 
WAS NOT FORMULATED IN THE LIGHT OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. TO DATE, IT HAS NOT YET 
REVISED THIS RETAIL VISION. THEY ONLY EXPRESSED THEIR AMBITION IN THIS FIELD.
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in relation to policies on business locations take demographic decline briefly into 
account: due to the demographic decline, the demand for business locations is 
expected to reduce and radical policy changes would be needed. However, this 
radical policy change is not established yet in provincial policy. In the regional pro­
gramme of the municipalities on business locations, demographic decline was also 
briefly mentioned but not connected to the agreements made at regional level.
FIGURE 6.11 OVERVIEW OF POLICY CHANGES AND ACTIONS IN DIFFERENT CASE-STUDY REGIONS.
CONSERVATIVE POLICY CHANGES 
AND ACTIONS
RADICAL POLICY CHANGES AND 
ACTIONS
MUNICIPALITY THE MUNICIPALITY OF DELFZIJL 
REDUCED THE SHOPPING AREA IN 
DELFZIJL NORTH.
REGION PARKSTAD LIMBURG, HEALTH 
CARE INSTITUTES AND 
KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTES SET UP A 
CARE ACADEMY;
ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN 
DEVELOPED A JOINT MARKETING 
CAMPAIGN TO ATTRACT NEW 
EMPLOYEES (INHABITANTS 
AND HOUSEHOLDS) FROM THE 
RANDSTAD, NORTH BRABANT AND 
FROM ABROAD.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DELFZIJL 
AND APPINGEDAM DECIDED TO 
REDUCE THEIR SHOPPING AREA;
IN THE EEMSDELTA, THE PROVINCE 
AND ALL MUNICIPALITIES DECIDED 
SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF 
SERVICES WAS NEEDED.
PROVINCE THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG, 
TOGETHER WITH OTHER ACTORS, 
SET UP MAASTRICHT REGION 
BRANDING AND LAUNCHED A 
WEBSITE (2009) TO ATTRACT NEW 
EMPLOYEES (INHABITANTS AND 
HOUSEHOLDS);
THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND 
DECIDED THAT THE INCREASED 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION FOR 
WOMEN AND ELDERLY WAS 
IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO DEAL 
WITH THE DECREASE IN THE 
WORKING AGE POPULATION;
THE PROVINCE OF ZEELAND 
AND THE MUNICIPALITY SLUIS 
COMMISSIONED SCOOP TO 
INVESTIGATE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE 
AND SERVICES.
In all regions, demographic decline is not the reason for the shift from development 
to restructuring of business locations. However, in all regions demographic decline is 
considered as a complicated factor in realising this restructuring process. In shrinking 
regions, business locations cannot be transformed into residential regions, because 
the demand for housing is marginal. Besides, due to the low demand for housing, 
shrinking municipalities do not earn much money from land development, which
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makes it difficult to find enough money to invest in the restructuring of business 
locations.
There have been many other changes introduced in the economic policies, which are 
not related to demographic decline (and therefore considered as policy stability in 
this study), but nevertheless can influence demographic developments. This subject 
is not discussed in the following sections of this chapter.
6.4 POLICY ARRANGEMENT
The previous section discussed whether demographic decline does or does not lead 
to changes in economic policy, and whether the policy changes that do take place 
are conservative or radical. This section, together with Sections 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7, 
explains why this is so; they provide insight into the conditions that influence those 
policy reactions. In each section, the case-study regions are described separately, 
because for each case-study region the conditions that influence local policy change 
can be different.
This section analyses how  the policy arrangements in the three case-study regions 
influence policy stability and/or local policy change. In accordance with the definition 
of policy arrangement as described in Chapter 3, this arrangement is described by 
referring to the four dimensions (which will be put in italics) that have been distin­
guished (discourses, actors/coalitions, resources/power, and rules) (see Section 
3.6). It describes whether changes in the dimensions of the policy arrangement took 
place.
Each case-study is structured around the policy changes that have been described in 
Section 6.3. A  distinction is made between policy in the fields of retail, labour market, 
and the regional economy. The reason for this is that each policy field has its own 
policy arrangement. The sequence in which the retail policy, labour policy and re­
gional economic policy is described is different for each case-study region; it depends 
on whether policy changes occurred or not.
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6.4.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
1993-2006: 
STABILITY OF LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
During this period, neither the municipalities, the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg, nor the province paid attention to demographic decline, or adapted their 
strategic and operational (economic) policies accordingly. An explanation for this 
policy stability could be that neither public bodies nor private companies perceived 
demographic decline as a problem in itself, or as a problem for the economy (dis­
course). Except for the work by Derks, there was not much empirical evidence to 
convince actors that they should change their perceptions. Because so much was un­
known about the relationship between demographic decline and the economy, and 
there was much disagreement am ong economic researchers about this, the actors 
(municipalities, the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg and the province of 
Limburg) felt no need to accept the new problem perception of Derks and to change 
their perceptions (discourse) (Derks 1996b, Derks, 2004).
2007-2009: 
POLICY PROCESS TOWARDS STRATEGIC CONSERVATIVE 
POLICY CHANGES FOR THE LABOUR MARKET
Between 2007 and 2009, a decline in working age population resulted in a few 
conservative changes in labour market policy. The first explanation for this could 
be the change in the problem perception of the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg and the province (discourse). They acknowledged that the region and the 
province were facing a decline in working age population, and that this might affect 
the labour market and cause problems there. It could lead to a qualitative mismatch, 
and some sectors would be confronted with a shortage of employees88. This change 
of problem perception (discourse) was stimulated by the fact that the province and 
the region were already confronted with this decline, and that provincial population 
projections expected this decline to continue. Moreover, at the national level,
88 THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG AND THE PROVINCE, HOWEVER,
THOUGHT THAT THE DECLINE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION MIGHT BRING OPPORTUNITIES 
TOO. IT MAY INCREASE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PEOPLE IN SEARCH OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
THE WILLINGNESS OF BUSINESSES AND INSTITUTES TO ENGAGE UNEMPLOYED, AND TO 
INVEST IN EDUCATION OF THEIR PERSONNEL (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2008B, P.18; PARKSTAD 
LIMBURG, 2007A).
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attention for this type of decline and its possible economic consequences in- 
creased89. This change in problem perception (discourse) was also based on research 
commissioned by the province, which concluded that the decrease in working age 
population caused labour market problems in Limburg (Provincie Limburg, 2006a; 
Provincie Limburg, 2008b).
The second explanation for these conservative policy changes could be that this new 
perception about the nature of the problem and its possible solutions (discourse) 
was closer to the problem perception (discourse) of those who nevertheless paid 
no attention to demographic decline90. The quantitative and qualitative mismatch 
between the labour demand and supply was, by all actors in the health care sector, 
perceived as a problem, regardless of the causes. The province and the regional 
organisation related those problems to the decline in working age population, while 
the businesses and municipalities did not.
The actors agreed also on the way to solve the problem, namely by attracting new 
employees from other regions and countries, through marketing, and through 
increasing the supply of labour by educating people. Although the national popula­
tion projections predicted that within a short time the whole of the Netherlands 
would face a decline in working age population, the province, the regional organisa­
tion, and the municipalities were quite optimistic about the possibilities for reversing 
this decline by attracting new employees.
Recently, some actors have started to challenge this solution. The Chamber of 
Commerce and the LW V  (employers’ association of Limburg) (2008), for example, 
argued that demographic decline is irreversible, and therefore measures to increase 
the working age population (or the supply of labour) will not be enough to maintain 
prosperity levels. They argued that, in order to achieve this, it would be necessary to 
increase labour productivity. This could be done by stimulating innovations and
89 UWV WERKBEDRIJF (2008) PROJECTED THAT, FROM 2011 ONWARDS, THE WORKING AGE 
POPULATION OF THE NETHERLANDS WOULD DECREASE. THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG 
REFERS TO THIS IN THEIR POLICY (PROVINCIE LIMBURG, 2008B).
90 A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE LACK OF ATTENTION FOR DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
AMONG THE BUSINESSES COULD BE THAT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION DID NOT GIVE RISE TO 
IT. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS DECREASED THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR, WHICH MASKED 
THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS (AND PROBLEMS) THAT A DECLINE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION 
MIGHT HAVE ON DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SECTORS.
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automation so that more could be achieved by less people (Ondernemend Limburg 
and Kamer van Koophandel, 2008)91.
This radical change in problem perception (demographic decline is irreversible) and 
the radical way of tackling it (discourse) were not shared by other actors involved 
in the economy, and for that reason there have been hardly any radical changes to 
labour market policy.
From 2009 onwards, the province started a number of initiatives to increase the 
attention of municipalities and large businesses for demographic decline and its 
economic effects. M ost of the initiatives that were started by them were focused on 
increasing the attention for this subject, also at national level92. In November 2009, 
the province of Limburg installed the Deetman commission to formulate a long-term 
provincial strategy to deal with demographic decline. Moreover, the province, to­
gether with Hogeschool Zuyd, organised a meeting with directors of large companies, 
which were established in Limburg, to discuss the demographic decline, its possible 
economic consequences and necessary strategies (Moolevliet, 2009).
2007-2009: 
NO STRATEGIC POLICY CHANGES IN OTHER ECONOMIC 
POLICIES
With regard to the other aspects of local economic policy, no attention was paid to 
demographic decline -  not by the province, the regional organisation, or the munici­
palities, nor did they change their policies in reaction to it. The first explanation for 
this could be that the problem perception of the actors did not change (discourse).
91 IN THE VISION, THREE PRIORITIES WERE FORMULATED FOR SOUTH LIMBURG. FIRST, TO 
ATTRACT AND RETAIN YOUNG PEOPLE AND EMPLOYEES, INCREASE LABOUR PARTICIPA­
TION, IMPROVE CROSS-BORDER LABOUR MIGRATION, AND ATTRACT PEOPLE FROM OTHER 
REGIONS. SECOND, TO IMPROVE THE IMAGE OF LIMBURG. THIRD, TO STIMULATE AUTOMA­
TION AND INNOVATION (ONDERNEMEND LIMBURG AND KAMER VAN KOOPHANDEL, 2008, 
P.26-27).
92 IN FEBRUARY 2009, THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG, TOGETHER WITH
NICIS, FOR EXAMPLE, ORGANISED A CONFERENCE ON SHRINKAGE IN KERKRADE (DE NIEUWE 
GROEI HEET KRIMP), IN WHICH ONE WORKSHOP PAID ATTENTION TO THE ECONOMIC STRATE­
GIES IN SITUATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. BOTH THE PROVINCE OF LIMBURG AND 
THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION OF PARKSTAD LIMBURG WERE INVOLVED IN THE ORGANISA­
TION OF THE WORKSHOP ABOUT EDUCATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET AT THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE (KRIMP ALS KANS), WITH THE AIM OF INCREAS­
ING AWARENESS AMONG MUNICIPALITIES (MINISTERIE VAN VROM AND MINISTERIE VAN BZK, 
2009B; AUTHOR UNKNOWN, 2009).
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They were reticent about using the term demographic decline and about think­
ing that it might be irreversible, because that would damage the image (business 
climate) and the economic situation of their region. It might discourage businesses 
from settling in Parkstad Limburg, threaten employment93 and strengthen the down­
wards demographic spiral.
Another explanation could be that there was still little empirical evidence to per­
suade governments that they need to change their problem perception (discourse). 
There was much disagreement among economic researchers about the relation­
ship between demography and economy. In addition, the internal fragmentation 
of municipal units (actors and coalitions) made it difficult to perceive demographic 
decline as a problem for the economy (discourse). Within each municipality, different 
units were responsible for the labour market, acquisition and marketing, the regional 
economy, and for business locations. The overall consequences of demographic 
decline for the economy, in its entirety, could not easily be seen.
There was policy stability, local and regional, also regarding for shopping facilities.
An explanation for this could also be that municipalities and retail traders did not 
perceive demographic decline as a problem (discourse). They did acknowledge that 
some retail centres were confronted with vacancies, but did not relate this to demo­
graphic decline. They argued that the vacancy rate was relatively high because of the 
restructuring plans for the inner cities. Besides, they cast doubt on the reliability of 
the source (Locatus) that showed that the vacancy rate of retail property in differ­
ent municipalities of Parkstad Limburg was high. This view was challenged by the 
regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg, which warned that demographic decline 
could indeed cause vacancies and render plans for new shopping areas overambi- 
tious94. However, the regional organisation did not have enough power (resources) 
to enforce its new ideas (discourse).
Yet another reason why the problem perception (discourse) of municipalities did 
not change could be because there was no empirical evidence about an oversupply
93 THIS IS ALSO CALLED THE COMMUNICATION PARADOX. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WOULD 
RATHER NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, BECAUSE VIEWED FROM AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, IT IS A DIFFICULT MESSAGE.
94 THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE REGIONAL STUDY KRIMP ALS KANS 
(GERRICHHAUZEN AND DOGTEROM, 2007), WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE REDUCTION IN 
THE SUPPLY OF RETAIL AND IN NEW RETAIL PLANS WAS NEEDED. BESIDES, OTHER STUDIES 
(E.G. DERKS ET AL., 2006B; VAN DAM ET AL., 2006; ROB/RFV, 2008), AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, 
CONCLUDED THAT THE DECLINE IN POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS MIGHT AFFECT 
THE RETAIL SECTOR NEGATIVELY.
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of development plans for new retail locations. The regional organisation wanted 
to make a regional inventory, to compare the development plans for new shop­
ping facilities with the expected demand in this area. However, municipalities were 
unwilling to do so. Some suggested that municipalities were afraid that the outcome 
would cast doubts on their own plans for the redevelopment of their inner cities.
The patterns of interaction between the municipalities (actors and coalitions) caused 
policy stability, too. There was a regionally shared retail vision (Parkstad Limburg, 
2002), but the municipalities accused each other of not acting in accordance with re­
gional agreements. This distrust between the municipalities made it difficult for them 
to radically change that regional retail vision.
The policy stability could be explained by another aspect of the actors and coalitions. 
Local administrators often have a short time horizon and do not pay attention to 
long term demographic trends. Moreover, they are often hesitant to intervene in the 
retail market: they say that they do not have many resources or instruments to do 
that, so they are primarily dependent on the behaviour of private actors (retail trad­
ers). Although, this argument is often used by local administrators it was not true. 
After all, they could use local land-use plans to intervene.
There were some other changes in economic policy, such as on business locations: 
but, as stated earlier, those changes do not meet the definition of policy changes 
used in Chapter 3, as they were not made in response to demographic decline. Re­
cently, the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg -  more specifically the foun­
dation for business park management (BTM) - has linked both issues. It presented 
demographic decline as an additional difficulty when restructuring business loca­
tions, for shrinking municipalities cannot earn the money (lack of financial resources) 
necessary for that restructuring.
6.4.2 EEMSDELTA
1993-2001: 
STABILITY OF LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
Between 1993 and 2001, neither municipalities nor the province paid attention to de­
mographic decline, and therefore did not change their retail policies in response to it. 
The reason for this policy stability in retail policy was that the municipalities did not 
perceive demographic decline as a problem (discourse). Another explanation could 
be the pattern of interaction (actors and coalitions): the municipalities are used to
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focusing on maintaining and strengthening their shopping function and this practice 
was not challenged by actors (Companen, 2009b, p.94).
In their other economic policies, too, the municipalities paid no attention to 
demographic decline. Again this can be explained by the fact that the municipalities 
did not perceive demographic decline as a problem (discourse). Also the pattern of 
interaction (actors and coalitions) could be an explanation for this. The municipality 
of Delfzijl, for example, aimed mainly at attracting businesses (and employment) to 
Delfzijl, a policy that had been followed by the municipality, the province and 
national government since the 1950s (Knol, 2004)95. The assumption behind this 
policy was that people would follow jobs96.
2001-2009: 
POLICY PROCESS TOWARDS RADICAL STRATEGIC 
CHANGES IN RETAIL POLICY
In 2002, the municipality of Delfzijl radically changed its retail policy in response to 
demographic decline, from expansion to restructuring and retention (Gemeente 
Delfzijl, 2002b). Those changes in local retail policy were triggered by the Tielrooij 
Commission (2000, 2001), which concluded that demographic decline was a struc­
tural phenomenon (discourse). However, the commission did not pay much attention 
to the effects this might have on retail or the economy97. The Masterplan Delfzijl 
(Gemeente Delfzijl, 2001) and the local retail policy (Gemeente Delfzijl, 2002) were 
challenged by a few economic actors (e.g. Rabobank  and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises) who argued that retail in Delfzijl had reached its maximum, and, given 
the existing and expected demographic decline, the supply of retail facilities should
95 IN 1958, THE MUNICIPALITY, THE PROVINCE AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT JOINTLY 
COOPERATED (HAVENSCHAP DELFZIJL) AND BOUGHT LAND TO SETTLE INDUSTRIES. IN THE 
FIFTIES SEVERAL INDUSTRIES SETTLED IN DELFZIJL, AMONG WHICH THE ROYAL DUTCH SALT 
INDUSTRY (KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSE ZOUT INDUSTRIE) (KNOL, 2004).
96 CHAPTER 5 SHOWED THAT THE MUNICIPALITY OF DELFZIJL, PARTLY DUE TO THE ECONOMIC 
CRISIS, DID NOT SUCCEED IN ATTRACTING EMPLOYMENT, WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED A 
MAIN CAUSE OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE.
97 IT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DELFZIJL HAD A BACKWARD ECONOMIC POSITION AND A WEAK 
LABOUR MARKET, AND CONCLUDED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE CAUSES OF POPULATION 
DECLINE. IT ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE PROJECTED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS GAVE 
NO REASON TO THINK THAT THE POPULATION DECLINE WOULD REVERSE (COMMISSIE 
TIELROOIJ, 2000, P.14). HOWEVER, IT DID NOT DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
THAT DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE MIGHT HAVE, NOR DID IT PAY ATTENTION TO THE DECREASE IN
WORKING AGE POPULATION.
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be reduced even further (instead of retained at the current level). There was, 
therefore, support for a radical policy change, a change more radical even than the 
municipality had wanted to make.
In 2009, demographic decline resulted in radical strategic policy change, also at 
regional level; in the pact region Eemsdelta (Gemeente Appingedam et al., 2009), the 
four municipalities and the province jointly decided to concentrate services (includ­
ing retail) in order to secure the economic support for these services (Gemeente 
Appingedam et al., 2009, p.3). Previously, each local government had tried to 
maintain and expand its local services. This policy change was made because the 
perception of the municipalities had changed radically (discourse). They accepted 
the idea that the Eemsdelta would continue to face demographic decline (seeing 
demographic decline as a structural problem) and acknowledged that this would 
cause problems for the commercial services (e.g. food and non-food). This change in 
perception was stimulated by a number of research studies (knowledge resources), 
such as Com panen  (2009a,b), and Oude Velthuis et al. (2009) which all concluded 
that demographic decline is a structural phenomenon that could have a negative 
impact on the commercial services, and could strengthen the demographic decline 
even further98. In addition, Com panen  (2009b) and Ecorys (Oude Velthuis et al, 2009) 
concluded that the future household decline would be lowest if the region were 
to radically change its current retail policy and housing policy (see Chapter 5) and 
adapt the supply of retail to the future demand99. Probably also the fact that some 
shopping areas already are confronted with vacancies supported the change in the 
problem perception (discourse) (Van Vliet and Dijkstra 2009) (see Section 6.6).
This policy change was influenced also by changes in the pattern of interaction of the 
actors (actors and coalitions). The province urged the municipalities to take demo­
graphic decline into account, and to increase their cooperation in the field of housing 
and services. The then new mayor of Delfzijl (Emme-Groot, a new actor) played an 
important role in formulating these regional agreements, because of his personal­
ity and working experience in two of the municipalities. It is still too soon to say
98 THE CONCLUSION THAT DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE COULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
FOR RETAIL WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OTHER STUDIES COMMISSIONED OR IMPLEMENTED 
BY NATIONAL INSTITUTES (E.G. DERKS ET AL., 2006B; VAN DAM ET AL., 2006; ROB/RFV, 2008).
99 THE RESEARCH BY ECORYS (2009B) CONCLUDED THAT IF THE MUNICIPALITIES WOULD NOT
CHANGE THEIR POLICIES AND IMPLEMENT THE POLICY AND PLANS THAT WERE AVAILABLE 
IN 2009, THIS WOULD LEAD, BETWEEN 2008 AND 2018, NOT ONLY TO A HIGHER DECLINE IN 
HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS, BUT ALSO TO A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF CLIENTS FOR RETAIL 
IN ALMOST ALL AREAS (EXCEPT FOR CENTRAL VILLAGES), AND A REDUCTION IN VALUE OF 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE OF -170 MILLION EUROS.
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whether the municipalities will put those agreements into practice. Moreover, the 
agreements were made on a voluntarily basis and there are no sanctions for munici­
palities that refuse to comply.
Lack of financial resources may have made it difficult to implement the proposed 
radical policy change (e.g. more spatially concentrated retail and reduction in square 
metreage of retail floor space). A  possible solution could be the strengthening of 
the cooperation of the commercial actors. However, retail traders often do not take 
demographic decline into account. In order to increase the cooperation between 
entrepreneurs and to inform them about future developments (e.g. demographic 
decline) special meetings (Ondernem ers in bew eging) are organised.
2001-2009: 
NO RADICAL STRATEGIC CHANGES IN OTHER ECONOMIC 
POLICIES
Demographic decline has resulted in hardly any changes in other the economic poli­
cies, neither at the local, regional, nor at the provincial level (see Section 6.3.2). From 
2007 onwards, the problem perception of the province and the municipalities did 
change and they started to perceive demographic decline as a problem (discourse)100. 
However, they made no connection (nor did the business sector) between demo­
graphic decline and the regional economy, so they did not change their economic 
policy (discourse).
That lack of connection was caused partly by the lack of attention paid to the de­
crease in working age population. Bureau PAU  (2007) and ABF (Luckey et al., 2007) 
both argued that, if labour participation levels were to stay the same, this decline 
would cause the labour force to decline as well. Not everyone agreed whether this 
decline in working age population would cause (labour market) problems (more 
specifically a decrease in the supply of labour), and that was a reason why municipali­
ties did not change their economic policies101.
100 THIS CHANGE IN PERCEPTION WAS INFLUENCED BY STUDIES MADE IN PREPARATION OF 
THE PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, SUCH AS LOUTER AND VAN EIKEREN (2007), MUST 
STEDEBOUW (2007), LUCKEY ET AL. (2007), AND VAN TIL ET AL. (2007A, B).
101 ALL RESEARCHERS (BUREAU PAU, 2007; LUCKEY ET AL., 2007; BROERSMA ET AL., 2008) 
AGREED THAT, AT THE TIME, THIS DECLINE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION WAS NOT CAUSING 
ANY PROBLEMS. THIS COULD BE EXPLAINED BY THE INCREASE IN GROSS LABOUR PARTICI­
PATION RATE (ESPECIALLY AMONG WOMEN). HOWEVER, THEY DISAGREED ABOUT THE 
FUTURE LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS OF THIS DECLINE. BUREAU PAU ARGUED THAT IN THE 
FUTURE THIS DECLINE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION COULD LEAD TO A DECLINE IN LABOUR
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There was not only disagreement about the development of the supply of labour 
but also about the development of the demand for labour. The governments 
(especially the municipalities) and business community (The Confederation of 
Netherlands Industry and Employers north Netherlands) were optimistic about the 
future development in labour demand. They expected that the number of jobs in 
the Eemsdelta would grow, because various energy companies decided to settle 
there (three new power plants will be built in the coming years). This was supported 
by some researchers (Broersma et al., 2009 and SBE, 2009a), however, there were 
also researchers who were more pessimistic about the development of the labour 
demand102.
The policy stability also can be explained by the existing pattern of interaction 
(actors and coalitions). Municipalities feared emphasising demographic decline, 
because this may negatively influence their region’s image, thus discouraging new 
businesses (employment) and people to settle there. They were afraid of a self ful­
filling prophecy. As a result, the municipalities did not pay attention to demographic 
decline in their economic policies.
6.4.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
2003-2008: 
STABILITY OF LOCAL STRATEGIC POLICY
During this period, demographic decline did not result in economic policy changes, 
for neither the municipalities nor the province perceived population decline as a 
problem (discourse). The attitude of the province could be explained by the fact that
FORCE, WHICH MIGHT CAUSE PROBLEMS (BUREAU PAU, 2007, P.15). IT WOULD BECOME 
DIFFICULT FOR BUSINESSES IN THE EEMSDELTA TO FIND ENOUGH EMPLOYEES, AND COULD 
BE A REASON FOR LABOUR-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES TO LEAVE THE REGION. BOTH DEVEL­
OPMENTS WOULD INFLUENCE THE EMPLOYMENT, NEGATIVELY, WHICH COULD INCREASE 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE EVEN FURTHER (BUREAU PAU, 2007). ALSO, TOP TEAM DIJKSTAL AND 
MANS (2009C) WARNED OF THIS CYCLICAL EFFECT AND ARGUED THAT EEMSDELTA, BECAUSE 
OF THEIR BACKWARD ECONOMIC SITUATION, WAS VULNERABLE TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. 
BROERSMA ET AL. (2008), IN CONTRAST, WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE DEVELOP­
MENT OF THE FUTURE LABOUR SUPPLY. THE REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT THEY EXPECTED 
THE LABOUR PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN TO INCREASE WHICH WOULD COMPENSATE THE 
DECREASE IN WORKING AGE POPULATION AND WOULD CAUSE AN INCREASE IN THE LABOUR 
FORCE (BROERSMA ET AL., 2008, P.9 AND 16).
102 GARDENIER ET AL. (2009) PREDICTED THAT EMPLOYMENT LEVELS IN THE NOTHERN NETHER­
LANDS WOULD CHANGE FROM -800 TO +2,000 (GARDENIER ET AL. 2009, 43) INSTEAD OF A 
GROWTH BY 10,000 JOBS IN ONE YEAR, AS EXPECTED BY BROERSMA ET AL. (2008).
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its population was not yet declining. Terneuzen, however, was facing a population 
decline, and is expected to do so in the future103. Nevertheless, Terneuzen believed 
that the demographic decline would be reversible, and it wanted to increase its 
population and employment opportunities. The existing pattern of interaction 
(actors and coalitions) also played an important role in this policy stability; the munici­
palities were used to competing with each other for attracting retail businesses, jobs 
in retail, and the shopping public.
In addition, the decline in working age population was not seen as a problem by the 
province or by the municipalities (discourse). Although, both were facing a decrease 
in the working age population, and are expected to do so in the future, they have not 
paid attention to this in their economic policies. Moreover, the province expected 
that, until 2015, the labour force in the province would grow, annually, by 0.5%, and 
this growth was expected to be largest (1.0%) during the years up to 2008 (Provincie 
Zeeland, 2005, p.11). The reason for this expected growth in labour force was the 
growth in labour participation which was expected to compensate the decrease in 
working age population (Provincie Zeeland, 2005, p.50). It was not the decline in 
working age population that was the perceived problem, but rather the creation of 
enough employment to enable the labour force to grow  (Provincie Zeeland, 2005, 
p.11). Besides, ageing of the labour force was also perceived a problem by the 
province and the municipality Terneuzen (Provincie Zeeland, 2005; Gemeente 
Terneuzen, 2005a).
This does not mean that, during this period, the economic policy did not change 
at all. However, local governments did not relate those changes to demographic 
decline, and the changes therefore are outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, 
those policy changes (e.g set up of N.V. Econom ic Im puls) may have a positive affect 
on demographic developments, by attracting new businesses and therefore people 
to the area.
103 TERNEUZEN RECOGNISED THAT, IF THE POPULATION DECLINE WOULD CONTINUE, THIS 
COULD AFFECT THE RETAIL SECTOR, NEGATIVELY (GEMEENTE TERNEUZEN, 2005A). 
TERNEUZEN ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, BETWEEN 1996 AND 2003, THE RETAIL SECTOR WAS 
CONFRONTED WITH JOB LOSSES AND CLOSURES. BESIDES, IT ARGUED THAT IN SOME AREAS 
RETAIL PROPERTIES REMAINED UNOCCUPIED (GEMEENTE TERNEUZEN, 2005A). BEFORE, 
DROOGH TROMMELEN BROEKHUIS (2003), WHO WERE COMMISSIONED BY THE CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE TO FORMULATE A REGIONAL RETAIL STRUCTURE FOR ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN,
ALREADY CONCLUDED THAT THE RETAIL SECTOR IN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN WAS RELATIVELY 
LARGE, COMPARED TO THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS AND THAT IN SOME AREAS (E.G. SAS
VAN GENT, OOSTBURG AND AXEL) RETAIL PROPERTIES REMAINED UNOCCUPIED. THIS INFOR­
MATION WAS USED AS A BASIS FOR THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF TERNEUZEN.
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2008-2009: 
POLICY PROCESS TOWARDS CONSERVATIVE STRATEGIC 
CHANGES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES
In 2008, the province started to challenge the lack of attention by municipalities for 
demographic decline (actor and coalition). This change in problem perception 
(discourse) was triggered by the demographic situation: the working age population 
had already decreased, and some municipalities already faced a population decline104.
Zeeland was the first Dutch province to pay attention to possible economic con­
sequences of demographic decline (Provincie Zeeland, 2008). Nevertheless, there 
were very few changes in its economic policy. The reason was that their economic 
policy was aimed at the 2009-2012 period, and the province expected its labour force 
not to decline until 2020 and its population not until 2025. Another reason for this 
policy stability was that the province was quite optimistic about the possibilities, at 
least for the short term, for compensating the decline in working age population by 
increasing labour participation of women.
Although there have been very few changes in the economic policy of the 
province or municipalities that are related to demographic decline105, there have 
been some actions (e.g. joint marketing campaign to attract inhabitants and 
employees, research about the relationship between population decline and ser­
vices). This first action can be considered conservative because it aimed to increase 
the working age population or the labour supply. The reason for this concrete action 
was that both government and business community considered the scarcity on the 
labour market (quantitative mismatch between the labour demand and supply) as a 
problem106, regardless of the causes. The governments related this problem to demo-
104 BESIDES, THE MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE, VAN WAVEREN, SEEMS TO PLAY AN 
IMPORTANT ROLE IN INCREASING THE ATTENTION FOR DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AT PROVIN­
CIAL LEVEL.
105 THE ABOVE MENTIONED CHANGE IN THE PROVINCIAL SOCIAL ECONOMIC POLICY IS AN 
EXCEPTION.
106 THE EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION FOR BRABANT AND ZEELAND (BRABANTS ZEEUWSE 
WERKGEVERSVERENIGING ABBREVIATION BZW) EXPECTS A SHORTAGE OF LABOUR WHICH
WILL BE A PROBLEM FOR REACHING THEIR AIM OF AN ANNUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH OF 
2.5%, 2040 (BZW, 2008B). THIS EXPECTATION WAS BASED ON RESEARCH BY BZW ABOUT THE 
DEMAND FOR LABOUR UNTIL 2015. THIS STUDY SHOWED THAT A SHORTAGE OF LABOUR 
MIGHT OCCUR. IT INDICATED THAT IT IS ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO FULFIL JOB VACAN­
CIES THAT REQUIRE PEOPLE WITH AN INTERMEDIATE VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND HIGHER 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATIONAL DEGREE, AND IT EXPECTS THAT THE PRICE FOR LABOUR WOULD
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graphic decline and considered it reversible. However, most businesses (except for 
some large companies and the Dutch association of industry and trade Zeeland107), 
while supporting the actions, did not relate labour market problems to demographic 
decline. Nevertheless, the actors agreed on the way to solve the problem, namely by 
attracting new employees from other regions and countries, through marketing.
From 2008 onwards, the province started a number of initiatives to increase the 
attention of municipalities and businesses for demographic decline and its conse­
quences for the labour market, in particular, and the economy, in general. The 
province was trying to convince others that, in the long run, demographic decline 
would not be completely reversible, and, therefore, that it would be important, not 
only to focus on attracting labour, but also on increasing labour productivity and 
participation108. However, municipalities and businesses were finding it difficult to 
accept the idea that demographic decline was a structural phenomenon and had 
to be accepted (BZW, 2008b). They did not share the problem perception of the 
province (discourse). They were afraid that doing so would damage the image of the 
region. The business community argued that it would be necessary to combat and 
reverse demographic decline, and municipalities and businesses accused the 
province of paying too little attention to the conditions that would make Zeeland an
INCREASE AS A RESULT OF THE SCARCITY AT THE LABOUR MARKET. THE REASON FOR THIS 
RESEARCH WAS THE SCARCITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET WHICH WAS INDICATED BY THE 
DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT, IN COMBINATION WITH THE INCREASE IN JOB VACANCIES. 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE WAS NOT MENTIONED (BZW, 2008A). NOT ONLY BZW, BUT ALSO 
THE DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE ZEELAND (NEDERLANDSE MAATSCHAP­
PIJ VOOR NIJVERHEID EN HANDEL, DEPARTEMENT ZEELAND) AND INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSES 
(RABOBANK, DOW  CHEMICALS, LOGISTICS BUSINESSES) EXPRESSED THEIR WORRIES ABOUT 
THE LABOUR MARKET PROBLEMS WITHIN ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN.
107 THE DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE ZEELAND DID RELATE THE LABOUR 
MARKET PROBLEMS TO DECLINE IN THE WORKING AGE POPULATION. THEIR AIM, AT THE 
LEAST, WAS TO STABILISE THE CURRENT WORKING AGE POPULATION. IN ORDER TO REACH 
THIS AIM, THEY ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO FOCUS ON RETAINING SUFFICIENT 
YOUNG PEOPLE OF THE AGE OF 0 TO 20 YEARS AND TO RETAIN THE POPULATION GROUP
OF THE AGE OF 20 TO 60 YEARS. THEY ARGUE THAT IN ORDER TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE 
IT IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT TO INVEST IN ATTRACTIVE SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT BUT ALSO TO 
CREATE ENOUGH EMPLOYMENT (JOBS) (NEDERLANDSE MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR NIJVERHEID EN 
HANDEL DEPARTEMENT ZEELAND, 2008).
108 THIS CONCLUSION ALSO WAS PRESENTED BY THE DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRY AND 
TRADE ZEELAND (NEDERLANDSE MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR NIJVERHEID EN HANDEL DEPARTE­
MENT ZEELAND, 2008) AND HOVENS ET AL. (2009), WHO WERE ASKED BY THE CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE TO INVESTIGATE THE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH-WEST NETHER­
LANDS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LABOUR MARKET AND ECONOMY.
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attractive place for new businesses to settle. The business community said that the 
province was using demographic decline as an argument not to invest in business 
locations or large projects, such as a new container terminal109.
Despite their disagreement about the nature of the problem, the province together 
with actors involved in the economy formulated several actions regarding the popu­
lation decline (Provincie Zeeland, 2009c). Only a few of these actions were related 
to the economy, most of them conservative. An exception is the idea to expand the 
opening hours of child care facilities in order to increase the labour participation 
am ong women. This can be considered a radical policy change because it does not 
intend to increase the working age population. It accepts that the current working 
age population decreases but tries to compensate it by increasing the labour partici­
pation and supply of labour. Regardless the difference in problem perception, this 
solution has been accepted by all participants, as it matches both problem percep­
tions.
2008-2009: 
NO STRATEGIC CHANGES IN RETAIL POLICY
In 2008, the province started to perceive demographic decline as a problem that 
could negatively affect the demand for services (including retail). It argued that it 
would be important to maintain the quality of services by concentrating them in 
centres and by a smart combination of services (Provincie Zeeland, 2008). The muni­
cipalities, however, continued their existing retail policies of maintaining and 
increasing their retail services. The prime reason for this policy stability was the 
existing pattern of interaction between municipalities (especially local politicians) 
(actors and coalitions) and their problem perceptions (discourse). They continued to 
compete against each other and to fight over more services in their local centres. 
This behaviour was based on the fear that a reduction in commercial services would 
increase demographic decline, which explains why they did not accept the new idea 
that demographic decline is a structural and irreversible problem. Besides, local 
administrators argued that attracting new retail businesses would be important 
because it creates employment (jobs) and attracts a shopping public, who spend
109 THE PROVINCE EXPECTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE DEMAND FOR BUSINESS LOCATIONS 
(REGULAR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES) WOULD REDUCE, DUE TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE 
(GEDEPUTEERDE STATEN PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2008; PROVINCIE ZEELAND, 2008). THEY 
BASED THIS CONCLUSION ON THE ADVICE OF THE DUTCH COUNCIL FOR HOUSING, SPATIAL 
PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT (DERKS ET AL., 2006A).
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money. In addition, the high vacancy rate of existing retail properties, according to 
the local administrators, is a result of the redevelopment plans110.
6.4.4 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS
The Eemsdelta was the only region in which a radical change in strategic local and 
regional retail policy took place. The prime reason for this radical strategic policy 
change was that the involved actors accepted the new problem perception that 
demographic decline is a structural and irreversible problem (discourse). This change 
in problem perception (discourse) was influenced, positively, by the various studies 
(knowledge resource) that expected the decrease in population to continue, and to 
cause vacancies in shops (and houses) and a reduction in the value of commercial 
real estate. Also the insight that, should governments continue to implement their 
existing policies, the decrease in household numbers would increase and the value 
of real estate would decrease, contributing to this change of the problem perception 
(knowledge resource). In addition, the appointment of a new mayor in Delfzijl (actors 
and coalition) and the stimulating role of the province played a pivotal role in achiev­
ing a regional agreement about services.
We have seen in the other two regions that demographic decline did not result in 
changes in retail policy. An explanation is that the majority of actors perceived 
demographic decline not as a problem for retail. In those regions, the problems in re­
tail (e.g. vacancies in retail property) were not related to demographic decline but to 
redevelopment plans. Local administrators were hesitant to make this link because 
they were afraid that it would affect their development plans on retail negatively. 
Besides, many actors also believed that the supply of services was an important 
factor in the attractiveness of a municipality (residential quality) to potential new 
residents. They were often afraid that a reduction in local services would increase 
demographic decline and, therefore, often did not accept the idea that demographic 
decline is a structural and irreversible problem which could affect retail, and that 
the retail policy needed to be changed radically, accordingly. Besides, unlike the 
Eemsdelta, in the other two regions there were not many studies (know ledge  
resources) available which could convince local administrators to change their 
perception about the nature of the problem and the possible solution to it.
110 IN 2009, THE PROVINCE ASKED SCOOP TO INVESTIGATE THE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS, 
THE AVAILABILITY AND THE NEED FOR SERVICES (INCLUDING SHOPS) BY INHABITANTS OF 
THE TEN VILLAGES BELONGING TO SLUIS (VAN DER WOUW ET AL., 2009). SEE CHAPTER 5 FOR 
OUTCOMES OF THIS STUDY.
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In relation to the labour market, in all three regions, policy changes have been made. 
M ost of these changes are in strategic policy and are considered conservative, as 
they are easier to agree on, because they fit in with the traditional policy arrange­
ment. Although there is no shared problem perception, the governments and busi­
nesses agreed to solve the labour market problems through attracting new working 
age population by holding marketing campaigns. Some perceive demographic de­
cline as a temporary and reversible problem which causes labour market problems, 
while others do not111. Both problem perceptions fit the existing pattern of interac­
tion (actors and coalitions), the resources, and the rules.
In 2009, the province of Zeeland changed its policies regarding labour market (and 
social-economic policy) and, in response to the decline in working age population, 
formulated several initiatives to increase labour participation and innovations, which 
could be considered radical strategic policy changes. An explanation for this is that 
the problem perception of the province changed radically (discourse). The province 
accepted the idea that demographic decline was a structural problem which could 
affect the labour market accordingly. This was stimulated by researches and the re­
gional dialogue (knowledge resource) which was organised by the province Zeeland.
In the other regions, demographic decline did not result in changes in economic 
policy. In none of the municipalities, including Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, changes were 
found in their economic and/or business location policy. The reason for this is that 
the actors involved did not perceive demographic decline as an economic problem 
(discourse). This could be explained by a lack of knowledge (resource). The lack 
of empirical evidence about the relationship between demography and economy 
made it difficult for governments to change their problem perception radically. This 
is also true for the existing patterns of interaction (actors and coalitions). Within a 
municipality, different units were often responsible for policies on labour market, 
acquisition and promotion, business locations and retail. This internal organisational 
fragmentation also did not help governments to acknowledge what economic 
effects demographic decline might have. The economic sector was also not used to 
taking demographic developments and projections into account. The governments 
were afraid of paying attention to demographic decline, in fear of a negative effect 
on the economy. They were afraid that this would harm the image of their region 
and discourage businesses from settling in the region. The municipalities were also
111 THIS CAN BE EXPLAINED BY THE EXISTING ECONOMIC SITUATION (THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, 
STARTED IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2008), CONCEALING ANY LABOUR MARKET PROBLEMS 
THAT DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE MAY HAVE CAUSED. IT (TEMPORARY) REDUCED LABOUR 
DEMAND, PERHAPS CAUSING POSSIBLE FUTURE LABOUR MARKET PROBLEMS TO BE UNDER­
ESTIMATED.
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hesitant to intervene in the market. The philosophy of ‘leaving it to the market’ was 
strongly supported.
The above mentioned radical strategic policy changes (in the province of Zeeland 
and Eemsdelta and Delfzijl) occurred with only a few of the dimensions of the policy 
arrangement changing as well. What did play an important role in reaching those 
radical changes in strategic policy were the new problem perception that demo­
graphic decline is a structural problem (discourse); new knowledge (resources); and 
challeging coalitions (actors and coalitions). However, radical changes in resource 
dimension (money) and rules dimension (formal and informal rules) did not occur. 
From this, can be concluded that, in order to reach radical strategic policy changes, 
changes in only a few dimensions (discourse, actors and coalitions, knowledge 
resource) of the policy arrangement would be sufficient.
6.5 CONGRUENCE
This section analyses congruence in the three case-study regions, making the distinc­
tion between strategic, structural-internal and structural-external congruence (see 
Chapter 3).
6.5.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
In Parkstad Limburg, demographic decline resulted in hardly any policy changes, 
except for conservative changes in labour market policy. Those last changes could 
be explained by the fact that the ideas of those who perceived demographic decline 
as a labour market problem matched the ideas of others, who saw the labour market 
problems without relating them to demographic decline. There was strategic congru­
ence about the nature of the problem112 and the way to solve it (but not about the 
causes). An additional explanation for the conservative policy changes could be that 
this new problem perception could be easily absorbed by the other dimensions of 
the policy arrangement: there was structural-internal congruence.
There were very few radical policy changes in labour market policy. This could be 
explained by the fact that the idea brought forward by ‘challenging’ actors (the 
province of Limburg, regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the organisation representing the interest of various businesses in 
Limburg (O ndernem end  Lim burg)) that demographic decline (decrease in working
112 THE ACTORS AGREED THAT SOME SECTORS WERE CONFRONTED WITH LABOUR SHORTAGES 
AND THEY BELIEVED THIS PROBLEM TO BE REVERSIBLE.
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age population) was structural and irreversible, was not shared by the actors in­
volved. From 2009 onwards, as described in Section 6.4.1, the province and regional 
organisation tried to convince other actors involved that they needed to change 
their problem perception radically. A  complicating factor was that this new prob­
lem perception did not match the other dimensions of the policy arrangement. For 
example, it did not fit with the behaviour of the actors who were used to striving for 
economic growth and believed that demographic growth was necessary to achieve 
this.
Structural-external incongruence, in contrast, did not seem to be the reason why 
there were so few radical policy changes. After all, the idea that the decrease in 
working age population was structural, irreversible, and may cause labour market 
problems, was in keeping with developments in the wider national institutional con­
text (see Box 6.1).
The fact that, in Parkstad Limburg, no policy changes regarding retail were formu­
lated in response to demographic decline, could be explained by the lack of strategic 
congruence. The regional organisation saw  the need for those (radical) changes, but 
municipalities did not see demographic decline as causing problems in the area of 
retail. Also, there was a lack of structural-internal congruence. Even if the involved 
actors had reached strategic congruence, it would have been difficult to formulate 
radical policy changes, because the idea that demographic decline affects retail and 
that demographic decline is structural and irreversible did not match the dimensions 
of the existing policy arrangement. It did not fit the existing pattern of interaction of 
the municipalities, who were used to competing with each other over the settlement 
of new retailers, nor did it fit the existing resources and rules. Unlike the other 
aspects of local economic policy, for retail there were no relevant developments in 
the wider institutional context. National government had no policy on this, because 
it considered it the responsibility of the provinces and municipalities. As a result, 
there were no national financial resources available to support municipalities in 
shrinking regions, to finance the restructuring of shopping areas. The wider national 
context, thus, did not stimulate local policy change. However, this did not prevent 
local governments from changing their policies. If local governments had wanted to 
change their retail policy radically, there would have been structural-external congru­
ence.
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BOX 6.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WIDER INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
IN 2008, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERCEIVED THE DECLINE IN WORKING AGE 
POPULATION AS A PROBLEM FOR THE LABOUR MARKET, AND TRIED TO SOLVE IT BY 
INCREASING THE LABOUR SUPPLY (E.G. BY INCREASING THE LABOUR PARTICIPATION FOR 
WOMEN AND ELDERLY) (COMMISSIE BAKKER, 2008). THE DISCUSSION ABOUT MOVING THE 
RETIREMENT AGE FROM 65 TO 67 IS AN EXAMPLE.
THIS PERCEPTION WAS TRIGGERED BY THE ADVICE OF THE BAKKER COMMISSION 
(COMMISSIE BAKKER, 2008), COMMISSIONED BY THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND 
EMPLOYMENT IN 2007. THE COMMISSION EXPECTED THAT, FROM 2010 ONWARDS, THE 
WORKING AGE POPULATION WOULD DECREASE. BETWEEN 2010 AND 2040, THE WORKING 
AGE POPULATION WAS EXPECTED TO DECREASE BY 1 MILLION PEOPLE. UNTIL 2016, IT 
EXPECTED THE LABOUR FORCE TO GROW, BECAUSE THE DECLINE IN WORKING AGE 
POPULATION WOULD BE COMPENSATED BY AN INCREASE IN LABOUR PARTICIPATION 
(TO AROUND 80%). HOWEVER, AFTER 2016, THE LABOUR FORCE ALSO IS EXPECTED TO 
DECREASE, FROM 7.9 IN 2016 TO 7.2 MILLION PEOPLE BY 2040 (COMMISSIE BAKKER, 2008, 
P.19-21). THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDED THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO STIMULATE 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION.
IN ADDITION, THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(VROM) AND THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM RELATIONS (BZK), IN 
THEIR ACTION PLAN ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE (INTERBESTUURLIJK ACTIEPLAN 
BEVOLKINGSDALING), STATED THAT POPULATION DECLINE MIGHT NEGATIVELY 
INFLUENCE THE LABOUR MARKET (ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF HEALTH CARE), AND THEY 
FORMULATED VARIOUS ACTIONS TO TACKLE THIS (MINISTERIE VAN BZK ET AL., 2009). THE 
SHRINKING REGIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD NEED TO MAKE REGIONAL LABOUR MARKET 
ANALYSES, AND THEY WOULD RECEIVE SUPPORT FOR THIS FROM THE MINISTRY OF 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EMPLOYMENT (MINISTERIE VAN BZK ET AL., 2009).
THE CONTENT OF THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE WAS 
INFLUENCED BY STUDIES BY TOP TEAM (TOPTEAM KRIMP) DIJKSTAL AND MANS (2009A, B, 
C), WHO RECOMMENDED THAT GOVERNMENTS AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY SHOULD 
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, AND THAT MUNICIPALITIES AND 
PROVINCES SHOULD INCORPORATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE 
INTO THEIR ECONOMIC AND LABOUR MARKET POLICIES. THIS TOP TEAM ALSO ARGUED 
THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO STRENGTHEN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN TRAINING 
AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, IN ORDER TO RESOLVE MISMATCHES BETWEEN THE 
LABOUR SUPPLY AND DEMAND113.
APART FROM ATTENTION PAID TO THE LABOUR MARKET, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO OTHER ECONOMIC POLICY FIELDS (E.G. RETAIL, BUSINESS 
AND OFFICE LOCATIONS, REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) IN RELATION TO 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WAS INVITED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTION PLAN BUT DECLINED. AS A RESULT, THOSE ASPECTS WERE 
NOT INCLUDED IN THE EXISTING NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY. MOREOVER, IN THE 
ACTION PLAN ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE, NOT MUCH ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE 
ECONOMY. THEREFORE, IF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAD WANTED TO CHANGE THEIR 
CONGRUENCE. BUT THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT STIMULATE NOR FACILITATE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DO SO. THERE WERE CHANGES IN THE WIDER INSTITUTIONAL
113 THE OUTCOME OF THE WORKSHOP ON EDUCATION AND LABOUR MARKET AT THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ABOUT POPULATION DECLINE (KRIMP ALS KANS) (MINISTERIE VAN VROM AND 
MINISTERIE VAN BZK, 2009; AUTHOR UNKNOWN, 2009) WAS ALSO USED AS INPUT FOR THE 
ACTION PLAN.
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CONTEXT, WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, WOULD 
ENABLE RADICAL ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES AT LOCAL LEVEL. THERE WOULD BE 
STRUCTURAL-EXTERNAL CONGRUENCE. THE EXISTING NATIONAL POLICIES ON BUSINESS 
LOCATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE CONSISTENT WITH RADICAL ECONOMIC POLICY 
CHANGES AT MUNICIPAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS114. FURTHERMORE, THEY STIMULATED 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (ALSO SHRINKING MUNICIPALITIES) TO CHANGE THEIR POLICIES 
RADICALLY.
FROM 2010 ONWARDS, THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS STARTED TO PAY 
ATTENTION TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE. IN RESPONSE TO THE DUTCH LOWER HOUSE 
RESOLUTION BY ORTEGA, SMEET AND TEN HOOPEN (TWEEDE KAMER, 2009B), THIS 
MINISTRY COMMISSIONED THE CONSULTING FIRM OF BERENSCHOT TO INVESTIGATE 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AND LOCAL ECONOMIC STRATEGIES FOR 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE (IN RELATION TO SERVICES, BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND 
EMPLOYMENT) (MINISTERIE VAN EZ, 2010). IN THE SAME YEAR, THE CABINET'S 
ATTENTION FOR DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN RELATION TO THE ECONOMY INCREASED. 
THE CABINET ASKED THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF THE NETHERLANDS 
(SER) TO INVESTIGATE HOW THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY COULD CONTRIBUTE TO 
RESOLVING THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION DECLINE. THE SER  WAS 
ASKED TO INVESTIGATE HOW THE AWARENESS IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY COULD 
BE STRENGTHENED AND HOW THIS COMMUNITY COULD ANTICIPATE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHANGES (MIDDELKOOP, 2010).
The changes in policy on business locations do not need to be explained here, for 
they were not made in response to demographic decline. If the involved actors 
had accepted the idea that demographic decline affected the demand for business 
locations, that the demographic trend was structural (and irreversible), and that the 
policy on business locations needed to change radically, it would have been easy to 
reach strategic congruence about this. After all, it matched the existing idea of the 
municipalities, the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg and the province that 
restructuring of business locations was important and that the development of only 
a few new business locations was necessary. However, it probably would have been 
difficult to reach structural-internal congruence, because the dimensions did not 
match this idea (discourse). Especially the lack of financial resources was expected to 
be a problem. The structural-external congruence would not have been a problem, 
because this new idea matched the national policy regarding business locations.
114 AT NATIONAL LEVEL, THERE WAS MUCH POLICY ATTENTION PAID TO RESTRUCTUR­
ING BUSINESS LOCATIONS, EXAMPLES OF THIS ARE THE SER SCALE (SER 2008), THE 
TASKFORCE ON RESTRUCTURING BUSINESS LOCATIONS UNDER LEADERSHIP OF 
NOORDANUS (TASKFORCE (HER)ONTWIKKELING BEDRIJVENTERREINEN, 2008), A PBL STUDY 
ON THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS LOCATIONS (RENES ET AL., 2009), A STUDY BY THE VROM 
COUNCIL (THE DUTCH COUNCIL FOR HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(VROMRAAD, 2006B)) AND THE PROGRAMME BEAUTIFUL NETHERLANDS (MOOI NEDERLAND), 
WHICH INTENDS TO PREVENT THE CLUTTERING OF THE LANDSCAPE.
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6.5.2 EEMSDELTA
In 2009, the municipalities Appingedam and Delfzijl jointly decided to radically 
change their retail policy. In 2002, Delfzijl already decided to change its retail policy 
radically. There was strategic congruence on the idea that demographic decline was 
a structural problem and that no more shopping areas were needed. There was, 
however, disagreement about the details and the implementation of the policy. This 
was caused by the lack of structural-internal congruence. For the idea of spatially 
concentrating commercial services did not fit the existing pattern of interaction (ac­
tor and coalitions), nor did it fit the resources, or the rules.
Another factor that might have made it difficult to formulate a radical retail policy 
change, was the lack of policy attention at national level for this policy field. Because 
the national government did not deal with retail, structural-external incongruence 
could not be the problem. However, at a national level, the lack of policy attention in 
this field did not support local governments to change their policy radically. In spite 
of all those hypothesised obstacles (structural-internal incongruence and the lack 
of national policy attention), the radical change to the retail policy did occur and in 
Delfzijl it was even implemented.
In Eemsdelta, hardly any changes in labour market policy could be attributed to 
demographic decline. The reason was the lack of strategic congruence: the involved 
actors did not share the same problem perception (discourse). They did not perceive 
demographic decline as a labour market problem. If they had agreed that demo­
graphic decline was a temporary problem, which would affect the labour market 
negatively, it would have been easy to reach conservative policy changes because 
this idea would have been structural-internal congruent. If however the involved 
actors had agreed that demographic decline was a structural problem which affected 
the labour market negatively and asked for radical policy changes, the structural- 
internal incongruence would have made it difficult to formulate a radical policy 
change. For the idea did not fit the existing pattern of interaction (actors and coali­
tions), resources and rules. The behaviour of the actors, for example, was focused 
on demographic growth (and increasing the working age population) because they 
expected the demand for labour to increase and considered demographic growth to 
be a necessary condition for economic growth. A s argued above (see Box 6.1), there 
would have been no problems with structural-external congruence if there had been 
a shared agreement about the structural nature of the demographic decline and the 
need for a radical labour market policy change.
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The policy on business locations also was not changed in the Eemsdelta in relation to 
demographic decline. There was no strategic congruence between the province and 
the business community. The business community did not agree with the province 
that there was no need for more business locations, nor did it agree with the policy 
that the provincial subsidy for restructuring business locations was available only to 
locations in the core regions.
6.5.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
For this region, it has been shown that most actors acknowledged that scarcity on 
the labour market was a problem, and that they wanted to reverse it. However, they 
did not relate this problem to demographic decline. The province did, arguing that 
the decline in working age population was a structural and irreversible problem. 
However, this new idea was accepted neither by the municipalities nor by the busi­
ness community. This lack of strategic congruence explains why there were no radi­
cal policy changes at local and regional government levels. M ost actors, in fact, saw 
demographic decline as being reversible. This made conservative policy changes pos­
sible, such as enlarging the working age population. Moreover, conservative policy 
changes matched the existing patterns of interaction (actors and coalition), resources 
and rules: there was structural-internal congruence. This, for example, 
fitted the behaviour of the involved actors who focused on increasing the working 
age population because they considered it to be necessary for economic growth.
In this case-study region, there were no radical policy changes in retail, which could 
be considered a response to demographic decline. Again, there was no strategic con­
gruence. The province tried to increase the policy attention of the municipalities and 
entrepreneurs for this subject, and to gather support for new ideas. It warned that 
demographic decline could endanger the supply of services, and that to maintain the 
quality of services, spatial concentration would be needed. The first idea matched 
the existing ideas of the municipalities, and probably could have counted on their 
support. However, the idea of spatial concentration did not match the existing pat­
tern of interaction (competition between municipalities); there was no structural 
internal congruence.
In 2008, the province argued that demographic decline might reduce the demand for 
business locations (Provincie Zeeland, 2008). This new problem perception was not 
shared by the municipalities nor by the business community (no strategic congru­
ence). There was also no structural internal congruence; the pattern of interaction 
was one of inter-municipal competition, and there were insufficient financial resourc­
es for restructuring business locations. This lack of strategic and structural-internal
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congruence is an explanation why no radical policy changes in business location 
policies were formulated in relation to demographic decline.
6.6 LOCAL SPATIAL CONDITIONS
This section analyses the local spatial conditions in the three case-study regions, and 
investigates whether these conditions have influenced changes in local economic 
policy.
6.6.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
The conservative policy changes, such as the marketing campaign to attract new 
people (of a working age) to the region, was partly influenced by the region’s loca­
tion, at the border with Germany. The growth of Aken University115 encouraged the 
regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg and the municipalities to believe that it 
was possible to attract new people (consisting of graduates from Aken University) 
to work and live in the region and to attract employees of that university to live (and 
spend money) in the region.
The local spatial conditions might have been a reason why radical policy changes at 
the regional level did not occur, for example, in the policy field of retail. There was no 
accepted central city, and the municipalities competed with each other over attract­
ing new shops to their regions. This unclear spatial hierarchy made it difficult to reach 
agreement about the reduction in development plans for additional shops, or on the 
distribution of those new shops over the municipalities.
Local spatial conditions affected other policy changes and actions that could not be 
attributed to demographic decline, such as the regional agreement that only a few 
new business locations were needed, the restructuring of business locations and the 
focus on certain economic sectors. For the demand for business locations was low, 
and plots of land were easily (and visibly!) available. The cross-border business loca­
tion of Avantis in Heerlen, which was intended to be a flagship project, is one
115 IN 2007, THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INDICATED THE RWTH UNIVERSITY OF AKEN,
WITH OVER 30,000 STUDENTS, AS AN ELITE UNIVERSITY. APART FROM THIS, THERE WERE
ANOTHER 10,000 STUDENTS AT THE THREE UNIVERSITIES OF APPLIED SCIENCES, ALSO 
LOCATED IN AACHEN. THE GERMAN STATE OF NORTHRHINE-WESTPHALIA, THE MUNICIPAL­
ITY OF AACHEN, AND THE UNIVERSITY RWTH, IN 2009, DECIDED TO CONSTRUCT TWO NEW 
CAMPUSES, WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF AACHEN. THIS WAS 
EXPECTED TO LEAD TO 19 RESEARCH CLUSTERS, GENERATING 20,000 NEW JOBS AND
ATTRACTING 25,000 EXTRA INHABITANTS.
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example. Regional agreement on business locations was relatively easy to reach, 
because only three of the seven municipalities had such locations.
There was another local spatial condition that affected the policy on business loca­
tions. In Parkstad Limburg, a lot of business locations were privately owned 
(especially in Heerlen (76%)116). Due to the low demand for business locations and the 
difficulty to earn land revenues in shrinking regions, it was difficult for municipalities 
to stimulate private owners to restructure their business locations117 118. Another local 
spatial condition that made it difficult to restructure business locations in Parkstad 
Limburg, was the fact that the soil in many of these locations was polluted, as the 
locations often were former mining areas.
The decision to focus local economic policy on certain sectors, another example of a 
policy change that could not be attributed to demographic decline, was also influ­
enced by local spatial conditions. One of these sectors was that of energy; and Park­
stad Limburg had housed this sector (coal mines) for many years. Another of these 
sectors was tourism; the region was already much loved by tourists because of its 
landscape, the music festivals, the museums, attraction parks and cultural heritage.
6.6.2 EEMSDELTA
In Eemsdelta, the demographic decline resulted in a radical change in local and 
regional retail policy. The visibility of the problem (high vacancies119) increased the 
perception in Delfzijl and Appingedam, that demographic decline was a problem for
116 IN KERKRADE, 18% OF BUSINESS LOCATIONS WERE PRIVATELY OWNED, AND IN BRUNSSUM 
NONE OF THE BUSINESS LOCATIONS WAS PRIVATELY OWNED (IBIS, 2007). IN THE OTHER TWO 
CASE-STUDY REGIONS, BUSINESS LOCATIONS WERE ALMOST ALL PUBLICLY OWNED.
117 BTM SUCCEEDED IN RECEIVING A SUBSIDY FROM THE NATIONAL INNOVATION PROGRAMME, 
BEAUTIFUL NETHERLANDS (INNOVATIEREGELING MOOI NEDERLAND), FOR A PILOT PROJECT 
IN WHICH SPECIAL ATTENTION WAS TO BE PAID TO RESTRUCTURING BUSINESS LOCATIONS IN 
SITUATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND TO DEVELOP INSTRUMENTS TO INCREASE THE 
REGIONAL COOPERATION.
118 WHEN THE MUNICIPALITY OR ANOTHER ACTOR WANTED TO BUY PRIVATELY OWNED VACANT 
LAND, THIS WAS OFTEN DIFFICULT. IN MANY CASES, THE PARENT COMPANY WOULD BE 
ESTABLISHED ABROAD, INCLUDING ITS MANAGEMENT. THIS MANAGEMENT WOULD DECIDE 
ON WHETHER TO SELL THE LAND OR NOT. THEY DID NOT CONSIDER LOCAL INTERESTS IN 
THE ACQUIRING OF LAND. THIS PROBLEM OCCURRED ESPECIALLY IN HEERLEN, WITH MOST 
BUSINESS LOCATIONS BEING PRIVATELY OWNED.
119 IN DELFZIJL AND APPINGEDAM, THE VACANCY RATES WERE HIGHER THAN ELSEWHERE IN THE
REGION. IN 2009, IN DELFZIJL, 13.4% OF THE RETAIL PROPERTY WAS VACANT AND IN
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the retail sector. Also, the decision by Delfzijl to maintain its existing retail facilities 
in the municipality as a whole, and to reduce the retail floor space in north Delfzijl (a 
radical, concrete action), could be explained by the spatial conditions (high vacancy 
rate of houses and shops120) in some parts of Delfzijl (am ong which north Delfzijl)
(see Section 5.6).
Some of the policy changes that could not be attributed to demographic decline 
were influenced by local spatial conditions, such as the economic strategy to focus 
on the chemical and energy sectors, because these sectors had been located in the 
region for decades. The wish to develop tourism as a new economic sector was 
based on the opportunities offered by the landscape (e.g. Damsterdiep), and on the 
desire to broaden the economic structure of the Eemsdelta.
6.6.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, demographic decline did not result in radical changes in retail 
policy. This was partly influenced by local spatial conditions. The retail sector in 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen had always been relatively large compared to the size of its 
population. This was especially the case for Sluis and Hulst, where the square 
metreage in retail floor space per inhabitant was above the national average121. This 
situation rose from the fact that Sluis and Hulst were popular shopping destinations 
for tourists (especially those from Belgium). Because the retail sector had always 
been relatively large in this region, this large amount of floor space per inhabitant 
was not a sign for local administrators that there might be a problem, nor that their 
retail policy needed to be changed, not even when the retail vacancy rate started 
to rise in the 2000s. This vacancy rate was noticed, but not considered a reason for 
municipalities to change their retail policies (radically). The growth in the regional 
retail sector encouraged the municipality of Terneuzen to continue to focus its policy 
on maintaining and expanding its retail level (Gemeente Terneuzen, 2005a). This opti­
mism was stimulated by being close to the border with Belgium; the municipalities 
had always been able to attract customers from the neighbouring country.
APPINGEDAM 6.4% (LOCATUS, 2009). IN LOPPERSUM AND EEMSMOND, THIS VACANCY RATE 
WAS 1.0 AND 4.3%, RESPECTIVELY.
120 IN NORTH DELFZIJL, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE IN NINE SHOPS WAS VACANT IN 2000 (VAN DER 
VELDEN AND AALDERS, 2002, P.12).
121 IN 2003, SLUIS COUNTED 2.3 M2 IN RETAIL FLOOR AREA PER INHABITANT, WHILE THE DUTCH 
AVERAGE WAS 1.4 M2 (GEMEENTE SLUIS, 2003, P.5).
273
This local policy stability could also be explained by two other local spatial condi­
tions. All municipalities consisted of different villages, that, previously, had been 
separate municipalities. The individual, local sentiments remained and made it 
difficult for municipalities to formulate radical policy changes. Also, there was no 
accepted spatial hierarchy. Terneuzen had the biggest population, but Hulst had an 
important retail function too, which it was not willing to give up.
Local spatial conditions positively influenced some conservative policy changes, such 
as the joint marketing campaign held to attract people. Throughout its history as a 
peripheral region, Zeeuws-Vlaanderen has developed its own culture and identity: 
the region even has its own flag. The location close to Belgium cities encouraged 
municipalities to be optimistic about the possibilities of attracting people from the 
Randstad, by presenting Zeeuws-Vlaanderen as an attractive place to live, close to 
the Belgian cities of Gent and Antwerp. The municipalities also emphasised the land­
scape qualities, such as its space, quiet and nature.
6.7 ASPECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
This section describes how  the demographic aspects influenced local policy changes 
in the three different case-study regions. More detailed information about the 
aspects of demographic decline in each case-study region is presented in Section 4.5.
6.7.1 PARKSTAD LIMBURG
The municipalities, the regional organisation, and the province paid hardly any atten­
tion to demographic decline in their economic policies. This policy stability could not 
be explained by the nature of those demographic developments, for the decrease 
in population and household numbers in Parkstad Limburg was quite large and had 
started many years before (see Sections 4.5.1 and 5.7.1).
An exception was the policy on the labour market, where some conservative chang­
es were formulated by the province and the regional organisation of Parkstad 
Limburg. Perhaps the demographic aspects could explain this exception. For, 
between 1995 and 2008, the individual municipalities, the regional organisation of 
Parkstad Limburg, and the province, all faced a decrease in working age popula­
tion, but not all had faced a decline in household numbers. Moreover, this decrease 
in working age population happened first and -  in absolute terms and in terms of 
percentage -  was much larger than the decrease in household numbers. This can be 
an explanation why the above mentioned local governments changed their labour 
policies, but not their retail policies.
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6.7.2 EEMSDELTA
In their economic policies, neither the municipalities nor the province paid much 
attention to the demographic decline. An exception was the radical policy change 
on retail, individually made by Delfzijl and jointly made by the municipalities in the 
Eemsdelta. These changes could be explained by the fact that the municipality 
Delfzijl and the region Eemsdelta had been losing inhabitants since 1981, and house­
hold numbers since 2003. Besides, (in absolute terms and in terms of percentage) 
this decrease has been quite large (see Section 4.5.2 and Section 5.7.2). Initially, the 
other municipalities (especially Eemsmond and Loppersum) were not convinced that 
a concentration of services within the region was necessary. This may be explained 
by the fact that their household decline was smaller and lasted for a shorter period 
of time, compared to that of Delfzijl. Studies and projections helped to convince 
these municipalities to support the regional collaboration around services.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain, on the basis of demographic aspects, why 
neither the municipalities nor the region changed their economic and labour market 
policies. After all, the decrease in working age population in the Eemsdelta hap­
pened in the same year (2003) as the decrease in household numbers, and this 
decline (in absolute terms and in terms of percentage) was larger than the decrease 
in household numbers.
The fact that the province paid hardly any attention to demographic decline in its 
economic policies could be explained by the fact that it had only recently been faced 
with this; a small decline in population since 2005, and a small decline in working age 
population since 2007.
6.7.3 ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN
Demographic decline in this region has been fairly small. In the region as a whole, 
the population and the working age population had been shrinking since 2003. 
Terneuzen lost the most in working age population, and Sluis the most in population. 
There has been no decline in household numbers yet. Those relatively small declines 
could explain the policy stability and the conservative actions. For the municipali­
ties and business community had difficulties with accepting the idea put forward by 
the province that demographic decline was structural and irreversible. The absolute 
decreases were small, and only a small number of people would be necessary to turn 
the decline into growth.
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The province, in contrast, did pay attention to demographic decline. It is difficult to 
explain this on the basis of the demographic aspects. The working age population 
in the province had been declining slowly since 2005, but at that level neither the 
population nor the number of households had declined. Nevertheless, there were 
certain regions and municipalities that were confronted with this, and this might be 
the reason why the province paid attention to it.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter answers the central questions of this study: how  do local governments 
react to demographic decline, and under which circumstances do they adapt their 
policies to it?
First, Section 7.2 presents the local government reactions in the three Dutch shrink­
ing regions of Parkstad Limburg, Eemsdelta and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen in the field 
of housing and economy. Section 7.3 explains those policy reactions. Section 7.4 
answers the question of whether the hypotheses are supported by the findings. In 
Section 7.5 the differences between housing market policy and economic policy are 
discussed. Finally, Section 7.6 reflects on the conceptual framework.
7.2 CHANGES IN LOCAL SPATIAL POLICY
This study focuses on local spatial policy changes in the field of housing and the 
economy. This study distinguishes between two different types of local spatial policy 
change: conservative and radical. Also, it distinguishes between three different levels 
of policy: strategic plans, operational plans and local actions (see Chapter 3).
7.2.1 POLICY REACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF 
HOUSING: THE FINDINGS
In the shrinking case-study regions, local governments changed their strategic poli­
cies related to housing. This means that local government took demographic decline 
into account in its policies and explicitly adapted its strategic spatial and housing 
policy (indicative and not binding) accordingly. M ost changes in strategic policy were 
found in Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, however, barely 
any change in strategic policy could be detected1.
M ost of the policy changes that were found can be considered conservative policy 
changes; new strategies were intended to increase the number of inhabitants and 
households. Examples of these strategies are new housing developments,
1 AN EXCEPTION ARE THE DECISIONS MADE IN 2005 BY TERNEUZEN AND SLUIS TO REDUCE 
THEIR GROWTH AMBITION.
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improvement to the image of the residential environment, and the development of 
new housing concepts. These strategies were intended to increase the demand for 
housing by attracting new residents and households to the region. The policy objec­
tive of these strategies were similar to the objective of local governments when they 
still experienced demographic growth.
Nevertheless, and contrary to what is argued in much of the literature (Section 
3.6.2), in Eemsdelta and Parkstad Limburg, local and regional governments formulat­
ed some radical policy changes, as well. They adopted a strategy in which an expect­
ed decrease in population and/or household numbers was accepted. The municipal­
ity of Delfzijl reduced the housing stock in north Delfzijl through demolishing and 
restructuring. At a regional level, there was radical strategic policy change as well; 
the four municipalities that make up the region of Eemsdelta decided to change their 
strategic policy and to reduce their existing housing stock by 700 houses. In Parkstad 
Limburg, the regional organisation and the seven municipalities reduced their hous­
ing programme and agreed on a regional restructuring vision. Those strategies were 
intended to adapt the housing supply to the smaller demand resulting from demo­
graphic decline. This policy objective is different from that of local governments in 
times of demographic growth.
There were hardly any changes in operational plans, conservative or radical, in 
response to demographic decline. Local governments barely changed their legally 
binding plans (e.g. local land-use plans). However, new actions were taken. M ost of 
these could be considered conservative, because they tried to increase the popula­
tion by attracting new inhabitants to the region. Examples are marketing campaigns, 
website launches, and participation in emigration fairs. An exception is Delfzijl, with 
the development company of Delfzijl (O M D ) that was set up and according to which 
parts of north Delfzijl would be demolished and restructured -  this can be consid­
ered a radical policy action.
7.2.2 POLICY REACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF THE 
ECONOMY: THE FINDINGS
In the shrinking case-study regions, local governments were found to have hardly 
taken demographic decline into account in their policies related to the economy, let 
alone changing their policies in response to it. This is especially the case for policies 
related to business and office locations. This does not mean that in those policy fields 
no changes took place at all. In these regions, several policy changes could be seen, 
such as attracting new businesses by improving the business climate; broadening 
the economic structure by stimulating new economic drivers, such as tourism, health
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care, renewable energy; restructuring retail and business locations; and limiting the 
development of new businesses locations. However, these changes were not in reac­
tion to demographic decline but to other considerations (e.g. efficient use of space)2. 
Sometimes, demographic decline was added later, as an argument to convince the 
involved actors that the change from expanding to restructuring business locations 
was needed. This, for example, happened in the province of Zeeland.
In the few cases in which local governments did mention demographic decline and 
adapted the content of their economic policy accordingly, these changes were in 
strategic rather than in operational policy. M ost of these changes were related to 
the labour market and can be considered conservative. The few changes that were 
found usually were intended to attract new people, households and workers to the 
region. This was based on the assumption that jobs (employment) follow people; 
wherever people are, jobs will follow. Examples of these strategies were the setting 
up of specific educational programmes by educational institutes and businesses, in 
order to increase the labour supply, and improving the image of the working and 
spatial environment to attract people. Increasing the labour supply was considered 
to be necessary for achieving economic growth. The policy objective of these strate­
gies is similar to when the local governments experienced demographic growth, 
therefore, they are conservative.
In the case-study regions, only a few radical changes to local economic policy could 
be detected, and these were all changes in strategic policy. In the Eemsdelta, Delfzijl, 
both individually and together with the other three municipalities, adopted a strat­
egy in which the supply of retail facilities was adapted to a decrease in the demand 
for them, which was partly caused by the population and household decline. This 
policy change (to reduce the number of shops and to concentrate them spatially) 
can be considered radical, because it was an adaptation to demographic decline.
The province of Zeeland, in response to demographic decline, also made a few radi­
cal changes in its socio-economic plan. Examples are measures to increase labour 
productivity and labour participation, both of which are focused on producing more 
with fewer people.
2 NEVERTHELESS, THESE POLICY CHANGES COULD AFFECT DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS. 
THIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE THAT PEOPLE FOLLOW JOBS; WHEREVER JOBS ARE, PEOPLE 
WILL FOLLOW.
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F IG U RE 7.1 SU M M A R Y  OF LOCAL SPATIAL PO LICY  C H AN G ES  IN TH REE C ASE -STU D Y  REG IO NS
HOUSING
ECONOMY
OPERATIONAL
STRATEGIC PLANS PLANS ACTIONS
CO N SERVAT IVE  PO LICY  CH AN G E
- MARKETING;
- ADD NEW HOUSING;
- IMPROVE THE CURRENT 
HOUSING STOCK BY 
RESTRUCTURING;
- REDUCE GROWTH 
AMBITION HOWEVER, 
MAINTAINING THE 
AMBITION TO GROW;
- REDUCE CURRENT 
HOUSING STOCK BY 
TRANSFORMING SOCIAL 
HOUSING INTO OWNER- 
OCCUPIED HOUSING (SELL 
OFF SOCIAL HOUSING);
- PROLONG THE PLANNING 
PERIOD.
- MARKETING (IMPROVE 
IMAGE);
- ATTRACT NEW PEOPLE 
(EMPLOYEES);
- LAUNCH WEBSITES;
- SET UP OF A REGIONAL 
BRANDING FOUNDATION 
OR (REGIONAL) 
MARKETING CAMPAIGN;
- PARTICIPATE IN 
EMIGRATION FAIRS;
- ADVERTISE IN 
NEWSPAPERS AND TV 
COMMERCIALS.
- LAUNCH WEBSITES;
- SET UP OF A REGIONAL 
BRANDING FOUNDATION 
OR (REGIONAL) 
MARKETING CAMPAIGN;
- SET UP OF A CARE 
ACADEMY
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HOUSING
ECONOMY
OPERATIONAL
STRATEGIC PLANS PLANS ACTIONS
- REGIONAL COOPERATION; - HOUSING DEMOLITION;
- REDUCE PLANS FOR NEW - SET UP OF A 
HOUSING; DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
- REDUCE CURRENT 
HOUSING STOCK BY 
RESTRUCTURING 
AND DEMOLISHING OF 
HOUSING.
R A D IC A L  PO L ICY  CHANG E
- SET UP OF A REGIONAL 
RETAIL VISION THAT 
INCLUDES THE 
DECISION TO SPATIALLY 
CONCENTRATE 
COMMERCIAL SERVICE 
LOCATIONS;
- INCREASE LABOUR 
PRODUCTIVITY 
(THROUGH STIMULATING 
INNOVATIONS).
- REDUCE FLOORSPACE OF 
SHOPPING AREA;
- SET UP INITIATIVES 
TO INCREASE LABOUR 
PARTICIPATION FOR 
WOMEN AND THE ELDERLY 
(E.G. EXTEND OPENING 
HOURS OF CHILD CARE 
CENTRES).
- INVESTIGATE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE 
AND SERVICES.
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Demographic decline hardly resulted in changes in local actions. Changes that did 
occur can be considered to be conservative. Local governments, for example, set 
up marketing campaigns to attract workers, and participated in European projects 
about demographic decline and labour market issues. Also a few radical local actions 
were taken. Delfzijl, for example, set up the development company of Delfzijl (OMD), 
which reduced the size of the shopping area in north Delfzijl, and the province of 
Zeeland took actions to increase labour participation, thus increasing the labour sup­
ply without increasing the working age population.
Figure 7.1 summarises local spatial policy changes in the field of housing and the 
economy that have been found in the three case-study regions in response to demo­
graphic decline.
7.3 EXPLAINING THE POLICY REACTIONS
The previous section answers the first central question of how  local governments 
react to demographic decline. This section answers the second central question: 
under which circumstances do they adapt their policies to it? Or under which circum­
stances does demographic decline lead to policy stability, conservative or radical 
change in local spatial policy? The circumstances differ for each policy field (housing 
and economy), each type of change (conservative or radical) and each level of policy 
(strategic plans, operational plans and local actions). Below, five different conditions 
are described.
1) The local demographic decline must have specific characteristics in order to trigger 
local governments to change their policies to it. Whether they react by formulating a 
conservative or radical policy change depends on the extent and duration of the de­
mographic decline. This is especially true for housing policy. The greatest number of 
policy changes were found in regions that had been facing population and household 
decline the longest, and where the decline had been the largest. This would explain 
why Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta (e.g. Delfzijl) made more changes, and more 
radical changes, than Zeeuws-Vlaanderen did, and why the only changes in this last 
region were conservative ones. Large and long-lasting decline seems necessary for a 
radical policy change in the field of housing.
The same is true for policies regarding retail. The radical policy changes in Eemsdelta 
and Delfzijl regarding commercial services, such as shopping facilities, could be 
attributed to specific characteristics of demographic decline; in this region, especially 
in Delfzijl, the decrease in household numbers was larger than in the other case­
study regions.
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The extent and duration of the demographic decline did not seem to have affected 
other local economic policies. Compared to the other case-study regions, the decline 
in the working age population in Parkstad Limburg was the largest and lasted the 
longest. However, this region had not formulated more policy changes than the 
other regions. On the contrary, the province of Zeeland made most changes in its 
economic policy, although the decline there was not the largest nor did it begin 
there first.
Moreover, it was notable that although the shrinking case-study regions were 
confronted with a decline in working age population before household numbers 
started to decline, there were more changes in housing policies than in those regard­
ing the economy. In addition, more radical changes were found in housing policies 
than in policies regarding the regional economy and the labour market.
2) Local governments must acknowledge the (expected) decline and the problems 
it might cause (e.g. change in discourse), before any form of action will be taken. 
Whether they react by formulating a conservative or radical policy change depends 
on the degree of change in the discourse (or in one of the other dimensions of the 
policy arrangement). When the involved actors perceive the decline as a structural 
and/or irreversible problem (this may be considered a radical change in discourse) 
they will change their policy radically; when they perceive it as a temporary and/or 
reversible problem (this may be considered a marginal change in discourse), they will 
change their policy conservatively; and when they do not perceive it as a problem 
they will not change their policy (policy stability).
Whether discourses change, and to which degree, depends on the aspects (extent 
and duration) of demographic decline, local spatial conditions (spatial concentration 
and ownership) and knowledge (resources). Demographic decline and local spatial 
conditions may affect problem perceptions (discourse). Knowledge about the 
current and expected demographic decline, its consequences and possible strategies 
for dealing with it, may also affect this.
In response to demographic decline, most local governments formulated a conserva­
tive rather than a radical policy change regarding housing. An explanation for this 
is that demographic decline initially caused only a marginal change in the discourse. 
M ost actors involved in housing perceived demographic decline as a temporary prob­
lem, and they were often optimistic about the possibility of reversing the decline, 
turning it into growth. This was caused by the fact that the demographic decline was 
small, the spatial consequences were not visible (yet), and not much was known 
about it.
283
Between 2002 and 2010, in Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta, a few radical strategic 
policy changes took place regarding housing. This can be explained by the fact that 
the actors involved perceived demographic decline increasingly as a structural and/ 
or irreversible problem (a change in discourse). This was supported by the large and 
long-lasting decline in those study areas and the fact that all the demographic pro­
jections by the various institutes (regional and national) expected that the decline 
would be structural3 (a change in knowledge - resource). This made it less realistic to 
assume that the decline in those regions could be ignored or easily reversed.
In addition, several studies made at national, provincial, regional and local levels 
about this topic became available (knowledge resources). All of them concluded that 
demographic decline (especially decline in household numbers) would negatively af­
fect the housing market, and would require a policy change. This change in problem 
perception was strengthened in Parkstad Limburg by the fact that all the actors were 
involved in the research. In the Eemsdelta the municipalities jointly commissioned 
the research, and this also contributed to the change in problem perception 
(discourse).
Finally, the fact that the problems associated with demographic decline became 
visible in the housing stock, stimulated a radical change in housing policy. For exam­
ple, the radical policy changes formulated in Parkstad Limburg and Delfzijl regarding 
housing were triggered by the fact that the problems that accompanied demo­
graphic decline became more visible, because the least attractive housing (which 
is especially vulnerable to demographic decline) was social housing, where low 
demand reveals itself in vacancies, often in a spatially concentrated way. As a result, 
in the above two study regions, the problems caused by demographic decline (e.g. 
vacancies) were concentrated in certain urban neighbourhoods (e.g. in 
Meezenbroek, Schaesbergerveld and Palemig in Heerlen, and in north Delfzijl).
However, local spatial conditions can also make it difficult to formulate radical policy 
changes. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the share of owner-occupied housing (72%) was 
larger than in the other case-study regions, and the consequences of demographic 
decline for this type of housing (average sale price and the length of time that prop­
erties are on the market) were less visible than for social housing (vacancies). This 
and the fact that the current and expected demographic decline in Zeeuws-Vlaan- 
deren was smaller than the decline in the other two case-study areas partly explain 
why, to date, no radical strategic policy changes have occurred there.
3 THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THIS DECLINE, BUT NOT ABOUT THE 
DIRECTION OF THE TREND.
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In Parkstad Limburg, local spatial conditions also made it difficult to formulate radical 
changes in housing policy at the regional level. The housing stock affected by decline 
was unevenly distributed over the region. As a result of this, not all municipalities 
perceived demographic decline as a structural problem. Especially those that, at the 
time, did not yet face demographic decline or its consequences, did not perceive de­
mographic decline as a problem and were therefore unwilling to anticipate or react. 
This also occurred in the Eemsdelta. Moreover, the relationships between municipali­
ties in Parkstad Limburg made it difficult to achieve radical regional policy changes, 
for there is no clear spatial-territorial hierarchy. Not all municipalities considered 
Heerlen as the centre of the region. This made it difficult to change the regional 
housing and retail vision (radically).
Radical policy changes regarding the economy rarely took place in the case-study 
regions: most municipalities and regions did not change their economic policies 
(see Section 7.6 for an explanation of this difference between the policy reactions 
in the field of housing and those in the field of the economy). An exception was the 
Eemsdelta, where, in response to demographic decline, in the north of Delfzijl, the 
retail space was reduced and the municipalities jointly decided to spatially concen­
trate the shopping facilities. The latter occurred because various studies (knowledge 
resource) helped to bring about a change in problem perception (discourse). Munici­
palities began to see that a decrease in population had become persistent (structur­
al) and was causing vacancy problems on the retail market. In the Eemsdelta, these 
problems (vacancies of shops) were spatially concentrated (and visible) in the centre 
of Delfzijl, which also triggered actors to perceive it as a structural problem and to 
change their policies radically.
Local spatial conditions not only may stimulate policy changes regarding retail, but 
also make them difficult to realise. In the other two regions, in contrast, vacancies 
and oversupply of retail properties were not seen as a problem. In Parkstad Limburg, 
retail was spatially dispersed, as a result of the region’s mining history. The vacant 
shops were also dispersed (less visible), or alternatively, could be explained as a 
consequence of the restructuring of some centres. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen there was 
a relatively large supply of shops compared to the population size, which could be 
explained by its popularity am ong Belgian tourists. Because the retail sector had 
always been relatively large in this region, this large amount of floor space per in­
habitant was not a seen as a problem nor considered a reason for changing the retail 
policies (radically).
Another example of a radical change regarding the economy could be found in the 
province of Zeeland, which, in response to demographic decline, tried to increase
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labour productivity and labour participation by women and the elderly. These radical 
changes were stimulated by the explorative study of the province of Zeeland 
(Provincie Zeeland, 2008a) (knowledge resource), which showed current and 
expected downward demographic developments and the economic consequences 
they might have, and by the regional dialogue that was organised around this 
subject.
3) The will to act requires not only acknowledgement of decline and the problems it 
might cause, but also unanimity (strategic congruence) between the relevant local 
actors (e.g. municipalities, housing associations, retailers) about the nature of the 
problem and the possible solutions. If there is no strategic congruence, there will be 
no policy changes.
A s mentioned before, whether local governments react by formulating a conserva­
tive or radical policy change depends on the degree of change in the discourse that 
the demographic decline causes (or in one of the other dimensions of the policy 
arrangement). Conservative changes are easier to realise than radical changes, 
because they require only a marginal change in shared discourse. This is easier to 
achieve because it is close to the traditional way of thinking about planning, which 
is focused on accommodating growth. Thus, strategic congruence was maintained, 
which explains why most local governments that changed their policies in response 
to demographic decline, came up with conservative policy changes rather than radi­
cal ones.
Nevertheless, some radical policy changes regarding housing and retail were for­
mulated. These were caused by challenging coalitions and new actors (actors and  
coalitions). The challenging coalitions often consisted of actors who were the first to 
be directly confronted with the results of the decline and/or actors with an overall 
view and a leading role. In Parkstad Limburg, the urban municipalities, the housing 
associations, and the regional organisation of Parkstad Limburg played an important 
role in the decision to reduce the number of housing development plans. In Delfzijl, 
the development company Delfzijl, the housing association Acantus, the province 
and the new mayor of Delfzijl stimulated the decision of the municipalities to reduce 
their housing stock in the region as a whole. These challenging coalitions were able 
to gain support am ong a majority of stakeholders. Thus, there was strategic congru­
ence, as well; a majority of actors in the policy arrangement shared the perception 
that demographic decline was a structural and/or irreversible problem.
The above mentioned circumstances are required in order to reach policy changes 
in strategic plans. However, to reach changes in operational plans and local actions,
286
there are additional preconditions. If there is strategic congruence but no structural- 
internal and/or structural-external congruence (these terms are elaborated in 
Sections 4 and 5), there can be conservative strategic change (and even radical 
strategic change) but there will be no radical operational change.
4 & 5) The feasibility of taking actions depends also on the extent to which the 
change in discourse (or in one of the other dimensions of the policy arrangement) 
caused by demographic decline matches the other dimensions, such as resources, 
rules and the existing patterns of interaction between the involved actors (actors and  
coalitions) (structural-internal congruence). This can be considered the fourth condi­
tion. The feasibility of taking action also depends on the extent to which the entire 
policy arrangement matches the wider institutional context (structural-external 
congruence). This can be considered the fifth condition. Certain types of local action 
may be taken only permitting the national policy context.
An explanation of why in response to demographic decline, local governments often 
formulate conservative policy changes is that these changes are easier to realise 
than radical changes. The change might consists of a marginal change in one of the 
dimensions of the policy arrangement (discourse). This is easy to combine with the 
other unchanged dimensions of the policy arrangement, all of which are focused on 
accommodating growth. Thus, structural-internal congruence was maintained. And 
there was strategic-external congruence, because the marginal change in discourse 
matched the wider institutional context, which also primarily focused on accommo­
dating demographic growth.
The fact that there were so few radical policy changes in response to demographic 
decline could be explained by the lack of strategic, structural-internal and structural- 
external congruence. The actors involved disagreed about the nature of the prob­
lem, its causes and the possible solution (discourse). Some argued that demographic 
decline is a structural and irreversible problem, but most did not share this problem 
perception. The lack of structural-internal congruence also made it difficult to formu­
late radical policy changes. After all, the new problem perception did not match the 
other existing dimensions of the policy arrangement. The actors involved said that 
radical policy changes hardly occurred because of the existing rules and resources 
(e.g. finances, political legitimacy) which were primarily based on stimulating and 
accommodating demographic growth. Local actors complained that the existing 
financing system stimulated municipalities to grow. A  reduction in housing plans 
would, for example, mean less income from the sale of land for development. In 
order to recover the structural-internal congruence, new rules and new resources 
(e.g. finances and political legitimacy) were needed.
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The actors also stated that the lack of structural-external congruence made the 
formulation of radical policy changes difficult. Such changes did not match with the 
wider institutional context (e.g. national housing policy, national spatial policy, 
national subsidies, such as BLS and ISV), which mainly focused on demographic 
growth. Local governments took various initiatives in order to direct the attention 
of the national government to demographic decline, so that structural-external con­
gruence would be created. This government attention for demographic decline has 
started to increase, but the institutional context, to date, has not changed signifi­
cantly.
Nevertheless, in Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta, a few radical strategic policy 
changes did take place. In both regions, a majority of actors within the policy 
arrangement changed their problem perception, radically, and perceived demo­
graphic decline as a structural problem (discourse). As described above, new 
knowledge (resources - e.g. studies, regional dialogues) and changes in patterns 
of interaction between actors (actors and coalitions - new actors) contributed to 
this strategic congruence. But this was not enough to initiate radical changes in 
operational plans. From this can be concluded that structural-internal and structural- 
external congruence are necessary conditions for local governments to make radical 
changes in their operational plans, but not in their strategic plans.
Apparently, the conditions for radical policy change depend on the type of plan, for 
example, the difference between strategic and operational plans. The reason for this 
is probably that strategic plans require less commitment from the actors than do op­
erational plans. A  radical change in at least one dimension of the policy arrangement 
(discourse) would be needed for a radical change in strategic policy. Radical changes 
in all dimensions of the policy arrangement would be needed for a radical change in 
operational policies to take place. This is probably also true for radical local actions 
also.
7.4 THE HYPOTHESES IN THE LIGHT OF THESE 
CONCLUSIONS
The first hypothesis is that, in order to realise a radical policy change, not only a 
radical change in discourse would be needed, but also radical changes in actors and 
coalitions, formal and informal rules, and resource/power balance. It is supported by 
the evidence on radical operational policy changes, but not on radical strategic policy 
changes. For it has been demonstrated that strategic policy can be changed radically 
even though there is no structural-internal congruence. Apparently, a radical change 
in one dimension of the policy arrangement (e.g. discourse) is sufficient for reaching
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radical strategic policy changes, as long as there is strategic congruence. A  majority 
of actors within a given policy arrangement would need to share the new problem 
perception (discourse) that demographic decline is a structural (irreversible) prob­
lem. Changes in the knowledge resource seemed to be sufficient for reaching this 
strategic congruence.
The second hypothesis is that, in order to realise a radical policy change, a radical 
change in the external (national) institutional context would be needed. It is not 
supported by the evidence on all types of policy changes. Again, this hypothesis was 
confirmed regarding radical operational policy changes and not regarding radical 
strategic policy changes. This study shows that even without changes in the wider 
institutional context, radical changes in strategic plans may occur.
The third hypothesis is that a radical change in one of the dimensions of the policy 
arrangement will take place only if demographic decline has become clearly visible in 
the physical environment. It is supported by the evidence from policies in the field of 
housing and economy, and also by the evidence from changes in strategic and opera­
tional plans. Local spatial conditions influence how problems related to demographic 
decline are perceived by actors (discourse). This study shows that not only the spatial 
concentration of the least attractive housing stock, but also the ownership of this 
stock influences how  the problems related to demographic decline appear and 
whether they will cause a radical change in problem perception. The consequences 
of demographic decline for social housing (e.g. vacancies) are more visible than 
those for the owner-occupied housing stock. Ownership influences thus not only the 
resource dimension but also the discourse dimension. This finding is an addition to 
what is stated in Chapter 3. The study shows that when the least attractive housing, 
retail, business and/or office stock is spatially concentrated and is rented rather than 
occupied by owners (which can easily may lead to vacancies), the consequences of 
demographic decline are more visible, stimulating a radical change in problem per­
ception (discourse) and, consequently in local policy. This might be true for changes 
at municipal level, but not for changes at regional level. The spatial conditions for 
introducing radical changes at regional level seem to be different. Not spatial concen­
tration, but spatial dispersion seems to be relevant to reach radical policy changes at 
the regional level. After all, when the least attractive housing stock is concentrated 
in only one or two municipalities, the problems related to demographic decline 
appear only in those municipalities, which affects the shared problem perception.
The study also shows that a clear spatial hierarchy is a spatial condition which sup­
ports the formulation of a radical policy change at regional level. Nevertheless, the 
hypothesis that local spatial conditions are important is confirmed.
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The fourth hypothesis is that a large and long-lasting demographic decline always 
precedes a radical policy change. It is supported by the evidence surrounding hous­
ing policy, but not by that related to economic policy. With respect to housing policy, 
this hypothesis is supported by the evidence from both strategic and operational 
plans and by the evidence from both conservative and radical policy changes. With, 
respect to economic policy, these findings are not in keeping with the hypothesis. 
The fact that the relationship between demography and economy is more complex 
than the relationship between demography and housing may be an explanation for 
this difference in response to demographic decline.
7.5 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOUSING 
MARKET POLICY AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONCLUSIONS
The study has shown that, in the policy reactions by local governments in shrinking 
regions, there are differences between policies on housing and on the economy.
The first difference is that, in economic policy, less attention was being paid to 
demographic decline than in housing policy. This cannot be explained by the dif­
ference in size (extent) or duration of the various types of demographic decline, 
for in all three case-study regions, the working age population (relevant to eco­
nomic policy) decreased before the number of households (relevant to housing and 
economic policy). Moreover, the absolute decrease in population and working age 
population was larger than in number of households.
A  possible explanation for this difference could be that the actors in the economic 
sector, unlike in the housing sector, were not used to taking account of demographic 
developments and projections. A  second explanation could be that the relationship 
between demography and the economy is more complex than the relation between 
demography and housing. Economic developments can be both the cause and the 
consequence of demographic decline, and the relationship between the two is often 
not direct. A  third possible explanation could be that the current economic crisis 
and the resulting decrease in the demand for labour masks any possible economic 
problems in the labour market caused by a decrease in working age population. In 
the housing market, the current economic crisis has increased the problems and 
made them more visible. A  fourth explanation could be the communication para­
dox. Governments as well as businesses are afraid to mention demographic decline, 
because they think that it will damage the regional economy. This fear is based on 
the generally accepted assumption, that demographic growth is an important condi­
tion for economic growth. The communication paradox affected changes in housing
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policy differently. Initially, the actors were afraid to mention demographic decline, 
but that did not prevent them from taking it into account. Rather, they presented de­
mographic decline as an opportunity to attract inhabitants, by emphasising that the 
houses in their regions were relatively cheap and the spatial environment attractive. 
A  final explanation may be that, in economic policy, local governments generally are 
more reluctant to intervene and have fewer instruments to do so, than in housing 
policy.
A  second difference in reaction between economic policy and housing policy is that 
there were fewer changes in economic policy. This could be explained by the fact 
that, in housing policy, demographic decline resulted in a change in the dimension of 
the policy arrangement (discourse), but that did not happen in economic policy. The 
actors involved in housing perceived demographic decline as a (temporary or struc­
tural) problem, unlike the actors in economic policy. The factors already mentioned 
above could explain this difference in perception. The few actors involved in the 
economy who did perceive demographic decline as a problem, saw it as temporary 
and reversible, while the actors involved in housing, saw it more often as structural 
and irreversible. Because the actors involved in housing changed their discourse 
more radically than those involved in the economy, there have been more radical 
changes in housing policy than in economic policy.
7.6 REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK
In order to carry out this study, the policy arrangement approach was chosen as a 
starting point. Subsequently, it was adjusted, both in order to make it dynamic, and 
to correct for some other perceived shortcomings. From the integral conceptual 
model that has been developed, four hypotheses about policy change in response to 
changes in the external context (demographic decline) have been derived. The final 
section of this study reflects on the usefulness of the developed conceptual frame­
work.
The conceptual framework was indeed useful for gaining insights into the conditions 
which might influence the local government reactions towards demographic decline 
in the fields of housing and economy. It contributes to planning research, something 
which, according to Wiechmann, is behind planning practice (Wiechmann, 2011). He 
argues that it is necessary to transform planning for shrinkage into a planning theory 
of shrinkage (Wiechmann, 2011). This study aims to contribute to this by categoris­
ing the different possible policy reactions to demographic decline and by identify­
ing the circumstances under which local governments adapt their policies to this
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decline. The study concludes that the local government reactions may be explained 
by the current problem perception, patterns of interaction, available resources, rules 
and the national institutional context. These are all focused on stimulating growth.
In addition, the extent and duration of demographic decline and the local spatial 
conditions in the regions may be also an explanation for the local policy reaction to 
demographic decline.
The conceptual framework also proved to be helpful in explaining the differences 
and similarities between government reactions to demographic decline in different 
regions, policy fields and at different government levels. The differences between 
government reactions in housing and economy could be explained by referring to 
the conditions which have been identified as affecting the policy reactions. However, 
in some cases the aspects (specifications) of these four conditions are different at 
different government levels, or similar aspects have a different effect on the policy 
reactions at different government levels. For example, in order to reach radical 
changes at regional government level, other spatial conditions (spatial hierarchy, 
spatial dispersion) are important than changes at the municipal government level 
(spatial concentration). Nevertheless, this study has shown that, for both govern­
ment levels, local spatial conditions are important to understand the policy reactions.
The results show  that it is important to make a distinction between changes in stra­
tegic policy, operational plans, and actions. For each type of change, the conditions 
under which demographic decline leads to a policy change are different. Second, a 
distinction should be made between the emergence of a policy change and the stabi­
lisation of that new policy, as the latter may be dependent on different conditions.
With those two refinements, the difference between the conclusions of this study 
and those by Boonstra (2004, 2006) can be explained. This study has shown that, 
despite the lack of structural-internal and structural-external congruence, policy can 
change radically, whereas Boonstra argues that in order to institutionalise a new poli­
cy arrangement (which is necessary for a radical policy change), strategic, structural- 
internal and structural-external congruence are all needed.
This difference can be explained in three ways. The first is the difference between 
strategic plans, operational plans and actions, for it has been concluded that the 
conditions for strategic policy change are different from those related to operational 
policy change. Radical change in strategic policy does not require change in all the 
dimensions of the policy arrangement, nor in the wider institutional context; how ­
ever, this would indeed be required for radical changes in operational policy.
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The second explanation is the difference between the emergence and stabilisation 
of a policy arrangement. We could argue that, in order to reach a radical strategic 
policy change, the emergence of a new policy arrangement is enough, but in order 
to reach a radical operational policy change, the new policy arrangement needs to be 
stabilised. This is in accordance with the conclusion of Boonstra, who introduced the 
distinction between emergence and stabilisation of policy arrangements. She argued 
that the emergence of a new policy arrangement requires strategic and structural- 
internal congruences, whereas the stabilisation of a new policy arrangement 
requires structural-external congruence, as well. We could say that where radical 
policy changes were made (Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta), new policy arrange­
ments have emerged, but, to date, have not stabilised. Apparently, such stabilisation 
of policy arrangements is not necessary for a radical change in strategic policy, but it 
is necessary for a radical change in operational policy.
Third, the difference between the conclusions of Boonstra and this research can be 
explained by differences between the wider institutional contexts of both studies. 
Boonstra studied new regional rural policies at a time when similar trends in rural 
policy were emerging at national government level. In contrast, this study investi­
gated changes in spatial policies at local and regional levels that were made in reac­
tion to demographic decline at a time when national government was paying little or 
no attention to the consequences of the new demographic trend. This difference in 
policy context may explain why Boonstra concluded that structural-external congru­
ence is important, whereas these research findings show  that radical changes in 
strategic policy can emerge, despite the lack of structural-external congruence.
The conceptual framework may also be useful to formulate recommendations for 
local, regional, provincial and national governments that face demographic decline 
and want to change their policies in response to it. At the same time, it may also be 
of help to provincial and national governments that want to support or encourage 
municipalities to anticipate or react to demographic decline. The recommendations 
for the different government levels in the Netherlands, can be found in the study by 
Verwest and Van Dam (2010b).
In this study, the conceptual framework has been applied to housing and economic 
policy dynamics in relation to demographic decline. But I expect that it may also be 
used for spatial policy dynamics that are not, or not solely, related to demographic 
developments.
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APPENDIX 3 
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE 
IN OTHER EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes the population changes in other European countries, in the 
past, present, and the expected future. For the European countries, the changes 
have been described at the levels of Europe itself, the Member States, and the 
regions (NUTS21). Developments in only two variables are described -  in general 
population and in working age population -  because at European level no data were 
available on developments in the number of households. To describe the past and 
present demographic trends in Europe, information from Eurostat (2009a, b) was 
used. The expected future demographic developments are described using the 
World Population Prospects of the United Nations (UN, 2008) and the population 
projections by Eurostat (2008a). The likely future size of the population predicted 
by those sources is influenced by many different factors that could not be taken into 
account in those projections. Therefore, they are uncertain and need to be used with 
caution.
1 NUTS2 (NOMENCLATURE OF UNITS FOR TERRITORIAL STATISTICS) IS A HIERARCHICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES DEVELOPED BY EUROSTAT. IT IS 
DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE A COMMON DESIGNATION FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ADMINIS­
TRATIVE GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES ACROSS THE EU, REGARDLESS OF LOCAL LANGUAGE
AND NAMING CONVENTIONS. THE NUTS LEVELS ARE DEFINED IN TERMS OF MINIMUM AND 
MAXIMUM POPULATION SIZES: FOR NUTS2 , THE MINIMUM POPULATION SIZE IS 800,000 AND 
THE MAXIMUM IS 3 ,000,000 (EUROSTAT, 2009A).
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POPULATION CHANGES AROUND THE WORLD,
IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Except for the period from 1995 to 2000, Europe, as a whole, experienced a popu­
lation growth, between 1950 and 20052. In the short run, Europe is expected to 
continue to grow. According to projections by Eurostat (2008a), the EU27 popula­
tion will increase from 495 million people at the beginning of 2008 to 521 million by 
2035. Thereafter, it is expected to decline gradually to 506 million people by 20603. 
From 2015 onwards, deaths are expected to outnumber births. Between 2015 and 
2035, this negative natural change is expected to be compensated by net positive 
migration, but this will not continue thereafter. Therefore, from 2035 onwards, the 
population is projected to fall. In this way, Europe is expected to be the first conti­
nent to experience a persistent (long-term) declining population. In contrast, the 
world population, as a whole, is expected to continue to grow. However, this growth 
is projected to be slower than in the past4 (see Figure 1).
2 BETWEEN 1995 AND 2000, THE POPULATION OF EUROPE, AS A WHOLE, DECREASED BY 793,000 
(-0 .1%). THIS PERIOD OF DECREASE WAS FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD OF GROWTH (SEE FIGURE 1).
3 THIS POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR THE 2008-2060 PERIOD HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE 
EUROPOP 2008 ‘CONVERGE SCENARIO'. THIS SCENARIO IS BASED ON THE POPULATION 
LEVEL OF 1 JANUARY 2008, AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT FERTILITY, MORTALITY AND NET 
MIGRATION WILL PROGRESSIVELY CONVERGE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, IN THE LONG RUN. 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS IN A DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WOULD LEAD TO 
DIFFERENT RESULTS (EUROSTAT, 2008A). THE PERIOD OF PROJECTIONS IS VERY LONG (UP 
TO 2060), WHICH INCREASES THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE OUTCOMES. THUS, THE POPULATION 
PROJECTIONS CONTAIN ONLY A ROUGH INDICATION OF THE FUTURE POPULATION. MORE 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE UNCERTAINTY OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS CAN BE FOUND IN 
CHAPTER 4 .
4 BETWEEN 1988 AND 1999, THE WORLD POPULATION GREW BY 1 BILLION PEOPLE, FROM 5 
TO 6 BILLION. THE FOLLOWING POPULATION INCREASE, OF 1 BILLION PEOPLE (FROM 6 TO
7 BILLION PEOPLE), WAS REACHED BETWEEN 1999 AND 2011; THIS LEVEL WAS MAINTAINED 
FOR 12 YEARS. FUTURE POPULATION INCREASES OF 1 BILLION PEOPLE ARE EXPECTED TO 
TAKE MORE TIME. AN INCREASE FROM 7 TO 8 BILLION PEOPLE IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE 
BETWEEN 2011 AND 2025, AND THIS POPULATION LEVEL MAY BE MAINTAINED FOR 14 YEARS.
A GROWTH FROM 8 TO 9 BILLION PEOPLE IS EXPECTED TO OCCUR BETWEEN 2025 AND 2045,
A LEVEL THAT MAY LAST FOR 20 YEARS. THE WORLD POPULATION IS EXPECTED TO STABILISE 
AROUND THE 9 TO 10 BILLION PEOPLE (BEETS, 2009, P.27-28).
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POPULATION CHANGE IN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES, IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE
Although Europe, as a whole, except during the 1995-2000 period, experienced a 
population growth (see Figure 1), there were a number of European countries with a 
declining population. Figure 2 shows that, between 1998 and 2005, 9 of the 29 Euro­
pean countries had a decline in population. These eight countries are mainly east­
ern European: Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. 
Germany is the only western European country where the population fell. The main 
causes of this demographic decline in the eastern European countries are low fertility 
rates5, and the high level of out-migration to the West, following the fall of 
communist regimes and the opening of the borders to the western part of Europe.
Of all countries, populations in Bulgaria and Latvia declined the most; in Bulgaria 
with 8.2 per cent and in Latvia with 6.6 per cent, between 1998 and 2009. (Eurostat, 
2009b).
According to the population projections by Eurostat (2008a) for the period between 
2008 and 2060, in 20 European countries a decline in working age population is 
expected and all European countries will experience a decrease in the share of the 
working age population (see Figure 4)6. The largest declines in the working age 
population are expected in Bulgaria and Latvia. The largest declines in the share of 
the working age population are expected in Slovakia and Poland, and the lowest 
shares of the working age population are expected in Poland and Lithuania.
The number of European countries with a declining population is expected to in­
crease: according to Eurostat, between 2008 and 2060, in 14 of the 27 countries (see 
Figure 3). Most of those countries are in eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and in 
the south (Greece, Italy, and Malta). The largest declines during that period are 
expected in Bulgaria (by almost one third), Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. In Germa­
ny, also, a large population decrease is projected, but (with almost 71 million people 
by 2060) the country is expected to remain one of Europe’s largest.
5 IN 2006, THE FERTILITY RATE IN POLAND WAS 1.27, IN ROMANIA THIS WAS 1.31, AND IN 
GERMANY 1.32; WHICH IS FAR BELOW THE REPLACEMENT LEVEL OF 2.1 (EUROSTAT, 2009B, 
P.17).
6 IN EUROSTAT, THE WORKING AGE POPULATION INCLUDES PEOPLE AGED BETWEEN 15 AND
65, WHEREAS IN THIS STUDY THE WORKING AGE POPULATION INCLUDES PEOPLE AGED 
BETWEEN 20 AND 65 (SEE CHAPTER 2).
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FIGURE 1 NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD, BETWEEN 1950 AND 
2050, EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. SOURCE: UN AND EUROSTAT (BEETS, 2009, P.30).
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FIGURE 2 CHANGES IN THE POPULATION IN EUROPE, BETWEEN 1998 AND 2009 (EU277 8). SOURCE: 
EUROSTAT, 2009A.
25%  __________________________________________________________________________
7 THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE CURRENT EU27 COUNTRIES, NORWAY AND 
SWITZERLAND.
8 SEE FIGURE 3 FOR ABBREVIATIONS AND FULL NAMES OF THE COUNTRIES.
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FIGURE 3 PROJECTIONS OF POPULATIONS IN 2008, 2035 AND 20609 (X 1 MILLION PEOPLE), EU2910.
SOURCE: EUROSTAT, 2008A.
POPULATION POPULATION
COUNTRY
ABBRE­
VIATION 2008 2035 2060
DEVELOPMENT 
2008-2035 (%)
DEVELOPMENT 
2008-2060 (%)
BELGIUM BE 10,656 11,906 12,295 11.7 15.4
BULGARIA BG 7,642 6,535 5,485 -14.5 -28.2
CZECH REPUBLIC CZ 10,346 10,288 9,514 -0.6 -8.0
DENMARK DK 5,476 5,858 5,920 7.0 8.1
GERMANY DE 82,179 79,150 70,759 -3.7 -13.9
ESTONIA EE 1,339 1,243 1,132 -7.2 -15.4
IRELAND IE 4,415 6,057 6,752 37.2 52.9
GREECE GR 11,217 11,575 11,118 3.2 -0.9
SPAIN ES 45,283 53,027 51,913 17.1 14.6
FRANCE FR 61,876 69,021 71,800 11.5 16.0
ITALY IT 59,529 61,995 59,390 4.1 -0.2
CYPRUS CY 795 1,121 1,320 41.1 66.2
LATVIA LV 2,269 1,970 1,682 -13.2 -25.9
LITHUANIA LT 3,365 2,998 2,548 -10.9 -24.3
LUXEMBOURG LU 482 633 732 31.3 51.7
HUNGARY HU 10,045 9,501 8,717 -5.4 -13.2
MALTA MT 410 429 405 4.5 -1.4
NETHERLANDS NL 16,404 17,271 16,596 5.3 1.2
AUSTRIA AU 8,334 9,075 9,037 8.9 8.4
POLAND PL 38,116 36,141 31,139 -5.2 -18.3
PORTUGAL PT 10,617 11,395 11,265 7.3 6.1
9 POPULATION AT 1 JANUARY 2008, 1 JANUARY 2035 AND 1 JANUARY 2060.
- THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS IN FIGURE 3 HAVE BEEN BASED ON PROJECTIONS BY 
EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT, 2008A). FOR MORE INFORMATION, SEE FOOTNOTE 3 .
- IN ORDER TO CONSTRUCT THESE POPULATION PROJECTIONS, EUROSTAT USES THE 
NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF THE SEPARATE COUNTRIES. THE POPULATION 
PROJECTIONS FOR THE NETHERLANDS HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE POPULATION PROJEC­
TIONS BY STATISTICS NETHERLANDS (CBS, 2006). HOWEVER, EUROSTAT DOES NOT ALWAYS 
ADOPT THE EXACT COUNTRY PROJECTIONS. IT USES ITS OWN ASSUMPTIONS AND COMPARES 
THE OUTCOMES OF NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS FROM SIMILAR COUNTRIES. THIS 
EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DUTCH POPULATION SIZE FOR 2050 EXPECTED 
BY STATISTICS NETHERLANDS (= 16.8 MILLION: CBS, 2006) AND BY EUROSTAT (16.9 MILLION: 
EUROSTAT, 2008A).
10 THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS CONTAIN THE CURRENT EU27 COUNTRIES, NORWAY AND 
SWITZERLAND.
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ROMANIA RO 21,423 19,619 16,921 -8.4 -21.0
SLOVENIA SI 2,023 1,992 1,779 -1.5 -12.1
SLOVAKIA SK 5,399 5,231 4,547 -3.1 - 15.8
FINLAND FI 5,300 5,557 5,402 4.9 1.9
SWEDEN SE 9,183 10,382 10,875 13.1 18.4
UNITED KINGDOM UK 61,270 70,685 76,677 15.4 25.1
NORWAY NO 4,737 5,634 6,037 18.9 27.4
SWITZERLAND CH 7,591 8,798 9,193 15.9 21.1
EU27 TOTAL 495,394 520,654 505,719 5.1 2.1
FIGURE 4 PROJECTIONS OF THE WORKING AGE POPULATION IN 2008 AND 2060 (X 1 MILLION
PEOPLE), EU2711. SOURCE: EUROSTAT, 2008A; EUROSTAT, 2008B.
COUNTRIES
ABBRE­
VIATION 2008 2060
WORKING AGE 
POPULATION 
2008-2060 (%)
SHARE OF THE 
WORKING AGE 
POPULATION 
2008
SHARE OF 
THE LABOUR 
FORCE 2060
BELGIUM BE 7,038.5 7,112.0 1.0 66.1 57.8
BULGARIA BG 5 ,294.8 2,952.6 -44.2 69.3 53.8
CZECH
REPUBLIC CZ 7,354.5 5,171.3 -29.7 71.1 54.4
DENMARK DK 3 ,612.8 3,474.9 -3.8 66.0 58.7
GERMANY DE 54,414.8 38,891.9 -28.5 66.2 55.0
ESTONIA EE 910.3 626.1 -31.2 68.0 55.3
IRELAND IE 3 ,021.5 3,905.4 29.3 68.4 57.8
GREECE GR 7,525.2 6,160.8 -18.1 67.1 55.4
SPAIN ES 31,143.4 28,420.8 -8.7 68.8 54.7
FRANCE FR 40,323.5 41,202.4 2.1 65.2 57.4
ITALY IT 39,229.8 32,748.5 -16.5 65.9 55.1
CYPRUS CY 556.8 777.0 39.5 70.0 58.9
LATVIA LV 1,566.5 897.5 -42.7 69.0 53.4
LITHUANIA LT 2 ,316.3 1,347.2 -41.8 68.8 52.9
LUXEMBOURG LU 326.2 441.1 35.2 67.7 60.3
HUNGARY HU 6 ,912.6 4,828.8 -30.1 68.8 55.4
MALTA MT 286.9 222.2 -22.6 70.0 54.9
NETHERLANDS NL 11,055.1 9,586.7 -13.3 67.4 57.8
AUSTRIA AU 5 ,627.5 5,171.7 -8.1 67.5 57.2
POLAND PL 27,083.4 16,334.8 -39.7 71.1 52.2
PORTUGAL PT 7,139.0 6,347.4 -11.1 67.2 56.3
ROMANIA RO 14,968.7 9,063.8 -39.4 69.9 53.6
11 THE PROJECTIONS CONTAIN THE CURRENT EU27 COUNTRIES, NORWAY AND SWITZERLAND.
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SLOVENIA SI 1,416.5 956.2 -32.5 70.0 53.7
SLOVAKIA SK 3 ,901.4 2,398.3 -38.5 72.3 52.7
FINLAND FI 3 ,530.0 3,048.6 -13.6 66.6 56.4
SWEDEN SE 6 ,032.8 6,193.1 2.7 65.7 56.9
UNITED
KINGDOM UK 40,659.8 45,011.5 10.7 66.4 58.7
NORWAY NO 3 ,136.5 3,493.6 11.4 66.2 57.9
SWITZERLAND CH 5 ,169.5 5,307.8 2.8 68.1 57.7
EU-27 TOTAL 333,248.5 283,292.6 -15.0 67.3 56.0
POPULATION CHANGES IN EUROPEAN REGIONS, 
IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
When we take a closer look at the European regions (NUTS2), we see a large differ­
ence between growing and shrinking regions. Figure 5 shows that, between 2003 
and 2007, a quarter (74) of the 292 European regions had a population decline. Most 
of those shrinking regions are rural, sparsely populated areas with a peripheral 
location. However, some urban regions in Germany also have shrunk. The shrinking 
regions are especially located in Germany (in particular, in former East Germany), 
Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the Baltic States, Scandinavia and 
Greece. These shrinking regions are in countries with a low fertility rate. In most 
countries, shrinking and growing regions exist next to each other.
According to the projections, between 2008 and 2031, the number of shrinking 
regions in Europe will increase. Figure 6 presents the projections, based on Eurostat 
(2008a). It is expected that, between 2008 and 2031, the population will decline in 
almost one third (98) of the 309 European regions. The regions with the largest pro­
jected decline are in the eastern and southern parts of Europe. The growing regions 
are located in Ireland, the United Kingdom, parts of the Benelux, France, southern 
parts of Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and the urban regions of Sweden and 
Finland.
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FIGURE 5 TOTAL POPULATION CHANGE, PER NUTS2 REGION, AVERAGE BETWEEN 2003 AND 200712 
PER 1,000 INHABITANTS. SOURCE: EUROSTAT, 2009B, P.16.
346
12 THIS MAP IS BASED ON DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS OBSERVED OVER THE PERIOD FROM 
1 JANUARY 2003 TO 1 JANUARY 2008 (EUROSTAT, 2009B, P.14).
FIGURE 6 PROJECTIONS OF POPULATIONS IN EUROPE, PER NUTS2 REGION, BETWEEN 2008 AND
2031. SOURCE: EUROSTAT, 2009A.
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APPENDIX 4 
EXPLANATION ABOUT 
THE PROJECTIONS USED
NATIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
PROJECTIONS
When this study was started, the national population projections (CBS, 2006) and 
the national household projections (CBS, 2007) had been released. During the study, 
both projections were updated (CBS, 2008b; CBS, 2009b). There are a number of 
important differences between the earlier and the later projections. One of these 
being the expected starting point of a countrywide decline in population and house­
hold numbers: according to the national population projections of 2006 (CBS, 2006), 
the Dutch population would reach its peak in 2034, while in the updated 
version (CBS, 2008b) this is expected to happen in 2038. Another difference 
concerns the year in which the working age population is expected to reach its peak; 
in the national population projections of 2006 (CBS, 2006) this peak was expected 
to be reached in 2008, while in the updated version (CBS 2008b) this was expected 
to happen in 2010. The third difference concerns the national household projections; 
according to the projections of 2007 (CBS, 2007) household numbers would decline 
after 2035, whereas the updated version (CBS, 2009b) expects this to happen after 
2039. The differences are caused by changed assumptions about life expectancy and 
migration rates.
REGIONAL POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
PROJECTIONS
For the regional projections, a similar situation applies; at the start of this study, the 
regional population projections of 2006 (Duin et al., 2006) and the regional house­
hold projections of 2007 (De Jong, 2007) were available. During the time of this 
study, these projections were updated, twice (in 2008 and 2009). The regional popu­
lation projections of 2006 and the regional household projections of 2007 had been 
based on the national population projections of 2004 (CBS, 2004) and the national 
household projections of 2005 (CBS, 2005). The regional population and household 
projections updated in 2008 (PBL and CBS, 2008) were based on the national popula­
tion projections of 2006 (CBS, 2006) and the national household projections of 2007
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(CBS, 2007), whereas the regional projections updated in 2009 (PBL and CBS, 2009) 
were based on the national population projections of 2008 (CBS, 2008b) and the 
national household projections of 2009 (CBS, 2009b).
According to the regional population and household projections of 2006, between 
2005 and 2025, 55% of municipalities would experience population decline and 20% 
would experience a decline in household numbers (RPB and CBS, 2006). According 
to the regional projections of 2008, between 2007 and 2025, 61% of municipalities 
were expected to experience a decline in population and 11% a decline in household 
numbers (PBL and CBS, 2008). According to the regional projections of 2009, 
between 2008 and 2025, 40% of the municipalities are expected to experience 
population decline, 3% will experience household decline, and 80% will experience a 
decline in working age population (PBL and CBS, 2009). These differences between 
projections illustrate the level of uncertainty in regional population and household 
projections.
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ENGLISH SUMMARY
DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES - A STUDY OF 
POLICY CHANGE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, the population of the Netherlands has grown. Recently, 
however, in some Dutch municipalities and regions it has started to decline. 
According to the regional population projections, more municipalities will follow. 
That decline in total population gives rise to a decline in household numbers and in 
working age population (people of the ages of 20 to 65).
This study seeks to provide an answer to the following questions: how do local 
governments react to demographic decline, and under which circumstances do they 
adapt their policies to it?
Because demographic decline tends to manifest itself at local government level, 
this study focuses on policy responses by municipalities (individually and jointly) and 
regional organisations. Also included is the provincial policy response, as provinces 
were also found to react to demographic decline.
This study focuses on local policy changes, because the literature concludes that 
demographic decline is a new policy context that requires adaptation to current 
policy. Local spatial policy consists of a set of policies and/or actions, formulated 
by local governments to influence the spatial structure of an area. This study pays 
special attention to two aspects of the spatial structure, namely housing and the 
economy, as these aspects would be affected most by demographic decline. This 
includes spatial strategies on housing, the spatial economy, labour market, and retail, 
business and office locations.
For decades, these policies have been relatively stable, being based on demographic 
growth. Now we see a gradual change in those policies. In order to investigate 
this change, we need a theory about continuity and changes that take place within 
policy.
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In order to answer the central questions, a conceptual model (see Chapter 3) was 
developed, based on the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA). Arts et al. (2000a, 
p. 54), who are the founders of this approach, define a policy arrangement as ‘the 
temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a particular policy domain 
at a specific level of policy making in terms of four dimensions: actors, resources, 
rules and discourses’. The ‘particular policy domain’ here is spatial policy and the 
‘specific level of policy making’ the local, regional and provincial levels.
This theoretical approach has been selected as it best helps to explain the character­
istics of demographic decline and local government strategies, compared to alterna­
tive theories of policy stability and change (e.g. Punctuated Equilibrium Framework 
by Baumgartner and Jones, the Stream Framework by Kingdon and Zahariadis, the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, and the discursive 
approach of Hajer).
First, the PAA explains both policy stability and disturbances, and the mechanisms 
behind the two. This is needed because the literature shows that local governments 
experiencing demographic decline often do not change their policy accordingly, but 
rather aim to stabilise it. The four dimensions of the policy arrangement (‘actors and 
coalitions’, ‘rules’, ‘resources’ and ‘discourses’) are inextricably interwoven. When 
the internal dimensions of the policy arrangement are congruent, there is policy 
stability. This implies that when in one of those four dimensions large changes occur, 
this causes effects in other dimensions too, which may result in a policy change.
Second, the PAA includes both actors and structures and the reciprocity between 
them. Existing research shows that it is impossible to explain policy stability or policy 
change based on only one of the two; actors and structures affect each other. These 
actors and structures and the reciprocity between them may be recognised in the 
four dimensions of the policy arrangement approach. The dimension ‘actors and 
coalitions’ obviously refers to the actors and the other three -  ‘resources’, ‘rules’ and 
‘discourses’ -  refer to structure.
An additional advantage of PAA, in comparison to the other theories, is that it can 
be used for empirical research relatively easily. Each of the four separate dimensions 
can be made operational for empirical research.
This study may contribute to the academic debate. It aims to deepen international 
and national academic debate on policy dynamics in general, and more specifically 
the debate on demographic decline and spatial planning policy. The first by using 
the PAA, which is often criticised for being too static, to investigate policy change.
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The second by focusing on shrinking regions (instead of shrinking inner cities), and 
on shrinkage that is caused, not only by a negative migration balance, but also by a 
negative natural balance.
The value of this study lies in the fact that it provides an overview of how local gov­
ernments in shrinking regions are dealing with demographic decline, and shows the 
results achieved. This can be helpful to local planners in other shrinking regions, or in 
those that are expected to shrink.
In order to answer the central questions, the case-study method was used and 
hypotheses were tested. In total, three shrinking regions were analysed (Parkstad 
Limburg, the Eemsdelta, and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen), all located in the Netherlands. 
Parkstad Limburg contains seven municipalities: Brunssum, Heerlen, Kerkrade, 
Landgraaf, Onderbanken, Simpelveld and Voerendaal; the Eemsdelta consists of 
Delfzijl, Appingedam, Eemsmond and Loppersum; and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen contains 
Terneuzen, Sluis and Hulst. More information about these regions can be found in 
Chapter 4.
Demographic shrinkage may take on three forms: shrinkage in population, house­
hold numbers, and working age population (people between the ages of 20 and 65). 
A  shrinking region is defined here as a region in which the majority of municipalities 
face a decline in population (1995-2008), and that are expected, by 2025, to face a de­
cline in at least one of the three distinguished dimensions. The data for this research 
were collected from various sources: descriptive statistics, interviews, document 
analyses, and participatory observations (see Chapter 4).
In Parkstad Limburg, the population has been declining since 1997, household num­
bers since 2002, and the working age population since 1993. In the Eemsdelta, the 
population has been declining since 1981, household numbers since 2003, and the 
working age population since 1993. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the population has been 
declining since 1982 and the working age population since 2003. It is expected that in 
these three regions these declines in population, number of households and working 
age population will continue.
LOCAL SPATIAL POLICIES
How have local governments in Parkstad Limburg, Eemsdelta and Zeeuws-Vlaan- 
deren reacted in their spatial policy to demographic decline in the fields of housing 
and the economy? And to what extent did they adapt their local spatial policy in 
these fields to demographic decline?
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In this study a distinction is made between conservative and radical policy changes. 
Conservative local policy changes are made when local governments mention 
demographic decline and adapt the content of their policies accordingly, in order 
to increase their population, household numbers, and/or working age population.
The aim is to combat this decline. Radical local policy changes are made when local 
governments mention demographic decline and adapt the content of their policy 
accordingly, accept the decreases in population, household numbers, and/or working 
age population, and adapt to that situation.
Also, the study distinguishes between three different levels of policy: 
strategic plans, operational plans, and local actions. Strategic plans are indicative 
plans that are not legally binding, such as municipal or provincial structure visions 
(Mastop & Faludi, 1997). Operational plans are legally binding plans, such as local 
land-use plans, project decisions, and the provincial ordinance (Mastop & Faludi, 
1997). Actions refer to the implementation of policies that are formulated in the stra­
tegic and operational plans (Alexander, 1992).
This research shows that local governments in the three shrinking regions mainly 
continued their policies unchanged (policy stability) and that most of the policy 
changes that were found could be considered to be conservative. Most of those 
conservative changes were found in strategic policy on housing. In the field of the 
economy, local governments were found hardly to have included demographic de­
cline into their policies, let alone changed their policies in response to it. Examples of 
conservative policy changes in the field of housing are new housing developments, 
improvement of the image of the residential environment, and the development 
of new housing concepts. Examples of conservative policy changes related to the 
economy are those that improve the image of the business and spatial environment 
of the region, and the setting up of specific educational programmes (especially in 
health care and technology). In addition, there are economic policy initiatives that 
do not take demographic decline explicitly into account. Examples are policies relat­
ed to business locations, the development of new economic drivers, and acquisition.
In the case-study regions, only a few radical policy changes were found. Examples 
of such radical changes are reducing the existing housing stock through demolition, 
and restructuring, reducing housing programmes, reducing or maintaining the exist­
ing level of services (reduction in retail floor space), and increasing labour participa­
tion and labour productivity. Most of these radical changes were found in strategic 
policy on housing. There were hardly any changes in operational plans and actions, 
not for housing or for the economy.
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Most of these radical changes were found in Parkstad Limburg and Eemsdelta. In 
Parkstad Limburg, the seven municipalities reduced their planned new housing 
developments from 10,000 to 3,449 (up to 2010), and they agreed on a regional 
restructuring vision which proposes demolition of between 6,245 and 13,157 houses, 
and restructuring of 12,748 houses, between 2008 and 2020. Delfzijl reduced the 
housing stock in north Delfzijl through demolition and restructuring, and reduced 
the shopping area. At a regional level, the four municipalities in Eemsdelta decided 
to change their strategic policy and to reduce their existing housing stock by 700 
houses and to concentrate retail facilities. The province of Zeeland made a few radi­
cal changes with respect to the economy. It decided to increase labour productivity 
and labour participation in response to the decrease in the potential working popula­
tion, in order to produce more with fewer people.
EXPLAINING LOCAL POLICY CHANGES
The policy arrangement approach emphasises policy stability. Nevertheless, we 
found that some local governments in shrinking regions did change their policies, 
and that different types of policy reactions could be distinguished. We want to 
explain why local governments decide to stabilise or change their policies and -  in 
cases of policy change -  why they choose for a certain type of change. In order to 
explain this, the policy arrangement approach is used and four adaptations have 
been made to it (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 CONCEPTUAL MODEL APPLIED TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
355
CHANGES IN DIMENSIONS OF THE POLICY 
ARRANGEMENT
The first addition to the PAA is the attention for the possible changes in each of the 
separate dimensions of the policy arrangement, and for the reactions to this (this 
adaptation is based on the work by Liefferink (2006) and Wiering and Crabbe 
(2006)). A  change in discourse includes changes in ideas about the nature of the 
problem and the possible solutions. Changes in the actor dimension refer to the 
arrival of new actors, changes in the constellation of actors, and changes in the 
patterns of interaction between those actors. In case of rules, there can be changes 
in the formal rules (e.g. changes in procedures, legal texts and documents) and 
the informal rules (e.g. changes in routines of interaction). Changes in resources or 
power balance are changes in the division of resources (e.g. knowledge, money, 
political legitimacy) or changes in power relations between actors.
This study begins the analysis with the discourse dimension. It is assumed that a 
change in the discourse may endanger the coherence of the policy arrangement 
(structural-internal congruence -  see below). When the discourse dimension chang­
es, the coherence can be restored by changes in the other dimensions. If the change 
in the discourse dimension is marginal, the other dimensions can adapt easily to that. 
In such a case, a new version of the existing arrangement could arise, a conservative 
policy change. If the change in the discourse dimension of the policy arrangement 
is large, a new policy arrangement is possible only if the other dimensions undergo 
a large change, as well. In such a case, a radical policy change could arise. Another 
necessary condition for this is that all the actors in the coalition share the change in 
the discourse. Then there is strategic congruence (see below).
From the above, the first hypothesis can be derived. In order to realise a radical policy 
change, not only a radical change in discourse is needed but also radical changes in 
actors and coalitions, formal and informal rules, and resource or power balance.
CONGRUENCE
The second addition to the PAA is the concept of congruence and the distinction 
between strategic, structural-internal and structural-external (in)congruence. This 
is based on the work by Boonstra (2004; 2006). Strategic congruence is the extent 
to which policy actors within a given policy arrangement share policy discourse and 
common interests when deploying actions. Structural-internal congruence is the 
extent to which the (four) dimensions of a policy arrangement (actors and coalitions; 
resources; rules and discourses) are coherent. Structural-external
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congruence is the extent to which the policy arrangement as a whole matches the 
wider (national) institutional context, outside the policy arrangement.
Boonstra (2004) concludes that, for the emergence and institutionalisation of a new 
policy arrangement, (which is needed for a radical policy change), all three types of 
congruence are needed. It is assumed that a radical policy change not only needs 
changes in all dimensions of the policy arrangement and that all the actors in the 
policy arrangement share the same discourse, (to realise strategic and structural- 
internal congruence), but also, if there is external structural incongruence, a radical 
change in the external (national) institutional context (in order to realise structural- 
external congruence). When the change in a dimension is marginal and causes no 
or little strategic and/or structural-internal and/or structural-external incongruence, 
whereby it can be easily absorbed by other dimensions of the policy arrangement, 
a new variety of the existing policy arrangement may arise, resulting in a conserva­
tive policy change. This can only happen when the external institutional context, 
with which the policy arrangement is in accordance, remains unchanged. When the 
change in a dimension is large, and whatever the strategic and structural-internal 
incongruence, if this does not fit the external institutional context, a tension with 
the external institutional context may emerge. A  change in the external national 
institutional context is needed to recover the structural external congruence that is 
needed for the emergence of a new policy arrangement.
The second hypothesis reads as follows: in order to realise a radical policy change, a 
radical change in the external (national) institutional context is needed.
LOCAL SPATIAL CONDITIONS
The third addition to the PAA is the local spatial condition. The importance of this 
has been recognised by others, too (e.g. Mol), who criticise the PAA for not paying 
enough attention to the specific features of the policy object. The importance of 
these specific features -  in this study called the local spatial conditions -  for explain­
ing the local government reactions is addressed in the literature about demographic 
decline and policy (see Chapter 3).
It is assumed that these local spatial conditions (such as the degree of concentration 
of the least attractive housing, retail, office and business stock in the region, and 
its ownership) affect the spatial consequences of demographic decline, and conse­
quently the perception about the nature of the problem (discourse) and the policy 
reactions of actors.
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The third hypothesis is that a radical change in one of the dimensions of the policy 
arrangement will take place only if demographic decline has become clearly visible in 
the physical environment.
ASPECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE
Finally, the aspects of demographic decline (the independent variable of this study) 
are added to the conceptual model. This addition is based on the work by Liefferink 
(2006), W iering and Crabbe (2006), Van Dam et al. (2006), Glock (2006), Beauregard 
(2008), Rotmans (2005) and Rotmans et al (2001). They acknowledge that the policy 
arrangements (and/or policy reactions) are influenced by the size and the duration 
of the problems to which the policy responds. Those aspects of demographic decline 
can affect the extent of the change in the dimensions of the policy arrangement.
Size (extent) of demographic decline refers to the (percentage) decrease in popu­
lation, household numbers, and working age population, during a certain period 
of time. Duration of demographic decline refers to the length of time (in years) 
between now and the year (called the turning point) in which the region for the first 
time was confronted with the decrease in population, household numbers and/or 
working age population.
It is the assumption that the larger the demographic decline and the longer it lasts, 
the greater the probability that there will be a radical change in the discourse 
dimension, which can result in a radical policy change. This relationship between the 
demographic decline and the policy change can be indirect, as well. A  large and long- 
lasting demographic decline may cause large changes in the physical environment, 
which the existing policy arrangement cannot deal with sufficiently, and this may 
be one of the causes of a radical change in problem perception (discourse). It might 
result in a new idea about the nature of the problem, and thus warrants a radical 
policy change.
The fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows: a large and long-lasting demographic 
decline always precedes a radical policy change.
COMPARISON OF FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESES
1) In order to realise a radical policy change, not only a radical change in discourse 
would be needed, but also radical changes in actors and coalitions, formal and informal 
rules, and resource or power balance.
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In response to demographic decline, most local governments did not change their 
policies, but when they did it was a conservative rather than a radical policy change. 
Moreover, most changes were found in strategic policies rather than operational 
policies and actions. An explanation for this is that demographic decline initially 
caused no or only a marginal change in the discourse dimension. Local administra­
tors did not perceive demographic decline to be a problem, or as a temporary (and 
reversible) problem. Such changes in the discourse dimension are relatively easy to 
accept because they match the current interaction patterns, resources and rules of 
the actors and their coalitions active in the shrinking region, which focus on accom­
modating growth (strategic and structural-internal congruence).
The study also demonstrates that local governments changed their strategic policy 
radically without radical changes to all the dimensions of the policy arrangement. 
From this we can conclude that the first hypothesis is supported by the evidence 
on radical changes to operational policy (and probably also to radical changes in 
concrete actions), but not by the evidence on radical changes to strategic policy. 
Apparently, for the last, a radical change in one dimension of the policy arrange­
ment is sufficient as long as there also is strategic congruence. This means that a 
radical change in strategic policy can be made as long as a majority of actors within 
a given policy arrangement share the new problem perception (discourse), namely 
that demographic decline is a structural (irreversible) problem. However, in order to 
reach radical change in operational policy or in a concrete action, radical changes in 
all dimensions of the policy arrangement (discourse, actors and coalitions, resources 
and rules) are needed. Moreover, it is questionable how radical these observed 
radical changes in strategic plans really are. In strategic plans, the intention can be 
formulated to reduce the housing plans, which can be considered a radical change, 
however, this is no guarantee that it will indeed be implemented.
2) In order to realise a radical policy change, a radical change in the external (national) 
institutional context would be needed.
Another explanation why, in response to demographic decline, local governments 
often formulated no, or only conservative, policy changes is that if there is a marginal 
change in the problem perception, this matches the external (national) institutional 
context, which is also focused on accommodating growth. As a result there is 
structural-external congruence.
Nevertheless, the second hypothesis is not supported by the evidence on all types of 
policy change. This hypothesis is confirmed regarding radical changes in operational 
plans and concrete actions, but not regarding radical changes in strategic plans. This
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study shows that even when the dimensions of the policy arrangement are not in 
accordance with the wider national institutional context (which focuses on accom­
modating demographic growth), radical strategic changes still occurred. Apparently, 
structural-external congruence is needed to reach radical changes in operational 
plans and actions, but not to reach radical changes in strategic plans. This helps to 
explain why radical operational changes rarely occur. That would require a radical 
change in the external (national) institutional context, which is not in the power 
of local governments. Again it is questionable how radical these radical changes in 
strategic plans really are. The fact that they can occur within the existing institutional 
context means they are not unacceptably incongruent.
3) A radical change in one of the dimensions of the policy arrangement will take place 
only if demographic decline has become clearly visible in the physical environment.
This hypothesis is supported by the evidence from policies in the field of housing 
and economy, and specifically by evidence from changes in strategic and operational 
plans in these fields.
This study shows that when the least-attractive housing, shops, business premises 
and/or offices are spatially concentrated and not owner-occupied, the consequences 
of demographic decline are more visible (e.g. through high vacancy rates), stimu­
lating a radical change in problem perception (discourse), which may result in a 
radical change in local policy. However, this is not true for changes at regional level. 
Spatial concentration of the least-attractive housing stock in one municipality makes 
it difficult to reach a radical policy change at regional level. After all, the local admin­
istrators of this one municipality will perceive demographic decline as a structural 
problem, but the other municipalities which are not facing the problems will not 
accept this problem perception, nor agree to change the regional policy radically.
The study also shows that a clear spatial hierarchy is a spatial condition which sup­
ports the formulation of a radical policy change at regional level. When municipalities 
agree which municipality has the central function for the region, it is easier to reach 
agreement about decisions, such as downsizing the plans of each municipality.
In the shrinking regions, local governments pay hardly any attention to demographic 
decline in their policies on the economy; this in contrast to policies on housing. An 
explanation of this difference is that the economic consequences of demographic 
decline are much less visible.
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4) A large and long-lasting demographic decline always precedes a radical policy 
change.
This hypothesis is supported by the evidence surrounding housing policy, but not by 
that surrounding economic policy.
The study shows that the greatest number of policy changes were found in regions 
that had been facing population and household decline the longest, and where 
the decline had been largest. Most of the radical policy changes related to housing 
were found in Parkstad Limburg and the Eemsdelta, where the decline in household 
numbers has been large, compared to the rest of the Netherlands, and where the 
decline was experienced first. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, where the population has been 
declining less than in the other two regions and the number of households has not 
yet started to decline, there have been barely any radical policy changes in the field 
of housing.
The size and duration of the demographic decline seem less relevant for explaining 
the policy reactions in the field of the economy. In this field, local governments were 
found to hardly have taken demographic decline into account. Those local govern­
ments that did pay attention to demographic decline in their economic policies were 
not necessarily the ones in which the decline in the working age population was 
the largest and had lasted the longest. This difference between the policy reaction 
for housing and for economy may have resulted from the fact that the relationship 
between demography and the economy is more complex than the relationship 
between demography and housing. Exceptions are the policy changes regarding 
retail: in Delfzijl and Eemsdelta, where the decrease in household numbers was large 
and began many years ago, the policy has changed radically.
REFLECTION
The conceptual framework developed for this study -  which was based on the PAA 
and four additions -  was useful for gaining insight into the conditions that influence 
the local government reactions towards demographic decline in the fields of housing 
and the economy. The results from testing the hypotheses have shown that the con­
ceptual framework needs to be refined in certain ways. The conditions under which 
demographic decline leads to a policy change, and, if so, the type of policy change, 
are different for each government level, for each type of plan (strategic and opera­
tional), and for each type of change (conservative and radical).
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The conceptual model may also be useful for planning practice, in formulating 
recommendations for local governments that face demographic decline. It gives 
insight into the implementation problems and into solutions for reaching radical 
policy changes. It could be helpful to the national government, also, by showing 
how it could help those local governments to deal with demographic decline and 
the conditions that are needed. More information about the recommendations for 
the different Dutch Government levels which can be derived from this study can be 
found in the study by Verwest and Van Dam (2010b).
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DUTCH SUMMARY 
(NEDERLANDSE 
SAMENVATTING)
DEMOGRAFISCHE KRIMP EN LOKALE 
OVERHEIDSSTRATEGIEËN - EEN STUDIE NAAR 
BELEIDSVERANDERING IN NEDERLAND 
INTRODUCTIE
De afgelopen tientallen jaren is de Nederlandse bevolking in omvang toegenomen. 
Tegelijkertijd echter, zijn recent verschillende Nederlandse gemeenten en regio’s 
met krimp geconfronteerd. Volgens de regionale bevolkingsprognose zal het aantal 
gemeenten waar de bevolking daalt, toenemen. Deze krimp zal ook leiden tot een 
afname van het aantal huishoudens en een kleiner wordende potentiële beroeps­
bevolking (20-65 jarigen).
In deze studie staan de volgende vragen centraal: Hoe reageren lokale overheden op 
demografische krimp, en onder welke omstandigheden passen zij hun beleid daarop
Omdat demografische krimp zich vooral op lokaal niveau voordoet, is deze studie 
voornamelijk gericht op de beleidsreacties van gemeenten (al dan niet in samen­
werking) en regionale organisaties. Maar ook de provinciale beleidsreacties komen 
aan bod, omdat provincies eveneens op demografische krimp blijken te reageren.
De keuze voor lokale beleidsveranderingen is gebaseerd op wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek, waarin krimp in het algemeen wordt beschouwd als een nieuwe beleids- 
context die vraagt om aanpassingen in het beleid. Lokaal ruimtelijk beleid omvat 
een combinatie van beleid en/of acties die lokale overheden formuleren om de 
ruimtelijke structuur van een gebied te beïnvloeden. In deze studie gaat de aandacht 
vooral uit naar twee aspecten van de ruimtelijke structuur, namelijk woningbouw 
en economie, omdat dit de velden zijn waar demografische krimp naar verwachting 
de meeste gevolgen zal hebben. Ingegaan wordt op de ruimtelijke strategieën voor 
wonen, ruimtelijke economie, arbeidsmarkt, retail, bedrijventerreinen en 
kantoorlocaties.
363
Het lokale beleid voor deze domeinen is al enkele decennia stabiel en gebaseerd 
op bevolkingsgroei. Nu is een geleidelijke beleidsverandering zichtbaar. Om dit te 
onderzoeken, is een theoretisch kader gekozen dat beleidsstabiliteit en -verandering 
als onderwerp heeft.
De centrale vragen zijn onderzocht aan de hand van een conceptueel model (zie 
hoofdstuk 3) waarin de zogenoemde beleidsarrangementenbenadering centraal 
staat. Voor het begrip ‘beleidsarrangement’ is uitgegaan van de definitie van Arts et 
al. (2000a, p.54), de grondleggers van deze benadering; zij verstaan hieronder ‘de 
tijdelijke stabilisering van de inhoud en organisatie van een specifiek beleidsdomein 
op een bepaald beleidsniveau in termen van vier dimensies: actoren en coalities, 
middelen, regels en discoursen’. Het ‘specifieke beleidsdomein’ is hier het ruimtelijk 
beleid, het ‘bepaalde beleidsniveau’ de lokale, regionale en provinciale schaal.
Voor deze benadering is gekozen, omdat die voor onderzoek naar demografische 
krimp en lokale overheidsstrategieën beter voldoet dan andere theorieën van 
beleidsverandering en beleidsstabiliteit (waaronder het ‘perspectief van het onder­
broken evenwicht’ van Baumgartner en Jones, de ‘stromenbenadering’ van Kingdon 
en Zahariadis, de ‘pleitcoalitiebenadering’ van Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith en de 
‘discursieve benadering’ van Hajer).
Ten eerste biedt de beleidsarrangementenbenadering zowel een verklaring voor 
beleidsstabiliteit als voor verstoringen daarin en de mechanismen die achter beide 
schuilgaan. Dit is voor deze studie noodzakelijk, omdat bekend is dat overheden die 
worden geconfronteerd met demografische krimp, hun beleid vaak niet wijzigen 
maar stabiliseren. Het idee is dat de vier onderscheiden dimensies van het beleids- 
arrangement (‘actoren en coalities’, ‘middelen’, ‘regels’ en ‘discoursen’) onlos­
makelijk met elkaar zijn verbonden. Dit betekent dat als zich in de vier dimensies van 
het arrangement (tijdelijk) geen veranderingen voordoen, het beleid (tijdelijk) stabiel 
is. Het impliceert ook dat als zich in een van de vier dimensies wel grote verande­
ringen voordoen, dit tot wijzigingen in de andere dimensies zal leiden, wat op zijn 
beurt tot een beleidsverandering kan leiden.
Ten tweede omvat de beleidsarrangementenbenadering zowel actoren als structu­
ren en de onderlinge relaties tussen beide. In eerder onderzoek naar demografische 
krimp is namelijk gebleken dat het onmogelijk is om beleidsstabiliteit dan wel -veran­
dering vanuit slechts één van beide te verklaren; actoren en structuren beïnvloeden 
elkaar wederzijds. Deze actoren en structuren en hun onderlinge wederkerigheid zijn 
in de vier dimensies van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering terug te vinden:
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de actoren uiteraard in de eerste dimensie ‘actoren en coalities’, de structuren en 
structurele aspecten in de ‘middelen’, ‘regels’ en ‘discoursen’.
Een bijkomend voordeel van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering is dat deze in ver­
gelijking met de andere theorieën makkelijker te  gebruiken is voor empirisch 
onderzoek, omdat de vier onderscheiden dimensies elk goed zijn te operatio­
naliseren voor empirisch onderzoek.
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan het wetenschappelijk debat over beleidsverandering in 
het algemeen, en aan het debat over demografische krimp en ruim telijk beleid in het 
bijzonder. Aan het eerste vanwege het gebruik van de beleidsarrangementenbena­
dering als zodanig, omdat een kritiekpunt op deze benadering is dat deze te  statisch 
zou zijn voor het onderzoek naar beleidsverandering. Aan het tweede, omdat het 
onderzoek is gericht op krimpende regio’s (in plaats van krimpende binnensteden) 
en op krimp die niet alleen w ord t veroorzaakt door een negatief migratiesaldo, maar 
ook door een negatieve natuurlijke bevolkingsaanwas.
Deze studie is daarnaast relevant voor de beleidspraktijk, omdat ze een overzicht 
biedt van de manier waarop lokale overheden in krim pregio’s met demografische 
krimp omgaan en van de resultaten die zij to t nu toe hebben bereikt. Dit kan niet 
alleen bruikbaar zijn voor lokale planners in andere regio’s die met krimp te maken 
hebben, maar ook voor die in regio’s die daarmee in de (nabije) toekom st te maken 
kunnen o f zullen krijgen. Voor concrete beleidsaanbevelingen w ord t verwezen naar 
Verwest en Van Dam (2010b).
Voor het beantwoorden van de centrale vragen is gebruikgemaakt van de case- 
studiemethode en zijn hypotheses getest. In totaal zijn drie krimpende regio’s in 
Nederland geanalyseerd (Parkstad Limburg, de Eemsdelta en Zeeuws-Vlaanderen). 
Parkstad Limburg bestaat uit de gemeenten Brunssum, Heerlen, Kerkrade, 
Landgraaf, Onderbanken, Simpelveld en Voerendaal; de Eemsdelta omvat de 
gemeenten Appingedam, Delfzijl, Eemsmond en Loppersum; en Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 
de gemeenten Hulst, Sluis en Terneuzen. Voor meer inform atie over deze regio’s, zie 
hoofdstuk 4 .
Demografische krimp kan zich in drie vormen voordoen: in een afname van de bevol­
king, een daling van het aantal huishoudens en een krimpende potentië le beroeps­
bevolking. Een ‘krim pregio’ is gedefinieerd als een regio waarin de bevolking in de 
periode 1995-2008  in de meerderheid van de gemeenten is afgenomen, en waar in 
de toekom st (2025) een krimp in een van de drie hiervoor genoemde vormen w ord t 
verwacht. Voor het onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van verschillende strategieën van
365
dataverzameling: descriptieve statistiek, interviews, documentanalyse en participe­
rende observatie (zie hoofdstuk 4 ).
In Parkstad Limburg daalt het aantal inwoners sinds 1997 , het aantal huishoudens 
sinds 2002 en de potentië le beroepsbevolking sinds 1993 . In de Eemsdelta daalt 
het aantal inwoners sinds 1981 , het aantal huishoudens sinds 2003 en de potentiële 
beroepsbevolking sinds 19 9 3 . In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen daalt het aantal inwoners sinds 
1982  en de potentië le beroepsbevolking sinds 2003 , maar het aantal huishoudens 
nog niet. De verwachting is dat het inwonertal, het aantal huishoudens en de poten­
tië le beroepsbevolking in de toekom st in alle drie de regio’s zullen (blijven) afnemen.
LOKAAL RUIMTELIJK BELEID
W elk ruim telijk beleid voeren lokale overheden in Parkstad Limburg, Zeeuws- 
Vlaanderen en de Eemsdelta op het terrein van woningbouw  en economie? En in 
hoeverre passen deze overheden hun beleid op deze terreinen aan op de 
demografische krimp?
In deze studie is een onderscheid gemaakt in conservatieve en radicale beleids­
veranderingen. Gesproken w ord t van een co n servatieve  ve ra n d e rin g  wanneer lokale 
overheden demografische krimp in hun beleid noemen en de inhoud van hun beleid 
aanpassen, en als deze aanpassingen zijn gericht op het laten toenemen van het 
aantal inwoners o f huishoudens o f de potentië le beroepsbevolking. Het doel is het 
bestrijden van de krimp. Bij een rad ica le  b e le id sve ran d e rin g  noemen lokale over­
heden demografische krimp in hun beleid en passen zij de inhoud van hun beleid 
daarop aan, maar accepteren zij de daling van het een en/of het ander en zijn de 
aanpassingen gericht op het begeleiden van de krimp.
Daarnaast is in de studie een onderscheid gemaakt in strategische plannen, opera­
tionele plannen en handelingen. S tra teg isch e  p lan n en  zijn indicatief en juridisch niet 
bindend, zoals gemeentelijke en provinciale structuurplannen (Mastop & Faludi, 
1997). O p e ra tio n e le  p lan n en  zijn juridisch wel bindend, zoals bestemmingsplannen, 
projectbesluiten en provinciale verordeningen (Mastop & Faludi, 1997 ). H andelingen, 
to t  slot, zijn de acties die actoren ondernemen om hun strategische o f operationele 
plannen ten uitvoer te brengen (Alexander, 1992).
U it d it onderzoek kom t naar voren dat de lokale overheden in de drie krim pregio’s 
hun beleid overwegend onveranderd voortzetten (stab ilite it) o f op de krimp reage­
ren met conservatieve beleidsveranderingen. De conservatieve beleidsreacties zijn 
vooral in het woningbouwbeleid terug te  vinden. Op economisch gebied overheerst
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beleídsstabílíteít en vormen de conservatieve beleidsveranderingen eerder 
uitzondering dan regel. Voorbeelden van conservatieve beleidsveranderingen op het 
terrein van w oningbouw  zijn de voortgezette ontw ikkeling van uitbreidingsplannen, 
plannen voor de ontw ikkeling van nieuwe woonconcepten en marketingcampagnes 
gericht op het verbeteren van het ‘woonim ago’. Op economisch gebied gaat het 
vooral om marketingcampagnes gericht op het verbeteren van het ‘werkim ago’ van 
de regio, en het ontw ikkelen van specifiek onderwijsaanbod (vooral in de zorg en 
techniek). Daarnaast zijn er op economisch terrein nog tal van andere beleidsinitiatie­
ven te noemen waarbij demografische krimp niet expliciet als reden voor aanpassing 
w ord t genoemd. Voorbeelden daarvan zijn bedrijventerreinenbeleid, de ontw ikke­
ling van nieuwe economische sectoren en acquisitie.
Radicale beleidsveranderingen komen in de drie regio’s slechts sporadisch voor. 
Voorbeelden van zulke reacties zijn de reductie van de woningvoorraad door sloop 
o f herstructurering, het naar beneden toe bijstellen van nieuwbouwplannen, de 
reductie o f handhaving van het bestaande voorzieningenniveau (zoals de ver­
kleining van het winkelareaal door sloop) en het stimuleren van arbeidsparticipatie 
en arbeidsproductiviteit. Ook voor deze veranderingen geldt, net als bij de conserva­
tieve beleidsreacties, dat ze, áls ze zich al voordoen, voornamelijk op het terrein van 
w oningbouw  zijn te vinden en dan overwegend in strategisch beleid. Veranderingen 
in operationele plannen en handelingen daarentegen, doen zich zowel in het econo­
misch als woningbouwbeleid nauwelijks voor.
De meeste radicale beleidsveranderingen zijn te traceren in Parkstad Limburg en de 
Eemsdelta. In Parkstad Limburg hebben de zeven Parkstad-gemeenten gezamen­
lijk besloten het aantal nieuwbouwplannen voor woningbouw  te reduceren van 
10.000  naar 3.449  (in 2010) en bereikten ze overeenstemming over de regionale 
herstructureringsvisie. Daarin is het voorstel om tussen 2008 en 2020 minimaal 6.245 
en maximaal 13 .157  woningen te  slopen en 12.748 woningen te herstructureren.
De gemeente Delfzijl (in de Eemsdelta) besloot in Delfzijl-Noord een deel van de 
woningvoorraad te slopen en het aantal vierkante meters w inkelvloeroppervlak te 
reduceren. Op regionaal niveau besloten de vier Eemsdelta-gemeenten de totale 
woningvoorraad in de regio m et 700 woningen te  verminderen en de voorzieningen 
meer ruim telijk te  concentreren. Verder formuleerde de provincie Zeeland een aantal 
radicale beleidsveranderingen in het economisch beleid. M et het oog op de afname 
van de potentië le beroepsbevolking, besloot zij haar beleid te  richten op het vergro­
ten van de arbeidsparticipatie en -productiviteit.
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VERKLARINGEN VOOR DE 
BELEIDSVERANDERINGEN
De beleidsarrangementenbenadering benadrukt de stabilite it in beleid. Toch hebben 
sommige lokale overheden in krim pregio’s hun beleid veranderd en zijn er verschil­
lende soorten beleidsreacties te onderscheiden. Om te verklaren waarom is gekozen 
voor stabilite it o f verandering en -  bij verandering -  waarom voor een bepaald soort 
verandering, is de beleidsarrangementenbenadering gebruikt en op vier manieren 
aangevuld (zie figuur 1 ).
FIGUUR 1 CONCEPTUEEL MODEL TOEGEPAST OP DEMOGRAFISCHE KRIMP
VERANDERINGEN BINNEN DE DIMENSIES VAN HET 
BELEIDSARRANGEMENT
De eerste aanvulling op de beleidsarrangementenbenadering is aandacht voor moge­
lijke veranderingen in elk van de vier dimensies van het beleidsarrangement en voor 
de reacties die zich dan voordoen (deze aanvulling is gebaseerd op het w erk van Lief- 
ferink (2006 ) en W iering en Crabbé (2006 )). Bij ‘discours’ gaat het om veranderingen 
in het idee over de aard van het probleem en de oplossingsrichting; bij ‘actoren en 
coalities’ om nieuwe actoren o f om veranderingen in de samenstelling van actoren 
o f in het interactiepatroon; bij ‘regels’ om veranderingen in de form ele regels (zoals 
gewijzigde procedures, w etten, enzovoort) o f de inform ele regels (zoals gewijzigde 
routines); en bij ‘m iddelen’ ten slotte om veranderingen in de verdeling van middelen
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(zoals kennis, financiën en politieke leg itim ite it) o f om veranderingen in machtsrela­
ties tussen actoren.
In het onderzoek zijn veranderingen in het discours als startpunt voor de analyse 
genomen. Verondersteld is dat een verandering in het discours de samenhang 
binnen het beleidsarrangement (de structureel-interne congruentie -  zie hierna) 
in gevaar kan brengen. Wanneer het discours verandert, dan hangt herstel van de 
congruentie af van de mate waarin (een van de drie) andere dimensies veranderen. 
Als de verandering in het discours marginaal is en geen al te  grote incongruentie 
veroorzaakt, kunnen de andere dimensies zich hieraan betrekkelijk gemakkelijk 
aanpassen. In dat geval ontstaat een nieuwe versie van het bestaande arrangement, 
een conservatieve beleidsverandering. Als de verandering in het discours g roo t is, is 
een nieuw beleidsarrangement pas mogelijk als ook de andere dimensies een grote 
verandering ondergaan. Dan kan een radicale beleidsverandering ontstaan. Nog een 
voorwaarde hiervoor is dat de verschillende actoren in het beleidsarrangement de 
(grote) verandering in het discours delen. Dan is er sprake van zogeheten strategi­
sche congruentie (zie hierna).
Hieruit kan de eerste hypothese w ord t afgeleid: O m  een rad ica le  be le id sve ran d e rin g  
te  realiseren , is n ie t a lleen  een rad ica le  v e ra n d e rin g  in h e t discours nodig , m a a r  zijn  ook  
rad ica le  ve ran d e rin g en  n o o d zake lijk  in de a c to re n  en coalities, fo rm e le  en in fo rm e le  
regels en m id d e len  o f  m ach tsre la ties .
CONGRUENTIE
De tweede aanvulling op de beleidsarrangementenbenadering is het begrip 
congruentie en het onderscheid tussen stra teg isch e , s tru c tu re e l-in te rn e  en 
s tru c tu re e l-e x te rn e  (in )c o n g ru e n tie . Dit is gebaseerd op het w erk van Boonstra (2004 ; 
2006 ). ‘Strategische congruentie’ is de mate waarin de actoren binnen het beleidsar­
rangement bij het inzetten van acties een beleidsdiscours en gezamenlijke belangen 
delen. Bij ‘structureel-interne congruentie’ gaat het om de vraag in hoeverre de (vier) 
dimensies van het beleidsarrangement (actoren en coalities, middelen, regels en 
discoursen) congruent zijn. Bij ‘structureel-externe congruentie’ gaat het om de 
mate waarin het beleidsarrangement in zijn geheel past bij de bredere (nationale) 
institutionele omgeving, buiten het beleidsarrangement om.
Boonstra (2004 ) concludeert dat voor de totstandkom ing en institutionalisering van 
een nieuw beleidsarrangement alle drie de typen congruentie noodzakelijk zijn. De 
veronderstelling is dat het voor het bereiken van een radicale beleidsverandering 
niet alleen nodig is dat er in alle dimensies van het beleidsarrangement
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veranderingen zijn en dat alle actoren het nieuwe discours delen. Maar ook dat, voor 
zover de bredere nationale institutionele context hiermee incongruent is, ook die 
m oet veranderen -  zodat het arrangement ook structureel-extern congruent is. 
Wanneer de verandering in een van de dimensies marginaal is en geen o f weinig stra­
tegische en/of structureel-interne en/of structureel-externe incongruentie 
veroorzaakt, kan deze verandering gemakkelijk worden geabsorbeerd door de 
andere dimensies van het beleidsarrangement. In dat geval kan een nieuwe variatie 
van het bestaande beleidsarrangement ontstaan, w at resulteert in een conservatieve 
beleidsverandering. Die kan alleen ontstaan als de bredere externe institutionele 
context, waarmee het beleidsarrangement in overeenstemming was, onveranderd 
b lijft. Wanneer de verandering in een van de dimensies g root is en -  ongeacht de 
strategische en de structureel-interne incongruentie -  niet past bij de externe institu­
tionele context, ontstaat een spanning met deze context. Een verandering hierin zal 
nodig zijn om de structureel-externe congruentie, die nodig is voor het ontstaan van 
een radicaal nieuw beleidsarrangement, te  herstellen.
De tweede hypothese lu idt dan ook als volgt: O m  een rad ica le  b e le id sve ran d e rin g  te  
realiseren , is een rad ica le  ve ra n d e rin g  in d e  e x te rn e  n a tio n a le  in s titu tio n e le  c o n te x t 
nodig.
RUIMTELIJKE CONFIGURATIE
De derde aanvulling op de beleidsarrangementenbenadering is de lokale ruimtelijke 
configuratie. Het belang hiervan is ook erkend door anderen (onder wie Mol), die 
stellen dat de specifieke kenmerken van een bepaald beleidsdomein in deze benade­
ring onvoldoende aan bod komen. Het belang van deze specifieke kenmerken -  in dit 
onderzoek de ruimtelijke configuratie -  voor de verklaring van de lokale ruimtelijke 
beleidsreacties, w o rd t ook onderkend in de literatuur over demografische krimp en 
beleid (zie hoofdstuk 3 ).
Verondersteld w ord t dat deze ruim telijke kenmerken, zoals de mate van concentra­
tie  van de minst aantrekkelijke delen van de woningvoorraad, winkelgebieden, 
bedrijventerreinen en kantoorlocaties en het eigendom ervan, de ruimtelijke 
gevolgen van demografische krimp beïnvloeden en daarmee de perceptie van de 
aard van het probleem (discours) en de beleidsreacties van actoren.
De derde hypothese is dan ook: Een rad ica le  v e ra n d e rin g  in een van de v ie r dim ensies  
van h e t b e le id s a rra n g e m e n t zal a lleen  p laa ts v in d en  als de ru im te lijk e  co n fig u ra tie  dus­
d a n ig  is d a t d e  dem o grafische  krim p  du id e lijk  z ic h tb a a r w o rd t in de fys ieke  om geving.
370
ASPECTEN VAN DEMOGRAFISCHE KRIMP
Tot slot zijn aan het conceptuele model kenmerken toegevoegd van de demo­
grafische krimp, de onafhankelijke variabele in deze studie. Deze aanvulling is 
gebaseerd op het w erk van Liefferink (2006 ), W iering en Crabbé (2006 ), Van Dam 
et al. (2006 ), Glock (2006 ), Beauregard (2008), Rotmans (2005) en Rotmans et 
al.(200 i) . Deze onderzoekers onderkennen dat beleidsarrangementen o f beleids­
reacties worden beïnvloed door de omvang en duur van de problemen waarop het 
beleid een reactie is. Deze aspecten van demografische krimp kunnen de omvang 
van de verandering in de dimensies van het beleidsarrangement beïnvloeden.
Onder omvang van demografische krimp w o rd t de (procentuele) afname verstaan 
van de bevolkingsomvang, het aantal huishoudens en omvang van de potentiële 
beroepsbevolking in een bepaalde periode. Onder de duur van demografische krimp 
w ord t verstaan de periode (u itgedrukt in jaren) tussen nu en het jaartal waarin de 
regio voor het eerst werd geconfronteerd m et een o f meerdere vormen van krimp 
(omslagpunt).
Verondersteld w ord t dat hoe omvangrijker en langduriger de demografische krimp 
is, hoe waarschijnlijker een radicale verandering in de ‘discours’-dimensie is, w at kan 
leiden to t  een radicale beleidsverandering. Ook kan een omvangrijke en langdurige 
demografische krimp grote  veranderingen in de fysieke omgeving veroorzaken, 
waarop het bestaande beleidsarrangement geen passend antwoord heeft; ook dit 
kan de oorzaak van een radicale verandering van de probleemperceptie zijn. Dit kan 
op zijn beurt weer resulteren in een nieuw idee over de aard van het probleem en to t 
een radicale beleidsverandering leiden.
De vierde hypothese lu idt dan ook als volgt: Een o m va n g rijk e  en lan g d u rig e  d e m o ­
g rafisch e krim p  g a a t a lt ijd  v o o ra f aan  een rad ica le  be le id sveran derin g .
DE BEVINDINGEN TEGENOVER DE HYPOTHESEN
1 ) O m  een rad ica le  be le id sve ran d e rin g  te  realiseren , is n ie t a lleen  een rad ica le  ve ran ­
d e rin g  in h e t discours nodig , m a a r zijn o o k  rad ica le  ve ran d e rin g en  n o o d zake lijk  in de 
a c to re n  en coalities, fo rm e le  en in fo rm e le  regels en m idd e len /m a ch ts re la ties .
Lokale overheden die m et demografische krimp te  maken krijgen, veranderen hun 
beleid niet o f formuleren conservatieve eerder dan radicale beleidsveranderingen.
De meeste van deze veranderingen zijn eerder in strategische plannen terug te 
vinden dan in operationele plannen en handelingen. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat
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demografische krimp aanvankelijk le idt to t geen o f een marginale verandering van 
de probleemperceptie (het discours). Lokale bestuurders percipiëren demografische 
krimp niet als een probleem o f zien dat als een tijde lijk  (en omkeerbaar) probleem. 
Zulke veranderingen in het discours zijn re latie f eenvoudig te bereiken, omdat ze 
overeenkomen m et de huidige handelingspatronen, de huidige middelen en huidige 
regels van de actoren en coalities actief in de krimpregio. Die zijn namelijk alle gericht 
op het accommoderen van groei (strategische en structureel-intern congruentie).
Deze studie laat ook zien dat zich ondanks het fe it dat niet alle dimensies van het 
beleidsarrangement radicaal zijn veranderd, toch radicale veranderingen in 
strategische plannen hebben voorgedaan. Deze bevindingen tonen aan dat de eerste 
hypothese wel geldt voor radicale operationele beleidsveranderingen (en waar­
schijnlijk ook voor radicale veranderingen in handelingen), maar niet voor radicale 
strategische beleidsveranderingen. Voor dat laatste is een radicale verandering van 
een van de dimensies van het beleidsarrangement voldoende, zolang er strategische 
congruentie is. M et andere woorden: wanneer een meerderheid van de actoren 
de nieuwe probleemperceptie (het discours) delen dat demografische krimp een 
structureel probleem is, kan een radicale verandering van strategisch beleid w or­
den bereikt. Voor een radicale verandering in operationele plannen o f handelingen 
daarentegen, moeten alle interne dimensies van het beleidsarrangement (discours, 
actoren en coalities, middelen en regels) radicaal veranderen. De vraag hierbij is wel 
hoe radicaal de radicale veranderingen in strategische plannen daadwerkelijk zijn. Zo 
kan in strategische plannen de intentie worden geformuleerd om de woningbouw- 
plannen te reduceren, w at kan worden gezien als een radicale beleidsverandering, 
maar d it is nog geen garantie dat d it ook daadwerkelijk zal gebeuren.
2) O m  een rad ica le  b e le id sve ran d e rin g  te  realiseren, is een rad ica le  v e ra n d e rin g  in de 
e x te rn e  n a tio n a le  in s titu tio n e le  c o n te x t nodig.
Een andere verklaring waarom lokale overheden die m et demografische krimp te 
maken krijgen vaak niet meer dan conservatieve beleidsveranderingen formuleren, is 
dat de marginale verandering in de probleemperceptie aansluit bij de bredere natio­
nale institutionele context, die eveneens is gericht op het accommoderen van groei. 
Hierdoor is er structureel-externe congruentie.
Toch gaat de tweede hypothese niet op voor alle type radicale beleidsveranderingen. 
Deze hypothese w o rd t bevestigd voor radicale veranderingen in operationeel beleid 
en in handelingen, maar niet voor radicale strategische beleidsveranderingen. Deze 
studie to o n t dat zelfs wanneer de dimensies van het beleidsarrangement niet in 
overeenstemming zijn m et de bredere nationale institutionele context (die vooral is
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gericht op het accommoderen van groei), radicale strategische beleidsveranderingen 
toch optreden. Structureel-externe congruentie is kennelijk noodzakelijk om radicale 
beleidsveranderingen in operationele plannen en handelingen te bereiken, maar 
niet om to t radicale veranderingen in strategische plannen te komen. Mede hierom 
komen radicale veranderingen in operationele plannen nauwelijks van de grond: 
de bredere nationale institutionele context bij krimp verandert namelijk niet snel. 
Bovendien hebben lokale overheden daar geen invloed op. Ook hier kan de vraag 
worden gesteld hoe radicaal de radicale veranderingen in strategische plannen daad­
w erkelijk zijn. Wanneer zij binnen de institutionele context plaats kunnen vinden, zijn 
ze blijkbaar niet onacceptabel incongruent.
3 ) Een rad ica le  ve ra n d e rin g  in een van d e  v ie r d im ensies van h e t b e le id sarra n g em e n t 
za l a lleen  p laa tsv in d en  als de ru im te lijk e  c o n fig u ra tie  d u sd an ig  is d a t de dem o grafische  
k rim p  du id e lijk  z ic h tb a a r w o rd t in de fys ieke om geving.
Deze hypothese w o rd t ondersteund door de bevindingen over het beleid voor 
w oningbouw  en economie, en specifiek door de bevindingen over het strategisch en 
operationeel beleid op deze terreinen.
Deze studie laat zien dat bij een concentratie van de minst aantrekkelijke woningen, 
winkels, bedrijventerreinen en kantoren en bij verhuur de gevolgen van demogra­
fische krimp zichtbaarder zijn (bijvoorbeeld vanwege de hoge leegstandspercen- 
tages). Dit veroorzaakt een radicale verandering in de probleemperceptie (het 
discours), w at to t een radicale beleidsverandering kan leiden. Dit geldt echter niet 
voor het regionale schaalniveau. Daarvoor geldt dat concentratie van de minst 
aantrekkelijke delen van de woningvoorraad in één gemeente het formuleren van 
een radicale beleidsverandering op regionaal niveau bemoeilijkt. De bestuurders van 
de betreffende gemeente ervaren de demografische krimp weliswaar als structureel 
probleem, maar bij de andere gemeenten, die de gevolgen van de krimp nog niet 
ervaren, zal deze probleemperceptie nog niet zijn geaccepteerd. Bijgevolg zullen zij 
niet bereid zijn to t  radicale beleidsveranderingen van het regionale beleid. De studie 
laat ook zien dat een duidelijke ruim telijke hiërarchie de form ulering van een radicale 
beleidsverandering op regionaal niveau stimuleert. Wanneer gemeenten het met 
elkaar eens zijn welke gemeente het centrum van de regio is, dan is het makkelijker 
m et elkaar overeenstemming te  bereiken, bijvoorbeeld over de vraag hoeveel nieuw- 
bouwplannen elke gemeente moet schrappen.
Overheden in de krim pregio’s besteden in hun economisch beleid weinig to t 
nauwelijks aandacht aan demografische krimp en de mogelijke economische 
gevolgen daarvan; d it in tegenstelling to t het woningbouwbeleid, waar
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demografische krimp steeds meer aandacht genereert. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat 
de ruimtelijke gevolgen van demografische krimp voor de economie minder 
zichtbaar zijn.
4 ) Een o m va n g rijk e  en lan g d u rig e  dem o grafische  k rim p  g a a t a lt ijd  v o o ra f aan een  
rad ica le  b e le id sveran d erin g
Deze hypothese w o rd t bevestigd door de bevindingen over de woningbouw, maar 
niet door die over de economie.
De studie laat zien dat beleidsveranderingen zich het eerst en het meest voordoen in 
de gemeenten waar de demografische krimp qua omvang het hevigst is en zich het 
langst voordoet. Radicale veranderingen in het woningbouwbeleid komen vooral 
voor in Parkstad Limburg en de Eemsdelta, waar de afname in het aantal huishou­
dens in vergelijking m et de rest van Nederland g roo t is en de krimp zich het eerst 
voordeed. In Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, waar de demografische krimp vooralsnog minder 
omvangrijk is en het aantal huishoudens nog niet afneemt, worden op het terrein 
van w oningbouw  nauwelijks radicale beleidsveranderingen doorgevoerd.
De omvang en duur van demografische krimp blijken voor de verklaring van de 
beleidsreacties op het economisch terrein m inder relevant te  zijn. De lokale over­
heden besteden op d it beleidsterrein nauwelijks aandacht aan demografische krimp. 
De overheden die dat wel doen, zijn niet zozeer afkomstig uit de regio’s waar de 
krimp van de potentië le beroepsbevolking zich het eerst voordeed o f waar deze 
krimp het omvangrijkst is. Dit verschil tussen de beleidsreacties bij w oningbouw  en 
bij eco­
nomie kan het gevolg zijn van het fe it dat de relatie tussen demografie en economie 
complexer is dan die tussen demografie en woningbouw. Een uitzondering vormen 
de beleidsveranderingen ten aanzien van de detailhandel. In Delfzijl en de rest van de 
Eemsdelta, de regio waar de huishoudensdaling omvangrijk was en al lang gaande is, 
is d it beleid radicaal veranderd.
REFLECTIE
Het voor deze studie ontw ikkelde conceptuele model, waarin de beleids- 
arrangementenbenadering m et enkele aanvullingen daarop centraal staat, b lijk t op 
het terrein van w oningbouw  en economie bruikbaar te  zijn voor het verklaren van 
beleidsveranderingen ten aanzien van demografische krimp. Wel kom t uit het onder­
zoek naar voren dat de hypotheses op sommigen punten aanscherping verdienen.
De omstandigheden die bepalen o f demografische krimp al dan niet to t  een
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beleidsverandering leidt, en zo ja to t w elk type beleidsverandering, blijken namelijk 
per schaalniveau, per type plan (strategisch-operationeel) en per type beleids­
verandering (radicaal en conservatief) te  verschillen.
Het conceptuele model is ook bruikbaar voor lokale overheden die m et demo­
grafische krimp te  maken hebben. Het geeft inzicht in de uitvoeringsproblemen en 
oplossingsrichtingen voor het realiseren van radicale beleidsveranderingen. Het kan 
ook relevant zijn voor de nationale overheid, omdat het inzicht biedt in hoe zij lokale 
overheden kunnen helpen hun beleid daarop aan te passen en de voorwaarden te 
formuleren die daarvoor nodig zijn. Meer inform atie over de beleidsaanbevelingen 
die op basis van deze studie kunnen worden gedaan, is te  vinden in de publicatie Van  
be s trijd en  n a a r bege le iden  van Verwest en Van Dam (2010b).
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OVER THE PAST DECADES, THE POPULATION OF THE NETHERLANDS, AS A WHOLE, HAS GROWN. RECENTLY, 
HOWEVER, SOME DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES HAVE STARTED TO DECLINE. ACCORDING TO THE REGIONAL 
POPULATION PROJECTIONS, MORE MUNICIPALITIES WILL FOLLOW. THAT DECLINE IN TOTAL POPULATION 
GIVES RISE TO A DECLINE IN HOUSEHOLD NUMBERS AND IN WORKING AGE POPULATION.
THIS STUDY SEEKS TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: HOW DO LOCAL GOV­
ERNMENTS REACT TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE, AND UNDER WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES DO THEY ADAPT 
THEIR POLICIES TO IT? IN ORDER TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION, THREE SHRINKING REGIONS HAVE BEEN 
INVESTIGATED - PARKSTAD LIMBURG, THE EEMSDELTA, AND ZEEUWS-VLAANDEREN -  USING THE POLICY 
ARRANGEMENT APPROACH. THIS STUDY PRESENTS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REACTIONS IN THESE THREE 
DUTCH SHRINKING REGIONS IN THE FIELD OF HOUSING AND THE ECONOMY, AND THE CONDITIONS THAT
INFLUENCE THOSE POLICY REACTIONS.
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IN OTHER REGIONS THAT ARE SHRINKING OR ARE EXPECTED TO SHRINK. THE STUDY ALSO COULD BE 
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TO ANTICIPATE AND DEAL WITH THIS DECLINE.
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